







LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS 



JZ 6374 
. U554 
1994 
Copy 1 


UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 


LESSONS LEARNED 


A Study Prepared by the 

Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under an Interagency Agreement with the 
Joint Staff J-8, Politico-Military Assessment 
The Pentagon 

Washington , DC 20318-5126 


March 31, 1994 


Project manager: Joshua Sinai 


Authors: 


Peter Blood 


Boris Boguslavsky 
Boris Bohun-Chudyniv 
Serge Demidenko 
Helen Fedor 
Carolyn Jefferson 


Amy Knight 
Ramon Miro 
Joshua Sinai 
Eric Solsten 


Editors: 


Marilyn Majeska 
Helen Metz 


Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-5224 




/A r~ 


C\/ 




Dear Reader: 


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Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540 






PREFACE 


This study was undertaken to support the work of the 
Politico-Military Assessment Branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
in formulating lessons from United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping 
operations for current and future applications. The project 
consists of a series of chapters, one chapter per operation, 
providing a concise compilation of facts, background, and 
analysis for the selected U.N. peacekeeping operations, in 
addition to two non-U.N. peacekeeping operations in the cases of 
Northern Ireland and Liberia. A three-part format is used to 
structure each chapter: the predeployment of forces (the initial 
crisis, the U.N. response, and the adoption of the U.N. 
resolution); the deployment of forces (the military and political 
goals, rules of engagement, composition of forces, equipment, 
tactics, training, costs, and the operational assessment of the 
mission); and the current situation (the mission's status quo). 
Each chapter is introduced by a selected chronology. A concluding 
section examines the particular mission's effectiveness at 
meeting its political and military goals. The study's concluding 
chapter assesses the overall nature of U.N. peacekeeping 
operations, including proposals for new roles and missions as 
well as possible deployments in new trouble spots. 


1 




















































































CONTENTS 


PREFACE . i 

INTRODUCTION . XV 

Amy Knight 

EUROPE 

1. UNITED NATION PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP) . . . 1 

Eric Solsten 

Selected Chronology . 1 

INTRODUCTION . 3 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 4 

The Initial Crisis . 4 

The U.N. Response.6 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution . 6 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 7 

Political and Military Goals . 8 

Rules of Engagement.9 

Composition of Forces . 9 

Equipment.10 

Training.10 

Tactics.12 

Cost.14 

Operational Assessment . 15 

CURRENT SITUATION . 17 

CONCLUSION.18 

2. UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR) . 25 

Boris Bohun-Chudynv 

Selected Chronology . 25 

INTRODUCTION . 28 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 29 

The Initial Crisis.29 

The U.N. Response.31 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.32 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 34 

Political and Military Goals . 35 

Rules of Engagement.3 6 

Composition of Forces . 37 

Equipment.3 9 

Training.40 

Tactics.40 

Cost.41 

Operational Assessment . 41 

iii 





































CURRENT SITUATION . 47 

CONCLUSION.4 9 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

3. UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO) . 58 

Joshua Sinai 

Selected Chronology . 58 

INTRODUCTION . 62 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 62 

The Initial Crisis. 62 

The U.N. Response.63 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 71 

Political and Military Goals . 74 

Rules of Engagement.74 

Composition of Forces . 75 

Equipment.7 6 

Training.76 

Tactics.76 

Cost.7 6 

Operational Assessment . 76 

CURRENT SITUATION . 80 

CONCLUSION.81 

4. FIRST UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I) . 87 

Joshua Sinai 

INTRODUCTION . 88 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 88 

The Initial Crisis.88 

The U.N. Response.90 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.90 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 90 

Political and Military Goals.91 

Rules of Engagement.91 

Composition of Forces . 92 

Equipment.9 3 

Training.93 

Tactics.93 

Cost.93 

Operational Assessment . 94 

CURRENT SITUATION . 95 

CONCLUSION.96 

5. SECOND UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II) .... 100 

Joshua Sinai 

INTRODUCTION . 101 


IV 






































PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 101 

The Initial Crisis.101 

The U.N. Response.102 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.103 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 103 

Political and Military Goals . 103 

Rules of Engagement.104 

Composition of Forces . 104 

Equipment.106 

Training.106 

Tactics.106 

Cost.107 

Operational Assessment . 107 

CURRENT SITUATION . 108 

CONCLUSION.109 

6. UNITED NATIONS YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION (UNYOM) .... 114 

Joshua Sinai 

Selected Chronology . 114 

INTRODUCTION . 116 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 116 

The Initial Crisis.116 

The U.N. Response. 118 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.119 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 119 

Political and Military Goals . 119 

Rules of Engagement.120 

Composition of Forces . 120 

Equipment.121 

Training.121 

Tactics.122 

Cost.122 

Operational Assessment . 122 

CURRENT SITUATION ... 124 

CONCLUSION.125 

7. UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF) . .131 

Joshua Sinai 

INTRODUCTION . 132 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 132 

The Initial Crisis.132 

The U.N. Response.132 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 133 

Political and Military Goals.134 

Rules of Engagement.135 

Composition of Forces . 135 

Equipment.135 

Training.136 


v 












































Tactics.136 

Cost.136 

Operational Assessment . 136 

CURRENT SITUATION . 138 

CONCLUSION.13 8 

8. UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL) .... 143 

Helen Fedor 

Selected Chronology . 143 

INTRODUCTION . 145 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 145 

The Initial Crisis. 145 

The U.N. Response. 147 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 148 

Political and Military Goals . 148 

Rules of Engagement.149 

Composition of Forces . 150 

Training.151 

Equipment.151 

Tactics.151 

Cost.152 

Operational Assessment . 152 

CURRENT SITUATION . 154 

CONCLUSION.155 

9. UNITED NATIONS IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER 

GROUP (UNIIMOG) .161 

Joshua Sinai 

Selected Chronology . 161 

INTRODUCTION . 163 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 163 

The Initial Crisis.163 

The U.N. Response.164 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.165 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 165 

Political and Military Goals . 166 

Rules of Engagement.166 

Composition of Forces . 166 

Training.167 

Equipment.167 

Tactics.168 

Cost.168 

Operational Assessment . 168 

CURRENT SITUATION . 170 

CONCLUSION.171 

10. UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION (UNIKOM) 176 


vi 









































Joshua Sinai 


Selected Chronology . 176 

INTRODUCTION . 177 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 177 

The Initial Crisis.177 

The U.N. Response.178 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution. 179 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 179 

Political and Military Goals . 180 

Rules of Engagement.18 0 

Composition of Forces . 180 

Equipment.181 

Training. 181 

Tactics.181 

Cost.181 

Operational Assessment . 182 

CURRENT SITUATION . 183 

CONCLUSION.184 

AFRICA 

11. UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC) . 189 

Boris W. Boguslavsky 

Selected Chronology . 189 

INTRODUCTION . 191 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 192 

The Initial Crisis.192 

The U.N. Response.193 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.194 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES. 194 

Political and Military Goals . 194 

Rules of Engagement. 195 

Composition of Forces . 196 

Equipment.196 

Training.196 

Tactics.197 

Cost.197 

Operational Assessment . 197 

CURRENT SITUATION . 201 

CONCLUSION.2 02 

12. UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION I (UNAVEM I) 208 

Ramon J. Miro 

Selected Chronology . 208 

INTRODUCTION . 210 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 211 

vii 








































The Initial Crisis.211 

The U.N. Response.214 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 215 

Political and Military Goals . 215 

Rules of Engagement.216 

Composition of Forces . 216 

Equipment.216 

Training.217 

Tactics.217 

Cost.217 

Operational Assessment . 218 

CURRENT SITUATION . 218 

CONCLUSION.219 

13. SECOND UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II 

(UNAVEM II).224 

Ramon J. Miro 

Selected Chronology . 224 

INTRODUCTION . 226 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 227 

The Initial Crisis.227 

The U.N. Response.228 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 229 

Political and Military Goals . 230 

Rules of Engagement.230 

Composition of Forces . 231 

Equipment.231 

Training.232 

Tactics.232 

Cost.232 

Operational Assessment . 232 

CURRENT SITUATION . 235 

CONCLUSION.237 


14. UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG) . . . 244 

Peter Blood 


Selected Chronology . 244 

INTRODUCTION . 248 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 248 

The Initial Crisis.248 

The U.N. Response.250 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.250 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 251 

Political and Military Goals . 252 

Rules of Engagement.253 

Composition of Forces . 253 

Equipment.2 54 

Training.254 


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Tactics.255 

Cost.255 

Operational Assessment . 255 

CURRENT SITUATION . 256 

CONCLUSION.256 

15. UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN 

SAHARA (MINURSO) . 261 

Carolyn M. Jefferson 

Selected Chronology . 261 

INTRODUCTION . 264 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 264 

The Initial Crisis.264 

The U. N. Response.266 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 267 

Political and Military Goals. 267 

Rules of Engagement.268 

Composition of Forces . 268 

Equipment.2 68 

Training.269 

Tactics.269 

Cost.269 

Operational Assessment . 270 

CURRENT SITUATION . 272 

CONCLUSION.272 

16. UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM) . 279 


Amy Knight 

. 279 
. 281 
. 281 
. 281 
. 283 
. 284 
. 287 
. 287 
. 287 
. 287 
. 288 
. 288 
. 288 
. 289 
. 289 
. 290 
. 290 
. 291 
. 291 
. 291 


Selected Chronology . 

INTRODUCTION . 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 

The Initial Crisis . 

The U.N. Response . 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 

Political and Military Goals 
Rules of Engagement . . . . 
Composition of Forces . . . 

Equipment . 

Training . 

Tactics . 

Cost. 

Operational Assessment . . . 

UNOSOM II . 

The Initial Crisis . . . . 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 

Political and Military Goals 


IX 













































Rules of Engagement.292 

Composition of Forces . 292 

Equipment.293 

Training.293 

Tactics.293 

Cost.294 

Operational Assessment . 294 

CURRENT SITUATION . 296 

CONCLUSION.297 


17. UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ) . . . .302 

Carolyn M. Jefferson 


Selected Chronology . 302 

INTRODUCTION . 304 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 304 

The Initial Crisis.304 

The U.N. Response.305 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.305 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 306 

Political and Military Goals . 306 

Rules of Engagement.3 07 

Composition of Forces . 307 

Equipment.3 08 

Training.308 

Tactics.308 

Cost.309 

Operational Assessment . 309 

CURRENT SITUATION . 312 

CONCLUSION.313 


18. UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (UNOMSA) 318 

Amy Knight 


Selected Chronology . 318 

INTRODUCTION . 319 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 319 

The Initial Crisis.319 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.320 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 322 

Political and Military Goals . 323 

Rules of Engagement.323 

Composition of Forces . 323 

Equipment.324 

Training.324 

Tactics.324 

Cost.325 

Operational Assessment . 325 

CURRENT SITUATION . 325 

CONCLUSION.326 


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19. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA 

AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP) .330 

Peter Blood 

Selected Chronology . 330 

INTRODUCTION . 332 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 334 

The Initial Crisis.334 

The U.N. Response.336 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.337 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 338 

Political and Military Goals . 338 

Rules of Engagement.340 

Composition of Forces . 341 

Equipment.341 

Tactics.342 

Cost.342 

Operational Assessment . 342 

CURRENT SITUATION . 344 

CONCLUSION.345 

20. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY FORCE IN WEST NEW GUINEA 

(WEST IRIAN) (UNSF) .352 

Serge Demidenko 

Selected Chronology . 352 

INTRODUCTION . 356 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 358 

The Initial Crisis.358 

The U.N. Response.360 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.361 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 362 

Political and Military Goals . 362 

Rules of Engagement.3 63 

Composition of Forces . 363 

Equipment.3 64 

Training.365 

Tactics.365 

Cost.366 

Operational Assessment . 366 

CONCLUSION.368 

21. UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA 

(UNTAC) .374 


Peter Blood 


Selected Chronology . 


374 






































INTRODUCTION . 376 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 377 

The Initial Crisis.377 

The U.N. Response.378 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution.379 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 380 

Political and Military Goals . 381 

Rules of Engagement.3 82 

Composition of Forces . 383 

Equipment.383 

Training.383 

Tactics.383 

Cost.383 

Operational Assessment . 385 

CURRENT SITUATION . 386 

CONCLUSION.388 

CENTRAL AMERICA 

22. UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA (ONUCA) 393 

Ramon J. Miro 

Selected Chronology . 393 

INTRODUCTION . 395 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 396 

The Initial Crisis.396 

The Central American Peace Process . 397 

The U.N. Response.399 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 402 

Political and Military Goals . 402 

Rules of Engagement.4 04 

Composition of Forces . 404 

Equipment.4 05 

Training.405 

Tactics.406 

Cost.406 

Operational Assessment . 406 

CURRENT SITUATION . 409 

CONCLUSION.409 

23. UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL) 415 

Ramon J. Miro 

Selected Chronology . 415 

INTRODUCTION . 418 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 419 

The Initial Crisis.419 

The U.N. Response.422 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 424 


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Political and Military Goals . 425 

Rules of Engagement.425 

Composition of Forces . 426 

Equipment.426 

Training.427 

Tactics.427 

Cost.428 

Operational Assessment . 428 

CURRENT SITUATION . 430 

CONCLUSION.430 

24. UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH) .... 436 

Ramon J. Miro 

Selected Chronology . 436 

INTRODUCTION . 438 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 439 

The Initial Crisis.439 

The OAS Response.443 

The U.N. Response.444 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 446 

Political and Military Goals . 446 

Rules of Engagement.447 

Composition of Forces . 448 

Equipment.448 

Training.448 

Tactics.448 

Cost.449 

Operational Assessment . 449 

CURRENT SITUATION . 450 

CONCLUSION.451 

NON-U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

25. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 

MONITORING GROUP IN LIBERIA (ECOMOG) . 457 

Ramon J. Miro 

Selected Chronology . 457 

INTRODUCTION . 459 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 460 

The Initial Crisis.460 

The ECOWAS Response.461 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 462 

Political and Military Goals . 466 

Rules of Engagement.4 67 

Composition of Forces . 467 

Equipment.468 

Training.468 

Tactics.468 

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Cost.469 

Operational Assessment . 469 

CURRENT SITUATION . 471 

CONCLUSION.472 

26. BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN NORTHERN IRELAND . 477 

Joshua Sinai 

Selected Chronology . 477 

INTRODUCTION . 478 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 479 

The Initial Crisis.479 

The British Response. 480 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES . 480 

Political and Military Goals . 481 

Rules of Engagement.482 

Composition of Forces . 482 

Equipment.483 

Training.484 

Tactics.485 

Cost.485 

Operational Assessment . 485 

CURRENT SITUATION . 487 

CONCLUSION.488 

CONCLUSION.492 

Amy Knight 


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INTRODUCTION 


The purpose of this study is to assess the overall 
effectiveness of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions by 
examining the performance of these operations on a case-by-case 
basis. After describing the initial crisis that gave rise to a 
U.N. response in each situation, the study goes on to examine the 
circumstances of the deployment, political and military goals, 
rules of engagement, composition of forces, equipment, training, 
tactics, and cost of these missions. It then considers the 
effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations in achieving the 
U.N.'s objectives. Altogether, the study analyzes 24 U.N. 
operations, beginning with the first peacekeeping mission, the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 
Palestine, in 1948. For comparison purposes, two other cases of 
non-U.N. peacekeeping or counterinsurgency operations are also 
examined: the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG) and the British 
counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland. 

Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is mandated to 
determine when a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of 
aggression has occurred in a given situation and to authorize the 
appropriate U.N. response. Chapter VII of the charter provides 
that the Security Council can order the use of armed forces, but 
it requires the unanimous agreement of all members of the 
council, a condition that has not been met during most of the 


xv 


U.N.'s history. As conflicts arose in various parts of the wor_ 
and ways had to be found to respond to these conflicts, the U. 
developed the practice of employing peacekeeping operations, 
which evolved on an ad-hoc basis, primarily as holding action: 

Peacekeeping operations have been used to supervise and 
maintain cease-fires, to provide a buffer between opposing 
forces, to prevent the presence of arms in an area, or to 
maintain and patrol a border. Peacekeeping operations never he 
a purely military function, but also include political or 
administrative roles. In certain cases, they even perform 
humanitarian assistance functions or supervise elections. In en 
specific case, the Security Council sets forth the function i: 
its resolution creating the mission. 1 

There are two kinds of U.N. peacekeeping operations: 
observer missions, of the type created in the 1940s, and 
peacekeeping forces. The first mission officially defined as 
"peacekeeping" was established in 1956, following the Suez 
crisis. The U.N. General Assembly authorized the first force- 
level operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to serve as 
buffer between Egypt and Israel in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsu_ 
Whereas observer missions are unarmed, requiring little equips 
and staff, peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and are larc: 
in terms of personnel, equipment, and cost. As of September lr 
a total of 28 U.N. peacekeeping operations had been establism 
Of these 18 were still continuing as of October 1993. 2 

U.N. peacekeeping missions have been based on a broad 


xvi 


of consensus on several basic principles. First, the consent of 
the host government or governments is obtained before the 
establishment of a mission. Such consent involves an agreement on 
the way in which the U.N. mission proposes to carry out its 
mandate. Second, the parties involved are consulted on the 
countries that are designated to contribute troops to the 
operation. Permanent members of the Security Council (China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) do not 
usually provide military components, although there have been 
important exceptions. 

A third, key principle has been the principle of 
impartiality, which is seen as fundamental for the success of a 
U.N. mission. The participants in an operation should avoid 
actions that favor one party against the other and must not 
interfere in the internal affairs of host countries. They should 
also avoid the use of armed force to carry out their mandate. 
Traditionally, troops in peacekeeping operations (aside from 
observer missions) are provided with weapons of a defensive 
character only and should not use these weapons except in self- 
defense. For their part, the parties to the conflict should allow 
the mission unrestricted access and freedom of movement within 
the countries of operation. 

Until recently, these principles have usually been adhered 
to by the U.N. and the host countries. With the ongoing U.N. 
mission to Somalia, however, the U.N. broke with past practice. 
Not only has the peacekeeping mission used armed force, but it 

xvii 


has also taken sides in the political conflict within Somalia - 
for the Somalis, their armed tribes have attacked U.N. forces - 
the country with increasing ferocity. A key question, then, i. 
whether missions like the one in Somalia can achieve peacekeear 
objectives efficiently and effectively, or whether developmer.- 
there represent a change to the detriment of the overall goal, 
and purpose of the U.N. 3 

During the years of the Cold War, East-West relations 
dominated international military affairs, relegating the U.N. 
the periphery. U.N. involvement was limited to special situates 
in which U.N. peacekeeping troops were called in to monitor 
cease-fires (in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel 
for example) or to help preserve law and order (in the Congo, 
1960-64, and in Cyprus, until 1974, for example). The dramati 
changes that have taken place in the world over the past few 
years have caused the peacekeeping role of the U.N. to become 
more prominent. Although the prospect of a global war has 
declined, regional conflicts have escalated tremendously, anc . 
response, the U.N. has become involved in a wide array of 
peacekeeping operations. Significantly, 13 U.N. missions were 
begun between 1988 and 1992, which is equal to the number 
undertaken in the previous 40 years of the U.N.'s existence." 

In contrast with missions in the past, these new operatir 
typically have more ambitious mandates. Whereas peacekeeping 
operations used to be limited to conflict containment using 
third-party troops and observers, such operations may no lone: 


xviii 


be sufficient to achieve peacekeeping goals. The growing number 
of regional conflicts resulting from ethnic and religious 
rivalries have created new demands for U.N. peace missions. As 
the New York Times put it: "Deterrence kept the peace in Europe 
and transferred the burdens of hostility onto third-country 
proxies .... Now the United Nations is expected to cope with 
the legacies of all these conflicts, plus new ones popping in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union." 5 

Increasingly the U.N. has acted as the "midwife of political 
transitions," with nine of the missions undertaken since 1988 
involved in resolving internal political conflicts and 
establishing democratic regimes. 6 Now, in both Somalia and the 
former Yugoslavia, the U.N. is deeply entangled in conflicts over 
territory and politics. This fact has created pressure on the 
U.N. to move beyond peacekeeping and into the much more active 
intervention of "peace enforcement." 

A key question that arises is that of financing the growing 
number of U.N. operations. Financing for U.N. peacekeeping comes 
out of a special UN budget, to which each member state 
contributes, according to a special assessment based on gross 
national product. The United States currently pays 31.7 percent 
of the U.N.'s annual peacekeeping expenses. 7 Peacekeeping 
operations, some of which have been going on for decades, have 
become a source of soaring costs. Lack of oversight and budgetary 
control—resulting in waste, mismanagement, and even corruption— 
have contributed greatly to the problem. Finding sufficient funds 


xix 



will be a growing problem for worldwide peacekeeping operat 
If the U.N. expands its regular role from that of peacekeep 
peace enforcement, a vast rise in costs will result. Will er 
member states be willing to pay for such operations? 

Although the U.N. will probably remain the world's lea 
choice for conducting peacekeeping operations in the future 
is not clear that the U.N. can handle this growing load. Th. 
escalating number of U.N. peacekeeping operations has pushe: 
financial and personnel resources to the limit. In light of 
financial problems and the increasing pressure on the U.N. i 
expand its peacekeeping missions to include a greater militr: 
role, it will be essential for the U.N. to devise a long-ter 
strategy, based on broad consensus and workable principles. 
Part of this strategy, one would hope, will be based on the 
lessons learned from peacekeeping missions in the past. 


xx 


Endnotes 


1. Marjorie Ann Browne, United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical 
Overview and Current Issues (CRS Report for Congress.) 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
January 31, 1990.) 

2. Marjorie Ann Browne, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for 
Congress (CRS Issue Brief.) (Washington: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, July 20, 1993.) 

3. United States Institute of Peace, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping: Implications for the United States Military 

(Washington: May 1993.) 

4. William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case 
Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993), 9. 

5. New York Times . January 17, 1993, E3. 

6. Durch, ed., Evolution of UN Peacekeeping . 11. 

7. United States. Central Intelligence Agency, Director of 
Intelligence, Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations. 1993 
(Washington: May 1993) . 


xxi 













Bibliography 


Browne, Marjorie Ann. United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview 
and Current Issues . (CRS Report for Congress.) Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 31, 
1990. 

-. United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress . (CRS Issue 

Brief.) Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, July 20, 1993. 

Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies 
and Comparative Analysis . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

New York Times . January 17, 1993, E3. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Director of Intelligence. 
Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations. 1993 . Washington: May 1993. 

United States Institute of Peace. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: 

Implications for the United States Military . Washington: May 
1993 . 


xxii 













United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 


Selected Chronology 

1955 


The Greek Cypriots began a guerrilla-type rebellion against 
British rule in Cyprus. 

1959 


Agreements were signed by representatives of Britain, 
Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot ethnic 
communities for an independent Republic of Cyprus. Britain, 
Greece, and Turkey were granted certain intervention rights in 
the republic's affairs. 

1960 


The Republic of Cyprus was officially established on August 
16. The country was governed by a constitution that divided power 
between the majority Greek Cypriot and the minority Turkish 
Cypriot communities, and established an elaborate system of 
safeguards to protect the rights of the minority community. 

1963 


In December, intercommunal violence erupted between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. 

1964 


The year began with frequent incidents of intercommunal 
violence. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention 
was proposed, but was rejected by Cypriot President Makarios. 
United Nations (UN) intervention was accepted and the first 
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) troops 
arrived in March. Invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces was 
averted in June by U.S. diplomacy. By fall, peace was restored 
and UNFICYP began peacekeeping operations on the island. 

1967 


In November, intercommunal clashes left several dozen people 
dead, almost all of whom were Turkish Cypriots. Turkish pressure 
forced Greece to withdraw most of its troops from the island. 

U.S. diplomacy was instrumental in restoring peace. 

1968 


1 









After the violence of late 1967, a long period of peace 
began, with the UNFICYP defusing many threatening incidents. A 
long series of intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot leaders commenced. 

1970 


An assassination attempt against President Makarios by Greek 
and Greek Cypriot extremists failed. 

1974 


A coup d'etat staged by Greek Cypriot extremists and backed 
by the military junta in Athens deposed President Makarios on 
July 15. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus on July 20-22 with a 
force of 40,000 troops. A short truce was followed by a second 
Turkish campaign on August 14-16, that gave Turkey possession of 
about 37 percent of Cyprus. UNFICYP began the second stage of its 
Cypriot tour by patrolling the buffer area between the Turkish- 
held territory in the north and the Greek Cypriot-controlled 
south. 

1975 


Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish-controlled territory 
of Cyprus to be the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC). 

1977-79 

A number of agreements between Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot leaders were reached. 

1983 


In November, Turkish Cypriots established an independent 
state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). As of 
October 1993, only Turkey had recognized the TRNC. 

1992 


In November, after the failure of yet another round of U.N.- 
sponsored talks between the leaders of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot communities, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued 
a public reproof of the Turkish Cypriots for their intransigence. 
Denmark began the withdrawal of its troops from UNFICYP in 
December. 

1993 


In June, Canada began the withdrawal of its troops from 
UNFICYP. 


2 









INTRODUCTION 


Intercommunal violence erupted in Cyprus in December 1963 
after several years of mounting political tension. The tension 
grew out of disputes between the majority Greek Cypriot and the 
minority Turkish Cypriot ethnic communities about how the country 
was to be governed. At the time, the Greek Cypriots numbered 
approximately 80 percent of the population and the Turkish 
Cypriots 18 percent. 1 Violence quickly escalated, and after 
rejecting proposed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
intervention, the government of the Republic of Cyprus requested 
the detachment of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping troops. The 
first members of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) arrived in March 1964. This force eventually totalled 
some 6,400 troops and consisted of military and police personnel 
from nearly a dozen nations. The principal mission of UNFICYP was 
to prevent incidents of intercommunal violence on Cyprus. Because 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities were scattered 
throughout Cyprus, UNFICYP needed to patrol the entire island. 

UNFICYP's task was altered greatly in mid-1974 when Turkish 
forces invaded the island and succeeded in occupying 37 percent 
of it. As of October 1993, this territory was still under Turkish 
control. Since the beginning of this occupation, UNFICYP has been 
mainly concerned with patrolling a buffer zone that separates the 
area controlled by the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus from the 
Turkish-held area. As of October 1993, UNFICYP consisted of just 
under 1,000 soldiers. 


3 


This case study examines the situation in Cyprus that led to 
intercommunal violence in December 1963, the deployment of 
UNFICYP to help prevent further violence, the effectiveness of 
its deployment, and the current situation in light of the 
mission's initial goals. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The initial crisis that precipitated the deployment of 
UNFICYP to Cyprus in March 1964 grew out of the long-standing 
frustration of the Greek Cypriot community with the terms of the 
constitution of 1960 that established the independent Republic of 
Cyprus. In November 1963, the republic's president, the Greek 
Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III, published a list of proposed 
amendments to the constitution that would have reduced the 
disproportionate political powers it granted to the small Turkish 
Cypriot community (approximately 18 percent of the island's 
population). These powers protected the rights of the Turkish 
Cypriots, but prevented the much larger Greek Cypriot community 
(80 percent of the island's population) from governing Cyprus as 
it desired. Makarios's proposed constitutional amendments were 
quickly rejected by Turkish authorities and subsequently by 
leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community. 

The failed Greek Cypriot attempt to gain political dominance 
on the island intensified tensions that were already high after 
several years of frustrating efforts on the part of the two 
communities to work together within the constitutional framework. 


4 



In the view of some Greek Cypriots, not only the constitution but 
also the republic itself was at fault and both were to be 
discarded at the first opportunity. Radical Greek Cypriot 
elements—armed and organized—sought to realize the long- 
cherished dream held by many Greek Cypriots of uniting Cyprus 
with Greece. Turkish Cypriot resistance to this unification 
(enosis, in Greek) was to be crushed. The Turkish Cypriot 
community was aware of these sentiments and had armed itself. 

Greek and Turkish political and military meddling in Cypriot 
affairs contributed to tensions on the island. Both countries 
sought to protect the well-being of their Greek- or Turkish¬ 
speaking cousins on Cyprus. The agreements they had signed in 
1959 to establish the Republic of Cyprus gave them the right to 
intervene, and even to maintain troops on the island. Britain was 
also involved in the affairs of its former colony and had two 
substantial military bases there. All three countries had the 
right to restore by force the republic established in 1960 if 
they saw it being destroyed, together if possible, unilaterally 
if not. 

Given the accumulated tension in Cyprus in December 1963, 
once intercommunal violence began on December 21 it escalated 
quickly. Within days, atrocities were committed by both sides, 
and at least 500 people were killed. 2 British authorities soon 
declared that the British peackeeping force on the island was 
insufficient to restore order. A U.S. proposal that a NATO force 
be sent to Cyprus was rejected by Makarios, who insisted that the 


5 



U.N. deal with the situation. 3 
The U.N. Response 

On December 27, 1963, the U.N. Security Council convened to 
discuss ways of dealing with the outbreak of violence. Following 
a request by the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and 
Britain for the appointment of a special representative of the 
Secretary-General to observe the British peacekeeping operation 
in Cyprus, Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani, of India, went to 
Cyprus in mid-January to report on the mission's performance. 4 He 
reported that the situation was deteriorating, hostages were 
being killed, normal government rule was disappearing, and that 
there were fears that Greece and Turkey might invade the island 
to restore order. 5 After a request, on February 15, by British 
and Cypriot representatives for Security Council action, the 
Secretary-General appealed to all sides to exercise restraint, 
while continuing his efforts to form a U.N. peackeeping force. 6 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

After receiving Lieutenant General Gyani's reports, on March 
4, 1964 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186 
(1964), declaring that intercommunal violence on Cyprus 
threatened international peace and recommending the creation of 
the UNFICYP, with the Cypriot government's consent. 7 According to 
the terms of the resolution, the UNFICYP was to prevent the 
recurrence of violence, maintain and restore law and order, and 
bring about a return to "normal conditions." 8 The resolution 
called on U.N. members, the Government of Cyprus, and the local 


6 




communities to refrain from exacerbating the situation. 9 The 
resolution called on the Secretary-General, following 
consultation with representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, 
Britain, Greece, and Turkey, to determine UNFICYP's composition, 
size, leadership, function, duration, and budget. 10 The UNFICYP 
was to be an impartial military and police force with no 
responsibility for arranging a political solution to the 
crisis. 11 In addition to creating a peacekeeping force, the 
resolution mandated the appointment of a U.N. mediator to work 
for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. 12 

Once the force became operational, its mandate was to run 
for three months. Until mid-1966 this mandate was extended by the 
Security Council for three-month periods. Since then, UNFICYP's 
existence has been extended for six-month periods, most recently 
in June 1993. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

On March 6, 1964, the Secretary-General appointed General 
Gyani as commander of the UNFICYP. The first components of the 
force, a Canadian contingent, arrived in Cyprus on March 13, 

1964. By March 27, a sufficient number of troops had arrived for 
the force to be declared operational. Swedish, Irish, and Finnish 
contingents arrived in April. As these contingents arrived, 
elements of the British troops, who had been involved in 
peacekeeping since December, withdrew from the U.N. effort. About 
200 civilian police personnel from Australia, Austria, Denmark, 
New Zealand, and Sweden also arrived in these months. An Austrian 


7 


field hospital unit arrived in May, and by early June UNFICYP's 
personnel amounted to 6,411. 13 

UNFICYP's main headquarters was established in Nicosia. The 
two British bases located on the island provided the main 
logistical support. Communication systems were established that 
enabled quick contact from the smallest patrol units up to U.N. 
headquarters in New York when needed. The sectors in which the 
various national contingents operated coincided with the existing 
administrative districts of the Republic of Cyprus. The Danes 
were located in the center of the island, the Swedes in the east 
and northeast, the British in the southwest, the Irish in the 
west, the Canadians in Nicosia and the northwest, and the Finns 
in the north center. Within these districts, troops were deployed 
near the armed camps of the two ethnic communities so that they 
could quickly intercede if trouble threatened. Troops were also 
located at a number of fixed points along cease-fire lines, in 
areas that appeared vulnerable, and near U.N. facilities. 14 
Political and Military Goals 

The UNFICYP's initial political and military goals were 
modified during the course of its operation as a result of 
changing circumstances in Cyprus, particularly the events in 1974 
that led to the Turkish invasion of the island. Thus the initial 
goals of supervising the 1964 cease-fire; reducing military 
tensions between the two sides by maintaining the status quo, 
particularly the preservation of the Turkish Cypriot community's 
status as guaranteed by the 1960 Constitution; and restoring the 


8 



rule of law and order were modified by the addition of the task 
of providing humanitarian and relief assistance to the 
inhabitants on both sides affected by the 1974 partition of the 
island. 15 Finally, throughout its existence, UNFICYP's main 
political goal was to promote peaceful conditions that would lead 
to a "just and lasting settlement" of the Cyprus problem. 16 
Rules of Engagement 

The UNFICYP was in Cyprus as a peacekeeping, rather than 
peace-making or peace-enforcing force. UNFICYP troops were 
required to be in uniform when outside their living areas. They 
carried small arms to be used only for purposes of self-defense. 
Self-defense included the defense of U.N. personnel, positions, 
and vehicles coming under armed attack. Attempts to disarm 
UNFICYP could also be met with force. The minimum of force was to 
be used, and only after all other means of persuasion had been 
tried. The commander on the spot decided when armed force was 
needed. 17 

Composition of Forces 

The UNFICYP reached its maximum strength in mid-1964, when 
it consisted of nearly 6,500 persons. Military contingents were 
supplied by Austria, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
and Sweden. The United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) consisted 
of about 200 civilian police who came from Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden. 18 The size of the force varied 
according to conditions on Cyprus. By early 1974, the force was 
down to 2,200 personnel; by mid-August it had doubled in size 


9 




because of the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios by Greek Cypriot 
extremists in mid-July and the Turkish invasion a week later. 

The UNFICYP's personnel were gradually reduced as intercommunal 
violence declined. As of June 1991, the force amounted to 2,151 
personnel. By that date, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden had 
withdrawn their troops. 19 By July 1993, the UNFICYP amounted to 
just under 1,000 troops after Denmark and Canada had begun 
withdrawing their troops in December 1992 and June 1993 
respectively. The withdrawals left British and Austrian troop 
contingents and about three dozen civilian police from Australia 
and Sweden to carry out the U.N. peacekeeping mission. 20 
Equipment 

The UNFICYP is lightly armed in accordance with its 
peacekeeping mandate. Because much of the force's work involves 
observation, its personnel are furnished with advanced night- 
vision equipment and binoculars. Although the UNFICYP has some 
armored personnel carriers at its disposal, they have been little 
used in recent years. For general transportation needs, vehicles 
such as Landrovers and Ferret Scout Cars are used (supplied to it 
by British forces). Bicycles are used for some patrols. Alouette 
and Wessex helicopters are also available and are especially 
valuable for transport in mountainous areas. 21 
Training 

UNFICYP troops received varying amounts of training before 
they arrived in Cyprus. Some countries, such as Canada, Denmark, 
and Sweden, provided their personnel with training beforehand in 


10 




crowd control, roadblocks, mine-detection, and other techniques. 
The supplier of the largest number of troops, Britain, made no 
effort to prepare its troops for peacekeeping duties because it 
was expected they would learn to manage their duties on site. 
Charles C. Moskos, Jr., an observer of the UNFICYP in the mid- 
1970s, found that national contingents differed little in 
performance of duties, even though some had received prior 
training (most notably Canada), some consisted largely of 
reservists with a degree of training (Denmark and Sweden), and 
some were made up of professional soldiers (Britain, Ireland, and 
Canada) , 22 

In order to become proficient at peacekeeping duties, 

UNFICYP troops had to unlearn some of what they had been taught. 
In a typical combat situation, for example, patrols have to be as 
invisible as possible. In Cyprus patrols had to be highly visible 
if they were to accomplish their peacekeeping mission. 23 Much 
self-control and tact, sometimes even under severe provocation, 
were also essential. Peacekeeping duty was so unlike regular 
military duty that one Canadian officer, experienced in both, 
wrote that although peacekeeping is no job for a soldier, it is a 
job that only a soldier can do. 24 

As of September 1993, the UNFICYP had been in place for 
almost thirty years. This fact meant that the nations supplying 
troops during much or all of this period had acquired 
considerable experience in peacekeeping duties. Enlisted 
personnel served only six-month tours in Cyprus, but some 


11 


returned for additional tours. Officers often served for longer 
periods. In some armies, Canada's for example, most army officers 
had served at least one tour in Cyprus, and some had served 
several. The extensive experience gained through these numerous 
tours provided UNFICYP with veteran peacekeepers. 

Tactics 

The U.N. created the UNFICYP in 1964 to prevent the 
recurrence of violence between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot ethnic communities. This was to be accomplished without 
recourse to armed force. Within weeks of their arrival, UNFICYP 
troops were deployed throughout the island near encampments of 
the rival communal forces and near other points where violence 
might erupt. Static posts housing mobile patrols were soon 
established. Elements were quickly sent to defuse potentially 
violent incidents or to quell violence that had already erupted. 
UNFICYP troops were to interpose themselves between rival 
factions. They were also to protect civilian populations from the 
numerous armed militias that roamed the island. If possible they 
were to persuade armed groups and fortified encampments to move 
away from hostile forces. To perform these tasks, the UNFICYP was 
granted almost unlimited access to all areas of the island. The 
force also strove to be completely impartial and on good terms 
with the military and civilian authorities in both communities. 
Effective means of communication were essential for these tasks; 
the UNFICYP needed quick access to higher authorities when 
threatening incidents occurred. 


12 



The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July and August 1974 by 
about 40,000 troops radically changed the methods and techniques 
used by the UNFICYP to fulfill its mandate. Because Turkish 
forces now occupied the northern third of the island, and the 
UNFICYP no longer had to prevent violence from erupting all 
through the island, the force focused its attention instead on 
the buffer zone that separated Turkish Cypriot territory from the 
Greek Cypriot-controlled territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The 
buffer zone was the area that lay between opposing forces' front 
lines when the cease-fire of August 16, 1974 went into effect and 
ended the second Turkish campaign on Cyprus. Up to 7 kilometers 
wide in some areas and as narrow as 4 meters wide in Nicosia, the 
buffer zone ran for about 180 kilometers across the island from 
the western to the eastern coasts and accounted for about 3 
percent of its area. 

UNFICYP troops established about 150 observations posts in 
and along the buffer zone, using a variety of existing and newly 
constructed structures. About 50 of these posts were occupied on 
a continuous basis; most were occupied from time to time. 25 The 
line was divided into a number of sectors, each patrolled by a 
different national contingent. The aim of the UNFICYP in these 
new circumstances was to prevent any violence in or along the 
buffer zone. The force accomplished this goal by constant 
observation and mobile patrols. Any change in the fortifications 
of opposing forces, even the most minor, was observed and dealt 
with. Any incidents of violence, or possible signs of violence, 


13 


such as the sound of a random gunshot, were investigated. 
Throughout the mission, the UNFICYP forces remained strictly 
impartial, maintained close contact with the opposing forces, and 
avoided the use of force except in self-defense. 

In addition to transforming UNFICYP's peacekeeping duties, 
the de facto partition of the island in mid-1974 added a sizeable 
humanitarian component to its tasks. The force came to serve as a 
key link between the two communities that were now officially 
separated. The UNFICYP also supervised mail deliveries between 
the communities. It visited and brought supplies to the estimated 
1,000 Greek Cypriots living in the Turkish-controlled territory 
and the 100 or so Turkish Cypriots living in the Republic of 
Cyprus. It arranged the transfers of members of these two groups 
back to their communities and coordinated visits by relatives. 

The UNFICYP also supervised farming in the buffer zone. It did so 
to ensure that valuable land would remain fertile. Because both 
communities farmed in the buffer zone, the UNFICYP was especially 
vigilant to prevent potentially violent incidents from occurring. 
Cost 

According to U.N. estimates, the cost of the UNFICYP from 
its beginning in March 1964 until mid-December 1990 was $635.7 
million. 26 Much of the mandate's expenses had been absorbed by 
the nations that provided the mission's troops, however. If the 
U.N. had had to pay for all of the UNFICYP's expenses, according 
to one estimate, $2 billion would have been required by 1990. 27 

Until late May 1993, the UNFICYP's costs were met in a way 


14 



unlike that of any other U.N. exercise: the nations contributing 
troops to it absorbed much of its costs and, in addition, 
voluntary contributions were received from other U.N. members. As 
of July 31, 1991, 78 countries had contributed $450.8 million to 
the fund. The United States was the largest contributor with 
$212.6 million, followed by Britain with $86.3 million. 28 Because 
of this method of financing, the UNFICYP cost the U.N. $19 
million annually, as of late 1992. Voluntary contributions were 
never adequate to meet the UNFICYP's costs, however, and the 
mandate's overall deficit amounted to about $200 million as of 
mid-1993. 29 To improve the mission's finances, Secretary-General 
Boutos-Ghali directed in May 1993 that the UNFICYP be financed by 
annual assessments on U.N. members. 30 The financial burden 
imposed on the nations providing troops to UNFICYP had forced 
some of them, for example Sweden, to withdraw their 
contingents. 31 
Operational Assessment 

Although the UNFICYP was generally considered successful in 
accomplishing its military objectives, in some respects it did 
not fulfill its mandate. 

First, the UNFICYP was unable to prevent a recurrence of 
violence between the two communities in August 1964 and in 
November 1967. In 1964, the UNFICYP's limited forces and the 
reliance on nonviolent measures had no effect on conflict in the 
Kokkina area of western Cyprus. It was only the intervention by 
Turkish air force fighter jets against Greek Cypriot ground 


15 



forces that saved besieged Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Threats by 
President Makarios to kill Turkish Cypriots throughout the island 
brought fighting to an end and the acceptance of a U.N.-sponsored 
cease-fire. 32 Similarly, the mission's nonviolent measures were 
unable to prevent the incidents at the villages of Ayios 
Theodoros and Kophinou in south central Cyprus in November 1967 
that cost the lives of about two dozen Turkish Cypriots. Only 
Turkey's threat to invade Cyprus and U.S. diplomatic pressure 
stopped the killing and led to the departure of thousands of 
Greek troops from Cyprus. 33 

Second, UNFICYP's mandate dealt with curbing intercommunal 
violence, not with international force. Thus, in 1974 the UNFICYP 
was unable to prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus with a force of 
40,000 troops. Although the UNFICYP presence prevented the 
killing of some civilians and wider war crimes, Turkish forces 
continued fighting in Cyprus until Ankara attained its goals. 34 
UNFICYP's occupation of the Nicosia International Airport saved 
it from destruction, but at the cost of several dozen UNFICYP 
fatalities. 

Third, the UNFICYP failed to achieve the last aim listed by 
Resolution 186 that "normal conditions" were to be restored in 
Cyprus. Although violent incidents were drastically reduced for 
long periods through the presence and activities of the UNFICYP, 
the island's central government ceased to function again 
according to the terms of the 1960 constitution. Nor was there 
extensive intermingling of the two ethnic communities in ordinary 


16 


day-to-day activities as had been the case before December 1963. 
Many Turkish Cypriots retreated into their armed enclaves, and 
the two communities viewed each other with fear and suspicion. 
Restoring "normal conditions" thus remained beyond the mission's 
capability. 

The mission's single success was its role in preventing 
recurrences of intercommunal violence during nearly all of the 
last thirty years. Except for the few months after its arrival, 
and the two periods of November 1967 and July-August 1974, the 
UNFICYP has kept Cyprus almost completely free of intercommunal 
violence. Thousands of potentially threatening incidents were 
defused by the quick and patient action of the UNFICYP. In times 
of tension, perhaps 50 of these incidents were recorded each 
month. At other times, there were far fewer. 35 Some incidents 
involved only minor misunderstandings. Other incidents were more 
serious, but were contained by the UNFICYP. Actual intercommunal 
violence remained at a minimum and rarely resulted in fatalities, 
a stark contrast to the thousands killed during the periods of 
intense crisis. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

As of October 1993, the UNFICYP remained in place in Cyprus. 
Its mandate was renewed for an additional six-month term in June 
1993, and was likely to be renewed again in December 1993. The 
UNFICYP continues to patrol the buffer zone between the territory 
controlled by the Republic of Cyprus and the area controlled by 
Turkey and occupied by the island's Turkish Cypriot community. 


17 


Despite repeated diplomatic efforts by the U.N. and the United 
States, a negotiated settlement that would reunite the island 
under one central government appears highly unlikely. 

The Turkish Cypriot state unilaterally declared in November 
1983 received no international recognition except by Turkey. 
However, the existence of this secessionist state indicates to 
some that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is satisfied with the 
island's de facto partition, enjoys having its own state to 
govern, and feels secure because of the military protection 
provided by the 30,000 troops Turkey maintains on the island. The 
Greek Cypriot leadership appears to seek an agreement, but is 
unable or unwilling to offer the necessary concessions for a 
lasting settlement. The international community has viewed this 
stalemate with bewilderment over the years. 

As of October 1993, UNFICYP numbered less than 1,000 
soldiers. Denmark began to withdraw its troops from the force in 
December 1992, with Canada following suit in June 1993. 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has judged the existing 1,000- 
person force as insufficient for its task. He believes that three 
350-personnel units, including an armored unit, are needed by the 
UNFICYP to fulfill its mandate. 36 Units from Hungary and 
Argentina are reportedly possible replacements for the departing 
units from Denmark and Canada. 37 
CONCLUSION 

The UNFICYP has not brought long-term peace to Cyprus, but 
it has generally served to maintain a semblance of peaceful 


18 


coexistence on the island. Peace was ultimately brought to Cyprus 
by Turkish military might and Greek military weakness. 
International agreements in 1959 established the independent 
Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The fragile power-sharing 
arrangements contained in the Cypriot constitution of 1960 were 
undermined by the widespread desire of the Greek Cypriot majority 
community for the union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. The 
Turkish Cypriot minority opposed enosis as a threat to its 
survival. 

The attempt of Greek Cypriot extremists to bring about 
enosis through a coup d'etat was thwarted by Turkey when it 
occupied the northern third of Cyprus. Thereafter, Ankara was 
content to allow the southern two-thirds of the island to survive 
and flourish as a wholly Greek Cypriot nation. As a result, the 
fragile and sometimes broken peace of the years between 1963 and 
1974 was replaced by a solid peace growing out of a military 
stalemate. 

The UNFICYP was generally successful in preventing 
intercommunal violence between 1964 and 1974. When violence 
erupted on a large scale, however, outside influences were needed 
to restore peace. Because of its size, UNFICYP functioned as an 
observer. With skill, tact, and impartiality, it has prevented 
minor incidents from escalating into full-fledged wars. Until the 
balance of power on the island or in the region changes, 

UNFICYP's mission of preventing a recurrence of intercommunal 
warfare on Cyprus makes its presence on Cyprus both valuable and 


19 





essential. 


Endnotes 


1• The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, 1990), 281. 

2. Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus (London: Brassey's for 
the Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989), 11. 


3. 

The Blue Helmets 

4. 

Ibid. 


5. 

Ibid., 

284-95. 

6. 

Ibid.. 

285. 

7 . 

Ibid., 

285. 

8. 

Ibid., 

285-86. 

9. 

Ibid., 

285. 

10, 

. Ibid. 

, 285-86. 


11. Ibid ., 287. 

12. Ibid .. 286. 

13. Ibid .. 287. 


14. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 94. 

15. The Blue Helmets . 290-96, 306; Karl Th. Birgisson, "United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in William J. Durch (ed.), 
The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative 

Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 224. 


16. The Blue Helmets . 306. 

17. Ibid .. 291. 


18. Ibid ., 287. 

19. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," 
228. 


20. Carol Migdalovitz, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations (CRS 
Issue Brief, No. IB89140.) (Washington: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, July 27, 1993), 10. 


21 























21. David Emmett, "UNFICYP: New Model Army," Army Quarterly and 
Defence Journal . 115, No. 1, January 1985, 40-41. 

22. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a 
United Nations Military Force (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976), 93-98. 

23. Edward Fursdon, "On the Line—2 Battalion: The Royal 
Regiment of Fusiliers with the UN Force in Cyprus," Army 
Quarterly and Defense Journal . 116, No. 3, July 1986, 197. 

24. J.L. Granatstein and David J. Bercuson, War and 
Peacekeeping: From South Africa to the Gulf—Canada's Limited 

Wars (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1989), 226. 

25. Alan James, "United Nations Peacekeeping: The UN Force in 
Cyprus," International Affairs . 65, No. 3, Summer 1989, 493. 

26. The Blue Helmets . 439. 

27. Mary Anne Weaver, "Report from Cyprus," New Yorker . 66, 

August 6, 1990, 68. 

28. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," 

226. 

29. Peacekeeping Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1), (New 

York: United Nations, 1993), 12-13. 

30. "Cyprus," Keesing's Record of World Events . 39, No. 6, June 
1993, 39530. 

31. James, "United Nations Peacekeeping: The UN Force in Cyprus," 
488. 

32. McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus . 13. 

33. Ibid ., 15. 

34. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," 
232-33. 

35. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 55. 

36. Migdalovitz, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations . 11. 

37. "Cyprus," Keesing's Record of World Events . 39, No. 6, June 
1993, 39530. 


22 





















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"Cyprus," Keesing's Record of World Events [London], 39, No. 6, June 
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Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies 
and Comparative Analysis . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

Emmett, David. "UNFICYP: A New Model Army," Army Quarterly and Defence 
Journal [Tavistock, Devonshire, United Kingdom], 115, No. 1, 
January 1985, 37-43. 

Fursdon, Edward. "On the Line—2 Battalion: The Royal Regiment of 
Fusiliers with the UN Force in Cyprus," Army Quarterly and 
Defence Journal [Tavistock, Devonshire, United Kingdom], 116, No. 
3, July 1986, 297-304. 

_. "UNFICYP," Defense and Diplomacy . 7, No. 12, December 1989, 

46-51. 


Gaffen, Fred. In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping . Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987. 

Granatstein, J. L., and David J. Bercuson. War and Peacekeeping: From 
South Africa to the Gulf—Canada's Limited Wars . Toronto: Key 
Porter Books, 1991. 

Harbottle, Michael. The Blue Berets . London: Leo Cooper, 1971. 

James, Alan. "The UN Force in Cyprus," International Affairs [London], 
65, No. 3, Summer 1989, 481-500. 

McDonald, Robert. The Problem of Cyprus . (Adelphi Papers, No. 234.) 

London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1989. 

Migdalovitz, Carol. Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations . (CRS Issue 

Brief, No. IB89140.) Washington: Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, June 27, 1993. 


23 



























Moskos, Charles C., Jr. Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United 
Nations Military Force . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976. 

Peace-keeping Information Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: 

United Nations, 1993. 

Rikhye, Indar Jit. The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping . New York: 
St. Martin's Press for the International Peace Academy, 1984. 

Solsten, Eric, ed. Cyprus: A Country Study . Washington: GPO, 1993. 

Stegenga, James A. The United Nations Force in Cyprus . Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1968. 

Stenhouse, Mark. "Cyprus Conflict Continues to Hamper Regional 

Security," International Defense Review [Geneva], 26, No. 7, July 
1993, 530-31. 

Venter, A1 J. "Blue Helmets on the Green Line: The UN Peacekeeping 

Force in Cyprus," International Defense Review [Geneva], 21, No. 
11, November 1988, 1431-36. 

Weaver, Mary Anne. "Report from Cyprus." New Yorker . 66, August 6, 
1990, 65-66, 68-72, 74-81. 


24 











United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 


Selected Chronology 

1991 


On June 25, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared 
independence from the Yugoslavian federation. On June 26, 
hostilities began, with intervention by the Serbian-controlled 
Republic's Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). The Slovenian militia 
repulsed the YPA's invasion. 

On July 7, Slovenia and the Yugoslav federal government 
agreed to terms of a cease-fire brokered by the European 
Community (E.C.) Council of Ministers. 

On July 18, the Yugoslav Federal State Presidency decided to 
withdraw the YPA from Slovenia, ending the war in that newly 
established republic. At the same time, the armed conflict 
intensified in Croatia between the YPA and Croatian military 
forces. 

On September 8, Macedonia voted overwhelmingly to become an 
independent republic. 

On September 25, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council 
imposed an embargo on deliveries of weapons and military 
equipment bound to the republics of the former Yugoslavia. 

Former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was appointed on 
October 8 as the U.N. Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for 
Yugoslavia. 

On November 23, in Geneva, both the Serbian and Croatian 
governments requested the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping 
operation, although they failed to maintain the cease-fire 
between their respective forces. 

In December, Macedonia and Bosnia and Hercegovina asked for 
E.C. and U.N. recognition as independent states. 

On December 11, the U.N. Secretary-General proposed to 
establish U.N. Protected Areas (UNPA's) in the Serb-occupied 
areas of Croatia. On December 15, the Security Council in 
Resolution 724 approved the formation of a peacekeeping operation 
in the former Yugoslavia. 

On December 19, a small advance team of U.N. military, 
police, and civilian officials arrived in Belgrade. 


25 



1992 


On January 2, Special Envoy Vance negotiated a cease-fire 
agreement, based on agreements signed in Geneva on November 23, 
1991. 


On January 8, the Security Council ordered the dispatch to 
Yugoslavia of up to 50 military liaison officers to help monitor 
the cease-fire. 

On February 21, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 
743, establishing UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in 
the former Yugoslavia for an initial 12-month period. 

On February 29-March 2, Bosnia and Hercegovina held a 
referendum on independence, boycotted by the local Serbs, in 
which 99.4 percent of the voters favored secession. 

In March, the YPA pulled out of Macedonia. 

In April, Bosnia and Hercegovina declared independence. 
Serbian militiamen began military operations throughout the newly 
independent country. On April 7, the Security Council authorized 
the full deployment of UNPROFOR to the five republics of the 
former Yugoslavia. 

On April 7, the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed an independent 
"Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 

On April 8, Macedonia was admitted to the U.N. under the 
name of "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," along with 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina. 

On April 27, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new state, 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

On June 5, the U.N. negotiated the opening of Sarajevo 
Airport for relief supplies. 

On September 6, Special Envoy Vance and Lord David Owen, the 
Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, issued an unconditional 
demand to the Bosnian Serbs to surrender to U.N. control by 
September 12 all heavy weapons around Sarajevo and other cities. 
Radovan Kardzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, agreed. 

On September 17, the Bosnian Serbs resumed heavy shelling of 
Sarajevo, ignoring the demand to surrender heavy weapons as 
promised. 

On September 22, the U.N. General Assembly voted to deny the 
rump Yugoslavia the U.N. seat held by the former Yugoslav 


26 



federation. 


On October 9, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 
781 banning military flights by other than U.N.-approved aircraft 
over Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

On November 6, a violent clash occurred between the police 
and ethnic Albanians in Skopje, Macedonia. The President of 
Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, requested the deployment of U.N. 
observers in the republic on November 11. 

On December 11, the Security Council passed Resolution 795 
authorizing the deployment of UNPROFOR in Macedonia as a 
preventive deployment operation. 

1993 


On January 6, the UNPROFOR contingent arrived in Macedonia. 

In January, the Bosnian Croats approved the Vance-Owen plan 
to divide the country into 10 semi-autonomous provinces. 

In March, the Bosnian Muslims approved the Vance-Owen Plan. 

On April 2, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan. 

On June 10, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
announced that the United States would send ground troops to join 
UNPROFOR in Macedonia. 

In July and August, a new plan was developed by Owen and 
Stoltenberg in the U.N./E.C. negotiations for the tripartite 
division of Bosnia and Hercegovina with the Serb side getting 53 
percent of the territory, the Bosnian Muslims 30 percent, and the 
Bosnian Croats 17 percent. 

On September 12, U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin indicated 
in Brussels that the U.S. might be willing to supply up to half 
of the 50,000 peacekeepers needed in Bosnia if the tripartite 
plan was accepted. 

In mid-September, the civil war in Croatia escalated. 

In the U.N./E.C. negotiations on tripartite division of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Bosnian Muslims demanded an outlet to 
the sea, and the Bosnian Serbs and Croats insisted on holding a 
referendum to decide on the question of the areas they hold to be 
annexed to Serbia and Croatia, respectively. 


27 



INTRODUCTION 


The raging ethnic strife in the former socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia led in February 1992 to the establishment 
of the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR). It is the 
largest U.N. peacekeeping operation ever deployed, with more than 
22,000 troops stationed in Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and 
Macedonia by the end of 1993. 1 Nevertheless, in order to fully 
carry out UNPROFOR's mandate it is estimated that tens of 
thousands of additional U.N. peacekeeping troops are required in 
the former Yugoslavia sector. In September 1993, for example, 

U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin estimated that 50,000 additional 
peacekeeping troops were required in Bosnia and Hercegovina 
alone. 2 He indicated that half of this force might have to be 
provided by the United States. The urgency of such a force stems 
from the fact that UNPROFOR has been one of the most dismal 
failures of all U.N. peacekeeping operations to date. 3 It has 
operated under a confused and constantly shifting mandate, under 
rules of engagement that call for a peacekeeping force to be 
deployed in a region in the midst of violent internecine war. One 
of the primary reasons for UNPROFOR's failure was the U.N.'s and 
the international community's costly delay in mounting an 
effective military response to the aggression by Serbian regular 
and irregular forces against the newly independent republics of 
Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina. 

The first signs of breakdown in the former communist 
Yugoslav regime occurred in 1980, following President Tito's 


28 


death, when the nine-member collective presidency was unable to 
maintain internal cohesion. 

A second development was the rise to power in Serbia, in the 
late 1980's, of current Prime Minister Slobodan Milosevic, a 
former communist functionary, who advocated the establishment of 
a "Greater Serbia." His seizure of control of the autonomous 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which was accompanied by 
Serbian violations of human rights, particularly those of 
Albanians in Kosovo, frightened the other nationalities and led 
to the strengthening of Slovenian, Croatian, and Muslim 
secessionist movements. 4 The Serbs, for their part, were alarmed 
by the links between the Croatian nationalist movement and the 
former pro-Nazi Ustache, especially the use of Ustache 
ultranationalist symbols and slogans. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia, two of the component 
republics of the former Yugoslavia, declared their independence 
from the Serb-dominated central government. The Yugoslav army 
immediately moved to crush the secession. The conflict involved 
three former republics: Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 

Slovenia 

The initial conflict began with the secession of Slovenia, 
where the YPA suffered major reverses and was defeated by Slovene 
irregulars. 


29 




Croatia 


The conflict then shifted to Croatia, where fighting 
initiated by Croatian Serb irregulars with full support of the 
YPA broke out in July 1991, and continued unabated through 
January 1992. The Croatian forces suffered heavy casualties and 
lost ground to the YPA and the Serbian irregulars, until a 
quarter of Croatia was occupied by Serbian forces. 

Bosnia-Herzeqovina 

The third phase of the conflict began when Bosnia- 
Herzegovina declared independence in April 1992, following a 
referendum held in March that was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs. 
In that referendum, independence was approved by 99.4 percent of 
the voting electorate, with a turnout of 63.4 percent despite the 
Serbian boycott. 5 Prior to the independence declaration, the 
Serbian militia, supported by the YPA, launched attacks 
throughout the country. 

Macedonia 

On November 6, 1992, a violent clash occurred between the 
police and ethnic Albanian demonstrators in Skopje, Macedonia, 
resulting in four killed and 36 wounded. Ethnic Albanians 
comprise 21 percent of the population of Macedonia, and Kiro 
Gligorov, President of Macedonia, made an urgent request for the 
deployment of U.N. troops to prevent a possible conflict in 
Kosovo, where the population is 90 percent Albanian, from 
spilling over into Macedonia. The likelihood of such a spillover 
is increased by the fact that Macedonia provides the only usable 


30 





road between Albania and Kosovo that armed groups from Albania 
could use to aid ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 6 
The U.N. Response 

Slovenia 

The Slovenian phase of the conflict was handled essentially 
without U.N. involvement. The European Community (E.C.) first 
opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia, but after fighting started the 
E.C. Foreign Ministers' Conference mediated a cease-fire 
agreement in July 1991 that resolved the conflict. The easy 
resolution came about because both parties in the conflict agreed 
on the accords. The principal consideration here was the fact 
that the Serbs decided not to pursue the conflict in Slovenia in 
order to concentrate on seizing territory in Croatia. 

Croatia 

In September 1991, the E.C. established the "Conference on 
Yugoslavia" in The Hague, chaired by Lord Carrington, former 
Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(N.A.T.O.), which has since been replaced by the joint U.N./E.C. 
body. However, the group's attempt to mediate the conflict in 
Croatia was stymied by the Serbian tactic (copied later by the 
other combatants) of agreeing to abide by cease-fires while 
ignoring them on the ground. The 15th cease-fire on January 2, 
however, held long enough to allow the deployment of UNPROFOR 
troops in Croatia. 

Bosnia and Hercegovina 

On April 24, 1992, the U.N. Security Council demanded an end 


31 






to "outside interference" in Bosnia. In May of that year, the 
Serbs claimed to be withdrawing the YPA from Bosnia, but in 
reality renamed a large part of the force, designating it as the 
local Bosnian Serb militia. Bosnian Croats then began to seize 
land in the largely Croatian areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina and 
turned against their Muslim allies. This action, in turn, led the 
Bosnian Muslims to undertake their own "ethnic cleansing" of 
Serbs and Croats living in areas under their control. 

Macedonia 

The U.N. response in Macedonia was preemptive, unlike its 
response in other cases. In this instance, only a token force was 
deployed, beginning with a 34-person reconnaissance party on 
December 29, 1992, with the first armed troops arriving on 
January 6, 1993. The deployment of about 1,000 troops was 
authorized in response to a Macedonian request for assistance in 
preventing expansion of the conflict to Macedonia and Kosovo. The 
principal mandate of the troops was to monitor activity along the 
borders with Albania and with the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), and to interpose themselves between potential 
combatants if imminent conflict were possible. 7 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

On September 25, 1991, the U.N. attempted to resolve the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia through Security Council 
Resolution 713. The resolution imposed a complete embargo on 
sales and deliveries of weapons to all the republics of the 
former Yugoslavia. 8 


32 




On November 27, the Security Council in Resolution 721 
approved the results of the November 23 Geneva convention. 9 

On December 15, 1991, in Resolution 724, the Security 
Council proposed the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in 
the three U.N. Protected Areas (UNPA's) in Eastern Slavonia, 
Western Slavonia, and Krajina. 10 Slavonia and Krajina are regions 
of Croatia now under Serb control as the self-declared Serb 
Republic of Krajina. 

On February 15, 1992, the Secretary-General issued a 
recommendation to the Security Council for the establishment of a 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) . 11 

On February 21, 1992, UNPROFOR was established by Security 
Council Resolution 743. It authorized a force of 14,000 personnel 
to help monitor the cease-fire in Croatia. 12 

On April 7, 1992, Security Council Resolution 749 authorized 
the full deployment of UNPROFOR by mid-May. 13 

In June 1992, the UNPROFOR mandate was enlarged by Security 
Council Resolution 762 to include the monitoring of other Serb- 
populated areas in Croatia, called "pink zones." 14 

In August 1992, Security Council Resolution 769 empowered 
UNPROFOR to control the entry of civilians into the UNPA's and to 
provide immigration and customs functions for the UNPA's at their 
international frontiers. 15 

On May 30, 1992, the Security Council, in Resolution 757, 
imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (the rump 
"Yugoslavia") as additional pressure to force a peaceful solution 


33 


to the conflict. 16 

On September 14, 1992, the Security Council approved 
Resolution 776, authorizing an additional 6,000 troops to operate 
humanitarian relief convoys in Bosnia and Hercegovina outside of 
Sarajevo. The troops were to be financed, supplied, and 
maintained by the participating national contingents. 17 

In October 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 781, 
banning military flights in regions of conflict (the "no-fly” 
zone) by other than U.N.-approved aircraft. 18 

On November 10, 1992, Security Council Resolution 781 
authorized an additional 75 military observers for UNPROFOR to 
monitor airfields in the whole region, in connection with the 
"no-fly" zone enforcement. 19 

On December 11, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 
795 mandating the deployment of UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops to 
Macedonia. 20 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

U.N. Forces were deployed in the former Yugoslavian 
republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Macedonia. The 
UNPROFOR contingents were preceded by advance mission personnel, 
and their operations have been conducted cojointly or in 
coordination with humanitarian operations, such as those of the 
UNHCR. 

Slovenia 

The conflict ended before UNPROFOR was established. 

Croatia 


34 





On December 19, 1991, the first U.N. advance team for the 
mission in Croatia arrived in Belgrade. The full force of 14,000 
was deployed in Croatia by the end of May 1992. 

Bosnia and Hercegovina 

On June 29, 1992, following negotiated agreements between 
the U.N. and Serbian forces, a Canadian contingent of UNPROFOR 
secured the Sarajevo Airport for delivery of humanitarian 
supplies to the besieged city. 

By July 3, 1992, U.N. observers and troops were deployed at 
the Sarajevo Airport, despite continued fighting in the area. 

Macedonia 

On December 3, 1992, an exploratory mission from the 
UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb traveled to Macedonia. After U.N. 
Resolution 795 was passed on December 11, a reconnaissance party 
from UNPROFOR went to Macedonia. The first contingent of UNPROFOR 
troops was deployed on January 6, 1993. 

Political and Military Goals 

The political and military goals of the U.N. peacekeepers 
and negotiators have shifted with the tide of the conflict. 

Slovenia 

In Slovenia the initial goal of the U.N. was for Slovenia to 
remain in Yugoslavia, but with the defeat of the YPA in Slovenia, 
the U.N. shifted course and recognized Slovenia as an independent 
state. 

Croatia 

UNPROFOR's Croatian operation was to implement the 


35 







demobilization of regions occupied largely by Serbs, in order to 
prevent resumption of the conflict. The final settlement of the 
future of the regions was not considered at the time. UNPA's were 
established with heavy weapons to be held in safekeeping by the 
U.N., and the U.N. forces were to interpose themselves between 
combatants as necessary to prevent the resumption of conflict. 

The establishment of local civilian police authority was also a 
priority. The return of the displaced non-Serb residents forcibly 
evicted by the local Serbs was also contemplated, but for a later 
phase, to be designed by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(U.N.H.C.R.) 21 

Macedonia 

The goal of the preventive deployment of UNPROFOR troops in 
Macedonia was to delay or prevent war in Kosovo between the 
minority ethnic Serbs, who had historical claims to the region, 
and the vast majority of ethnic Albanians residing there. 

Rules of Engagement 

The UNPROFOR mandate was defined by the U.N. Secretary- 
General, 22 as follows: the troops were to be under the command 
of the Secretary-General, they were not permitted to receive 
operational orders from their national authorities, they were to 
be impartial, and they were to use minimum force when required in 
self-defense or under other emergency situations. 

On February 19, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 
807, providing for "all appropriate measures" to be taken to 
ensure UNPROFOR's security, although the mandate did not specify 


36 




exact rules of engagement on the ground. 23 
Composition of Forces 

As of March 1993, a year after the initial deployment, the 
total strength of UNPROFOR was 23,000 military and civilian 
personnel. 24 The countries of origin were Argentina, Australia, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, the Czech 
Republic/the Slovak Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Ghana, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, Poland, 
Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Venezuela. 25 

Slovenia 

The Slovenia conflict ended before UNPROFOR was established. 

Croatia 

UNPROFOR in Croatia was deployed in three UNPA's divided 
into four sectors: 26 Sector East, with 1,550 military personnel 
(688 from Belgium/Luxembourg, 863 from Russia), 13 mixed military 
observers, and 200 civilian police and other personnel; Sector 
West, with 3,768 military personnel (895 from Argentina, 1,090 
from Canada, 884 from Jordan, 900 from Nepal), 24 mixed military 
observers, and 100 civilian police and other personnel; Sector 
North, with 2,620 military personnel (866 from Denmark, 886 from 
Nigeria, 868 from Poland), 50 mixed military observers, and 250 
civilian police and other personnel; Sector South, with 2,344 
military (957 from France, 485 from the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, and 902 from Kenya), 50 mixed military observers, and 


37 





290 civilian police and personnel. 

In addition, logistics and engineering battalions serving in 
the four sectors comprised an additional 3,000 personnel, and the 
United States deployed a field hospital in Zagreb, with 343 
personnel. 27 

Bosnia and Hercegovina 

The Bosnia and Hercegovina UNPROFOR command, under General 
Briquemont of Belgium, contained the following components: 1) 
United Kingdom - one infantry battalion HQ deployed in Vitez, one 
logistics battalion in Durno, one logistics battalion in Divulje, 
one infantry company in Kladanj, one infantry company in Gornj 
Vakuf, and one helicopter company in Divulje, comprising a total 
of 2,626 personnel; 2) France - two infantry battalions in 
Sarajevo, three infantry battalions in Velika Kladusa, comprising 
a total of 2,509 personnel; 3) Canada - one infantry battalion 
of 1,300 personnel in Pakrac (Croatia); 4) Spain - one infantry 
battalion in Jablanica and Medzhugorje, and one helicopter 
company in Medzhugorje, comprising a total of 750 personnel; 5) 
Netherlands - one transport company in Busovad and one transport 
company in Metkovic, comprising a total of 500 personnel; 6) 

Egypt - one infantry battalion of 400 personnel in Sarajevo; 7) 
Ukraine - one infantry battalion of 400 personnel in Sarajevo; 8) 
Denmark - one HQ company of 200 personnel in Kiselak; 9) Belgium 
- one transport company of 130 personnel in Busovac; 10) Norway - 
one platoon of 40 personnel. 28 

In addition, approximately 7,500 troops were pledged but had 


38 



not yet been deployed by France, Jordan, Malaysia, the 
Netherlands, and Pakistan. Their mission will be to protect the 
U.N.-declared "safe havens." 

Macedonia 

In Macedonia, 300 U.S. troops joined a U.N. battalion of 700 
from Norway. The U.S. troops came from the 502d Infantry 
Regiment, based in Berlin. 29 
Equipment 

UNPROFOR's equipment was either U.N.-owned, leased, or 
remained the property of the national contingents deployed in the 
operation. This equipment consisted of light and heavy transport 
vehicles, such as trucks, jeeps, and armored personnel carriers 
(APC's) (including spare parts); mine clearing equipment; 
communications gear; binoculars; fixed-wing aircraft for 
transport and reconnaissance; general-purpose helicopters; light 
arms; and medical supplies. The origin, type, and technological 
level of equipment used depended on the particular national 
contingents involved. In Macedonia, for instance, Finnish Sisu 
wheeled APC's have been deployed. C-130 transport aircraft 
equipped with AWADs (Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery) radar, have 
been used in airdrops. The missions have deployed three to four 
aircraft at a time, each carrying eight to ten bundles of MRE's 
(Meals, Ready-to-eat) with 800 rations per bundle. 30 Sixty 
fighter and ground attack aircraft and 20 support aircraft were 
stationed on the aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt off the Bosnian 
coast. 31 


39 





Training 


The national contingents detached to UNPROFOR have undergone 
a variety of training exercises in preparation for the 
peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia. 

The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have provided unique 
training for a variety of peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations, such as tactics developed by the U.S. forces for 
humanitarian airdrop procedures under difficult conditions. Since 
the initial U.S. effort, French and German aircraft have joined 
in the airdrop operations, providing opportunities for 
multinational joint training exercises. 

The imposition of "no-fly" zones, the enforcement of the air 
and sea embargo, and the recently completed set of complex 
exercises preparing for possible air strikes against ground 
positions around Sarajevo have also provided extensive training 
opportunities. 

Tactics 

The tactics employed by the U.N. forces have involved cease¬ 
fire negotiations, sea, air and land embargo enforcement, as well 
as delivery of humanitarian aid and evacuation of wounded. 

Slovenia 

The conflict ended before UNPROFOR was established. 

Croatia 

In Croatia, the U.N. established UNPA's (United Nations 
Protected Areas) and monitored "pink regions" (regions with 
significant armed conflict.) 


40 






Tactical operations have involved securing heavy weapons 
storage, monitoring of human rights, interposition of U.N. forces 
between combatants to stop fighting, and minesweeping operations. 

Bosnia and Hercegovina 

In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the principal tactical operations 
involve humanitarian aid delivery by vehicle convoy. 

Macedonia 

The principal activity of UNPROFOR in Macedonia is to 
establish and monitor various border observation posts. 

Cost 

In 1993 UNPROFOR's annual cost was approximately $1.02 
billion. 32 The mission's budget was financed through a Special 
Account. As of April 1993, approximately $325 million of the 
mission's financing was in arrears, as a result of outstanding 
contributions from member states. 33 
Operational Assessment 

The successful accomplishments of UNPROFOR's peacekeeping 
operations have included the following: 

First, the negotiations brokered by the U.N. on Slovenia's 
future resulted in the withdrawal of the YPA and a cessation of 
armed conflict. 

Second, the presence of UNPROFOR troops in the parts of 
Croatia captured by Serbian forces has resulted in a drastic 
reduction, if not temporary cessation, of armed conflict in those 
regions. 

Third, the airport in Sarajevo was opened to U.N. 


41 






peacekeeping forces to carry out humanitarian relief operations, 
and the massive starvation of Sarajevo's population in the winter 
of 1992/93 was averted. 

Fourth, some areas in Bosnia and Hercegovina have been 
provided with medical and food relief by U.N. truck convoys and 
by airdrops from U.S. aircraft. Even the slowly tightening 
implementation of the U.N.-imposed embargo might be considered a 
partial success. 34 

Fifth, the airdrop missions have been successful, with most 
airdrops delivered over intended areas. 

Sixth, a Canadian contingent was successful in carrying out 
limited minesweeping operations in Krajina and in instructing the 
local military in such operations. A massive mine-clearing 
operation, however, remains to be undertaken. 

Finally, the preventive deployment of a small U.N. 
peacekeeping contingent in Macedonia, including troops from the 
U.S., ensured that conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians 
would not erupt. However, the size of this peacekeeping 
contingent is considered too small to intervene effectively 
should internecine fighting erupt. 

The U.N.-sponsored negotiations have benefited the parties 
in different ways. 

First, the Serbs have been able to delay or prevent any 
military actions (such as air strikes against Serbian targets) on 
the part of the U.N./N.A.T.O. forces. 

Second, Bosnian Muslims present an image of "victims who are 


42 


also very cooperative," setting the stage for eventual military 
support (such as air strikes and the lifting of the embargo on 
arms purchases). 

Third, Croats are able to delay consideration of their 
aggressive actions against the Bosnian Muslims while they attempt 
to return Krajina to their republic. 

The U.N. peacekeeping mission, nevertheless, has failed to 
fulfill its mission effectively in a number of areas. The most 
crucial are the many problems that UNPROFOR has experienced in 
implementing its political and military goals because of poor 
mission design, unrealistic expectations of immediate success, a 
vague mandate that kept changing to meet new and more militarily 
debilitating situations, and rules of engagement that proved 
grossly inadequate to maintain cease-fire agreements that were 
repeatedly violated, making it very difficult even to deliver 
humanitarian aid to suffering populations. 

First, despite UNPROFOR's presence, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
a U.N.-recognized entity, which at the outset of the conflict was 
a multicultural society (an estimated 40 percent of the 
population was Muslim, 30 percent Serb, and 17 percent 
Croatian) 35 has been carved up into "ethnically cleansed" areas 
by the warring factions. 

Second, UNPROFOR has not lived up to its mission as a 
"Protection Force." For example, General Lewis W. McKenzie of 
Canada, the commander of the Sarajevo sector of UNPROFOR, whose 
contingent opened the airport at Sarajevo for its first 


43 


humanitarian relief supply, has complained that the words 
"Protection Force" in UNPROFOR have led the citizens of Sarajevo 
to expect protection from Serb attack; in actuality, little 
evidence of this protective capability has been demonstrated on 
the ground. 36 

Third, the rules of engagement, as interpreted by the 
commanders on the ground, have frequently reduced UNPROFOR to 
inaction. Any relief convoy can be stopped with impunity by local 
militias to obtain extortion payments, confiscate part of the 
convoy's supplies and equipment, and even drag out of vehicles 
and execute on the spot Bosnian government officials traveling on 
U.N.-approved official business under the protection of armed 
U.N. soldiers. The lack of respect given to the U.N. peacekeeping 
force by the combatants is epitomized by an act of a Serbian 
soldier, who climbed on top of an armored personnel carrier at a 
Serbian roadblock, opened the hatch, and urinated into the 
vehicle. 37 

Fourth, despite the fact that the peacekeeping force was 
destined for Croatia, UNPROFOR's headquarters was initially 
located in Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, because it was relatively 
free from conflict and to discourage the Serbs from attacking 
secessionists in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Serbs, however, 
still attacked the Bosnian Muslims, forcing UNPROFOR to move its 
headquarters to Zagreb, Croatia, by which time the fighting in 
Croatia had already cost 10,000 lives and left 600,000 
homeless. 38 


44 


Fifth, UNPROFOR has been unable to deter aggression by 
Serbia's army and the local Serbian militia (armed by Milosevic) 
against the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians. The aggression was 
accompanied by the open practice of "ethnic cleansing" and many 
well-documented atrocities. 

Sixth, the inability of the U.N. peacekeeping force to deter 
aggression has led Croatian irregulars to seize Bosnian land and 
to commit atrocities against their Muslim allies. Similar ethnic 
cleansing practices have also been adopted by Bosnian Muslims 
against the Serbs and Croats in their midst. Such actions have 
taken place under the purview of UNPROFOR's command, deployed on 
the ground, and the U.N.H.C.R.'s humanitarian operation based in 
Sarajevo. 

Seventh, the Vance-Owen plan to create ten loosely 
connected, ethnically based cantons has proven unsuccessful. It 
failed because of widespread genocide and "ethnic cleansing," 
which led the populations to resist major changes in their 
boundaries, and because the expelled populations insisted on 
returning to their homes. 

Eighth, the deployment of UNPROFOR in Macedonia, although a 
positive step toward peace, has indirectly served to reward the 
Serbs by solidifying their hold on Kosovo. This is similar to 
earlier placement of UNPROFOR's headquarters in Sarajevo in order 
to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia and Hercegovina. 

Ninth, in terms of the humanitarian aspects of the 
operation, the U.N. has shown itself to be singularly helpless 


45 


even in situations over which it has clear control. The 
evacuations of the wounded, particularly children, have received 
a great deal of media attention, although only a very small 
percentage of the wounded has been evacuated. Some of the 
difficulties have resulted from cumbersome U.N. procedures. The 
evacuation of wounded children from Sarajevo, for instance, was 
bogged down by lengthy internal U.N. approval requirements. 
Similarly, college students admitted to programs in the United 
States have been prevented from leaving Sarajevo because the U.N. 
has claimed that allowing the students to leave might cause 
political difficulties (although the small student group 
contained a balanced membership from all ethnic groups involved 
in the struggle.) Artists and performance groups have faced 
similar travel restrictions. 

Tenth, inadequacies and incompatibilities in equipment have 
resulted in communications problems and in reducing operational 
capability. The Egyptian contingent, for example, was 
inadequately clothed for the region's cold climate. 

Eleventh, the various embargoes have not deterred the 
Serbian authorities from pursuing their expansionist aims despite 
the damage caused to the Serbian economy. The weapons embargo 
also denied the Bosnians a means for defending themselves by 
procuring heavy weaponry. Furthermore, the embargo also proved to 
be ineffective because of lax enforcement. It was violated by 
Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Greek, and other traders dependent 
on commerce with Belgrade. The Croatian forces also managed to 


46 


rearm themselves during the "embargo," and the Bosnians obtained 
some covert aid from Islamic countries. 39 

CURRENT SITUATION 

Throughout the conflict in the former Yugoslavia there has 
been a great disparity between the ongoing U.N.-sponsored 
negotiations and the military situation on the ground, with 
doubts that signed peace agreements can actually resolve the 
conflict. The latest plan, devised by David Owen and Thorvald 
Stoltenberg in Geneva, is to divide Bosnia and Hercegovina into 
three parts, with Muslims getting 30 percent of the territory, 
the Bosnian Serbs 53 percent, and the Croats 17 percent. 40 In the 
negotiations that resumed in Geneva on August 31, 1993, the Serbs 
and Croats accepted the proposal, whereas the Bosnian Muslims 
asked for more territory, an outlet to the Adriatic Sea, and 
substantial military guarantees of enforcement of the peace plan. 
The talks, however, broke down the next day because of Serb and 
Croat rejection of the Bosnian Muslim demands. The U.S. voiced 
support for the Bosnian Muslim demands and initially agreed to 
participate in the 50,000-strong peace enforcement contingent 
envisaged by the U.N. planners, but later emphasized that 
participation would be contingent on full acceptance of the plan 
by all concerned and with N.A.T.O. playing a leading role in the 
implementation. 

The U.S. has been directly involved in some aspects of the 
operation, including monitoring of the embargo against republics 
of the former Yugoslavia and monitoring of the "no-fly" zones and 


47 


humanitarian air drops. However, no U.S. ground forces have been 
deployed, except for a small contingent of 300 U.S. ground troops 
in Macedonia. The latter were intended to serve as a "tripwire" 
to prevent expansion of the war to the province of Kosovo. 

The possibility of U.N.-mandated tactical air strikes by 
N.A.T.O. forces against Serbian artillery positions around 
Sarajevo if the Serbian shelling of the city continued was raised 
again. There was no reason for the Serbs to believe that the plan 
was serious enough to require them to respond with more than 
temporary changes as long as they continued their participation 
in the negotiations and agreed to what the U.N./E.C. negotiators 
proposed. Furthermore, the absence of a practical exit strategy 
for the UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia places U.N. troops and 
civilians in great danger should the Serbian militias react to 
the air strikes by a massive attack on U.N. forces. 

The September 1993 round of negotiations illustrates some of 
the problems of the peace process. The presidents of Croatia and 
Bosnia, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovich, respectively, 
signed a cease-fire to take effect on September 18, 1993, ending 
the hostilities between the Muslim and Croatian fighters in 
Bosnia. The cease-fire was followed, however, by escalation in 
the fighting, with Bosnian Muslim forces advancing along a new 
front about 20 miles northwest of Mostar. 41 Reports indicated 
that Bosnian forces conducted a massacre of as many as 38 Croats 
(mostly civilians) in the village of Uzdol, near the Jablanica- 
Gornji Vakuf road. The Bosnian government later said it would 


48 


investigate the event and punish those responsible. On September 
16, 1993, the Bosnian Serbs signed a similar agreement with the 
Bosnian Muslims, agreeing to the same cease-fire conditions to 
take place on September 19, 1993. The conditions involved 
cessation of hostilities, to be followed by the unconditional 
disbanding of all detainee camps, release of prisoners, and the 
creation of conditions guaranteeing the free and unhindered 
passage of all relief convoys. 42 

Unless the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia sign a 
binding peace accord allowing the UNPROFOR II humanitarian effort 
to proceed unimpeded, the future is likely to produce great 
hardship for Bosnian civilian populations, particularly the 
Muslims. 

The principal conflict in the region, however, is between 
the Serbs and the Croats, the two most powerful republics. Their 
conflict is likely to persist after the future of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina is resolved, because of the deep rooted historical 
enmity between the Serbs and Croats. 

CONCLUSION 

Serbia was the initial aggressor in the conflict, but with 
little international response, all parties, including the Croats 
and the Bosnian Muslims, have followed the Serb lead in 
committing "ethnic cleansing" atrocities to consolidate as much 
territory as possible. 

The previous situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina, in which 
Muslims, Serbs, and Croats lived together in relative harmony, 


49 


had the potential to produce a multinational state in the region 
that would serve as a harmonizing buffer between Serbia and 
Croatia. This potential is an important counterweight to the 
argument that because an independent State of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina has never previously existed, it does not deserve 
statehood. 

Discrimination against the 12 percent Serb minority in an 
independent Croatia was plausible, but not to the degree that the 
Milosevic government tried to project, and it could well have 
been controlled through E.C.-based or U.N.-based venues. The 
Serbs would have had international legitimacy if the 
discrimination was of a nature that justified intervention. The 
large Serb minority in Bosnia and Hercegovina (31 percent of the 
prewar population) could have exerted a dominant influence, 
especially because, according to Vance and Owen, the Serbs 
controlled 60 percent of the land. 43 

The war was tragically unnecessary, even from a Serbian 
nationalist perspective. Serbia should have permitted the 
secession of the other former Yugoslav republics as Russia did of 
its borderline republics. Doing so would have avoided massive 
bloodshed, yet Serbia would still have been the dominant power in 
the region with enormous influence in the other republics. 

After the initial settlement of the Slovenian secession, 
there was a window of opportunity for the United States, Western 
Europe, and the U.N. to intervene effectively. For instance, 
during the naval bombardment of Dubrovnik, the U.N. could have 


50 


issued an ultimatum to Milosevic either to demobilize his naval 
fleet or have it sunk by a certain date, should the YPA disengage 
and withdraw behind Serbian national boundaries. Similar demands 
could have been issued with regard to the Yugoslav air forces. 
Faced with the prospect of significant military threat, Milosevic 
would not have embarked on the Bosnian campaign, settling instead 
for consolidation of his gains in Krajina and negotiated 
compromise in Bosnia. 

The negotiations in Croatia and in Bosnia have always 
concentrated on interim solutions without much consideration of 
the resolution of territorial issues. The present tripartite 
proposal for Bosnia and Hercegovina is much more viable because 
it has shorter frontiers to defend. If accepted by the parties 
involved, no such defense would be necessary, but it is difficult 
to predict such an outcome. 

A number of strategic and tactical lessons can be derived 
from UNPROFOR's experience in the former Yugoslavia. These 
lessons must include awareness of the danger in allowing the 
aggressors to: 1) manipulate negotiations (agree to everything, 
do nothing), offering excuses for failing to implement agreements 
(local commanders did not get the word); 2) convert local 
authorities into instant pseudo-independent states, legitimizing 
these states by overwhelming referendum results with only the 
supporters participating (others discouraged, or even expelled 
from the region); 3) pose as "perpetrators-turned-statesmen" who 
then complain about "intransigent locals" in their puppet 


51 


operations, promise to try to persuade them into other courses of 
action and agree to stop supplying them, but refuse any 
inspection of shipments because this would "violate national 
sovereignty"; 4) make extravagant promises with impunity, such as 
the Serbian offer to place all heavy weapons under U.N. control, 
with the subsequent explanation that "control" meant that U.N. 
observers could, when permitted, watch the heavy artillery shell 
the opposition. 


52 


Endnotes 


1. James Gow, "The Future of Peacekeeping in the Yugoslav 
Region," Brassev's Defense Yearbook (London: Brassey's, 1993), 
179. 

2. "Aspin Says 50,000 Peace Keepers Likely Needed for Bosnia 
Force," Washington Post . September 13, 1993, A22. 

3. On December 7, 1992, as reported by The Guardian , the U.N. 
commanding officer in Sarajevo, Egyptian General Adnan 
Abdelrazek, called the U.N. mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina a 
failure and asked the U.N. to intervene by military force. 

4. Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign 
Affairs . 72, No. 3, 1993, 82. 

5. Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim, Yugoslavia Crisis and U.S. 
Policy . (CRS Issue Brief, No. IB91089.) (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, August 13, 
1993), 6. 

6. Bob Furlong, "Powder Keg of the Balkans," International 
Defense Review . 5, 1993, 364. 

7. Ibid ., 366. 

8. Peace-keeping Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1) (New 
York: United Nations, March 1993), 37. 

9. Ibid . 

10. Ibid ., 38. 

11. Ibid . 

12. Ibid . 

13. "Wide-Ranging Sanctions Imposed Against Yugoslavia," U.N. 
Chronicle . 29, No. 3, September 1992, 6. 

14. Peace-keeping Information Notes . 39. 

15. Ibid . 

16. Ibid . 

17. Ibid ., 40. 

18. Ibid . 


53 
























19. Ibid. 


20. Ibid .. 42. 

21. James Gow, Brassev's Defense Yearbook. 1993 . 183. 

22. Ibid .. 180. 

23. Julie Kim, Yugoslavia: The United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) and Other Multilateral Missions (CRS Report for 
Congress.) (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, April 19, 1993), 2. 

24. Peace-keeping Information Notes . 37. 

25. Ibid . 43. 

26. Kim, Yugoslavia: The United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) and Other Multilateral Missions . 4. 

27. Ibid . 

28. Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia and Macedonia: U.S. Military 

Operations . (CRS Issue Brief, No. IB93056) (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, September 
22, 1993), 11. 

29. "World Sitrep," Soldier of Fortune . 18, No. 10, October 1993, 
17. 


30. Bowman, Bosnia and Macedonia: U.S. Military Operations ." 8. 

31. Ibid ., 7. 

32. United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, 

August 1993), 29. 

33. Ibid . 

34. John Pomfret, "Neighbors Enforce Yugoslav Embargo, Most 
Borders Finally Close, But Croatia and Slovenia Still Let Trucks 
Through," Washington Post , September 14, 1993, A8. 

35. William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 469. 

36. Peter Saracino, "Polemics and Prescriptions: Interview With a 
Peacekeeper General," International Defense Review . 5, 1993, 370. 

37. "COMMENTARY" editorial, "Beef Up U.N. Forces," Defense News . 
June 28-July 4, 1993, 24. 


54 
























38. United Nations Document S/23111 (New York: United Nations, 
April 2, 1992), 1. 


39. Julie Kim, et al., Bosnia-Hercegovina: Support from Islamic 
Countries . (CRS Report for Congress, 93-596F.) (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, June 19, 
1993). 

40. David B. Ottaway, "Hopes Fade for Imminent Bosnia Peace 
Pact," Washington Post . September 19, 1993, A22. 

41. Chuck Sudetic, "Bosnian Troops Advance Against Croats in 
Offensive Near Mostar," New York Times . September 16, 1993, A3. 

42. David B. Ottaway, "Bosnians Reportedly on Brink of Signing 
New Peace Agreement," Washington Post . September 13, 1993, A34. 

43. Steven J. Woehrel, Bosnia-Herzegovina Negotiations: The 
Vance-Owen Plan ." (CRS Report for Congress, 93-431F.) 

(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
April 14, 1993), 16. 


55 










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Affairs . 72, No. 3, 1993, 110-121. 

Bowman, Steven R. Bosnia and Macedonia: U.S. Military Operations . 

(Issue Brief No. IB93056.) Washington: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, August 17, 1993. 

Djilas, Aleksa. "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign Affairs . 

72, No. 3, 1993, 81-96. 

Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping . New York: 

St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

Gow, James. "The Future of Peacekeeping in the Yugoslav Region." In 
Brassev's Defense Yearbook. 1993 . London: Brassey's, 1993. 

Gutman, Roy. A Witness to Genocide . New York: Macmillan, 1993. 

Kim, Julie, et al. Bosnia-Hercegovina: Support from Islamic Countries . 
(CRS Report for Congress, No. 93-596F.) Washington: Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, June 19, 1993. 

Kim, Julie, ed., War in the Former Yugoslavia: Chronology of 

Events. August 16. 1992-Mav 30, 1993 . (CRS Report for Congress, 
No. 93-594F.) Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, June 15, 1993. 

Kim, Julie. Yugoslavia: The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
and Other Multilateral Missions . (CRS Report for Congress, No. 
93-439F.) Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, April 19, 1993. 

Lefever, Ernest W. "Reining in the U.N.," Foreign Affairs . 72, No. 3, 
1993, 72, No. 3, 1933, 17-21. 

Meron, Theodor. "The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia," 

Foreign Affairs . 72, No. 3, 1993, 122-35. 

Ottaway, David B. "Bosnian Troops Advance Against Croatia in Offensive 
Near Mostar," Washington Post . September 16, 1993, A3. 

-. "Hopes Fade for Imminent Bosnia Peace Pact," Washington Post . 

September 19, 1993, A22. 

"U.N. Troops Step Between Croats, Serbs," Washington Post . 
September 16, 1993, A24. 

Pfaff, William. "Invitation to War," Foreign Affairs . 72, No. 3, 1993, 
97-109. 


56 























Pomfret, John. "Neighbors Enforce Yugoslav Embargo, Most Borders 
Finally Close, But Croatia and Slovenia Still Let Trucks 
Through," Washington Post . September 14, 1993, A8. 

Saracino, Peter. "Polemics and Prescriptions: Interview With a 

Peacekeeper General," International Defense Review . 5, 1993. 

Sudetic, Chuck. "Bosnian Troops Advance Against Croats in Offensive 
Near Mostar," New York Times . September 16, 1993, A3. 

United Nations. "Parties to Conflict in Yugoslavia Urged to Settle 

Their Disputes Peacefully," U.N. Chronicle . 28, No. 4, December 

1991, 35-36. 

-. Peace-keeping Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) New 

York: United Nations, March 1993. 

-. "Security Council Acts Six More Times on Yugoslav Crisis," 

U.N. Chronicle . 29, No. 4. December 1992, 18-25. 

-. "Security Council Establishes Force to Handle Yugoslav 

crisis," U.N. Chronicle . 29, No. 2, June 1992, 15-18. 

-. "Situation Worsens as Peace Process Continues," U.N. 

Chronicle . 30, No. 2, June 1993, 4-12. 

-. "U.N. Peace-Keeping Operation for Yugoslavia in Question, 

Cease-fire must be respected," U.N. Chronicle . 29, No. 1, March 

1992, 72-73. 

Woehrel, Steven J. Bosnia-Herzegovina Negotiations: The Vance-Owen 
Plan . (CRS Report to Congress, No. 93-431F.) Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 14, 

1993, 

Woehrel, Steven J., and Julie Kim. Yugoslavia Crisis and U.S. Policy . 
(CRS Issue Brief, No. IB91089.) Washington: Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, September 2, 1993. 

"World Sitrep," Soldier of Fortune . October 1993, 18, No. 10, 17. 


57 






















United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) 

By Joshua Sinai 


Selected Chronology 

1947 


In April, the British mandatory authority referred the 
question of the future of Palestine to the United Nations (U.N.), 
after Britain had failed to reconcile Arab and Jewish claims to 
the area. 

On November 29, the U.N. General Assembly recommended the 
partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, 
with an international trusteeship for Jerusalem. The Arab states 
and the Palestinian Arabs rejected the partition resolution, 
while the Palestinian Jewish community accepted it. The General 
Assembly also established a Truce Commission to implement the 
partition resolution and to establish a truce between the warring 
Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. 

1948 


On May 14, as the British mandate for Palestine expired, the 
Provisional Government of Israel immediately proclaimed 
independence. The Arab states invaded Palestine, leading to a 
full-fledged war. 

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the U.N. Security Council 
called for a four-week cease-fire. Following a formal request by 
the Truce Commission on May 21, the Security Council on May 29 
passed Resolution 50 (1948) to establish a military observer 
mission, known as the United Nations Truce Supervisory 
Organization (UNTSO), to supervise the four-week cessation of 
fighting between Israel and the Arab states. 

On June 11 as the truce agreement went into effect, Ralph J. 
Bunche, the Secretary-General's Personal Representative, arranged 
for a group of military observers to be deployed in newly 
independent Israel and neighboring Arab countries. 

On August 1, the first contingent of UNTSO personnel arrived 
in the mission area. 

On September 17, U.N. Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte, of 
Sweden, was assassinated in Jerusalem by members of the Stern 
Gang, a Jewish rightwing terrorist group. Ralph Bunche assumed 
the mediator's duties and was appointing Acting Mediator. 

On October 19, the Security Council called for a cease-fire 


58 




in the Negev. 

On November 4, the Security Council called on the concerned 
governments to withdraw their troops to their October 14 
positions and establish truce lines and neutral or demilitarized 
zones. On November 16, the Security Council requested the parties 
to establish an armistice. 

On December 29, the Security Council adopted Resolution 66 
(1948) calling on the concerned governments to order an immediate 
cease-fire and facilitate the supervision of the truce by the 
UNTSO. 

1949 


On May 25, UNTSO's headquarters were transferred from Haifa 
to Government House in Jerusalem. 

On August 11, the Security Council assigned UNTSO new 
functions. The Mediator's role was ended, and the Truce 
Commission became inactive. UNTSO became an autonomous operation 
under the Security Council, and its function changed to assist in 
supervising the General Armistice Agreements. 

1954 


In June, UNTSO mediated an exchange of prisoners of war 
between Israel and Jordan. 

1955 


On February 28, Israel carried out a large-scale reprisal 
raid against military targets in the Egyptian-controlled Gaza 
Strip. 

1956 


In October, following the Egyptian blockade of the Suez 
Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, sabotage 
incursions into Israel, and the encirclement of Israel by large 
troop concentrations, war broke out as Israeli forces conquered 
Egyptian strongholds in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. 
Several days later, in conjunction with the Israeli operation, 
British and French forces intervened in Egypt. The Sinai 
Peninsula was occupied by Israeli forces. As part of the 
conditions for Israeli withdrawal, it was agreed that a new U.N. 
peacekeeping force would fill the power vacuum left by 
withdrawing troops and that this force would place itself between 
Egypt and Israel. The agreement resulted in the establishment of 
the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF, also known as UNEF I). 
UNTSO continued to operate along the Jordanian, Lebanese, and 
Syrian borders with Israel. 


59 






After denouncing the Armistice Agreement with Egypt, Israel 
refused to take part in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice 
Commission (EIMAC). 

1960 


A detachment of UNTSO personnel set up the U.N. Operation in 
the Congo (ONUC). 

1963 


UNTSO personnel were detached to set up the U.N. Yemen 
Observation Mission (UNYOM). 

1967 


On June 7, following UNEF's removal from the Sinai Peninsula 
amid heightening tensions between Israel and Egypt, Israel 
carried out a preemptive air strike against Egyptian and Syrian 
forces, shattering their armies within six days. 

Following the 1967 War, UNTSO's functions increased when it 
was given responsibility for monitoring the cease-fire on the 
Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal 
area. 


On November 22, the Security Council passed Resolution 242 
to promote Arab-Israeli peace. 

1972 


UNTSO set up a cease-fire observation operation in southern 
Lebanon. 

1973 


On October 6, war broke out when Egyptian and Syrian armies, 
in a simultaneous operation, attacked outposts along the Israeli- 
controlled Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights, respectively, 
with the aim of recapturing territories lost in the 1967 War. The 
war was halted by an October 22 U.N. cease-fire. 

On October 25 when the Security Council passed Resolution 
340, UNEF II was established to interpose between Israel and 
Egypt. 

On December 21, the Geneva Peace Conference was convened 
under U.N. auspices with the participation of Egypt, Jordan, and 
Israel, but not Syria. 

1974 


60 








Following the October War, several UNTSO observers were 
dispatched to the new U.N. peacekeeping force, the United Nations 
Disengagement Observed Force (UNDOF), established on May 31 and 
deployed on the Golan Heights. Other UNTSO personnel were 
assigned to the newly-established Observer Group Golan (OGG) 
peacekeeping operation. The Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD) 
became a separate UNTSO unit in Syria, providing support 
functions for OGG. In Egypt, UNTSO observers were organized as 
Observer Group Egypt (OGE). 

1978 


Some UNTSO observers were detached to the newly established 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), while another 
segment formed Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). 

1988 


UNTSO personnel assisted in setting up the United Nations 
Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), and 
the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). 

1991 


UNTSO personnel assisted in setting up the United Nations 
Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). 

1992 

UNTSO personnel assisted in setting up the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and the United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ). 

1993 


In September, the Israeli government and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) announced a draft treaty for mutual 
recognition, setting the stage—subject to a five-year interim 
period—for autonomy and eventual statehood for major portions of 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Arab states of Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon were also expected to reach peace terms with 
Israel. 


61 


\ 







INTRODUCTION 


The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is 
the first United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operation ever 
formed and its longest-running mission. Since its early days in 
1948, there have been five wars directly connected with the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, in addition to numerous border clashes. Five 
U.N. peacekeeping operations have been established to supervise 
truce agreements in the region. In 1993, three of these 
operations continued to be deployed. 

UNTSO's duties have ranged from observation of the 1949 
truce and subsequent armistice agreements to general observation 
in the entire Middle Eastern region, with specific roles assigned 
to it after the Arab-Israeli wars of October 1956, June 1967, 
October 1973, and September 1982, as well as the 1979 Egypt- 
Israel peace treaty. 

Unlike other missions, UNTSO has an indefinite mandate 
arising from the political necessity of having a U.N. 
peacekeeping observation mission as a constant presence in one of 
the world's most volatile regions. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

UNTSO's mandate arose indirectly from the May 1948 Security 
Council decision, embodied in Resolution 48, to establish a Truce 
Commission to negotiate and supervise a truce between Israel and 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. 

The Initial Crisis 

The Arab-Israeli conflict arose from the conflicting claims 


62 



of Jews and Arabs to the territory of Palestine. Following more 
than 400 years of rule by the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was 
placed under a League of Nations mandate with Great Britain as 
the mandatory power, after the Ottomans were defeated in World 
War I. The purpose of the mandate was to prepare the area for 
eventual self-government in their respective spheres by 
Palestine's Arab and Jewish communities. 1 Finding itself unable 
to reconcile the differences between the Arab and Jewish 
communities and facing mounting hostilities between the 
paramilitary forces of the two sides, the British government 
brought the problem of Palestine before the U.N. on April 2, 
1947. Since then the question of the future of the territory 
known as historical Palestine has continuously been brought to 
various U.N. bodies for deliberation in order to establish cease 
fire and truce arrangements, peace observation, emergency forces 
fact-finding missions, and short- and long-term conflict 
resolution. 

The U.N. Response 

The U.N. involvement in the area known as historical 
Palestine can be divided into five periods. The first period 
lasted from April 2, 1947 to July 20, 1949. On November 29, 1947 
the U.N. General Assembly, acting on the report of the Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), recommended the partition of 
Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with an 
international trusteeship for Jerusalem. A Palestine Commission 
was established in December to implement the General Assembly's 


63 



recommendations. However, problems arose when the Arab Higher 
Committee, the leadership body of the Palestinian Arabs, 
vehemently rejected the recommendations of the General Assembly, 
terming it tantamount to a "declaration of war"; the Jewish 
Agency, the governing body of the Jewish community in Palestine, 
accepted the partition resolution. The U.N. Security Council then 
passed a resolution calling for a truce between the Arab and 
Jewish communities, and established a Truce Commission to 
negotiate and supervise such a cease-fire. UNTSO grew out of the 
team employed by the Truce Commission to observe and supervise 
the cease-fire and truce. 2 In addition, the General Assembly 
appointed a U.N. Mediator, with functions overlapping those of 
the Truce Commission, to promote a peaceful settlement of the 
situation. 

The British mandate for Palestine expired on May 15, 1948, 
and the Provisional Government of Israel immediately proclaimed 
independence. Hostilities broke out when armed forces from the 
neighboring Arab states attacked the new Israeli state. The 
Security Council obtained a four-week cease-fire and enlarged the 
authority of the U.N. Mediator to supervise its observance. 

When hostilities resumed following expiration of the cease¬ 
fire, the Security Council on July 15, 1948 ordered the parties 
involved to desist from further military action. Nevertheless, 
sporadic military action continued, including the assassination 
of the U.N. Mediator, Count Bernadotte, by an extremist right- 
wing Jewish terrorist group. On November 16, the Security Council 


64 


passed a resolution to seek agreement by the parties to the 
conflict, leading to an immediate armistice, including the 
delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines. 

On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly established a 
Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to assume mediation 
functions formerly assigned to the Mediator and the Truce 
Commission. The mediation resulted in four separate General 
Armistice Agreements (GAA) in 1949: Egypt-Israel, February 24; 
Lebanon-Israel, March 23; Jordan-Israel, April 3; and Syria- 
Israel, July 20. Each agreement provided for a Mixed Armistice 
Commission (MAC) to supervise the truce, to define the 
demarcation lines, to provide for withdrawal and reduction of 
forces, and to consider complaints of breaches of the armistice 
agreements. 3 The agreements made reference to UNTSO's function of 
observing the armistice lines; that function was formally 
recognized by Security Council Resolution 72 (1949). Each of the 
four MAC'S was composed of an equal number of members from the 
parties, and the Chief-of-Staff of UNTSO, or his representative, 
was designated as chairman responsible to the Security Council. 4 

1949-1956 

The second period, lasting from July 20, 1949 until November 
7, 1956, represented the institutionalization of the U.N.'s 
peacekeeping observation mandate to monitor the four armistice 
agreements. With the attainment of the armistice, the Security 
Council on August 11, 1949 terminated the functions of the 
Mediator, and requested the Secretary-General to arrange for the 


65 



continued service of UNTSO personnel to observe and maintain the 
cease-fire and perform the functions assigned by the four MAC'S. 
The Chief-of-Staff of UNTSO was also given liaison functions with 
the U.N. and the PCC. However, the PCC played a minor role in 
peace observation because it was primarily assigned as a mediator 
seeking a long-term peace agreement between Israel and the Arab 
states. 5 

1956-1967 

The third period was marked by a reduction in UNTSO's 
effectiveness as a peacekeeping observation mission as a result 
of an escalation in hostilities along the Egyptian-Israeli and 
Syrian-Israeli armistice boundaries, which led to two full- 
fledged wars. The most difficult problems arose along the Egypt- 
Israel Armistice lines. In 1948 Egypt imposed a blockade on 
Israeli-bound shipping along the Suez Canal, as well as a 
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, which leads to the southern 
Israeli port of Eilat. The blockades were followed in the early 
1950s by continuous Egyptian-supported Palestinian guerrilla 
sabotage raids across the Egyptian Armistice lines, along with an 
encirclement of Israel by large Egyptian and Syrian troop 
concentrations. Israel perceived these actions as amounting to an 
abrogation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements, and the October 1956 
War broke out as Israeli forces conquered Egyptian strongholds in 
the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Several days later, in 
conjunction with the Israeli operation, British and French forces 
intervened in Egypt. The Sinai Peninsula was occupied by Israeli 


66 



forces. As part of the conditions for Israeli withdrawal, it was 
agreed that a new U.N. peacekeeping force would fill the power 
vacuum left by withdrawing troops and that this force would place 
itself between Egypt and Israel. The agreement resulted in the 
decision by the General Assembly on November 4, 1956 to establish 
the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF, also known as UNEF I— 
see next section), which was deployed along the borders in March 
1957. 

Because of the events that led to the 1956 War, Israel 
denounced the Armistice Agreement with Egypt and refused to take 
part in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC). 

UNTSO now operated along the Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian 
borders with Israel, although it could patrol only along the 
Egyptian side of the armistice line in the Sinai Peninsula and 
the Gaza Strip, and the MAC lost much of its influence because it 
now only had U.N. and Egyptian members. 6 Even under these 
circumstances, there was a reduction in the number of violations 
along the Egyptian-Israeli border until early 1967. 7 The 
situation differed along the Israel-Syria border where a MAC 
still functioned, although it lacked the resources to investigate 
the large volume of complaints about border incidents lodged by 
Syria and Israel. 8 Along the Jordan-Israel Armistice lines, there 
were frequent border clashes caused by Palestinian guerrilla acts 
of sabotage followed by Israeli retaliation. There were also 
problems in implementing the terms of the armistice agreements 
concerning the final status of Jerusalem. 


67 


1967-1973 


Mounting hostilities in the mid-1960s, particularly along 
the borders between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel, led to 
the outbreak of the June 1967 War. Israeli villages were shelled 
by Syrian positions on the Golan Heights. In mid-May 1967, Egypt 
requested the immediate withdrawal of UNEF forces from their 
positions along the Egypt-Israel border, the Straits of Tiran, 
and the Sinai Peninsula, to be effective during the period of May 
16-18. Secretary-General U Thant immediately complied with 
Egypt's request. On May 20-21, Egypt reimposed the blockade on 
the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli-bound shipping; Israel 
regarded the blockade as a casus belli. 

On June 7, amid these heightening tensions between Israel 
and Egypt, Israel carried out a preemptive air strike against 
Egyptian and Syrian forces, shattering their armies within six 
days. Following Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the 
Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, UNTSO's 
function changed to observing cease-fire lines, as opposed to 
armistice lines. Its functions increased when it was given 
responsibility for monitoring the cease-fire in the Suez Canal 
area, in place of the departed UNEF, and on the Israeli-occupied 
Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector. This responsibility 
lasted until October 1973. 

A further development during this period was the passage on 
November 22, 1967, of Security Council Resolution 242, which 
called on Israel to exchange territory captured during the 1967 


68 



War in return for peace with neighboring Arab states. 

From 1967 to 1973, the Arab-Israeli conflict remained 
stalemated, with Israel remaining in control of all the 
territories captured in the June 1967 War. 

1973-Present 

Two major military conflicts, the October 1973 War and the 
Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978, as well as the 
signing of the Egypt-Israel 1979 peace treaty, resulted in the 
seconding of UNTSO's personnel to form three new peacekeeping 
forces. UNTSO missions in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon were also 
reorganized. 

On October 6, 1973, war broke out on the Arab-Israeli front 
when Egyptian and Syrian armies, in a simultaneous operation, 
attacked outposts along the Israeli-controlled Suez Canal area 
and the Golan Heights, respectively, with the aim of recapturing 
territories lost in the 1967 War. The war was halted by an 
October 22 U.N. cease-fire. On October 25, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 340 to establish UNEF II to interpose between 
Israel and Egypt. This action was followed by the signing of a 
disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel on January 18, 
1974. When UNEF II's mandate expired in 1979 as a result of the 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, UNTSO's observers remained in the 
Sinai Peninsula, but were reorganized as Observer Group Egypt 
(OGE). 9 Following a three-stage withdrawal process under the 
terms of the 1979 peace treaty, Israel withdrew from the Sinai 
Peninsula on April 25, 1982, and a non-U.N. Multinational Force 


69 



and Observers (MFO) mission was deployed in the eastern portion 
of the Sinai Peninsula. 

Under the terms of the 1978 Camp David Accords, Israel also 
agreed on a framework for resolving the Palestinian issue through 
the provision of eventual autonomy for the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. 

A disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, signed 
on May 30, 1974, resulted in the detachment of some UNTSO 
observers to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF), established on May 31 and deployed on the Golan Heights. 
UNTSO in the Syrian-Israeli sector was reorganized as the 
Observer Group Golan (OGG) peacekeeping operation. The Observer 
Detachment Damascus (ODD) became a separate UNTSO unit in Syria, 
providing support functions for OGG. 

UNTSO underwent further reorganization along the Israeli- 
Lebanese frontier. In 1972 five UNTSO outposts were established 
in Lebanon along the Lebanon-Israel armistice lines. When the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was formed 
following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and an Israeli 
"security zone" in southern Lebanon was established, UNTSO's 
functions were suspended and it was reorganized to form Observer 
Group Lebanon (OGL) in order to assist UNIFIL. 10 UNTSO's Lebanon 
contingent was reorganized again in August 1982 when Observer 
Group Beirut (OGB) was created following Israel's invasion of 
Lebanon in June 1982. In addition to the U.N. peacekeeping 
observer presence, a non-U.N. Multinational Force (MNF) was 


70 


established to maintain order in Beirut and monitor Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon. The first phase of Israel's withdrawal 
from Lebanon took place in February 1985. Although Israel 
announced the completion of its withdrawal from Lebanon on June 
10, 1985, it continued to retain a "security zone" along the 
border inside Lebanon, policed by the Israeli-sponsored South 
Lebanon Army (SLA) and supported by smaller numbers of Israeli 
troops. The "security zone" was a constant source of friction 
with the U.N. peacekeeping contingent in Lebanon. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

During the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, UNTSO has 
been deployed in a variety of peacekeeping missions in the 
sector's frontiers, with several of its units reconfigured to 
meet changing circumstances and requirements. UNTSO was first 
deployed in the Palestine sector following the passage of 
Security Council Resolution of April 23, 1948. The first 
contingent of U.N. observers dispatched to Palestine arrived in 
mid-June 1948, and numbered 93. 11 By September 1948, 572 
observers were deployed; their number was reduced to between 30 
and 140 once the General Armistice Agreements were concluded in 
1949, and remained at that strength for the next two decades. 12 

In the Egyptian-Israeli sector, after the October 1956 War 
UNTSO observers were deployed only on the Egyptian side of the 
armistice line of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, as a 
result of Israel's denunciation of the Armistice Agreement with 
Egypt and refusal to participate in EIMAC's proceedings. 13 Actual 


71 


peacekeeping functions were henceforth performed by UNEF I, 
although in cooperation with UNTSO. In May 1967, when UNEF I 
forces were withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian government, 
UNTSO observers undertook limited patrols along the armistice 
demarcation line; their numbers were increased from six to 20 as 
additional UNTSO observers from Jerusalem were sent to Gaza to 
supplement that force. 14 Following the June 1967 War, UNTSO 
observers were redeployed to patrol along the Suez Canal area. 

In 1979, UNTSO observers remained in the Sinai Peninsula, forming 
Observer Group Egypt (OGE). OGE numbered 55 observers (June 1990) 
and operated six observation outposts in the Sinai Peninsula, one 
at Ismailia, with a headquarters in Cairo. 15 However, with the 
conclusion of the Egypt-Israel 1979 peace treaty and the 
establishment in 1982 of the non-U.N. Multinational Force and 
Observers (MFO) to patrol the Sinai, OGE observers saw their 
peacekeeping role reduced substantially. There was a possibility 
that in the future they might substitute for the MFO, should 
Egypt and Israel "mutually agree to phase out that force." 16 

In the Syrian-Israeli sector, on the Golan Heights, UNTSO 
observers staffed observation posts on both the Syrian and 
Israeli sides. On the Golan Heights, some UNTSO observers were 
seconded to UNDOF in May 1974 as Observer Group Golan (OGG), 
coming under UNDOF's operational command. 17 Because of the 
prohibition against the participation in UNDOF of UNTSO observers 
from the Security Council's five permanent members, a separate 
unit known as Observation Detachment Damascus (ODD) was 


72 


established and charged with providing OGG with various support 
functions. 18 As of June 1990, 138 UNTSO military observers were 
deployed in the Syria-Israel sector, with 96 seconded to OGG, 35 
to ODD, and seven holding staff positions at UNDOF's headquarters 
in Damascus. 19 

In the Jordanian-Israeli sector, no cease-fire observation 
posts have ever been established along that common border because 
of the reluctance of both countries to accept a deployment of 
U.N. observers in the Jordan Valley. 20 Nevertheless, an Israel- 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission was based 
in Amman, Jordan, with two UNTSO military observers staffing the 
liaison office. 21 

In the Lebanese-Israeli sector, UNTSO personnel established 
five observation posts on the Lebanese side of the armistice 
demarcation line after 1970. Following the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1978, UNTSO's functions ceased in that country. UNTSO 
observers then were either seconded directly to the newly formed 
UNIFIL or were reconstituted as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). In 
1990, OGL had 65 military observers. 22 In August 1982, following 
Israel's second invasion of Lebanon, UNTSO personnel were 
seconded to the newly created Observer Group Beirut (OGB); eight 
observers remained by late 1990. 23 

UNTSO observers have also been detached or seconded to other 
peacekeeping operations, such as the Iran-Iraq Military Observer 
Group (1984-88), the U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and the Angola Verification Mission. 24 


73 


Political and Military Goals 


UNTSO's political and military mandate has been radically 
altered by the various armed conflagrations since 1948. It was 
initially deployed to supervise the May 1948 truce, but in 1949 
it was assigned to supervise the work of the four MAC'S, which 
were set up to provide a forum of authorized U.N. representatives 
to hear specific complaints from the Arab and Israeli parties 
about alleged violations of the cease-fire. The MAC'S then 
forwarded the complaints in written reports and recommendations 
to the U.N. The MAC'S, however, lacked the power to impose 
sanctions against cease-fire violators. As they became 
increasingly overwhelmed by complaints from both sides, which 
made it difficult for them to function effectively, their role 
declined over the years; none remained functional after 1967. 25 
UNTSO then became the primary U.N. agency to observe, 
investigate, and report on border incidents in the region, and it 
reported on these incidents directly to the Security Council and 
the Secretary-General. 26 

UNTSO's primary military goal is to serve as a deterrent to 
aggression by either side because of its presence as neutral 
observer and its role in assessing cease-fire violations. 27 To 
ensure their status as neutral observers, UNTSO troops are 
unarmed. Thus their primary function is to "observe, report, and 
investigate" border incidents while using no force or enforcement 
powers to resolve these violations. 

Rules of Engagement 


74 




UNTSO's mission in the Arab-Israeli sector is essentially to 
observe, investigate, and report on border incidents in the 
Israeli-Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese sectors, in 
cooperation with other U.N. peacekeeping forces in the region. It 
observes the implementation of cease-fires and reports complaints 
submitted by the parties concerned to the Secretary-General. It 
conducts inspections of areas where armaments and forces are 
limited by disengagement agreements. UNTSO personnel are unarmed 
and therefore not in a position to prevent the outbreak of war. 
Composition of Forces 

By 1993, nineteen countries provided UNTSO with military 
observers and other personnel. 28 The participation in UNTSO by 
officers from the Soviet Union and the United States began only 
in 1973. However, because the Soviets were not accepted by the 
Israelis and the Syrians refused to accept the Americans, neither 
group could be deployed at observation posts along the Syrian- 
Israeli frontier. 29 They did, however, constitute the majority of 
the OGE observer contingent. 30 

UNTSO's maximum strength was 572 personnel in 1948; on June 
30, 1990, it numbered 291 military observers. 31 Throughout 
UNTSO's existence, its observers have been designated or seconded 
into groups and assigned to the Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, 
Lebanese, and Israeli sectors. 32 

Members of UNTSO are rotated during their tour of duty in 
order to expose them to a variety of environments, ranging from 
peaceful to highly volatile and dangerous. 


75 



Equipment 


UNTSO's equipment ranged from ground transport vehicles such 
as trucks and jeeps (with U.N. markings) , to light aircraft and 
helcopters; high frequency VHF radio and other communications 
equipment; binoculars; light arms; and medical supplies. 

Training 

As the U.N.'s first and longest-running peacekeeping 
operation, UNTSO's training procedures have evolved over the 
years to meet changing requirements, and in the process its 
personnel gained increasing experience in peacekeeping duties. It 
thereby gained a role as a training ground and a source of 
potential reserves, frequently in rapid deployment situations, 
for the establishment of new peacekeeping operations. 33 
Tactics 

UNTSO observers monitor border situations by staffing 
observation posts and by conducting mobile reconnaissance patrols 
in marked U.N. jeeps. 34 
Cost 

Since its inception, UNTSO's expenditures have been financed 
by the U.N.'s regular budget. From May 1948 until December 31, 
1989, UNTSO's expenditures totaled $310,521,300; by 1991 its 
expenditure had reached $356 million. 35 UNTSO's annual operating 
costs are approximately $31 million. 36 
Operational Assessment 

UNTSO's successes and failures are measured in terms of the 
fulfillment of its mandated functions to observe, investigate, 


76 







and report on border incidents, and to serve as a neutral body in 
deterring aggression across borders by the parties to the 
conflict. 

Successes have included the following: 

First, UNTSO representatives have provided an indispensable 
function as mediators between Israel and the neighboring Arab 
states because most of the parties have been in a state of war 
with each other and have no formal diplomatic relations. This 
mediation function has included exchanges of prisoners of war. 

Second, UNTSO has fulfilled an important function in 
impartially and objectively documenting facts concerning 
violations of the cease-fire and acts of aggression. This 
function was essential during periods of heightened hostility and 
tension. For example, upon the outbreak of the October 1973 War, 
the U.N. Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that 
Egypt had attacked first, which Egypt subsequently denied. But 
the accuracy of the Secretary-General's report forced the 
Egyptian government to reverse its denial. 37 

UNTSO observers have also provided an important source of 
reporting in highly volatile areas where objective information 
was scarce. The 1982 UNTSO detachment to Lebanon, known as 
Observer Group in Beirut (OGB), was considered a success because 
it reported on the effectiveness of the multinational force, the 
progress of Israeli withdrawal, and the conditions in the refugee 
camps. 38 

Third, UNTSO's long-term experience and training as 


77 


peacekeeper in the Arab-Israeli sector have enabled it to rapidly 
deploy its detachments to newly formed peacekeeping missions in 
other regions; its presence on the ground has served as an 
initial deterrent to renewed hostilities. 39 

Failures have included the following: 

First, despite the initial U.N. intention that the 1949 
armistice lines would be only temporary arrangements and would be 
followed by peace treaties between the contending parties, by 
1993 most of the basic issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
remained either unresolved or in the process of resolution. This 
situation was not caused by a deficiency in UNTSO's role or 
function; rather, it points to the basic limitation of its 
peacekeeping mission. It is only through agreements by the local 
parties that conflicts are ultimately resolved, as demonstrated 
by the Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement of September 1993. In 
the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a series of national 
security policies by the local parties exacerbated the situation 
from the very beginning. In 1949, for example, Transjordan, with 
Israeli acquiescence, took over the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, while Egypt assumed control of the Gaza Strip—the 
areas allotted to the Palestinians by the 1947 U.N. partition 
resolution. The defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the June 
1967 War resulted in the Israeli takeover of the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, and together with a hardening 
of positions by all sides resulted in the further postponement of 
the resolution of the future of the Palestinian people. 


78 


Second, UNTSO was vulnerable on a number of occasions to 
unilateral eviction by a party to the conflict. This fact was 
demonstrated in May 1967 when Egypt demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of UNTSO (and UNEF I) from its territory. 

Third, UNTSO's effectiveness was repeatedly compromised by 
the conflicting approaches to the Arab-Israeli dispute taken by 
the U.N.'s General Assembly and Security Council, particularly in 
addressing the Palestinian issue. Annual resolutions passed by 
the General Assembly tended to exceed and question the decisions 
of the Security Council, thus undermining the U.N.'s impartiality 
in settling the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. 40 Furthermore, the 
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People, a special U.N. body, has been criticized for 
being heavily biased against Israel, resulting in the refusal of 
Western countries to participate in its deliberations. 41 

Fourth, despite the initial hope when the U.N. was founded 
that soldiers detached to peacekeeping forces would transfer 
their national allegiance to the U.N., military personnel 
seconded to UNTSO have tended to function as representatives of 
their own countries, serving their countries' national interest 
or security. 42 

Fifth, the seconding of unarmed military personnel to 
peacekeeping missions located in highly volatile regions has at 
times resulted in risking their lives. This fact was underscored 
in February 1988 by the kidnapping and execution by Lebanese 
extremists of Lieutenant Colonel (USMC) William Higgins, who was 


79 


serving as UNTSO's commander in southern Lebanon. 43 

CURRENT SITUATION 

In 1993, UNTSO continued to deploy observer groups in Egypt 
(particularly in the Sinai Peninsula), Lebanon (especially 
Beirut), Syria (on the Golan Heights and in Damascus), Jordan 
(with a liaison office in Amman), and Israel (where it maintained 
its headquarters), with some of its personnel detailed to UNIFIL 
and UNDOF. 

The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty paved the way for UNTSO's 
replacement in the Sinai Peninsula by the non-U.N. Multinational 
Force (MNF). 

In December 1987, the Palestinian intifada (uprising) broke 
out in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, continuing 
until the Israeli-PLO rapprochement in late 1993. It served to 
transform the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by bringing it into 
Israel itself, with UNTSO playing no peacekeeping role in the two 
territories. 

In February 1988, following a number of diplomatic 
initiatives in the 1980s, United States Secretary of State George 
Schultz outlined a plan bearing his name to provide a framework 
for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on U.N. 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. This plan ultimately 
led to a number of major diplomatic breakthroughs. On December 
13, 1988, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, in an address to the U.N. 
General Assembly, which had relocated to Geneva, offered an 
historic concession by explicitly recognizing Israel and 


80 


This statement, as well as other 


rejecting "terrorism." 
diplomatic moves initiated by the United States, inaugurated a 
new phase in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking. 

In the early 1990s, there was substantive progress in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the future of the Palestinian issue. 
Under United States leadership, a peace process was convened 
involving a series of bilateral Arab-Israeli talks under the 
mantle of an international conference, with the U.N. having 
observer status. On October 30, 1991, the first Arab-Israeli 
peace conference was held in Madrid, under United States, Soviet 
Union (later the Russian Republic), and U.N. auspices. Further 
peace conferences were held in Washington and Moscow. For the 
first time, the participants included Israel, a Palestinian 
delegation, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Alongside these 
bilateral and multilateral meetings, Israel and the PLO began to 
meet secretly, under Norwegian auspices, culminating in the 
September 1993 rapprochement between the two sides. 

CONCLUSION 

The fate of UNTSO and its various peacekeeping detachments 
has always depended on the actions of the parties involved in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. First, although UNTSO's presence generally 
contributed to the maintenance of relative peace along the 
armistice and cease-fire boundaries between Israel and Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, on several occasions it was unable to 
prevent the outbreak of hostilities once the local parties had 
decided to launch preemptive strikes against each other. This 


81 


resulted from UNTSO's limited mandate and lack of enforcement 
capability. Second, the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was always recognized to be beyond UNTSO's mandate. In 
fact, even the U.N. played no role in bringing about the 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict because the General 
Assembly resolutions over the years tended to be highly partisan 
and were not constructive in terms of conflict resolution. 

Nevertheless, tremendous progress was achieved in resolving 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1990's because of the 
diplomatic efforts of the United States, various European 
nations, and Russia. These efforts ultimately led to the historic 
September 1993 Israeli-Palestinian treaty of mutual recognition, 
which provided a five-year transitional framework for Palestinian 
self-rule beginning in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, on the West 
Bank, and accompanied by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from 
those areas. This treaty was likely to lead to yet another 
transformation in UNTSO's peacekeeping mission. The final fate of 
UNTSO: to be reconstituted along new international 
Arab/Palestinian-Israeli frontiers or to be replaced by a non- 
U.N. peacekeeping organization similar to the MNF in the Sinai 
Peninsula, depended on the outcome of Israeli-Palestinian/Arab 
negotiations. 


82 


Endnotes 


1. For analyses of the controversy over the aims of the British 
mandate for Palestine, see Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to 
Israel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); J.C. 
Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Schocken, 1976); 
and Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest: Readings in 
Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948 (Washington: 
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987). 

2. N.D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1990), 184. 

3. David Wainhouse, ed., International Peace Observation: A 
History and Forecast (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 
244; and Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine, eds., Political 
Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: 
Quadrangle, 1974), 404. 

4. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation . 244. 

5. Ibid . 245. 

6. Mona Ghali, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 
1948-Present," in William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analyses (New York: 

St. Martin's Press, 1993), 95. 

7. Ibid . 

8. Ibid . 

9. Ibid .. 97. 

10. Ibid ., 97. 

11. Ibid .. 93. 

12. Ibid ., 94. 

13. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 

August 1990), 25. 

14. Ibid .. 26. 

15. Ibid ., 37. 

16. Ghali, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948- 
Present," 97. 


83 


























17. The Blue Helmets . 38; 
Supervision Organization: 

18. The Blue Helmets . 38; 
Supervision Organization: 

19. The Blue Helmets . 38; 
Supervisory Organization: 


Ghali, "United Nations Truce 
1948-Present," 97. 

Ghali, "United Nations Truce 
1948-Present," 97. 

Ghali, "United Nations Truce 
1948-Present," 97. 


20. Ghali, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948- 
Present," 96. 


21. The Blue Helmets . 38. 

22. Ibid ., 39. 

23. The Blue Helmets . 41; Ghali, "United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization: 1948-Present," 98. 

24. The Blue Helmets . 41-2. 

25. W. Andrew Terrill, "The Lessons of UNTSO and the Future of UN 
Truce Supervision," Conflict . 9, No. 2, 1989, 199. 

26. Ibid. 


27. Ibid. 


28. Peace-Keeping Information Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New 
York: United Nations, March 1993), 4. 

29. Fred Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987), 37. 

30. Ghali, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948- 
Present," 97. 

31. The Blue Helmets . 419. 

32. Ghali, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948- 
Present," 94. 

33. Ibid .. 100. 

34. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 37. 

35. The Blue Helmets . 419; Ghali, "United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization: 1948-Present," 91. 

36. Peace-Keeping Information Notes . 4. 


84 




















37. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security . 214. 

38. Ibid . 

39. The Blue Helmets . 15. 

40. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security . 128. 

41. Ibid . 

42. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 38. 

43. Terrill, "The Lessons of UNTSO and the Future of UN Truce 
Supervision," 201. 


85 










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Ghali, Mona. ’’United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948- 
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Hurewitz, J.C. The Struggle for Palestine . New York: Schocken, 1976. 

Khalidi, Walid, ed. From Haven to Conguest: Readings in Zionism and 
the Palestine Problem Until 1948 . Washington: Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1987. 

Peace-Keeping Information Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: 
United Nations, March 1993. 

Shimoni, Yaacov, and Evyatar Levine, eds. Political Dictionary of the 
Middle East in the 20th Century . New York: Quadrangle, 1974. 

Sykes, Christopher. Crossroads to Israel. 1917-1948 . Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1973. 

Terrill, W. Andrew. "The Lessons of UNTSO and the Future of UN Truce 
Supervision," Conflict . 9, No. 2, 1989, 197-208. 

Wainhouse, David, ed. International Peace Observation: A History and 
Forecast . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 

White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 

Peace and Security . New York: Manchester University Press, 1990. 


86 



















United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) 


Selected Chronology 

1956 


War broke out in October when, following a period of 
heightened tension, Israeli, British, and French forces initiated 
military action against Egypt. In November, the U.N. General 
Assembly voted to establish UNEF (also known as UNEF I) . 

1957 


In March, UNEF I was deployed along the border between Egypt 
and Israel. 

1967 


In mid-May, Egypt requested UNEF I's immediate withdrawal 
from its positions along the Egypt-Israel border, the Straits of 
Tiran, and the Sinai Peninsula. UNEF I was withdrawn on May 16- 
18. On June 7, the Six-Day War broke out as Israeli forces 
shattered the Egyptian and Syrian armies. Following the 
conclusion of the war, UNTSO personnel were given responsibility 
for monitoring the cease-fire, in place of the departed UNEF. 


87 





INTRODUCTION 


United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF; also known as UNEF 
I) was established following the United Nations (U.N.) General 
Assembly's decision on November 5, 1956 "to secure and supervise 
the cessation of hostilities" 1 that had resulted from the October 
1956 Egypt-Israel War (also known as the Sinai Campaign). 
Following the war and the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and 
French troops from Egyptian territory, Egypt agreed to the 
deployment of the UNEF in Egypt and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza 
Strip; Israel, however, refused to permit the force to be 
stationed on its territory. During the Egyptian-Israeli crisis of 
May 1967 and Egypt's unilateral demand for its evacuation, UNEF 
(and United Nations Truce Supervisor Organization--UNTSO) forces 
were withdrawn from their positions along the border and replaced 
by Egyptian troops. UNEF's mandate was terminated following the 
outbreak of the June 1967 War, when it was replaced by UNEF II. 
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

Growing tensions in 1955-56 along the Egypt-Israel border, 
as well as British and French opposition to Egyptian 
nationalization measures, resulted in the outbreak of the October 
1956 War. Israel felt threatened by a number of developments that 
it regarded as abrogating the 1949 Armistice Agreements. These 
developments included an arms deal between Egypt and 
Czechoslovakia in 1955 that Israel viewed as upsetting the 
military balance; an Egyptian blockade of the port of Eilat and 


88 



the Gulf of Aqaba, imposed since 1954; continuous sabotage raids 
from their bases in Gaza, across the Egyptian armistice lines, by 
Palestinian guerrilla forces (fedaiyin), supported by the 
Egyptian government; and public statements by Egyptian officials 
threatening Israel's destruction. 2 In addition, in October 1956, 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan established a Unified Military Command 
of their forces. 3 

A number of factors caused France and Britain to join forces 
with Israel against Egypt. France, which had colonial interests 
in the Middle East and was Israel's main arms supplier, and 
Britain, which had been the colonial ruler of Egypt, had both 
become alarmed at Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company and its growing ties with the Soviet Union. 4 Following 
Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the French and 
British governments requested the convening of the Security 
Council to discuss Cairo's unilateral action. Egypt, however, 
responded that the Security Council should instead consider the 
French and British actions "which constitute a danger to 
international peace and security...." 5 The Security Council met 
on September 26, 1956, to consider this issue, and the Secretary- 
General proposed six principles to resolve the crisis, which were 
incorporated in Security Council Resolution 118 (1956) of October 
13. Full-scale fighting, nevertheless, broke out at the end of 
the month. 6 

Because of these developments, on October 29 Israel launched 
a preemptive strike against Egypt, in coordination with British 


89 


and French forces. In the fighting, the Israeli forces routed the 
Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula (stopping 10 miles east of 
the Suez Canal) and the Gaza Strip, which it proceeded to occupy. 
On October 31, the Anglo-French forces invaded the Suez Canal 
Zone. 7 The other Arab countries, however, took no part in the 
fighting, despite their mutual defense treaties with Egypt. 

The U.N. Response 

The Security Council was initially paralyzed in responding 
to the outbreak of fighting because Britain and France, two of 
its permanent members, had veto rights over any decision. 8 Thus, 
for example, a draft resolution submitted to the Security Council 
on October 30 calling for Israeli withdrawal was vetoed by 
Britain and France. 9 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

To overcome a British or French veto, a special emergency 
session of the General Assembly was held on November 1-2, 1956. 
With United States and Soviet support, the General Assembly 
passed Resolution 997 (ES-I) calling for Israel's immediate 
withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines. 10 This action was 
followed on November 5 by the General Assembly's vote in 
Resolution 1000 (ES-I) to establish UNEF to replace the 
withdrawing Israeli, British, and French forces. 11 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

UNEF's initial deployment began on November 12, 1956, when a 
UNTSO detachment of military observers arrived in Cairo to 
establish temporary headquarters. 12 It became fully operational 


90 




in mid-November upon the establishment of the cease-fire. UNEF's 
initial tasking was to replace the withdrawing forces of the 
three occupying states and to temporarily administer the Gaza 
Strip. Under a "good faith agreement" between the U.N. Secretary- 
General and the Egyptian government, UNEF detachments were 
stationed in Egypt and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip. 13 They 
also were stationed at Sharm ash-Shaykh on the Straits of Tiran 
to ensure the free passage of shipping in the straits. Israel 
refused to have UNEF troops deployed on its territory. 

UNEF continued to carry out its peacekeeping mission until 
the crisis of May 1967, when Egypt requested the withdrawal of 
its (and UNTSO's) contingents from its territory, including Sharm 
ash-Shaykh. Egyptian forces then took up positions along the 
border with Israel. 

Political and Military Goals 

UNEF's mandate and goals were derived from resolutions 997, 
998, 999, and 1000 passed by the General Assembly in November 
1956. These resolutions called on the UNEF force to secure a 
cease-fire, to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops, and to 
observe and patrol the armistice lines. 14 The military goal of 
the UNEF mission was to prevent clashes between Israeli and 
Egyptian forces by its presence, rather than by any enforcement 
action. 15 

Rules of Engagement 

From 1956, until it was withdrawn in May 1967, UNEF I 
performed peacekeeping functions along the Egypt-Israel frontier. 


91 




However, unlike UNTSO, which was strictly an observer operation, 
UNEF I was a peacekeeping mission that served as a lightly armed 
barrier between Egypt and Israel. The mission involved 
supervising the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel; observing, 
investigating, and reporting on border incidents; and acting as 
an "informal buffer" between Israeli and Egyptian forces along 
the international frontier and the Armistice Demarcation Line 
(ADL). 16 Until Egyptian authority was reestablished in the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip in March 1957, UNEF I temporarily 
performed civil affairs functions, including security, in those 
inhabited areas. 17 Other functions included the use of force, 
although "only in self-defense"; 18 arranging for the 
implementation of prisoner of war exchanges between Egypt and 
Israel; providing protection to mine-clearing ships deployed by 
Britain and France in the Suez Canal, as well as participating in 
some of the minefield clearing operations on land; and repairing 
some roads and tracks in the peninsula. 19 
Composition of Forces 

UNEF's size at the initial deployment in 1956 was more than 
6,000 personnel; by May 1967 it had been reduced to 3,378. 20 The 
U.N. force was composed of contingents from 10 countries, with 
the national contingents kept separate and intact, although under 
the U.N.'s operational control. 21 Thus, for example, each 
national contingent was led by its own commander, and each had 
exclusive responsibility for administering criminal and military 
law to its troops. 22 Yugoslavia provided an entire reconnaissance 


92 



battalion, Canada supplied a light-armored squadron, as well as 
transportation, engineering, ordnance, and medical units; and the 
Indian contingent was responsible for the supply depot and other 
services. 23 
Equipment 

UNEF's equipment consisted of Caribou C-119 light transport 
aircraft; supply aircraft; a helicopter; British and American- 
made patrol vehicles; supply trucks; wrecker and tow trucks, 
logistical and communications equipment; light firearms, 
including rifles and automatic weapons; mine-clearing equipment; 
water supplies; and various electrical equipment. 24 
Training 

Many of the initial UNEF I forces had been seconded from the 
UNTSO mission already deployed along the Israel-Arab boundaries; 
hence they were already experienced in peacekeeping operations. 
The later UNEF I forces consisted of other national contingents, 
with each providing a particular specialty. Their experience had 
been obtained during national military training. 

Tactics 

UNEF troops carried out mobile ground patrols and manned 
observation posts along the Egyptian side of the frontier because 
of Israel's refusal to permit U.N. troops on its side of the 
boundaries. The U.N. peacekeepers also conducted air patrols, 
with some units providing air reconnaissance support. The troops 
carried weapons and engaged in self-defense. 

Cost 


93 






From its inception in November 1956 until June 1967, UNEF 
I's expenditures totalled $214,249,000. 25 The countries providing 
contingents of peacekeepers and other staff absorbed some of the 
expenses incurred by the operation, thus reducing the financial 
cost to the U. N. 26 

UNEF's financing came from a special U.N. budget raised by 
member states. The force encountered difficulties, particularly 
over the refusal of the Soviet bloc to pay its share, despite an 
advisory opinion of the International Court in 1962 that declared 
the contribution of U.N. members to the force's financing to be 
obligatory. 

Operational Assessment 

UNEF I's record of accomplishment was mixed. It succeeded in 
maintaining relative peace along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier 
for a decade, despite its ad hoc and improvised beginnings and 
Israel's refusal to allow the force to be stationed on its side 
of the cease-fire line. Thus, the number of infiltrations across 
the Egypt-Israel frontier, particularly by Palestinian 
guerrillas, was "markedly reduced" by UNEF's presence. 27 

Nevertheless, UNEF was involved in several significant 
failures that had long-term repercussions for peacekeeping 
operations generally. First, the decision by U.N. Secretary- 
General U Thant to comply with the unilateral Egyptian request to 
withdraw UNEF troops from its territory during a period of high 
tension in the region aroused great controversy and marred the 
reputation of the U.N. as an instrument for conflict resolution. 


94 



Israel, in particular, considered UNEF's removal at Egypt's 
insistence, without approval by the Security Council, to be 
unjustified and incompatible with assurances it had received in 
1957 when the peacekeeping force was originally deployed. 28 This 
action reinforced Israel's "basic lack of confidence" 29 in the 
U.N. as an impartial peacekeeping organization. 

Second, UNEF I's organizational structure was criticized for 
being "scattered." 30 Its headquarters was situated in the Gaza 
Strip, while most of the troops were deployed a great distance 
away along the Egypt-Israel armistice line. 

Third, UNEF I's command and control structure was considered 
to be "large" and "unwieldy." 31 

Fourth, the mixture of equipment deployed by the various 
national contingent forces created logistical difficulties. 32 
These difficulties were exacerbated by the variety of languages 
spoken by the different forces. 33 

Fifth, UNEF I lacked adequate intelligence-gathering 
resources. 34 No units responsible for intelligence gathering and 
dissemination were attached to the force. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

Following UNEF's withdrawal from the Egyptian frontier on 
May 18, 1967, Secretary-General U Thant decided to increase the 
number of UNTSO observers along the Armistice Demarcation Line 
between Egypt and Israel. 35 This increase was intended to provide 
for a U.N. presence, if only symbolic, along the frontier, which 
was gearing up for war. Although U Thant had arranged to arrive 


95 


in Cairo on May 22 to discuss new security arrangements with the 
Egyptian government, the tensions between Israel and Egypt 
quickly escalated prior to his arrival when President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser on May 21-22 reimposed a blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba, 
thus closing the Strait of Tiran to Israeli-bound shipping. 36 

Full-fledged war broke out on June 5, 1967 when, in a 
preemptive action, the Israeli Air Force attacked Egyptian, 
Syrian, and Jordanian positions. After routing the Arab forces in 
the Six-Day War, Israel was left in control of the Sinai 
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. 
UNTSO, the U.N.'s umbrella peacekeeping mission in the Arab- 
Israeli sector, then assumed the peacekeeping duties formerly 
assigned to UNEF along the Egyptian-Israeli border. 

CONCLUSION 

The withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula under 
Egyptian pressure in May 1967 was not responsible for the 
outbreak of hostilities in June. Even if the force had remained 
in place, it would not have deterred either side from initiating 
war because it is up to the parties to the conflict to initiate 
and end hostilities. 


96 


Endnotes 


1• The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 
(New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 
August 1990), 46. 

2. Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine, eds., Political Dictionary 
of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: Quadrangle, 
1974), 352; The Blue Helmets . 43. 

3. Shimoni and Levine, Political Dictionary of the Middle East in 
the 20th Century . 352. 

4. Ibid .. 83, 136. 

5. The Blue Helmets . 44. 

6. Ibid . 

7. Ibid .. 45. 

8. Ibid ., 352. 

9. Ibid . 45. 

10. Ibid . 

11. Ibid . 

12. Ibid . 70. 

13. Ibid ., 53. 

14. N.D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1990), 218. 

15. The Blue Helmets . 73. 

16. Ibid .. 73. 

17. Ibid .. 73. 

18. Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I," in William J. 
Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 118. 

19. The Blue Helmets . 72; Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force 

I," 120. 

20. The Blue Helmets . 57. 


97 




























21. The Blue Helmets . 56, 58; Fred Gaffen, In the Eve of the 
Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau and 
Wayne, 1987), 42. 

22. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 42. 

23. The Blue Helmets . 56. 

24. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 46-56. 

25. The Blue Helmets . 421. 

26. Ibid . 

27. Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I," 123. 

28. Shimoni and Levine, Political Dictionary of the Middle East 
in the 20th Century . 407. 

29. Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I," 125. 

30. Ibid . 

31. Ibid . 

32. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 73. 

33. Ibid . 

34. Ibid . 

35. The Blue Helmets . 78. 

36. The Blue Helmets . 78; Shimoni and Levine, Political 
Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century . 353. 


98 





















Bibliography 


The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, Department of Public Information, August 1990. 

Gaffen, Fred. In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping . Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987. 

Ghali, Mona. "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force." In William 
J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

"United Nations Disengagement Force." In Peace-Keeping Information 
Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: United Nations, March 

1993 . 

"United Nations Disengagement Force." In The Europa World Year Book. 
1993 . London: Europa, 1993. 

White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 

Peace and Security . New York: Manchester University Press, 1990. 


99 

















United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) 


Selected Chronology 

1973 


The October War broke out on the Arab-Israeli front when 
Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked outposts along the Israeli- 
controlled Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights, respectively. 

On October 25, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 340 to 
establish UNEF II to interpose between Israel and Egypt. 

1979 


UNEF II's mandate expired as a result of the Egypt-Israel 
Peace Treaty. 


100 




INTRODUCTION 


United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was established 
following the cease-fire agreement that terminated the October 

1973 Arab-Israeli War (also known as the Yom Kippur War and War 
of Ramadan), when the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council 
voted to dispatch a new peacekeeping mission to the Israeli- 
Egyptian sector. When it was proposed that the UNEF II provide a 
similar function for the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement, 
a detachment of UNEF was deployed on the Golan Heights on May 31, 

1974 and renamed United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces 
(UNDOF). UNEF II's mandate was terminated in July 1979 when the 
non-U.N. Multinational Force was established in the Sinai 
Peninsula to monitor the implementation of the Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The Initial Crisis 

Following a seven-year political stalemate between Israel 
and the Arab states over the future of the Israeli-occupied West 
Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights captured in 
the June 1967 War, Egypt and Syria decided to break the stalemate 
by initiating a war to recapture these territories. The October 
1973 War (also known as the Yom Kippur War and Ramadan War) broke 
out on October 6 when, in a surprise move, the Syrian and 
Egyptian armies carried out a simultaneous attack against Israel. 
On the northern front, the war began with Syrian air attacks and 
heavy artillery bombardment of Israeli positions on the Golan 


101 



Heights. On the southern front, Egyptian infantry divisions 
(consisting of 70,000 troops) crossed the Suez Canal, where only 
some 500 Israeli soldiers were deployed to protect Israel's main 
line of defense (the Bar-Lev Defense Line). 1 

The fighting terminated on the northern front on October 22, 
as the Syrian forces retreated deep into Syrian territory. On the 
southern front, fighting ceased on October 24, with the 20,000- 
man Egyptian Third Army maintaining two bridgeheads along the 
east bank of the Suez Canal and the Israeli forces occupying a 
large territory inside Egypt. 2 

The military losses by both sides in the war were heavy, 
with an estimated 3,500 Syrians, 15,000 Egyptians, and 2,700 
Israelis killed. More than 1,000 Egyptian and 1,100 Syrian tanks 
in addition to massive quantities of other material were 
destroyed. 3 
The U.N. Response 

On October 22, 1973, the Security Council, at the initiative 
of the United States and the Soviet Union, passed Resolution 338 
calling for a cease-fire to end the war. Passage of the 
resolution was followed by the implementation of U.N. Resolution 
242 (of June 1967), which called for establishing a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East. This action was followed on 
October 23 by Security Council Resolution 339, which called for 
the return of all forces to the positions held when the cease¬ 
fire came into force, as well as the deployment to the cease-fire 
area of a contingent of the United Nations Truce Supervision 


102 



Organization (UNTSO), the U.N.'s primary peacekeeping mission in 
the region. 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

On October 25, the Security Council passed Resolution 340, 
which called for observance of the cease-fire, increased the 
number of UNTSO's observers, and established a new United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF II) for the region. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

Immediately following the cease-fire agreement of October 
22, 1973, UNEF II established observation posts on both sides of 
the Suez Canal and along the Cairo-Suez road. The mission's 
headquarters was initially established in Cairo; in August 1974 
it was moved to Ismailia, Egypt. 4 In May 1974, UNEF II's 
detachment along the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line was renamed 
United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces (UNDOF). 

Political and Military Goals 

During its six-year existence, UNEF II's political and 
military goals were revised on several occasions to reflect 
changing conditions. Its original goals, as approved by the 
Security Council on October 27, 1973, were to supervise the 
implementation of the cease-fire agreement as embodied in 
Resolution 340 and to provide humanitarian relief to the besieged 
Egyptian Third Army. 5 During the second phase of the operation, 
UNEF II's assignment shifted to supervising the implementation of 
the January 1974 and September 1975 disengagement agreements 
between Egypt and Israel. UNEF II was responsible for supervising 


103 




the redeployment of the Egyptian and Israeli armies, and manning 
and controlling the buffer zones established east of the Suez 
Canal set up by those agreements. 6 The military goals also 
included checking the "fixed levels of troops and weapons" 
deployed by Egypt and Israel in the restricted zone established 
on both sides of the buffer zone. UNEF II's goals were again 
revised during its final phase, although it was not given the 
opportunity to implement them. Thus, although the April 1979 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty requested UNEF II to "supervise the 
implementation of the security arrangements," 7 the mission's 
mandate was terminated because of opposition to the treaty by the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Arab states, and the 
Soviet Union. 

Rules of Engagement 

UNEF II's rules of engagement provided for "freedom of 
movement" necessary to perform its assigned tasks. 8 The mission's 
military troops and supporting civilian personnel were granted 
"all relevant privileges and immunities" provided by the 
appropriate U.N. diplomatic conventions. 9 The peacekeeping troops 
were instructed to use force only in self-defense, which included 
"resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from 
discharging its duties under the Security Council's mandate." 10 
The force was to "act with complete impartiality" and "avoid 
actions" that would "prejudice the rights, claims or positions of 
the parties concerned." 11 
Composition of Forces 


104 




UNEF II's size varied during the course of its existence. 

The Secretary-General's report of October 25, 1973, recommended 
an authorized level of 7,000 troops, to be composed of 
contingents from countries based on "the principle of 
geographical representation." 12 The first contingents were drawn 
from countries that could deploy their peacekeeping troops at 
short notice. 13 Canada supplied the initial logistics and 
aviation components, and Poland provided additional logistics 
support in the form of a road transport unit, as well as a 
medical unit. 14 The Canadian contingent had an estimated strength 
of 1,000 (for the first time, the Canadian contingent included 
female members 15 ); the Polish contingent had 800 personnel. 16 By 
February 20, 1974, UNEF II reached its maximum authorized 
strength of 6,973 personnel, with a supporting staff of 
international civilians at headquarters numbering 160. 17 UNEF II 
was also assisted by 120 UNTSO military observers. 18 Twelve 
countries contributed contingents to the force, including 604 
personnel from Austria, 1,097 from Canada, 637 from Finland, 499 
from Ghana, 550 from Indonesia, 271 from Ireland, 571 from Nepal, 
406 from Panama, 497 from Peru, 822 from Poland, 399 from 
Senegal, and 62 0 from Sweden. 19 

In June 1974, following the establishment of UNDOF, UNEF 
II's strength dropped to 5,079 personnel, but with the arrival in 
July of additional personnel from Canada and Poland its size 
increased to 5,527. 20 In 1976, the mission's size was reduced to 
about 4,174 personnel, and it remained at that force level for 


105 


the next three years. 21 When UNEF II's mandate was terminated in 

July 1979, it had 4,031 personnel. 22 

Equipment 

During UNEF II's initial deployment, vehicles, stores, and 
equipment were provided by United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in 
Cyprus and UNTSO on a temporary basis until its regular supplies 
arrived. 23 UNEF II's troops were provided with defensive 
weapons. 24 For its air and ground patrols, the mission employed 
reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, and jeeps of North 
American, West European, and East European origins. 25 An air- 
conditioned bus was purchased from West Germany, the logistics 
operations were provided with communications equipment, and 
drinking water was provided by reservoirs and pipelines. 

Training 

UNEF II's initial contingent was drawn from experienced 
UNTSO personnel who were already deployed in the region. Some of 
the national contingents deployed later in the operation had had 
prior peacekeeping experience. 

Tactics 

UNEF II's tactics consisted of establishing a system of 
checkpoints and observation posts, conducting air and ground 
patrols, and supervising the use of, as well as providing 
escorts, in agreed-upon "common road sections" to and from watch 
and surveillance stations. 26 It also supervised the biweekly 
inspections of force limitations and armament in specified 
areas. 27 To guard against intruders, the peacekeeping mission 


106 





established a security zone around camp perimeters. Barbed wire 
fences were installed, and infantry troops conducted regular 
night-time foot patrols. 28 
Cost 

The total cost of the six-year UNEF II mission was $446,487 
million. 29 The mission was financed through assessments from a 
U.N. Special Account. 

Operational Assessment 

UNEF II has proven to be one of the U.N.'s most successful 
peacekeeping operations, although it was initially deployed 
following the cessation of fighting and not in the midst of a 
wartime situation. Unlike UNEF I, which was established by the 
General Assembly following the threat of veto by France and 
Britain, UNEF II was established by the Security Council, with 
the approval of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
thus had greater international legitimacy. Its operational 
successes and failures (although of a limited nature) provide 
valuable lessons for U.N. peacekeeping planners and the various 
national contingents that participated in its mission. 

First, UNEF II's greatest success was its distinction of 
being terminated by a peace treaty between two long-time 
belligerent nations. 

Second, the mission was instrumental in reopening the Suez 
Canal in 1975, following eight years of idleness as a result of 
the June 1967 War. 

Third, UNEF II personnel, unlike UNEF I, were permitted to 


107 




travel to Israel with relative ease because of Israel's 
cooperation with the peacekeeping mission, a factor that was 
absent during UNEF I's tenure. 

Fifth, the security of the mission's camps against night¬ 
time intruders was greatly enhanced upon the arrival of the 
Gurkha troops, who were assigned primary responsibility for 
security. 30 

Among the most notable failures were the following: First, 
as recognized by the Canadian contingent, it is operationally 
inadvisable during the initial deployment phase to deploy units 
whose troops have had little prior experience interacting with 
each other. 31 Thus, one of the problems facing the Canadian 
contingent upon initial deployment was to establish a unified 
peacekeeping force out of personnel who had never "functioned 
together" in a comparable undertaking. 32 

Second, during the force's initial deployment only certain 
national contingents were properly supplied, a fact that resulted 
in resentment by the other nationalities. 33 

Third, there was a shortage of some essential equipment, 
particularly kerosene heaters, chemical toilets, and mosquito 
netting, during the mission's initial phase. 34 Problems persisted 
in this area; the Secretary-General reported in October 1978 that 
the "supply of goods and services to UNEF continues to be 
handicapped by the long procurement lead times." 35 
CURRENT SITUATION 

Following the initial U.N.-mediated cease-fire and 


108 


disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel, several 
additional agreements were signed between the two countries. 

These agreements led eventually to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty. In September 1974, the mediation efforts by United States 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger led to a further disengagement 
agreement for an enlarged buffer zone further to the east between 
Egypt and Israel that was completed in February 1976. The United 
States then provided personnel and electronic surveillance 
equipment for the non-U.N. Multinational Force deployed west of 
the Mitla Pass. 

UNEF II's mandate was terminated upon the signing of the 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979. Given a likely veto 
of its renewal by the Soviet Union, which opposed the peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Security Council allowed 
UNEF II's mandate to expire on July 24, 1979. 

CONCLUSION 

UNEF II was the only U.N. peacekeeping mission assigned to 
the Middle East to be terminated when the warring countries 
signed a peace treaty. Also, in contrast to other missions, its 
mandate terminated under favorable conditions for long-term 
peace, with both Israel and Egypt over the years continuing to 
make substantial progress in this direction. Its replacement by 
the non-U.N. Multinational Force proved to be highly successful 
in maintaining a peaceful border between Egypt and Israel. UNEF 
II may serve as a model for future reorientation of U.N. 
peacekeeping operations in the Arab-Israeli sector when peace 


109 


treaties are signed between Israel and the neighboring Arab 
nations, including the envisioned future Palestinian state. 


110 


Endnotes 


1. Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine, eds., Political Dictionary 
of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: Quadrangle, 
1974), 506. 

2. Ibid .. 509. 

3. Ibid ., 505-9. 

4. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, August 1990), 94. 

5. Ibid ., 88. 

6. Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force II," in William J. 
Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 136; 
The Blue Helmets . 92-95, 423. 

7. The Blue Helmets . 97. 

8. Ibid ., 81. 

9. Ibid . 

10. Ibid . 

11. Ibid . 

12. Ibid .. 82-3. 

13. Ibid .. 85. 

14. Ibid . 

15. Fred Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 133. 

16. The Blue Helmets . 84. 

17. Ibid . 84-5. 

18. Ibid ., 86. 

19. Ibid .. 84. 

20. Ibid .. 85. 

21. Ibid . 

22. Ibid ., 423. 


Ill 




























23. Ibid .. 84. 

24. Ibid ., 82. 

25. Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force II," 141-2. 

26. The Blue Helmets . 96-7. 

27. Ibid .. 97. 

28. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 118. 

29. The Blue Helmets .. 423. 

30. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 118. 

31. Ibid .. 134. 

32. Ibid .. 134-5. 

33. Ibid ., 135. 

34. Ibid . 

35. Cited in Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force II," 142. 


112 













Bibliography 


United Nations, R Au gust°i99o!' ted Natlons Peacp -*eeping . New York: 
G3ffe ^^^ Wayn^ 0 ^ ^ 

Ghali ed M ? n ^S J. Ourch, 

z 2 ***^^^ ;g 3- 

t naan, ?" J t hHS?h f "- 

amgaursya b. 


113 


































United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) 


Selected Chronology 

1962 


On September 19, Imam Ahmad, North Yemen's dynastic ruler, 
died. On September 26-27, a military coup overthrew his son and 
successor, Imam Muhammad al-Badr, and proclaimed the Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR). A guerrilla-style civil war began between 
royalist and republican forces, each backed by external patrons. 

1963 


In an April 29 report, United Nations (U.N.) Secretary- 
General U Thant requested Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for 
Special Political Affairs, to undertake a fact-finding mission to 
Egypt and Yemen. 

In a May 27 report, the Secretary-General recommended the 
deployment of U.N. observers in Yemen. 

The Secretary-General reported on June 7 that Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt had agreed to subsidize the costs of a U.N. operation 
in Yemen. On June 11, Security Council Resolution 179 (1963) 
authorized the Secretary-General to establish an observation 
operation in Yemen (UNYOM). 

1964 


On September 4, UNYOM terminated its activities and withdrew 
its personnel and equipment from the YAR. 

1965 

In August, Saudi Arabia's king Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz A1 
Saud and Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser met in Jiddah, 
Saudi Arabia, and reached an agreement on a cease-fire, which was 
not implemented. 

In November-December, representatives of republican and 
royalist forces met at Harad, Saudi Arabia. No agreement was 
reached, and the civil war continued. 

1967 


In the June War, Israel defeated the combined armies of 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. 


114 







In October, the last Egyptian troops were withdrawn from the 


YAR. 


In November, the Abd Allah al-Sallal government was deposed 
in the YAR and replaced by Republican Council under Abd al-Rahman 
al-Iryani. 

In December, royalist forces began the siege of Sanaa. 


1970 


In March, the Jiddah peace conference produced agreement to 
end the YAR civil war. 

In May, royalists were added to the cabinet as part of the 
YAR reconciliation. 

In December, the YAR implemented a permanent constitution. 


115 



INTRODUCTION 


The Yemeni civil war broke out following the overthrow of 
Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the dynastic ruler, in a coup d'etat on 
September 26-27, 1962. In June 1963, a United Nations Observation 
Mission (UNYOM) was dispatched to North Yemen (then known as the 
Yemen Arab Republic, later the unified country of Yemen) to 
implement the terms of a cease-fire disengagement agreement 
between republican and royalist forces and their external 
backers, Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic), and 
Saudi Arabia, which maintained a military presence in the 
country. After its task was made impossible by the refusal of 
both sides to abide by the terms of the agreement, on September 
4, 1964, UNYOM's activities terminated and its personnel and 
equipment were withdrawn from the country. Although government 
forces, backed by Egyptian troops, proved superior to the 
insurgents, the fighting continued for several years until a 
formal reconciliation was reached in 1970. 

This case study examines the initial crisis in Yemen, the 
factors leading to the detachment of UNYOM, the effectiveness of 
its deployment, and the current situation in the country in light 
of the mission's initial goals. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The initial crisis that precipitated the detachment of UNYOM 
was the death of Imam Ahmad, the Yemeni dynastic ruler, on 
September 18, 1962 and the inability of his son and successor, 


116 



Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr, to prevent the overthrow of the 
Hamid al-Din Imamate (dynasty) by a military coup on September 
26-27 of that year. The military coup was led by Colonel (later 
Field Marshal) Abd Allah al-Sallal, commander of the Royal Guard, 
who immediately formed the Revolutionary Command Council and 
announced the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). However, 
the Imam managed to escape to the mountainous north, the 
stronghold of the pro-royalist tribes, where he succeeded in 
rallying royalist forces in a guerrilla-style counterrevolution 
to regain his throne. The royalists set up their counter¬ 
government in Saudi Arabia and were also assisted by Britain, 
which controlled the Federation of South Arabia and the Aden 
colony (South Yemen). The new military government, with al-Sallal 
appointed president, gained control of the cities and towns in 
North Yemen's central, southern, and western sea coast areas, but 
the royalist forces controlled the northwest and southeast 
mountains and the deserts in the eastern part of the country. 

Although Egyptian forces may have been deployed already in 
anticipation of the coup, Egypt quickly dispatched military aid 
in the form of troops (some 28,000 in 1963), arms, and supplies 
to assist in consolidating the new Yemeni regime. 1 Egyptian 
President Gamal Abd al-Nasser was motivated by a number of 
factors, including his interest in extending the influence of the 
Egypt-dominated Pan Arab movement over the oil-rich and 
strategically important region of the Arabian Peninsula, which 
was ruled by traditional monarchs. By 1964 Egypt had deployed 


117 


some 40,000 troops in the YAR; in 1966 this figure increased to 
50,000. 

Saudi Arabia viewed the new republic as a threat to the 
interests of the Saudi royal family, a fear that increased when 
al-Sallal spoke of creating a Republic of the Arabian Peninsula 
to replace the existing monarchies. Saudi Arabia and Jordan, 
another potentially threatened monarchy, supported the royalist 
forces with arms and other military supplies. 

The first phase of the civil war began in October 1962, when 
royalist troops mounted an offensive that was counterattacked by 
the republicans and their allies in March 1963. 

The U.N. Response 

As the fighting intensified in early 1963, both United 
States President John F. Kennedy and U.N. Secretary-General U 
Thant became alarmed at the escalating crisis in the YAR. Their 
concern resulted in separate fact-finding missions in late 
February 1963 by Ralph Bunche, the U.N. Under-Secretary General 
for Special Political Affairs, and by Ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker, President Kennedy's emissary. After several weeks of 
separate negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the YAR, 
Bunche and Bunker reported to the Secretary-General about their 
findings, which were incorporated in U Thant's report of April 
30, announcing that the three governments had accepted identical 
terms of disengagement from the YAR. Saudi Arabia agreed to end 
all forms of support to the royalist forces, whereas Egypt 
undertook to withdraw gradually its troops and terminate its 


118 



military activities in the YAR. A demilitarized zone extending to 
twenty kilometers (approximately twelve miles) on each side of 
the YAR-Saudi Arabian border was established, with U.N. observers 
stationed to verify compliance of the disengagement terms. 2 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

After considering the Secretary-General's reports, the U.N. 
Security Council adopted Resolution 179 (1963) on June 11, 1963 
to authorize the UNYOM operation. The Security Council vote was 
10 to 0, with the Soviet Union abstaining. Major General Carl von 
Horn, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization 
in Jerusalem, was appointed Commander of UNYOM. He had earlier 
carried out a fact-finding mission on behalf of the Secretary- 
General to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the YAR. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

A UNYOM advance party, led by General von Horn, arrived in 
the YAR on June 13, 1963, and set up headquarters in Sanaa, the 
capital. The headquarters staff consisted of some 28 civilians 
attached to the U.N. and 20 members who were locally recruited. 3 
A liaison office was established in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. The 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) liaison office in Cairo 
provided assistance in maintaining contact with the Egyptian 
government. UNYOM's operations began on July 4 with the 
deployment of reconnaissance and air units in their assigned 
areas. 

Political and Military Goals 

UNYOM was initially assigned the military goals of "checking 


119 




and certifying" that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were fulfilling the 
terms of the disengagement agreement. The operation was not 
tasked with any peacekeeping or investigative functions; rather, 
it was to observe and verify the intentions of Saudi Arabia to 
cease its activities in support of the royalist insurgents and of 
Egypt to withdraw its forces from Yemen. 4 UNYOM had no political 
functions of providing mediation or conciliation to the parties 
involved; it had no authority or military power to compel 
compliance to the disengagement terms; and it exercised no role 
in the YAR's internal affairs, external relations, or bordering 
territories. 5 When Pier P. Spinelli, the Under-Secretary and 
Director of the U.N.'s European Office, was appointed by the 
Secretary-General on November 4, 1963 to head UNYOM, the 
mission's military mandate was supplemented to include 
exploratory discussions with the concerned parties about 
resolving the conflict. 6 
Rules of Engagement 

UNYOM's rules of engagement entailed ground patrolling in 
the demilitarized zone and surrounding areas, and air patrolling 
in the mountainous central part of the buffer zone, where land 
patrolling was difficult. 7 The military observers stationed in 
Sanaa were to observe and certify the withdrawal of troops. 8 
UNYOM was not authorized to issue orders or directives and could 
not initiate or engage in combat. 9 
Composition of Forces 

At maximum strength, UNYOM consisted of 189 personnel from 


120 




11 nations, including 25 military observers, a Yugoslav 
reconnaissance unit of 114 officers and other enlisted personnel 
serving with UNEF, and a Royal Canadian Air Force unit of 50 
officers and other enlisted personnel. 10 

In November 1963, a reappraisal of UNYOM's requirements 
resulted in a decision to progressively withdraw the Yugoslav 
military contingent in the demilitarized zone, with the number of 
military observers there increased to 25. 11 The number of 
Canadian personnel was also reduced, and their assignment during 
the third mandate shifted from air patrolling to providing 
logistic support. 12 
Equipment 

Because it was an observer mission, the majority of UNYOM's 
officers were unarmed. Logistical equipment was used by the 
reconnaissance units. Ground transportation included light 
vehicles. UNYOM had eight aircraft, consisting of Caribou 
aircraft for logistics, liaison flights, and reconnaissance, and 
Otter aircraft for daily patrolling. 13 Because the Otters were 
considered inadequate for the Yemeni environment, Caribous 
replaced them during the mission's third mandate. 

Training 

Units participating in UNYOM's mission were seconded from 
other U.N. peacekeeping deployments, with the majority having 
gained training and other experience in the Congo and Sinai 
operations. The limited mandate of UNYOM did not require 
additional training. 


121 




Tactics 


Tactics consisted of establishing checkpoints and air and 
ground patrols to cover all main roads and tracks leading into 
Yemen and the demilitarized zone. During UNYOM's third mandate, 
the tactics of the military observers changed. For the Canadian 
contingent, the assignment shifted from air patrolling to 
providing logistic support. 14 
Cost 

The estimated cost of the initial four-month Yemeni 
operation was authorized at $1 million, but the U.N. incurred no 
financial obligations because Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to 
divide the costs for two months at a time until the termination 
of the mission in September 1964. 15 The total cost for the 
fourteen-month operation was $1,840,450. 16 
Operational Assessment 

Although the observer mission was ineffectual in 
accomplishing its political and military objectives, it achieved 
several limited successes. These successes included the 
following: 

First, during its 14-month deployment in the YAR, UNYOM had 
a restraining influence on hostile activities in the area. There 
was a reduction in Saudi arms shipments across Saudi borders to 
the Yemeni royalists, and Egypt ceased bombing Saudi towns and 
supply trains and depots intended for royalist forces. 17 

Second, a gradual rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt began to occur in early 1964, following the Cairo 


122 





conference of Arab heads of state, leading to the resolution of a 
number of outstanding issues between them. 

Third, despite several incidents the mission incurred no 
fatalities. 18 

UNYOM was ineffectual for the following reasons: 

First, solution of the problem was beyond the scope of 
UNYOM's original mandate. UNYOM could at best serve only as an 
intermediary because full and final responsibility for 
implementing the disengagement agreement rested with the YAR 
government, the royalist forces, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. 

Progress could be achieved only through bilateral negotiations 
between the Egyptians and the Saudis. 

Second, the size of the U.N. force was inadequate for its 
task. 19 

Third, UNYOM's air and ground patrolling was ineffective. 
Many potential military cargoes on the ground were unchecked 
because most observation by ground and air patrols of land 
traffic occurred during daylight hours, whereas most traffic 
actually took place at night because the harsh desert climate 
necessitated travel during the cooler hours. 20 

Fourth, during the period of UNYOM's mandate, both Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia violated the terms of the disengagement agreement by 
continuing to send large quantities of arms, ammunition, and 
funds, and to either mount or tolerate offensive actions by their 
respective client forces. 

Fifth, UNYOM was limited by its mandate only to observe and 


123 


report on the implementation of the disengagement agreement in 
the demilitarized zone; its responsibilities did not extend to 
the undefined portion of the Saudi Arabian-YAR border or the 
border between the YAR and the (South Yemen) British-controlled 
South Arabian Federation. 21 

Sixth, the initial phase of the operation was disorganized, 
with shortages of gasoline, spare parts, and food. 22 UNEF I in 
Egypt provided insufficient air and logistical assistance; the 
U.N. headquarters in New York offered inadequate administrative 
support; UNYOM personnel often complained of inadequate provision 
for leave; and medical facilities were in short supply. 23 The 
Otter aircraft were inadequate for the Yemeni environment because 
they lacked oxygen equipment for high altitude flying and 
required extensive maintenance. 24 Security for the aircraft was 
inadequate, and accommodation and living conditions for the 
mission's personnel, particularly in terms of hygiene, health, 
and food, also were inadequate. 25 

Seventh, on several occasions there was uncertainty about 
the duration of UNYOM's mission because Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
had agreed to finance the cost of the operation only at two-month 
intervals. There was some demoralization among the forces 
involved when cost agreements were delayed upon the expiration of 
a two-month period. 26 
CURRENT SITUATION 

UNYOM's mission to the YAR ended on September 4, 1964. At 
the time of its withdrawal, UNYOM's personnel consisted of 25 


124 


military observers and the Canadian supporting air unit. 27 A 
number of initiatives were undertaken by Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
to resolve the civil war. Among these was the October 1964 
conference at Erkowit in Sudan between moderate republican and 
moderate royalist factions, at which a temporary cease-fire was 
proclaimed. There were also several abortive efforts by Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia to negotiate an end to the conflict during the next 
several years. However, these efforts failed, and fighting 
continued, with neither side making much headway. 

CONCLUSION 

UNYOM faced many obstacles during its 14-month existence: in 
particular, the harsh Yemeni terrain, uncertain financial 
provisions, inadequate size, limited political and military 
goals, and actions by partners to the conflict that ran contrary 
to the terms of the disengagement agreement that the U.N. mission 
was established to supervise. 

However, whereas the UNYOM operation may be considered a 
failure, it succeeded indirectly in paving the way for a gradual 
series of agreements between the Egyptian and Saudi backers of 
the Yemeni parties to the conflict. Following a six-year 
stalemate in fighting after the departure of UNYOM, these 
agreements culminated in the holding of a peace conference in 
Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in March 1970, which produced an agreement 
to end the civil war. In May of that year, royalists were added 
to the YAR-expanded Republican Council and cabinet, as part of 
the country's reconciliation. A permanent constitution was agreed 


125 


to in December. 


Following the resolution of the Yemeni civil war in 1970, 
the YAR's attention turned to the conflict with its southern 
neighbor, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South 
Yemen), which was created in 1967, following British withdrawal. 
However, after twenty years of intermittent fighting between the 
two southern Arabian nations, this conflict was resolved when 
both countries united to form the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 
1990. 


126 


Endnotes 


1. "Yemen," in The Middle East and North Africa. 1992 (London: 
Europa, 1991), 992. 

2. Fred Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987), 77. 

3. David W. Wainhouse, et al., International Peace Observation: A 
History and Forecast (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 427. 

4. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, 1985), 194. 

5. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation . 427, 431. 

6. Ibid .. 431. 

7. Ibid., 427. 

8. Ibid . 

9. Ibid . 

10. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, August 1990), 433. 

11. "UN Yemen Observation Mission," 193; Gaffen, In the Eve of 
the Storm . 83. 

12. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 83. 

13. Ibid .. 78, 82. 

14. Ibid .. 83. 

15. In 1963-64 the U.N. experienced financial difficulty as a 
result of the Congo operation's high costs and Soviet refusal to 
pay its assessed share for the Congo and UNEF I. Gaffen, In the 
Eve of the Storm . 282, and The Blue Helmets (1985), 191-2. 

16. The Blue Helmets (1990), 433. 

17. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation . 434. 

18. The Blue Helmets (1990), 433. 

19. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 78. 

20. Ibid . 

21. Ibid. 


127 




























22 


Ibid ., 81 
Ibid. 


23. 

24. Ibid . 82. 

25. Ibid ., 83. 

26. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation . 435. 

27. The Blue Helmets (1990), 433. 


128 








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The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, 1985. 

The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, August 1990. 

Douglas, J. Leigh. The Free Yemeni Movement, 1935-1962 . Beirut: 
American University of Beirut, 1987. 

Dresch, Paul. Tribes. Government, and History in Yemen . New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989. 

Gaffen, Fred. In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping . Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987. 

Gause, Gregory F. Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and 
Foreign Influence . New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 

Gibbons, H. Scott. The Conspirators . London: Baker, 1967. 

Halliday, Fred. Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South 

Yemen. 1967-1987 . New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 

Ismael, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismael. The People's Democratic 

Rebublic of Yemen: Politics. Economics, and Society: The Politics 

of Socialist Transformation . Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986. 

Katz, Mark N. "Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security," Middle East Policy . 

1, No. 1, 1992, 117-35. 

Kostiner, Joseph. South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy. 1970-1985 . 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. 

McMullen, Christopher J. Resolution of the Yemen Crisis. 1963: A Case 
Study in Mediation . Washington: Institute for the Study of 
Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 

1980. 

Nyrop, Richard F., ed. The Yemens: Country Studies . Washington: GPO, 
1986. 

O'Ballance, Edgar. The War in the Yemen . Hamden, CT: Archon, 1971. 
Peterson, John. Yemen: The Search for a Modern State . Baltimore: Johns 


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Hopkins University Press, 1982. 


Pridham, B.R., ed. Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical 
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Rahmi, Ali Abdel Rahman. The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World: 

Intervention in Yemen. 1962-1967 . Washington: University Press of 
America, 1983. 

Schmidt, Dana Adams. Yemen: The Unknown War . New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, 1968. 

Stookey, Robert W. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic . 
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"UN Observation In Yemen, 1962-1964." In David W. Wainhouse, et al.. 
International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast . 

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 

"UN Yemen Observation Mission." In The Blue Helmets: A Review of 

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of Public Information, 1985. 

Wainhouse, David W., et al. International Peace Observation: A History 
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Wenner, Manfred W. Modern Yemen. 1918-1986 . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1967. 

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Land . Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 

White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 

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"Yemen." In The Middle East and North Africa. 1992 . London: Europa, 
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130 




















The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 


Selected Chronology 

1973 


War broke out on the Arab-Israeli front on October 
Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked Israeli outposts in 
Canal and the Golan Heights areas, respectively. 

1974 


On May 30, Syria and Israel signed a disengagement 
agreement. On May 31, UNDOF was established by the U.N. 
Council and was deployed in the Golan Heights on June 3 

1992-93 


6 when 
the Suez 


Security 


Israel and Syria engaged in a series of bilateral 
negotiations to determine the future of the Golan Heights. 





INTRODUCTION 


The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was 
established on the Golan Heights (also known as Golan) as a 
result of the May 31, 1974 separation of forces agreement between 
Syria and Israel. In June of that year, UNDOF became operational 
and continues to supervise the disengagement of forces on the 
Golan to the present day. It has been one of the U.N.'s most 
successful peacekeeping operations, as demonstrated by the small 
number of incidents that have occurred in its sector and the 
renewal of its mandate, with both parties' agreement, every six 
months for the past 19 years. 1 
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The Golan Heights is a volcanic plateau at the southern foot 
of Mount Hermon, adjacent to the Sea of Galilee. Its total area 
is 714 square miles, with a width of 18 miles. Prior to 1967, the 
Golan was part of the Syrian provinces of A1 Qunaytirah and Fiq. 
It has been occupied by Israel since the June 1967 War, when 
Israel conquered the territory following intense fighting against 
Syrian forces. In the October 1973 War, the Syrian army initially 
overran part of the Golan, but was repulsed by Israeli forces 
during the second stage of fighting, with the Israelis expanding 
the area under their control to ten miles into Syrian territory. 
The U.N. Response 

With the fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces on the 
verge of escalating, on October 22, 1973, at the urging of both 


132 




the United States and the Soviet Union, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 338 (1973) calling for a cease-fire between 
Syria and Israel. Syria and Israel agreed to the cease-fire, 
although the Israeli consent resulted from U.S. pressure. At this 
point, Israeli forces were deployed beyond the 1967 cease-fire 
lines, where they occupied a salient ten miles into Syrian 
territory on the Quineitra-Damascus road. The Security Council 
then authorized the deployment of a contingent of United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and United nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) II military observers at temporary 
observation posts around that salient, thus resuming the cease¬ 
fire observation operation in the Syrian-Israeli sector. 2 
Nevertheless, the situation remained highly unstable during the 
period of March-May 1974, with many cease-fire violations 
committed by both parties. This volatile situation led U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to undertake a diplomatic 
mission to the Middle East, which resulted in the Israeli-Syrian 
Agreement on Disengagement in May 1974, and laid the foundation 
for UNDOF's establishment. 

UNDOF was formally established by Security Council 
Resolution 350, of May 31, 1974. 3 Its mandate, like other U.N. 
peacekeeping missions, was to be renewed periodically every six 
months. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

On June 3, 1974, UNDOF's initial contingent arrived in 
Syria, where it established a provisional (later to become 


133 


permanent) headquarters in Damascus, in a building occupied by 
the Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. The force initially 
consisted of 90 UNTSO observers who had been detailed to the new 
mission and Austrian and Peruvian advance teams; it was commanded 
on an interim basis by the commander of the northern brigade of 
UNEF II, Brigadier General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos, of Peru. 4 
Later, these forces were joined by the remaining Austrian and 
Peruvian contingents, as well as by logistics units from Canada 
and Poland. On June 16, when UNDOF's strength was brought to its 
authorized level of 1,250 personnel two of the contingents were 
located in Israel and two in Syria. 5 
Political and Military Goals 

UNDOF's initial political and military goals were to take 
control of the territory ten miles into Syriad that was being 
evacuated by Israeli forces in stages. According to the 
provisions of the disengagement agreement, it was to hand over 
this territory to Syrian authorities and to establish the 
separation of forces area on the Golan Heights. 6 The mission's 
permanent goals were to maintain, observe, and supervise the 
Syrian-Israel cease-fire as contained in the disengagement 
agreement and protocol, which specified the two forces' areas of 
separation and limitation on their activities. 7 UNDOF also was to 
perform certain humanitarian assistance functions, such as 
arranging the transfer of released prisoners of war and bodies of 
war dead between Israel and Syria, providing medical treatment to 
local inhabitants, and facilitating the delivery of parcels and 


134 



mail, as well as persons, across the area of separation. 8 
Rules of Engagement 

In fulfilling the terms of its mission, UNDOF's rules of 
engagement called for complying with "generally applicable Syrian 
laws and regulations," including noninterference with the 
"functioning of local civil administration." 9 UNDOF was provided 
with the necessary "freedom of movement and communication" to 
perform its mission and provided with weapons "to be used only in 
self-defence. " 10 
Composition of Forces 

UNDOF's authorized strength was 1,250 personnel. 11 The 
national contingents were selected from U.N. member states, 
excluding Security Council permanent members. 12 In May 1985, 
UNDOF's size was increased to 1,331. 13 In May 1993, UNDOF's 
strength was 1,130 troops, with additional assistance by 
approximately 96 military observers from UNTSO's Observer Group 
Golan. 14 

UNDOF's national contingents come from Austria, Canada, 
Finland, and Poland. 15 As an illustration of the mission's 
composition, the Canadian contingent comprises about one-sixth of 
the force, with thousands of Canadians serving on the force since 
its inception. 16 The average tour of duty for members of the 
Canadian contingent is six months, after which they are rotated 
to make way for replacements. 17 
Equipment 

UNDOF's equipment consists of observation towers, 


135 





binoculars, jeeps for ground patrols, light arms and medical 
supplies. The mission's logistics units are supplied with 
transport trucks, mine-clearing equipment, communications 
equipment, and other essential items. 

Training 

Many UNDOF forces had prior peacekeeping experience either 
with UNTSO or UNEF II. The Canadian and Polish logistic 
contingents, for example, were transferred from peacekeeping 
duties in UNEF II. Other national contingents were experienced in 
infantry maneuvers. 

Tactics 

UNDOF forces are deployed in static observation posts and 
conduct daily mobile patrols at irregular intervals along 
predetermined routes to ensure that neither Syrian nor Israeli 
forces are in the U.N. area of separation (AOS). 18 Observers, 
assisted by liaison officers provided by the two host countries, 
carry out fortnightly inspections of the Israeli and Syrian areas 
of limitation of armaments and forces (AOL) . 19 
Cost 

UNDOF's budget was initially financed from a special account 
set up for UNEF II, but UNDOF assumed control of the account upon 
UNEF II's termination in July 1979. 20 From UNDOF's inception in 
June 1974 until November 30, 1990, the mission's budget totaled 
$452.4 million. 21 Its annual cost is approximately $36 million. 22 
The mission's budgetary deficit, resulting from unpaid 
contributions by member states, totaled $33 million as of January 


136 





31, 1993. 23 

Operational Assessment 

UNDOF is generally considered to be one of the U.N.'s most 
effective peacekeeping operations. UNDOF's greatest success 
results from its physical presence on the Golan Heights and its 
role in separating Syrian and Israeli forces, which has prevented 
the two parties from initiating a war against each other despite 
the continuation of the dispute over the Israeli occupation of 
the Golan and the absence of a final peace settlement between 
Israel and Syria. Thus, while escalation leading to armed 
conflict was a distinct possibility on numerous occasions, the 
peace held. Syria and Israel, for example, did not go to war when 
Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and June 1982. 

On the less positive side: Although UNDOF succeeded in 
preventing the escalation into full-fledged war, its peacekeeping 
presence on the Golan Heights may have encouraged Israel and 
Syria to be satisfied with the status quo and a political 
stalemate in their dispute with each other, as opposed to 
immediately embarking on new initiatives for a peace 
settlement. 24 

A second problem facing UNDOF is the restrictions on the 
freedom of movement in certain areas. These restrictions have 
prevented UNDOF from carrying out its mission of Syrian and 
Israeli armament and of ensuring the limitation forces in those 
avenues. 25 This situation led to numerous protests by UNDOF's 
Commander. 


137 



CURRENT SITUATION 


A number of developments have taken place since June 1967 in 
the Golan Heights that have served both to complicate and 
facilitate resolution of the occupied territory's future. First, 
Israel has established 17 settlements in the Golan since 1967, 
and Israeli law and administration were applied to the territory 
in December 1981. Both of these actions represent a de facto act 
of annexation not recognized by the international community. 26 

Second, the prospect for resolving the Golan's future is 
today better than ever before, despite the previously mentioned 
Israeli actions in the territory. This optimism results from the 
current engagement of Israel and Syria in bilateral talks as part 
of the multilateral round of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, 
sponsored by the United States, Russia, and the U.N., with both 
countries demonstrating new flexibility on the future of the 
Golan. For example, Israel is prepared to offer substantial 
territorial concessions in the Golan in exchange for a peace 
treaty with Syria, and Syria is promising "total peace" in 
exchange for total Israeli withdrawal, although more progress is 
required in precisely defining the terms "peace" or "withdrawal." 
CONCLUSION 

Substantial progress in the direction of peace has been made 
in the Syrian-Israeli sector, facilitated by UNDOF's effective 
presence in maintaining relative calm along the Golan Heights 
frontier. In October 1993, a number of steps still needed to be 
taken for long-term peace between Syria and Israel to be 


138 


achieved. First, although a peace treaty between Syria and Israel 
would satisfy many of Israel's security concerns, any territorial 
compromise over the Golan Heights would have to provide Israel 
with firmly established, secure, and defensible borders. Second, 
it is likely that new security arrangements along the Syrian- 
Israeli border would still provide for the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force, with UNDOF either remaining as the frontier's 
peacekeeping force or being replaced by a non-U.N. peacekeeping 
mission. 


139 


Endnotes 


1. Mona Ghali, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," in 
William J. Durch, ed. , The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case 
Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993), 152. 

2. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 
August 1990), 99. 

3. Ibid ., 101. 

4. Ibid . 

5. Fred Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987), 143; The Blue 
Helmets, 103. 

6. "United Nations Peace-keeping Operations," Europa World Year 
Book. 1993 (London: Europa, 1993), 44. 

7. The Blue Helmets . 100. 

8. Ibid ., 6. 

9. Ibid . 

10. Ibid .. 100-1. 

11. Ibid ., 101. 

12. Ibid . 

13. Ibid . 105. 

14. "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," in Peace- 
Keeping Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1) (New York: United 
Nations, March 1993), 5; "United Nations Peace-keeping 
Operations," Europa World Year Book 1993 . 44. 

15. The Blue Helmets . 105. 

16. Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm . 145. 

17. Ibid . 

18. Ghali, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," 160. 

19. Ibid. 


140 



























20. "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," in Peace- 
Keeping Information Notes . 6. 

21. The Blue Helmets . 425. 

22. "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," Peace-Keeping 
Information Notes . 6. 

23. Ibid . 

24. N.D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1990), 222. 

25. The Blue Helmets . 110. 

26. Ibid .. 109. 


141 












Bibliography 


The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, August 1990. 

Gaffen, Fred. In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping . Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987. 

Ghali, Mona. "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force." In William 
J. Durch, ed.. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

"United Nations Disengagement Force." In Peace-Keeping Information 
Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: United Nations, March 

1993. 

"United Nations Disengagement Force." In The Europa World Year Book, 
1993 . London: Europa, 1993. 

White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 

Peace and Security . New York: Manchester University Press, 1990. 


142 













United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 


Selected Chronology 

1958 


In June, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon 
(UNOGIL) was established. Soon afterward, the United States 
stationed troops in Lebanon in the wake of a coup in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq, but withdrew them as soon as UNOGIL 
was expanded to take over the peacekeeping duties. 

In September, as relations with Syria were normalized, 
Lebanon requested that UNOGIL forces be withdrawn. 1 

1975 


Civil war broke out in Lebanon. 


1976 


Syria invaded Lebanon in an effort to manage the civil 
conflict. 

1978 

On March 11, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
claimed responsibility for a commando raid near Tel Aviv, Israel. 

On March 14-15, Israel occupied southern Lebanon in 
retaliation against the PLO. 

On March 15, Lebanon protested Israel's invasion to the 
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council. 

On March 19, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution 
establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
for an initial period of six months. 

On March 21, the Secretary-General assigned UNIFIL's initial 
troops. 

On June 13, the last Israeli forces withdrew from southern 
Lebanon. 

1981-1982 


The cease-fire held from July 1981 to April 1982. 2 


1982 


143 








On June 6, Israel invaded Lebanon for the second time. 


1985 


In June, Israel completed withdrawal of its forces from 
Lebanon, but retained a nine-mile-wide strip along the border as 
a "security zone." 

1993 


In July, Israeli forces and Hizballah guerrillas exchanged 
heavy fire as a large stream of civilian refugees headed north to 
Beirut. 

On September 13, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration 
of Principles Between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization. 


144 




INTRODUCTION 


Lebanon, a country with a mosaic of religious sects and 
ethnic-based clans, many with foreign ties, has been the setting 
for the transformation of domestic conflicts into regional and 
international crises. Religious differences between Muslims and 
Christians, as well as within these communities, pitting 
Maronites, Shia, Sunnis, Druze, Palestinians, and others against 
each other, have spilled over into domestic politics and across 
borders as these groups have sought regional and international 
backing to their causes. 

After the June 1967 War, Israel increasingly became the 
target of cross-border attacks by Palestinian guerrilla groups 
based in Lebanon. Israel responded by providing support to its 
allies in the Maronite community, such as arming their militias, 
in order to assist them in maintaining their hold on power, 
particularly the presidency, and thus to prevent Lebanon from 
becoming a base for hostile activity against Israel. Israel also 
launched military actions against the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) bases in Lebanon. 3 
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The Lebanese civil war broke out because by 1975 the 
distribution of political power between Christians (mostly 
Maronites) and Muslims (particularly the disenfranchised Shia 
plurality), established by the National Pact of 1943, no longer 
reflected the religious makeup of the country. The underlying 


145 



cause of the civil war was the Maronite president's attempt to 
change the law to allow himself a second term; the immediate 
cause was an assassination attempt on a Maronite chieftain, 
followed by Maronite retaliation against Palestinians. Fighting 
escalated quickly in the following months, involving not only 
Lebanese groups, but also foreign governments and the PLO. The 
PLO (together with non-PLO organizations), Syria, and Israel 
became the main players in the civil war, which gradually wound 
down in all but the southern part of the country, where Israeli- 
Palestinian fighting intensified. 

After Syria's invasion of Lebanon in 1976, the League of 
Arab States (Arab League) sent a peacekeeping force (consisting 
of a large Syrian contingent, with token representation from 
Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia) to supervise a cease-fire. The 
mandate was weak, however, because the Arab League lacked the 
will and manpower to solve Lebanon's political problems, and soon 
only Syrian troops remained. 4 

By 1977 Lebanon had been divided into three sections: the 
north, controlled by Syria; a coastal section, controlled by the 
Maronites; and the south, controlled by Maronite militias 
(supported and supplied by Israel) and Palestinian elements. 5 

In December 1975, the Lebanese government repeatedly 
complained to the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council about 
Israeli attacks on its soil; it was only after Israel's invasion 
of Lebanon in March 1978 that Lebanon submitted a formal protest 
to the Security Council, calling for immediate action. Four days 


146 


later, on March 19, the Security Council adopted a U.S.-initiated 
resolution to create the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), which was intended to help restore order. 6 
The U.N. Response 

The four days it took the Security Council to pass 
Resolution 425 (1978) calling for the withdrawal of Israeli 
troops from Lebanon and the deployment of an international peace¬ 
keeping force was a remarkably short period by U.N. standards. 7 
After the Lebanese government sent a letter to the Security 
Council on March 15 strongly protesting the invasion, the U.S. 
and Lebanese delegations succeeded in persuading Security Council 
members to either support or agree not to veto the proposal to 
establish the peacekeeping force. 8 

The U.S., which sought to contain the crisis so as not to 
endanger the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations under way, saw a 
peacekeeping force as a way to provide Israel with a channel to 
retreat from Lebanon. 9 Other nations, however, were more 
skeptical of such an outcome because Israel, the PLO, and Syria 
had not explicitly supported establishing such a force during the 
Council's debate. Various countries also were apprehensive that 
UNIFIL's mandate would not be as temporary as originally 
intended. There were other problems as well: Arab states wanted a 
resolution that condemned the Israeli action in stronger 
language, and the Soviet Union, which doubted that Lebanese 
government authority could be asserted in southern Lebanon, 
refused to pay its share of the UNIFIL assessment. Another 


147 



complicating factor was the need to obtain PLO cooperation in 
setting up UNIFIL. This cooperation was achieved a week after 
UNIFIL's deployment. 

Finally, the U.N. Secretariat was unsure whether UNIFIL 
would be able to carry out its task, given the lack of political 
support by states such as Israel and Syria. Together with the 
Security Council, it questioned whether Israel was truly 
committed to withdrawing its troops from southern Lebanon, how 
UNIFIL was to deal with all the different armed militias in its 
area of operation, and whether the Lebanese government's 
authority could be reestablished in the south. 10 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

On March 20, 1978, General Emmanuel A. Erskine, Force 
Commander of UNIFIL, established the Force's temporary 
headquarters at Naqurah. Plans were made to deploy the troops 
directly south of the Litani River and to assume control of the 
three main crossing-points into southern Lebanon. However, 
objections were immediately raised by both Maronite and PLO 
forces, foreshadowing UNIFIL's ongoing problems in carrying out 
its mandate. 11 

Political and Military Goals 

UNIFIL's original six-month mandate called for it to monitor 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, assist in 
asserting the Lebanese government's authority in southern 
Lebanon, and establish and maintain an area of operation in which 
no hostile activities would be allowed. The Force was to be 


148 



assisted by a detachment from the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which would continue to be 
deployed along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) after 
UNIFIL's mandate ended. 12 

On June 14, 1979 , when UNIFIL's mandate was extended again, 
the Secretary-General added the goal of reactivating the Israel- 
Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in accordance with the 
1949 agreement. 13 

Over the years, the function of providing humanitarian 
assistance to the local population was added unofficially to the 
Force's duties, especially after the second Israeli invasion in 
1982 when conditions deteriorated in the countryside. 

Rules of Engagement 

In his report to the Security Council on implementing 
Resolution 425 (1978), the Secretary-General stated that UNIFIL's 
rules of engagement would be based on the operational guidelines 
used by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United 
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). This meant that the 
force was to be supplied with light weapons for use only in self- 
defense (including any armed attempts to prevent it from 
discharging its duties), and it was prohibited from taking over 
any responsibilities exercised by the Lebanese government. 

In addition, UNIFIL was granted "all relevant privileges and 
immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations." 14 

Some of UNIFIL's operating procedures were developed over 


149 



the course of its deployment. For example, confiscated weapons 
were returned to their owners after a certain period of time in 
order to prevent retaliation; a special U.N. security detachment 
was established to protect UNIFIL headquarters at Naqurah; 
Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) was established to assist UNIFIL and 
provide the necessary continuity and expertise; and captured 
arms-carrying individuals were turned over to their parent 
organizations. 15 
Composition of Forces 

Although UNIFIL's original mandate called for a total 
strength of 4,000 troops of all ranks, the number of troops 
changed often, increasing to a maximum of approximately 7,000 in 
early 1982, 16 then decreasing to 5,250 in 1993. 17 

UNIFIL's initial contingent was drawn from the military 
personnel of two peacekeeping forces already deployed in the 
Middle East: one reinforced company from the Iranian contingent 
of UNDOF; a similar detachment from the Swedish contingent of 
UNEF II; and Canadian logistics, movement control, and signal 
detachments from UNEF II. 18 These troops were joined by 45 
military observers already stationed at Naqurah, with another 19 
UNTSO observers added. Forty-two of the observers were organized 
as OGL, under the operational control of the Force Commander of 
UNIFIL. 19 

The national composition of the troops changed frequently. 

In 1993 the countries contributing troops were Fiji, Finland, 
France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway, Poland, and Sweden. 


150 



UNIFIL was supported by some 155 international staff members from 
the U.N. Secretariat and 369 local Lebanese staff. 20 OGL 
consisted of 65 UNTSO military observers. 21 UNIFIL was often 
assisted by Lebanese gendarmes. 

Training 

UNIFIL's initial contingent was composed of troops with 
prior peacekeeping experience in UNDOF, UNEF, and UNTSO. 

Equipment 

After July 1979, UNIFIL's troops were deployed along the 
perimeter of its area to control infiltration, and surveillance 
and detection capability was improved by using strong 
searchlights, sophisticated ground surveillance radar, and more 
night-vision binoculars. UNIFIL also used helicopters, although 
their use was controlled by the Christian militias who insisted 
on preapproving flights over their territory. 22 
Tactics 

UNIFIL had 45 checkpoints along main roads and 95 
observation posts both on and off roads; there were also 29 
combination checkpoints/observation posts. 23 In addition, foot 
and motorized patrols were conducted day and night along key 
highways, in villages, and in remote ravines, and random night¬ 
time listening posts were established at certain localities to 
detect unauthorized armed movement. UNIFIL also disposed of mines 
and roadside bombs, as well as arms caches. 

UNIFIL's humanitarian tasks included providing harassed 
civilians with medical supplies, water, food, fuel, electricity, 


151 





engineering work, and U.N. escorts for farmers going to and from 
their fields. 

Costs 

Although UNIFIL's annual costs of approximately $146 
million 24 were to be borne by U.N. member states as apportioned 
by the General Assembly, many refused to pay, causing UNIFIL's 
Special Account to run at a deficit. Consequently, the U.N. fell 
behind in reimbursing governments for costs incurred in 
contributing troops, equipment, and supplies. In December 1979, 
the General Assembly supplemented UNIFIL's Special Account with a 
Suspense Account, which was to be financed by voluntary 
contributions from governments, international organizations, and 
private sources, and was to be used solely for reimbursing 
governments contributing troops to UNIFIL. 

As of January 31, 1993, UNIFIL's total financial shortfall 
was approximately $210 million. 25 
Operational Assessment 

UNIFIL's first success was in verifying the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from Lebanon after the 1978 invasion. Four years 
later, however, Israeli troops again invaded Lebanon, treating 
UNIFIL as an enemy. The Israelis demanded UNIFIL's withdrawal 
with half an hour's notice, and then removed and bulldozed the 
force's roadblocks, sometimes at gunpoint. 26 

When Israeli troops left Lebanon after their second 
invasion, UNIFIL again faced a major problem. When the troops 
left, they did not turn over their positions to UNIFIL, as called 


152 




for by the initial resolution, but to the Maronite-controlled 
South Lebanon Army (SLA), with whom UNIFIL could not deal 
officially. This situation allowed the SLA to harass UNIFIL in 
numerous ways, including limiting its freedom of movement and 
setting up additional positions in the force's area of 
operation. 27 

Other problems also existed. For example, because anyone 
dressed in civilian clothes who had an identification card and 
was not carrying a weapon was allowed into UNIFIL's area, PLO 
fighters could enter in disguise, obtain arms from hidden caches, 
and then get assistance from sympathizers inside the area. 28 

UNIFIL's hands were tied when it came to maintaining an 
official area of operation. Resolution 425 (1978) did not define 
such an area, leaving it instead to be agreed upon by all the 
parties. Because each party had a different understanding of 
UNIFIL's mission, such an area was never explicitly defined, and 
the framework of the operation was never established officially. 

UNIFIL's failure to assert the Lebanese government's 
authority in southern Lebanon was caused mainly by the presence 
of the Israelis and the SLA, the most powerful forces in the 
area, but also by the weakness of the Lebanese government and its 
inability to control the area. In addition, the SLA was 
determined to prevent UNIFIL from changing the status quo, which 
favored its position. 29 The UNIFIL, however, managed to transfer 
responsibility for part of the Ghanaian battalion sector to the 
Lebanese Army in April 1992. 


153 


To a limited degree, UNIFIL succeeded in part of its 
mission. It provided a buffer zone between the Israeli-backed SLA 
and the PLO, reducing the number and intensity of clashes between 
them. 30 It also succeeded in reducing infiltration by armed 
elements into its area of operation. 

UNIFIL's greatest success was in providing humanitarian 
assistance to the local populace. Food, water, medicine, and 
material and supplies for medical facilities and schools were 
among the items provided to civilians by the countries sending 
troops. 31 

CURRENT SITUATION 

Although Israel officially completed its withdrawal from 
Lebanon in June 1985, it maintained a military presence, both 
directly and through the SLA, in a nine-mile-wide "security zone" 
along the border. In January 1990, Israeli forces and the SLA 
maintained 70 positions in this area. 32 Israel stated that it was 
merely doing what the Lebanese government could not: preventing 
Palestinian guerrilla groups (including such radical groups as 
the Iranian-backed Hizballah) from attacking Israel. As a result, 
not only has Israel prevented UNIFIL from moving into the 
territory adjacent to the border (as it was originally mandated), 
but it has also controlled part of UNIFIL's area of operation. 

After Israel's withdrawal in 1985, there was little change 
in the security situation in southern Lebanon. The Palestinian 
and Hizballah guerrilla groups continued their battle against 
Israeli and Israeli-backed forces, as well as against UNIFIL; the 


154 


Israelis continued to maintain their actual and proxy presence; 
the SLA continued to fight both the Palestinian forces and 
UNIFIL; and UNIFIL was largely limited to providing humanitarian 
aid and to protecting itself. 

Since 1986, UNIFIL's area of operation has been divided into 
four sections: the northwestern area, around Tyre; the central 
area, bordering the northwestern area and the Israeli-controlled 
area; the Israeli-controlled area; and the Norbatt sector, which 
has been separated from the other sections and behind Israeli 
lines since 1982. 33 

In July 1993, Israel launched a major missile attack on 
southern Lebanon to avenge the killing of seven Israeli soldiers 
by the Hizballah Shia group. In the course of the battle, Israeli 
aircraft bombed the headquarters of UNIFIL's Nepalese soldiers 
and destroyed or damaged twenty U.N. buildings. 34 

As of 1993, UNIFIL had suffered 190 fatalities over the 
course of its deployment. 35 
CONCLUSION 

In its haste to respond to the Lebanese crisis by deploying 
UNIFIL, the U.N. paid little attention to diplomatic support of 
the mission. No high-level talks were initiated with either the 
superpowers or the parties to the conflict, and the political 
problems at the root of the crisis were mainly ignored. The weak 
Lebanese government was unable to resolve the problems in the 
south, yet no solid efforts were made to strengthen the 
government. The major foreign powers held no discussions on 


155 


Lebanon's future, including their involvement in the country. 

The situation in Lebanon improved dramatically in 1993 when 
the civil war ended. First, the Lebanese government, under Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri, began to embark on a program of national 
reconstruction that was intended to rehabilitate a country torn 
by civil war. Second, in September 1993, Israel and the PLO 
signed a treaty of mutual recognition, paving the way for a five- 
year transitional period leading to Palestinian independence in 
portions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be determined 
during the course of negotiations. This treaty had major 
ramifications for Lebanon, especially in potentially easing its 
Palestinian problem, whose future was linked to the resolution of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Third, the prospects markedly 
improved for Lebanon, like its neighbors Syria and Jordan, to 
sign a peace treaty with Israel, thereby resolving the conflict 
along its southern border. Thus, UNIFIL's future depended on the 
outcome of these peace negotiations. 

In late 1993, future options for UNIFIL included being 
replaced by a non-U.N. multinational peacekeeping force, 
receiving a restructured mandate, or maintaining the status 
quo. 36 Leaving Lebanon was unlikely because UNIFIL provides the 
local population with some measure of security, stability, and 
humanitarian aid. Replacing UNIFIL with a non-U.N. peacekeeping 
force was also unlikely. North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and former Warsaw Pact troops (if there should even be 
interest on the part of these troops) was unlikely to be approved 


156 


by Syria, Lebanon's chief patron, and no other national 
contingents were envisioned. 37 Furthermore, a redefinition of 
UNIFIL's mandate (to include formally recognizing its 
humanitarian activities), although frequently suggested, has been 
rejected by the U.N. 38 

The current situation of violence and retaliation, with 
UNIFIL unable to enforce compliance, was likely to continue 
unless the U.N. is able to convince all the parties to the 
conflict to respect UNIFIL's mission until a regional political 
solution is devised. 39 

Although in late 1993, substantial progress had been made in 
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would probably be some 
time before Lebanon and UNIFIL were directly affected by 
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 


157 


Endnotes 


1. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, 1990), 184. 

2. Ibid .. 125. 

3. Arthur R. Day and Michael W. Doyle, eds. Escalation and 
Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives 

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 35. 

4. Ibid ., 43. 

5. Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World Since 1945 (London: 
Cassell, 1991), 442. 

6. Day and Doyle, eds., Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral 
Security and Its Alternatives . 4 3. 

7. John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of 
Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface (London: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989), 43. 

8. Bjorn Skogmo, UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. 
1978-1988 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 8. 

9. Ensio Siilasvuo, In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 
1967-1979 (London: Hurst, 1992), 342. 

10. Skogmo, UNIFIL . 11. 

11. The Blue Helmets . 119. 

12. Ibid ., 120. 

13. Ibid ., 137. 

14. Emmanuel A. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL: An African 
Soldier's Reflections (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 198. 

15. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL . 31. 

16. The Blue Helmets . 116. 

17. "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," Peacekeeping 
Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) (New York: United 
Nations, March 1993), 8. 

18. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 103. 

19. The Blue Helmets . 115. 


158 




























20. "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," 8. 

21. Europa World Year Book. 1993 . 1 (London: Europa, 1993), 44. 

22. The Blue Helmets . 128. 

23. Peace-Keeping Information Notes . 8. 

24. Ibid . 

25. Ibid . 

26. The Blue Helmets . 142. 

27. Ibid ., 128. 

28. Ibid ., 127. 

29. Day and Doyle, eds. Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral 
Security and Its Alternatives . 45. 

30. Ibid . 

31. The Blue Helmets . 122. 

32. Ibid .. 149. 

33. Mona Ghali, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978- 

Present," in William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: 

St. Martin's Press, 1993), 196. 

34. David Hoffman, "Israeli Offensive Sends Civilians Fleeing 
From Southern Lebanon", Washington Post . July 28, 1993, Al. 

35. "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," Peace-keeping 
Information Notes . 7. 

36. Day and Doyle, eds., Escalation and Intervention . 45. 

37. Ghali, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978- 
Present," 200. 

38. Ibid ., 201. 

39. Ibid ., 


203 . 
























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Arnold, Guy. Wars in the Third World Since 1945 . London: Cassell, 
1991. 

The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, August 1990. 

Day, Arthur R., and Michael W. Doyle, eds. Escalation and 

Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives . 

Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 

Erskine, Emmanuel A. Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldiers 
Reflections . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 

Europa World Year Book. 1993 . 1. London: Europa, 1993. 

Ghali, Mona. "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978-Present." 
In William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping; Case 
Studies and Comparative Analysis New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993. 

Hoffman, David. "Israeli Offensive Sends Civilians Fleeing from 
Southern Lebanon," Washington Post . July 28, 1993, Al. 

Mackinlay, John. The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping 

Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface . London: Unwin Hyman, 
1989. 

Rikhye, Indar Jit. The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping . New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1984. 

Siilasvuo, Ensio. In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 1967- 
1979 . London: Hurst, 1992. 

Skogmo, Bjorn. UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. 1978- 
1988 . Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989. 

"United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon." In Peace-Keeping 

Information Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: United 
Nations, March 1993. 


160 





















United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) 
Selected Chronology 

1979 


In February, the revolutionary Islamic regime of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini assumed power, following the overthrow of the 
Shah's monarchy. 

1980 

On September 17, Iraq abrogated the March 1975 Algiers 
Treaty with Iran, which specified terms for settling the border 
dispute between the two countries. 

On September 22, following an intensification of the border 
conflict, the Iraqi army crossed the Iranian frontier and 
launched a full-scale war with Iran. 

On September 23, United Nations Secretary-General Kurt 
Waldheim brought the issue of the Iraq-Iran fighting to the 
Security Council's attention. 

On September 28, the Security Council adopted Resolution 479, 
urging Iraq and Iran to cease armed hostilities and to use 
peaceful means to settle their dispute. 

1983 


The Security Council passed Resolution 540 calling for an 
Iran-Iraq cease-fire and the possible deployment of U.N. 
observers to monitor the cease-fire. 1 The resolution was accepted 
by Iraq, but rejected by Iran. 

1984 

In June, following agreement by Iran and Iraq to refrain from 
attacking each other's population centers and to abide by a 
truce, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council 
that two inspection teams would be deployed to Baghdad and 
Tehran, respectively. 2 

1987 


On July 20, the Security Council passed Resolution 598 
calling for an immediate stop to hostilities, the withdrawal of 
the two forces to their internationally recognized boundaries, 
the repatriation of war prisoners, and the dispatch of a U.N. 
observer team to "verify, confirm and supervise" the cease-fire 
accord, including the force withdrawals. 3 


161 







1988 


On July 17, Iran formally accepted Resolution 598, followed 
by the Iraqi consent on August 6. 

On August 9, the Security Council passed Resolution 619, 
establishing the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group 
(UNIIMOG). On August 10, UNIIMOG's advance teams arrived in Iran 
and Iraq. The Iran-Iraq cease-fire began on August 20. 

1990 


On August 2, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. 


1991 

In late February, UNIIMOG's mandate was terminated following 
the launching of the U.N.-authorized allied war against Iraq. 


162 





INTRODUCTION 


The eight-year Iran-Iraq War broke out in September 1980, 
following an intensification of the border conflict between the 
two countries. Although the United Nations (U.N.) made several 
attempts to arrange a cease-fire between the two belligerents, it 
was only in June 1984 that a small U.N. inspection team was 
deployed in the region, following the conclusion of a temporary 
truce. This U.N. achievement at peacekeeping was followed in July 
1987 by the establishment of UNIIMOG to observe the cease-fire 
between the two parties. Although Irag was far more cooperative 
than Iran in facilitating UNIIMOG's peacekeeping operation, the 
mission's mandate was terminated in February 1991 because of the 
U.N.-authorized allied launching of full-scale war against Iraq 
later that month, following Iraq's August 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The Initial Crisis 

The conflict between Iran and Iraq, although rooted in 
historical geopolitical rivalries between the two nations, was 
exacerbated by the coming to power of the revolutionary Islamic 
regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. A series of border 
incidents in April 1980 provided the Iraqi government under 
Saddam Husayn with an opportunity on September 17 to abrogate the 
1975 Algiers Treaty. Iraq was dissatisfied with the treaty, which 
it had reached with the former Shah of Iran, because it had given 
Iran half of the Shatt al-Arab, thereby limiting Iraq's access to 


163 



the Persian Gulf. 4 Thus, on September 22, Iraqi forces launched a 
full-scale war against Iran in a simultaneous action involving a 
border crossing by six Iraqi army divisions and an attack by 
Iraq's fighter aircraft against ten Iranian air bases. 5 By 
November 1980, Iraqi forces had gained some Iranian territory, 
but at a high price, incurring approximately 6,000 Iraqi 
casualties and larger losses for Iran. 6 However, after November 
1980, Iran counterattacked by launching a series of major 
offensives against Iraq. In one of the war's turning points, in 
March 1982, Iranian forces inflicted heavy casualties on three 
Iraqi divisions; Iran subsequently regained some territory in 
May, leading to the withdrawal of Iraqi units from Iranian 
territory. 7 A "war of attrition" followed in 1983-84, resulting 
in a military stalemate between the two sides. After 1984, Iran 
made some military gains against Iraq, capturing some Iraqi 
territory, although at a heavy loss of life for both sides. The 
war, which took a series of turns in 1986-87, included a "tanker 
war" that provoked great concern among the oil-producing Persian 
Gulf states, the United States, the West European nations, and 
Japan. 

The U.N. Response 

The U.N. initially became involved in the Iran-Iraq War on 
September 23, 1980, when Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim brought 
to the Security Council's attention the threat that the war posed 
to international stability. On September 28 of that year, the 
Security Council, in Resolution 479, called upon Iran and Iraq to 


164 



refrain from further use of force and use peaceful means to 
settle their dispute. 8 In June 1984, at the height of the 
conflict's "war of the cities" phase, with the agreement by Iran 
and Iraq the U.N. dispatched one inspection team each to Baghdad 
and Tehran to investigate attacks by both sides on each others' 
populated areas. 9 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

The major U.N. diplomatic initiative to reach an Iran-Iraq 
settlement began in January 1987, 'after almost seven years of 
continuous warfare. At the Secretary-General's initiative, 
following intensive negotiations with the Iranian and Iraqi 
governments, the Security Council adopted Resolution 598, which 
called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of the two forces to 
their internationally recognized boundaries, and an exchange of 
war prisoners. 10 Resolution 598 also requested the Secretary- 
General to dispatch a U.N. observer team to supervise the cease¬ 
fire and the withdrawal of the two forces to their respective 
boundaries. 

On July 17, 1988, Iran formally accepted Resolution 598, 
which Iraq reaffirmed the following day. 11 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

Once the formal agreement by Iran and Iraq to establish a 
cease-fire was imminent, a U.N. technical mission was dispatched 
during the period of July 25 to August 2, 1988 to Tehran and 
Baghdad to prepare the ground for UNIIMOG's deployment. 12 
UNIIMOG's deployment was expedited by the presence in Tehran and 


165 



Baghdad of the U.N. military inspection teams, first stationed in 
the two capitals in June 1984. 

Political and Military Goals 

UNIIMOG's political and military goals were to "verify, 
confirm and supervise" compliance by Iran and Iraq of the 
specifications in the cease-fire and withdrawal agreement 
embodied in Resolution 598. 13 Other goals included conducting an 
impartial inquiry, as requested by Iran, into responsibility for 
initiating the conflict; studying reconstruction issues brought 
on by the war's destructiveness; and examining steps needed to 
enhance the region's stability. 14 Finally, the military observers 
were charged with providing humanitarian assistance to both 
sides, including exchanging war dead or prisoners of war. 15 
Rules of Engagement 

The mission's rules of engagement specified that UNIIMOG's 
actions would be completely impartial, and that Iran and Iraq 
would fully comply with the Security Council decisions so as to 
give UNIIMOG "freedom of movement and communication and other 
facilities that would be necessary for the performance of its 
tasks." 16 UNIIMOG's observers were granted the privileges and 
immunities embodied in the U.N.'s charter to enable them to 
"function independently." 17 When cease-fire violations occurred, 
the observers were empowered to negotiate with the local Iranian 
or Iraqi commanders about a return to status quo ante 
positions. 18 
Composition of Forces 


166 





UNIIMOG's force strength was 399 personnel as of June 30, 
1990. 19 Some 26 countries contributed military observers to the 
mission, with none coming from Middle Eastern countries because 
of their support either for Iran or for Iraq. 20 The specialized 
force units included an air unit provided by New Zealand, a 
military police unit staffed by Ireland, a signals unit provided 
by Canada, and Austrian medical orderlies. 21 Following Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, UNIIMOG's observer force and 
supporting staff were reduced, with 60 observers remaining in 
Iran and 56 in Iraq by late 1990. 22 When the U.N.-authorized 
allied coalition began to strike Iraq on January 16, 1991, most 
of UNIIMOG's forces were moved from Baghdad to Iran; only three 
(which were part of the U.N. Offices of the Secretary-General in 
Iran and Iraq—UNOSGII) remained in Baghdad. 23 
Equipment 

UNIIMOG's equipment consisted of three fixed-wing transport 
and communications aircraft, a Jetstream 31 aircraft used as an 
air ambulance, 12 helicopters, two marine patrol vessels, large- 
dish satellite communications equipment, intra-theater ultra high 
frequency radio net, and small-dish International Marine 
Satellite Organization terminals. 24 Some of this equipment was 
not always deployed because of resistance by one side or the 
other. 25 
Training 

Some of the mission's military units had received prior 
training while serving in UNTSO in the Arab-Israeli sector. Other 


167 




units had received training as part of their military service in 
their countries of origin. 

Tactics 

UNIIMOG military observers conducted an average of 64 mobile 
patrols on a daily basis, using mostly vehicles, helicopters, and 
boats. 26 In difficult mountain terrain, mules and skis were used 
to conduct mobile patrols, in addition to foot patrols. 27 The 
patrols were charged with checking cease-fire compliance, as well 
as verifying complaints, by means of observation on a regular 
basis of "forward defended localities." 28 
Cost 

UNIIMOG's costs were borne by the U.N. member states, in 
accordance with an assessment credited to the mission's special 
account. 29 The mission's cost from its inception on August 9, 

1988 until its termination on March 31, 1991 totaled $235 
million. 30 

Operational Assessment 

Throughout its operation, UNIIMOG's effectiveness depended 
on the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as the full support 
of the Security Council, including manageable tasks; the full 
cooperation of Iran and Irag in carrying out the terms of its 
mission; and adequate coverage of its costs. 31 

In terms of the first condition, the Security Council 
provided UNIIMOG with complete support throughout its operation. 
This support was essential to the fulfilment of the mission's 


168 





objectives because it counteracted Iran's continuous attempts to 
undermine the mission's effectiveness. 

However, UNIIMOG's mandate specified certain tasks that the 
mission was unable to carry out, such as restoring the status quo 
ante situation following violations of the terms of the cease¬ 
fire by Iran and Iraq. 32 In addition, although the mission was 
able to work out with Iran and Iraq procedures for the settlement 
of disputes, it failed to establish settlement criteria 
acceptable to the two sides. 33 

Second, UNIIMOG did not receive the full cooperation of Iran 
and Iraq in carrying out its mandate. Although Iran reluctantly 
accepted Resolution 598, it was much more uncooperative than Iraq 
in facilitating the resolution's implementation, and was highly 
suspicious of the mission's presence. 34 For example, Iran 
initially prevented the deployment of UNIIMOG's radio-equipped 
vehicles, making it difficult to communicate with the mission's 
mobile units; eventually these vehicles were permitted to be 
deployed. 35 Although both parties restricted the movements of 
U.N. observers to certain areas on their side of the cease-fire 
lines, Iran was especially constraining in limiting the 
deployment of some of the mission's ground patrol vehicles and 
helicopters in its part of the cease-fire zone. 36 This lack of 
cooperation by Iran contributed to severely limiting the 
effectiveness of UNIIMOG's operations in Iranian territory. 37 

Although Iraq was more supportive of the U.N. resolutions 
and accepted the U.N.'s mediating role in the conflict, it 


169 


violated some of the terms of UNIIMOG's mandate by continuing to 
launch military operations against Iran. These operations 
included the use of illegal chemical weapons as part of its 
campaign to expand the territory under its control. 38 
Furthermore, Iraq held several hundred Iranian prisoners for some 
two years, despite its acceptance of UNIIMOG's mandate to 
facilitate the exchange of war prisoners. 39 Finally, in August 
1990, Iraq completely disregarded the U.N.'s conciliatory 
presence in its midst by launching its aggressive invasion of 
Kuwait. 

Third, UNIIMOG's costs were adequately covered by the 
assessments levied on U.N. member states. Although an estimated 5 
to 15 percent of the mission's assessments were not paid by the 
member states, no deficit was incurred because of savings 
generated by personnel reductions that were requested by the 
Iranians, as well as the cancellation or nondeployment of certain 
maritime and helicopter patrols. 40 

Finally, despite certain problem areas, for much of its 
existence in the late 1980s war did not break out between Iran 
and Iraq; UNIIMOG's presence exerted a restraining influence on 
both sides. Nevertheless, UNIIMOG's presence did not deter Iraq 
from its decision to invade Kuwait in August 1990. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

The eight-year Iran-Iraq War ended on August 20, 1988, upon 
the signing of the cease-fire and the deployment of UNIIMOG along 
the common border between the two countries. UNIIMOG's mandate 


170 


was officially terminated by the Security Council on February 28, 
1991, following the start of the U.N.-authorized allied war 
against Iraq on January 16. On February 20, 1991, as Operation 
Desert Storm was escalating, UNIIMOG had verified and confirmed 
the withdrawal of Iranian and Iraqi forces to the internationally 
recognized borders. While Iraq was engaged in the war against the 
U.S.-led coalition, Iran and Iraq began a series of confidence¬ 
building measures to reduce the levels of military forces and 
equipment along their common borders. However, relations between 
Iran and Iraq deteriorated when Iraqi Shia in the southern and 
central parts of the country rebelled against Saddam Husayn's 
regime in the aftermath of Iraq's military defeat by the 
multinational coalition in March 1991. Although at the height of 
the Shia uprising Iran officially committed itself to the 
territorial integrity of Iraq, Baghdad accused Tehran of 
providing material assistance to the Shia rebels and, in turn, 
resumed its support of the militant Iranian dissident group, the 
Mujahidin-e-Khalq, as well as the Kurdish Democratic Party 
(KDP). 41 Nevertheless, despite the continuation of disputes 
between Iran and Iraq, following the 1991 Persian Gulf War Iran 
began cooperating with Iraq by violating the U.N.-imposed 
economic blockade on Baghdad. The 906-mile-long Iranian-Iraqi 
border has become the scene of the smuggling of contraband goods 
into Iraq, and Iran has served as a market for a variety of Iraqi 
exports. 42 
CONCLUSION 


171 


Although the military hostilities between Iran and Iraq 
provisionally ended in August 1988, the problems and differences 
that had originally caused the Iran-Iraq War have remained 
basically unresolved. By late 1993, the terms of Resolution 598 
were not fully implemented. Most of the territory conquered by 
Iraq had been returned to Iran, and the U.N. had fulfilled some 
of the terms of Resolution 598 by establishing a commission to 
investigate culpability for initiating the Iran-Iraq War, and, in 
accordance with Iran's initial demands, in August 1991 published 
a report assessing the damage caused by the fighting. 
Nevertheless, both countries still held thousands of each other's 
war prisoners, and a comprehensive peace settlement between the 
two countries had yet to be achieved. 


172 


Endnotes 


1. Brian D. Smith, "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer 
Group," in William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1993), 241. 

2. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, August 1990), 324. 

3. Ibid .. 325. 

4. Shaul Bakhash, "Historical Setting," in Helen Chapin Metz, 
ed., Iran: A Country Study (Washington: GPO, 1987), 60. 

5. Joseph A. Kechichian and Houman Sadri, "National Security," 
Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Iran: A Country Study (Washington: GPO 
1987), 271. 

6. Ibid .. 272. 

7. Ibid .. 274. 

8. The Blue Helmets . 323. 


9. Ibid .. 324. 

10. Ibid., 324-25. 

11. Ibid .. 326. 

12. Ibid ., 327. 

13. Ibid .. 328. 

14. Ibid ., 326. 

15. Ibid ., 331. 

16. Ibid ., 329. 

17. Ibid .. 332. 

18. Ibid . 

19. Ibid ., 442. 

20. Ibid .. 328; Brian D. 
Military Observer Group, 


Smith, 
" 247. 


"United Nations Iran-Iraq 


21. Ibid. 


in 


173 
























22. Smith, 
249. 

"United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group," 

23. Ibid. 



24. The Blue Helmets . 331; Smith, "United Nations Iran-Iraq 
Military Observer Group," 247, 251. 

25. The Blue Helmets . 331. 


26. Ibid., 

331. 


27. Ibid. 


28. Ibid. 


29. Ibid.. 

333. 

30. Smith, 
246. 

"United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group," 


31. Ibid. 


32. Ibid. 


33. Ibid., 

251. 

34. Ibid., 

244. 

35. Ibid., 

251. 


36. Ibid. 


37. Ibid., 

245. 


38. Ibid. 


39. Ibid., 

246. 

40. Ibid. 



41. "Iran," in The Middle East and North Africa. 1993 (London: 
Europa, 1992), 425. 

42. Kenneth Katzman, Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements . 
(CRS Issue Brief.) (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, September 28, 1993), 13. 


174 





















Bibliography 


Bakhash, Shaul. "Historical Setting." In Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Iran: 
A Country Study . Washington: GPO, 1987. 

The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, August 1990. 

Gazit, Shlomo, ed. The Middle East Military Balance. 1990-1991 . 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 

"Iran." In The Middle East and North Africa. 1993 . London: Europa, 
1992. 

Katzman, Kenneth. Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements . (CRS 

Issue Brief) Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, September 28, 1993. 

Kechichian, Joseph A., and Houman Sadri. "National Security." In Helen 
Chapin Metz, ed., Iran: A Country Study . Washington: GPO, 1987. 

Smith, Brian D. "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group." In 
William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case 
Studies and Comparative Analysis . New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993 . 


175 











United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) 


Selected Chronology 

1990 


In May, Iraq's President, Saddam Husayn, convened an Arab 
summit conference in Baghdad, where he issued a warning to the 
Amir of Kuwait concerning Kuwait's oil policies. 

By the end of July, Husayn had deployed 30,000 Iraqi troops 
along the Kuwait border. 

On August 2, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait and took control of 
the city of Kuwait. 

On November 29, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council 
issued an ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by January 
15, 1991. 

1991 


On January 16, the U.N.-authorized United States-led coalition 
forces launched a series of air and artillery attacks against 
Iraq. 

On February 24, the coalition began a ground offensive against 
Iraq. 

On February 27, the coalition halted the war. 

On April 9, the Security Council established the United 
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). 

On April 13, UNIKOM's advance party arrived in the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between Iraq and Kuwait. 

On November 24, the Security Council declared that Iraq had 
not complied with its obligations under the U.N.'s cease-fire 
resolutions. 

1992 


The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carried out a series of 
inspections of Iraq's military industries. 

1993 


On January 13, following a series of Iraqi incursions into the 
Kuwaiti side of the DMZ, United States and British forces carried 
out a series of strikes against Iraq's military targets. 


176 






INTRODUCTION 


The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait was caused by Iraqi 
president Saddam Husayn's claim that the two nations were part of 
a single historical entity and that Kuwaiti oil policies were 
damaging Iraq's economy. The situation led Iraq to launch an 
invasion against Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The United Nations 
(U.N.) responded to this act of aggression by authorizing in 
Resolution 678 a United States-led multinational force to take 
military action against Iraq. After a warning period of some five 
months, the U.S.-led force launched a series of air strikes 
against Iraq on January 16, 1991, accompanied by ground attacks 
on February 24, in what became known as Operation Desert Storm or 
the Gulf War. Upon Iraq's military defeat, the U.N. Security 
Council on April 9, 1991, passed Resolutions 687 and 689, which 
mandated the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and 
the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The 1991 Gulf War was caused by Saddam Husayn's territorial 
ambitions on Kuwait, which he claimed was part of the Iraqi 
historical entity. In July 1990, the Iraqi president accused the 
Amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad A1 Sabah, of cooperating 
with the United States in a conspiracy to undermine Iraq. The 
accusation involved Kuwait's alleged role in causing fluctuation 
in the price of oil on the international markets by flouting its 


177 



oil production quotas. Saddam claimed that Kuwait's ignoring of 
the quotas was adversely affecting Iraq by keeping the price of 
oil at $14 a barrel, a price too low to support Iraq's economic 
needs. Saddam also claimed Iraqi rights to oil resources worth 
$2.4 billion within Kuwaiti frontiers. 1 In July, Saddam convened 
an Arab summit conference in Baghdad, where he warned the Kuwaiti 
ruler about his country's oil policies. Saddam then deployed some 
30,000 troops along the border with Kuwait. 2 A mediation meeting 
between Iraq and Kuwait was held in Saudi Arabia on July 31. 
However, the talks collapsed on August 1, despite Kuwait's 
willingness to write off Iraq's war debt incurred in its war with 
Iran and to give Iraq the Warbah Island in the Persian Gulf 
(instead of the Bubiyan Island demanded by Iraq). On August 2, 
Iraq invaded Kuwait, sweeping across the border in tanks and in 
helicopters. Iraq claimed that it had entered the country at the 
invitation of insurgents who had overthrown the country's 
monarchy. 3 
The U.N. Response 

On August 2, 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed 
Resolution 660, condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from 
Kuwait by or before January 15, 1991. The resolution also called 
for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. On August 6, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 661 imposing economic 
sanctions on Iraq. On August 9, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 662, which nullified Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, and 


178 



urged member states not to recognize Iraq's establishment of the 
Provisional Free Government there. 

The U.N. also supported the dispatch of United States troops 
to Saudi Arabia, in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter. By January 1991, a U.N.-authorized multinational force 
was deployed in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, with 
the U.S. contributing an estimated 500,000 military personnel. 4 
Other members of the multinational force included contingents 
from Britain, France, and the Arab states of Egypt, Syria, 
Morocco, and the Persian Gulf principalities. 

After a series of diplomatic efforts had failed to achieve a 
peaceful solution to the conflict, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 678 on November 29, authorizing the use of force 
against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. On January 16, 1991, in 
accordance with Resolution 660, Operation Desert Storm was 
launched against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. 

Adoption of U. N. Resolution 

On April 3, 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 
687, stipulating the terms of a cease-fire. The resolution was 
accepted by Iraq on April 5. On April 9, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 689, which created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
on both sides of the Iraq-Kuwait border to be monitored by the 
newly established U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

UNIKOM's advance party arrived in the region on April 13, 
1991, and was fully deployed on May 6. When the withdrawal of 


179 



Iraqi and coalition armed forces was completed on May 9, the DMZ 
came into effect; UNIKOM assumed observation responsibilities in 
the DMZ. 

Political and Military Goals 

UNIKOM was established as an observation mission and lacks 
the "authority" or the "means" to enforce Security Council 
resolutions. 5 Its mandate is open-ended, to be reviewed every six 
months. The mission's political and military objectives are to 
monitor the 25-mile-long Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway between Iraq 
and Kuwait and the 125-mile-long DMZ; to deter boundary 
violations in the DMZ; and to observe "hostile" action undertaken 
by either party. 6 UNIKOM is not assigned "civil administrative or 
humanitarian functions"; these services remain the responsibility 
of Iraq and Kuwait. 7 
Rules of Engagement 

UNIKOM's military observers are unarmed; the U.N. police are 
permitted to carry only sidearms in the DMZ. 8 Although the 
mission was given "full freedom of movement" in the DMZ, it was 
not empowered to use physical force to prevent military personnel 
or equipment from entering the DMZ. 9 The Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
governments retain the responsibility for maintaining law and 
order in their sectors of the zone. 10 
Composition of Forces 

UNIKOM had an initial authorized deployment of 300 military 
observers. 11 During its initial phase (until they were withdrawn 
in late June 1991), UNIKOM was supported by five infantry 


180 





companies (680 officers and enlisted personnel) that were 
seconded from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL). 12 The mission's support staff included 90 international 
and 96 local civilian personnel. 13 
Equipment 

Administrative and logistic support included tents, 
generators, communications gear, helicopters, and aircraft, mine- 
clearing equipment, air-conditioned trailers, binoculars and 
passive night vision devices. In addition, engineering, medical, 
and civilian services were provided. 

Training 

Most of the UNIKOM units had participated in other 
peacekeeping operations and thus were adequately trained for the 
initial deployment. 

Tactics 

UNIKOM's tactics consist of ground and air (helicopter and 
fixed-wing aircraft) patrols, manning the 18 observation posts, 
and investigating cease-fire violations throughout the DMZ. 14 
Cost 

UNIKOM's annual cost is estimated at $67 million. 15 As of 
January 31, 1993, approximately $37 million of the total assessed 
contributions to the mission's special account were 
outstanding. 16 Additional costs are foreseen if UNIKOM is to be 
strengthened, with $112 million required for the first six-month 
period, and an additional $12 million per month. 17 


181 






Operational Assessment 


UNIKOM's peacekeeping operation so far has encountered a 
number of problems. First, its capability to deter border 
violations in the DMZ has been limited because of its small size, 
limited mandate, and shortage of adequate equipment. 18 For 
example, during its initial deployment many Iraqis entered the 
DMZ to steal weapons and land mines, which they sold to the 
Baghdad government. 19 In addition, during the first two months of 
its deployment, allied aircraft repeatedly overflew the DMZ in 
contravention of the cease-fire agreement, apparently regarding 
UNIKOM as an instrument in their operations against Iraq. 20 

Second, UNIKOM lacked the necessary sophisticated equipment 
to perform its observation function effectively. 21 Its 
observation equipment was of the most basic variety (binoculars 
and passive night vision devices), rather than thermal imaging 
equipment and ground surveillance radars that are more effective 
in daylight and at night in the harsh desert environment. 22 

Third, during its initial deployment the mission was 
disorganized because of inefficient planning at U.N. 
headquarters. 23 Thus, many of the mission's operational plans had 
to be hastily formulated in field, rather than planned in 
advance. 

Fourth, the mission's supply system was outmoded, with 
inadequate reserves and stockpiles. 24 Procedures for expenditure 
requirements were cumbersome; committee approval was necessary 
for any amounts above $40,000. 25 


182 



Fifth, UNIKOM's rules of engagement calling for an unarmed 
observer force weakened the mission's effectiveness as a 
peacekeeping enforcer. This was particularly true in a situation 
where there was sufficient support for it to be deployed as an 
armed force following the defeat of a declared aggressor. 26 

Sixth, UNIKOM's effectiveness has been constrained by Iraq's 
deliberate policy of noncompliance with applicable U.N. 
resolutions. For example, Iraqi forces have made many incursions 
into the demilitarized zone, which Iraq is forbidden to do under 
Resolution 687. Furthermore, Iraqi forces have fired at Saudi 
border guards along the Iraq-Saudi border in violation of 
Resolution 686, which forbids Iraq to undertake hostile acts 
against other states. 27 

Seventh, although not directly involving UNIKOM, Iraq has 
been extremely selective in complying with Security Council 
resolutions 687, 707, and 715, which call on Iraq to cooperate 
with the U.N. in identifying, destroying, and monitoring its 
weapons of mass destruction and their production sites. 28 

Finally, Iraq has not fully complied with the U.N. 
resolutions calling on it to return the property it appropriated 
from Kuwait during its occupation between August 1990 and 
February 1991. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

In 1993 Iraqi forces engaged in a series of cease-fire 
violations, including illegal incursions into the demilitarized 
zone and cross-border shootings against Saudi border guards. 


183 


These hostile actions resulted in several new U.N. decisions. 
First, on February 5, 1993, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 806 proposing the gradual expansion of UNIKOM by up to 
3,600 additional troops, with a battalion of 750 soldiers 
replacing the mission's lightly armed military observers. 29 This 
new proposed battalion, however, had still not been established 
in October 1993 because the U.N. was overcommitted with regard to 
maintaining peacekeeping operations in other regions. Second, 
under the terms of Resolution 687 Iraq is liable for financial 
losses and other damages incurred as a result of its aggression 
against Kuwait. 30 However, as with other Security Council 
resolutions, Iraq so far has offered no compensation to any 
governments, nationals, or corporations that suffered losses 
resulting from Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. Third, although not 
directly related to UNIKOM, Iraq has repeatedly harassed the 
teams of UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspectors on its territory, making their U.N.-authorized mandate 
to monitor Iraqi weapons facilities extremely difficult to 
exercise. Finally, additional Iraqi violations of the cease-fire 
agreement have led to several allied airstrikes on Iraqi air 
defense and weapons facilities. An attempt sponsored by Iraqi 
operatives to assassinate former president George Bush during his 
visit to Kuwait on April 15-16, 1993, led to a United States 
retaliatory strike involving Tomahawk cruise missiles against the 
Iraqi Intelligence Service's headquarters in Baghdad. 31 
CONCLUSION 


184 


As an observer mission, UNIKOM's mandate and function are 
relatively limited. During the concluding phase of the Iraq- 
Kuwait conflict, however, in order for UNIKOM to become a more 
effective peacekeeping operation, its mandate must be 
strengthened by the deployment of additional well-armed U.N. 
soldiers operating under rules of engagement that permit greater 
enforcement powers. Stengthening the force should not pose a 
dilemma for the U.N. because UNIKOM is a peacekeeping operation 
that is sanctioned by the international community against a 
declared aggressor state. 


185 


Endnotes 


1. "Iraq," in The Middle East and North Africa, 1993 (London: 
Europa, 1992), 473. 


2. Ibid . 

3. Ibid . 

4. Ibid .. 474. 

5. Ibid ., 17. 

6. Ibid .. 15. 

7. William J. Durch, "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission," in 
William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case 
Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993), 261. 


8. Peace-Keeping Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) (New 
York: United Nations, March 1993), 15-16. 


9. Ibid .. 15-16. 

10. Ibid .. 16. 

11. Ibid ., 17. 

12. Ibid ., 18. 

13. Ibid. 


14. Durch, "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission," 266. 

15. Peace-keeping Information Notes . 18. 


16. Ibid . 

17. Ibid . 

18. Durch, "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission," 266. 

19. Ibid . 

20. Ibid . 

21. Ibid ., 267. 

22. Ibid . 

23. Ibid. 


186 
























24. Ibid. 


25. Ibid . 

26. Ibid ., 268. 

27. Kenneth Katzman, Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements 
(CRS Issue Brief) (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, September 28, 1993), 11. 


28. Ibid ., 1. 

29. Katzman, "Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Violations," 11. 

30. Ibid .. 13. 

31. Ibid .. 9. 


187 









Bibliography 


^nn Browne, Marjorie. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 1988- 
1993: Background Information . (CRS Report for Congress.) 
Washington: Library of Congress, February 28, 1994). 

^ordesman, Anthony. After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in 
the Middle East . Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. 

Durch, William J. "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission," in William J. 
Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

’Iraq." In The Middle East and North Africa. 1993 . London: Europa, 

1992. 

’Iraq." In The Middle East and North Africa. 1994 . London: 

Europa, 1993. 

'Iraq: Challenges to UN Decisions Scrutinized; Baghdad Sites Attacked 
After Assassination Plot," UN Chronicle . 30, No. 3, September 

1993, 20-22. 

'Iraq: Full Compliance Asked: 'Less Distance Between Two Sides," UN 
Chronicle . 30, No. 4, December 1993, 60-61. 

Catzman, Kenneth. Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements . (CRS 
Issue Brief.) Washington: Library of Congress, September 28, 

1993 . 

_. Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements . (CRS Issue Brief.) 

Washington: Library of Congress, March 2, 1994. 

Peacekeeping Information Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: United 
Nations, March 1993. 

Peacekeeping Information Notes . (1993: Update No. 2.) New York: United 
Nations, October 1993. 


188 

















United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) 


Selected Chronology 

1960 


On June 30, the Belgian colony of the Congo became an 
independent republic, with Joseph Kasavubu as president and 
Patricia Lumumba as prime minister. 

On July 4, workers in Conquilhatville went on strike. 

On July 6, the Congolese soldiers of the Belgian-officered 
Force Publique rioted. 

On July 10-11, Belgian troops landed in the Congo. 

On July 11, Moise Tshombe, president of the province of 
Katanga, proclaimed independence. 

On July 12, Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba requested 
military assistance from the United Nations (U.N.). 

On July 14, the Security Council authorized the creation of 
the U.N. Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au 
Congo—ONUC) . 

1961 

On February 21, the Security Council authorized ONUC to use 
force and increased its size to 18,000. 

On September 17, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, 
was killed in a plane crash while negotiating a cease-fire. 

On October 13, a peace protocol was signed between ONUC and 
the Katanga forces. 

On December 21, Cyrille Adoula and Moise Tshombe signed a 
declaration establishing the authority of the central government 
over the entire Congo and ending the secession of Katanga. 

1962 

In August, Adoula and Tshombe signed the Plan of 
Reconciliation. 

1963 

On January 14, Tshombe announced the end of the Katanga 
secession and requested amnesty. 

On January 21, ONUC established complete control of Katanga. 


189 






On October 18, the General Assembly decided to terminate 
ONUC's operation on June 30, 1964. 

1964 

On June 30, ONUC withdrew from the Congo. 


190 



INTRODUCTION 


The paternalist Belgian colonial administration had not 
prepared the Republic of the Congo for the independence that it 
achieved on June 30, 1960. It lacked trained black civil 
administrators, engineers, lawyers, and army officers. The 
country had no experience with democracy to help it make a smooth 
transition from colonial status to independence. Not 
surprisingly, the two rival dominant Congolese leaders who had 
been elected by the new legislature—President Joseph Kasavubu 
and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba—had a serious problem 
maintaining law and order. 1 

The problem was compounded by an economic recession in the 
late 1950s that carried over from colonial rule into the early 
days of the new republic. Pinched economically, workers in 
Conquilhatville, capital of Equator province, took advantage of 
the hesitancy in the new government and went on strike on July 4, 
1960. The ensuing riots were crushed by the military arm of the 
government, the Public Force (Force Publique). However, on July 6 
the Congolese soldiers of the Force Publique refused to obey 
their Belgian officers, and a rebellion rapidly spread throughout 
the country. 

On July 14, 1960, the United Nations Operation in the Congo 
(Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC) was established 
at the request of the Congolese Central Government for the 
purpose of maintaining internal order in the country. ONUC, which 
terminated in June 1964, was the largest peacekeeping operation 


191 


ever established by the U.N. in terms of size and 

responsibilities up to that date. This study examines the factors 
that led to the mission, the deployment, and the outcome. 
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The initial crisis in the Congo arose because of the 
inability of Lumumba and Kasavubu, two of the top leaders of the 
Congolese Central Government, to quell the military mutiny by 
disaffected troops of the Force Publique. In an attempt to gain 
the support of the mutineering force's soldiers, Lumumba and 
Kasavubu agreed to their soldiers demands and dismissed the its 
Belgian officers. Lumumba's uncle, Victor Lundula, was appointed 
commander in chief, and Joseph-Desire Mobutu, chief of staff. The 
name of the Force Publique was changed to National Congolese Army 
(Armee Nationale Congolaise—ANC). 2 

As the rebellion continued, thousands of Belgians fled the 
country. On July 10, Belgian paratroopers who had been stationed 
in the Congo by a June 29, 1960 treaty between Belgium and the 
Congo acted to crush the mutiny. On July 11, the Belgian 
government airlifted metropolitan troops to the Congo to assist 
the resident paratroopers in restoring law and order and 
protecting Belgian nationals. Lumumba initially countenanced the 
intervention, provided that the troops were restricted to the 
protection of persons and property. 3 The Belgians quickly 
exceeded this restriction. The Belgian navy bombarded the port of 
Matadi, killing 19 Congolese. Rather than restoring order, the 


192 



Belgian intervention greatly intensified the military rebellion. 

The situation deteriorated still further on July 11, when 
the province of Katanga, which provided more than half of the 
country's revenues, announced that it was seceding and forming an 
independent state. Belgian troops, who had arrived in Katanga 
without the permission of the Congolese government, directly 
supported the secession. Reportedly, the secession was 
masterminded by the Belgian General Company (Societe Generale de 
Belgique—SG), which controlled the rich copper and cobalt mines 
of the province. 4 

On July 12, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba 
sent a joint telegram to U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold 
requesting military assistance. They viewed the "unsolicited 
Belgian action" as "an act of aggression" against the new 
Republic of the Congo. 5 At the same time, three other government 
ministers had cabled Washington to request the deployment of 
United States troops to help maintain internal order, but the 
request was turned over to the U.N. 6 
The U.N. Response 

On July 13, 1960, Hammarskjold invoked the U.N. Charter's 
Article 99, which empowers the Secretary-General to convene the 
Security Council, to request the Security Council's urgent 
consideration of the situation in the Congo. When the Council met 
that evening, Hammarskjold recommended the establishment of a 
U.N. peacekeeping force to assist the Congolese government in 
maintaining law and order until, with technical assistance from 


193 



the U.N., the Congolese national security forces were able fully 
to meet their tasks. 7 He assumed that the U.N. action would lead 
the Belgian government to withdraw its forces from the Congo. 8 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

On July 13-14, the Security Council responded to 
Hammarskjold's recommendation by adopting Resolution 143. It 
urged Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and 
authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Congolese 
government with military assistance until its forces were able to 
restore order and stability. 9 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

Following adoption of Resolution 143, Ralph J. Bunche was 
appointed to head the mission as the Secretary-General's Special 
Representative in the Congo. Lt.-General Carl C. von Horn, of 
Sweden, was appointed Supreme Commander of ONUC. A small 
contingent of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO) officers was detached to ONUC to assist Lt.-Gen. von Horn 
in the initial stages of the operation. ONUC's advance party 
arrived in Leopoldville on July 15-18, and established the 
mission's headquarters at the airport. 10 By July 1961, at its 
peak, ONUC's forces totalled 19,828 personnel. 11 
Political and Military Goals 

The two main objectives of ONUC during the initial phase 
were to help the Congolese government restore law and order and 
achieve the timely withdrawal of Belgian forces. To bring about 
the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga and deal with its 


194 




declared secession, on August 24 the government of the Congo 
issued an ordinance to the effect that all non-Congolese officers 
and mercenaries serving in the Katanga forces should leave the 
Congolese territory forthwith. The government asked the U.N. for 
help in implementing the ordinance. 

Armed with the ordinance, ONUC, in a sudden swoop on August 
28, 1961, seized control of the radio, airports, and post offices 
in Katanga. ONUC forces also started apprehending foreign 
mercenaries. 

In the ensuing months, ONUC also tried to prevent or control 
hostilities between the various Congolese factions. Thus, for 
example, it protected the Baluva tribesmen in Katanga who were 
opposed to the regime of the provincial president Tshombe and 
were being exterminated by Tshombe's gendarmes. 

Rules of Engagement 

The principles that governed the activities of the U.N. 
force in the Congo were as follows: 

(a) The force was to be regarded as a temporary security 
force to be deployed in the Congo with the consent of the Congo 
government until the national security forces were able to meet 
fully their tasks. 

(b) Although serving as an arm of the Congo government, the 
Force was to be under the exclusive command of the U.N. and not 
to become a party to any internal conflict. 

(c) The U.N. military units were not to use force except in 
self-defense. 


195 



(d) The U.N. was to have free access to the area of 
operation and full freedom of movement within that area as well 
as all the communications and other facilities required to carry 
out its tasks. 

On February 15, 1961, the Security Council, faced with what 
appeared to be an imminent civil war in the Congo, authorized 
ONUC to use force to prevent an outbreak of fighting, although 
only as a last resort. 12 
Composition of Forces 

The initial U.N. force consisted of seven battalions of 
4,000 troops provided by five African nations: Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia. 13 In addition to military units, 

ONUC had a Civilian Operations component that employed some 2,000 
experts and technicians who assisted the Congo government in 
administrative, technical, and humanitarian areas. 14 As the 
responsibilities of the U.N. in the Congo expanded, the force 
grew until it reached 19,828 at its peak strength in July 
1961. 15 
Equipment 

ONUC was equipped with small arms, artillery, transport and 
military aircraft, heavy armored vehicles, river boats, and field 
army radios. 16 Much of the heavy transport and military 
equipment was supplied by the United States. 

Training 

Most of the ONUC units had participated in other 
peacekeeping operations and thus were sufficiently trained for 


196 





the initial deployment. Additional training was obtained in the 
course of adapting to the African environment, including the 
primitive road system. 

Tactics 

ONUC's tactics were driven by the mission's primary task of 
maintaining law and order in a chaotic situation. It undertook 
joint patrols with the local Congolese police; it performed 
security functions, including police duties, when government 
authorities were lacking; and took other measures to provide for 
the protection of threatened individuals and property. 17 
Cost 

The total cost of the four-year ONUC operation amounted to 
approximately $400.13 million. 18 The mission's budget was 
financed by assessments to a Special Account. 19 
Operational Assessment 

One of ONUC's main objectives was to stabilize the Congo 
government and provide technical assistance in the operation of 
essential services and economic development. However, given the 
vast area of the Congo, the ONUC force, even at peak strength, 
was barely sufficient for this task. The ANC proved to be of 
little help. Army troops were often away, busy subduing rebel 
tribes and provinces; in addition, elements of the force 
periodically mutinied. As a result, in Leopoldville ONUC had to 
police the city's main arteries to ensure the protection of 
essential services and when necessary had to bring unruly ANC 
elements under control. 


197 





Occasionally, ONUC's activities were hampered when the 
government itself resorted to actions that tended to endanger law 
and order, or restrict human rights. In such cases, ONUC 
endeavored to persuade Congolese authorities to change their 
course of action and sometimes to protect the threatened persons. 
But, following orders, it refused to use force to subdue 
Congolese authorities or the ANC. 20 

ONUC's primary activity in the Congo was the restoration of 
public services and the development of the national economy. 
Engineers, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, radio 
operators, postal experts, physicians, and teachers were rushed 
into the country. In response to the central government's appeal, 
the U.N. provided $5 million to finance essential government 
services. 

ONUC helped to set up and manage the country's fledgling 
economic and financial administration. In all these fields, 

ONUC's efforts were designed to improve the ability of the 
Congolese authorities to discharge their responsibilities toward 
the population despite the precipitate departure of non-Congolese 
technicians and administrators. 

Famine conditions in some areas and widespread unemployment 
led the Secretary-General to institute refugee relief and relief- 
work programs. In South Kasai, where it was reported that some 
200 persons were dying daily from starvation, the U.N. shipped 
and distributed food and medical supplies for six months. The 
number of lives saved approximated 250,000. 


198 


U.N. training services continued as a long-range operation. 
Training courses were organized for air traffic controllers, 
agricultural assistants, farm mechanics, foresters, medical 
assistants, labor officials, police commissioners, etc. 

A telecommunications training center was set up, a national 
pedagogical institute was established, and undergraduate medical 
studies were fostered. In addition, a national school of law and 
administration was opened and a technical college established. 
Fellowships for study abroad were awarded to school directors, 
medical students, police officers, and social workers. A program 
was also prepared for the reorganization and retraining of the 
ANC. 

The ANC program was set up because the majority of the 
serious incidents that had occurred in the country were caused by 
military elements of Congolese armed forces, whether part of the 
ANC, the Katangese gendarmerie, or individual provincial forces. 
From the outset, ONUC considered it essential to help the 
Congolese government establish discipline in the armed forces. 

In 1960 and 1961, ONUC Civilian Operations provided 600 
experts and technicians to do the jobs of departing Belgian 
personnel. These experts and technicians, drawn from some 48 
nationalities, provided the Congo with expertise in the fields of 
finance and economics, health, transport, agriculture, public 
works, postal services, and others. In addition, a large number 
of secondary school teachers were recruited. These assistance 
programs continued until 1964. 


199 


As a result of the various training programs set up by ONUC, 
it became possible in 1963 to replace some international 
personnel by qualified Congolese, particularly in the postal, 
meteorological, telecommunications, and civil aviation services. 
In 1963, 55 of the 130 medical assistants sent abroad for 
training in 1960-1961 returned to the Congo and were assigned to 
various parts of the country. 21 

On December 21, 1961, Tshombe, after a meeting with Prime 
Minister Adoula, signed an eight-point declaration by which he 
recognized the authority of the central government over all parts 
of the Congo and agreed to a number of steps aimed at ending the 
secession of Katanga. 

Further talks to discuss the procedure for carrying out the 
provisions of the declaration failed, and the agreement was not 
implemented owing to the procrastination and intransigence of the 
Katangese leader. 

In August 1962, Secretary-General U Thant proposed a "Plan 
of National Reconciliation," which was accepted by Adoula and 
Tshombe. On the Katanga side, however, no substantial steps were 
taken to implement the plan. And the Katangese fired, without 
provocation, on U.N. positions. 

Retaliating, the U.N. forces occupied, one by one, Kamina, 
Jadotville, and Kipushi. In all these areas, measures were taken 
to restore essential services and protect the local population. 

In the meantime, Tshombe fled to Kolwezi. From there, on 
January 14, 1963, the Secretary-General received a message from 


200 


Tshombe announcing his readiness to end the secession of Katanga 
and asking for amnesty, freedom, and safety for the Katangese 
government. The Secretary-General welcomed Tshombe's message and 
confirmed the amnesty proclamation of November 1962. By January 
21 the U.N. force had under its control all important centers and 
quickly restored law and order in Katanga. Thanks to the skill 
and restraint displayed by ONUC troops, the casualties incurred 
during the fighting were relatively light. In the 24 days of 
activity, 10 ONUC members were killed and 77 wounded. Katangese 
casualties also appeared to have been low. 

Thus, the secession of Katanga had been ended; once this was 
accomplished an important phase of ONUC's operations had been 
completed. 22 
CURRENT SITUATION 

On February 4, 1963, the Secretary-General reported to the 
Security Council on the fulfillment by ONUC of the following 
tasks: the territorial integrity and political independence of 
the Congo had been established; the secession of Katanga had 
ended; there was no direct threat to Congo's independence from 
external sources; assistance in maintaining law and order was 
continuing, and, with the vast improvements in that regard, a 
substantial reduction of ONUC forces was being made. 

In view of these accomplishments, on June 27, 1963, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 1876, which established 
December 31, 1963 as the terminal date for ONUC's military phase. 

However, in his letter of August 22, 1963, Prime Minister 


201 


Adoula expressed a need for the continued presence of a small 
U.N. force of about 3,000 officers and men through the first half 
of 1964. 

Acting on this request, the General Assembly decided, on 
October 18, 1963, by Resolution 1885, to continue the U.N. 
operation in the Congo until June 30, 1964, and authorized an 
expenditure of up to $18.2 million to that effect. 

On June 30, 1964, the U.N. force in the Congo withdrew from 
that country according to plan. 23 

Following ONUC's departure, public order soon deteriorated. 
Disturbances and rebellions broke out in Kwilu, southern Kivu, 
and northern Katanga. Forces in the Katanga rebellion were 
defeated by the ANC backed by mercenaries and Belgian paratroops. 
The commander of the ANC, Mobutu, asked Tshombe to become prime 
minister and to form a new government. Elections for the new 
parliament gave an overwhelming victory to Tshombe, but President 
Kasavubu refused to accept his administration and conflict broke 
out again between the president and prime minister. 

In November 1965, Mobutu took over as head of state and 
installed his supporter, Colonel Leonard Mulamba, as prime 
minister. This seizure of power was reportedly assisted by the U. 
S. Central Intelligence Agency. 24 Thereafter, Mobutu's 
consolidation of power continued uninterrupted. 

CONCLUSION 

The crisis that overtook the newly independent Congo was so 
complex that it prevented ONUC from achieving an easy and obvious 


202 


success. Although the crisis was precipitated by the revolt of 
the ANC and the subsequent Belgian armed intervention, the roots 
of the problem went much deeper. The absence of an indigenous 
elite to provide political leadership, the lack of familiarity 
with the working of democratic institutions, and the 
deteriorating economic conditions were just a few of the Congo's 
troubles. 

As a result of this situation, the means at the disposal of 
ONUC were not commensurate with the nature and magnitude of the 
task entrusted to it. Permitted initially to act only in self- 
defense, for example, the U.N. force could not maintain law and 
order effectively. The restriction on the U.N. mission's 
enforcement capability explains its inaction during the crucial 
period of constitutional crisis. Even after the Security Council 
strengthened the mandate by authorizing the use of force, the 
limitations were not completely removed because ONUC still had to 
scrupulously respect the domestic jurisdiction of the Congolese 
Republic. 

The work of ONUC was adversely affected by the political 
developments in the Congo. Within less than two months after the 
mission began, a constitutional crisis removed one of the most 
important prerequisites for the success of the mission, a viable 
and stable government in the Congo. Internal developments, as 
well as constant outside interference in the internal affairs of 
the Congo, undermined the usefulness of the work done by ONUC. 

Nonetheless, the U.N. operation in the Congo did preserve 


203 


the political independence and territorial integrity of that 
state. It also helped in the task of nation-building, which was 
geared toward making the Congo self-reliant. The work of the ONUC 
thus highlighted the possibilities as well as the limitations of 
the U.N. in its peacekeeping missions. 


204 


Endnotes 


I. "History of Central Africa", Encyclopedia Britannica . 3 
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1980), 1098. 

2• The—B lue — Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping . 

(New York: United Nations, 1990), 217-18. 

3. David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World 
Intervention (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 82. 

4. Ibid .. 114. 

5. Ram Chandra Pradham, The United Nations and the Congo Crisis 
(New Delhi: MANAS, 1975), 35. 

6. William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," in 
William J. Durch, ed. , The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping; Case 
Studies and Co mparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993), 319. 

7. The Blue Helmets r 219. 

8. Ibid . 

9. Ibid . 

10. Ibid .. 222. 

II. Ibid . 

12. Pradham, United Nations and the Congo Crisis . 43-50. 

13. Ibid . 221. 

14. Ibid .. 221. 

15. Ibid .. 222. 

16. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo," 337. 

17. The Blue Helmets . 226-7. 

18. The Blue Helmets . 435. 

19. Ibid. 


20. The Blue Helmets . 223-27. 

21. Ibid .. 227-38. 

22. Ibid .. 256. 


205 




























23. Ibid., 257-59. 

24. Gibbs, T he Politica l Ec onomy of Third World Intervp.nt- i on 


206 







Bibliography 

New YorJ< 

Chicago: ^UniversJty^of^chicago^PressT'klJgiT^’^ - ^^^Siltion. 
^^Encyclopedia^ritannica, 3. Chicago: 

University, e i9 8 '77 iE ^ _ ^~^ 21ii i^i--S£lJdy• Washington: American 

n 1 : n 


207 
























United Nations Angola Vertification Mission I (UNAVEM I) 


Selected Chronology 

1974 


In September, the new Portuguese government, following a 
military coup, announced its intention to grant independence to 
its colonies in Africa, including Angola. 

1975 


In October, while the Angola was preparing for independence, 
South African troops invaded the country in support of its rebel 
allies. 

On November 11, Angola attained independence from Portugal, 
ending a 14-year independence war. Factional fighting began among 
government forces of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(Movimiento Popular de Libertagao de Angola—MPLA) and the rebel 
troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) and 
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional 
de Libertagao de Angola—FNLA). The UNITA and FNLA rebels were 
supported by South Africa, while the Soviet Union and Cuba 
provided weapons and troops, respectively, to assist the MPLA, 
which controlled a majority of the country's provincial capitals. 

1978 


In September, United Nations (U.N.) Security Council 
Resolution 435 (1978) called for South African withdrawal from 
Namibia and the granting of full independence. 

1986 


The U.S. resumed its military assistance to UNITA following 
congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment, which had forbidden 
such aid since 1976. 

1987 

In November, U.N. Security Council Resolution 602 (1987) 
called for an immediate withdrawal of South African forces from 
Angola. 

1988 


From January until April, MPLA and Cuban forces repelled a 
South African offensive against the southern Angolan city of 
Cuito Cuanavale. 


208 








In August, a partial cease-fire was negotiated in Geneva 
among Cuba, Angola, and South Africa. 

In December, a tripartite agreement among Angola, Cuba, and 
South Africa was signed, providing for Namibian independence in 
March 1990. A parallel bilateral agreement between Cuba and 
Angola established a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. The parties to both agreements requested U.N. 
verification. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 626 (1988) established the 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) to monitor 
the withdrawal from Angola of 50,000 Cuban troops . 

1991 

In May, the Cuban troop pullout was completed and verified 
by UNAVEM I. 


209 





INTRODUCTION 


The Angolan civil war began in 1975, when the three most 
prominent guerrilla movements in the independence struggle fought 
over control of the new government. At the national level, the 
conflict pitted the armed forces of the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimiento Popular de 
Libertagao de Angola-Partido Trabalho—MPLA-PT) against its two 
main rivals, the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola— 
UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola—FNLA). 

The civil war immediately drew international intervention 
because the MPLA-PT received military aid and troop 
reinforcements from the Soviet Union and Cuba, whereas South 
Africa and the United States assisted UNITA and the FNLA. 

The 15 year civil war claimed more than 500,000 lives and 
displaced an estimated 1.3 million persons. 1 An additional 
900,000 persons in southern Angola were in acute danger of 
starvation in 1990. Damage to the country's infrastructure was 
estimated at more than $10.5 billion. 2 

Multilateral negotiations between the parties led to an 
agreement in December 1988 for a United Nations (U.N.)-monitored 
withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola, concurrent with a 
withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia. The Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola was monitored by the first United Nations 


210 


Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), which was established by 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 626 (1988) on December 20, 

1988. 3 

This study examines the original crisis in Angola, the 
factors leading to the deployment of UNAVEM I, the evolution of 
its mandate, the effectiveness of its deployment, and the current 
situation and outlook in Angola in light of the mission's initial 
goals. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The Initial Crisis 

The Angolan crisis was primarily a national civil war, 
driven by factional and ethnic disputes, which became 
progressively linked to the confrontation between the Cold War 
superpowers and their regionally influential intermediaries, Cuba 
and South Africa. 

At the national level, the war entailed factional fighting 
between the self-declared government forces of the MPLA-PT and 
its rivals, UNITA and the FPLA. The war also had significant 
ethnic and regional dimensions. The MPLA-PT drew most of its 
support from the Mbundu ethnic group, which predominates in 
Angola's north-central region, and UNITA garnered most of its 
support from the Ovimbundus of the south. 

International intervention began in early 1975, following 
the collapse of the transitional coalition government established 
under the Alvor Agreement, which the departing Portuguese had 
negotiated among the MPLA-PT, the FNLA, and UNITA. After the 


211 



MPLA-PT reneged on its commitment to hold national elections, as 
mandated by the agreement, UNITA and the FNLA withdrew from the 
government and entered into a tacit alliance against the emerging 
single party socialist regime of MPLA-PT President Agostino Neto. 

Seeking to bolster their military position, the parties 
obtained foreign military assistance and direct intervention on 
their behalf. In October, 1975 UNITA joined South African forces 
in launching the first of several incursions into Angolan 
territory. The South African incursions, ostensibly to strike at 
Namibian guerrillas belonging to the South West Africa People's 
Organization—SWAPO), mainly served to assist UNITA's forces 
under the command of Jonas Savimbi in their war against the 
Cuban-backed MPLA-PT. 4 Foreign military assistance was also 
provided by Zaire and the United States. 

To consolidate its control of the new government and help 
defend against the South African-UNITA offensive, the MPLA-PT, 
which held the capital of Luanda, accepted in November 1975 the 
dispatch of an initial 10,000 Cuban troops and massive amounts of 
Soviet military equipment. Eastern bloc military aid would 
eventually total 50,000 Cuban troops, hundreds of Soviet 
advisers, and more than $1 billion in Soviet military equipment. 5 

The FNLA and UNITA engaged in guerrilla warfare against the 
MPLA-PT government throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 
1984, the FNLA negotiated a cease-fire with the MPLA-PT, leaving 
UNITA as the main military threat to the government. The UNITA 
threat increased in the mid-1980s, as South Africa augmented its 


212 


military presence in Angola and the United States restored its 
military aid to Savimbi's forces following the congressional 
repeal of the Clark amendment, which had forbidden such aid since 
1976. 6 

The Angolan fighting intensified in January 1988, when a 
major South African incursion led to an extended battle for the 
strategic garrison town of Cuito Cuanavale. This battle became a 
turning point in the war, when 10,000 Angolan government troops, 
backed by the 50th Division of the Cuban army, successfully 
withstood an offensive by 8,000 South African troops and their 
UNITA allies. 7 

The prolonged standoff at Cuito Cuanavale, which was 
considered a major setback for South Africa and UNITA, led to a 
year-long series of negotiations linking Cuban withdrawal from 
Angola with South African withdrawal from Namibia. An important 
factor contributing to the negotiations was the emerging pattern 
of international cooperation between the United States and the 
reformist Soviet government headed by Mikhail S. Gorbachev. 

In April 1988, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz met 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze to devise a 
political framework for resolving the South West African crisis. 
The superpowers arranged for a series of talks among Angola, 

Cuba, and South Africa to be chaired by the United States. UNITA 
and SWAPO were not parties to the talks, which at this stage 
involved only state actors. After three difficult rounds of 
negotiations during the spring and summer of 1988, a preliminary 


213 


agreement was reached in New York in mid-July, linking a Cuban 
withdrawal to Namibian independence. 8 The terms of a cease-fire 
between the states were negotiated in Geneva in August 1988. 

Further negotiations took place in Brazzaville, Congo, in 
fall of 1988. After the negotiating parties had failed to meet 
two consecutive deadlines for a resolution, the agreements 
finalized in Brazzaville were formally signed in New York on 
December 22, 1988. The Tripartite Agreement among Angola, Cuba, 
and South Africa established a timetable for South African 
withdrawal from Namibia in 1989, leading to Namibian independence 
in 1990. 9 A parallel bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba 
set a timetable for the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from 
Angola by July 1991. The states unanimously requested U.N. 
verification of the parallel withdrawals from Angola and 
Namibia. 10 
The U.N. Response 

U.N. involvement in the Angolan crisis has historically been 
overshadowed by its much deeper commitments in neighboring 
Namibia. A direct U.N. presence in Angola was necessitated, 
however, by the linkage that was established between the South 
African withdrawal from Namibia and the Cuban withdrawal from 
Angola during the tripartite negotiations. The centerpiece of 
U.N. policy in South West Africa until 1990 was Security Council 
Resolution 435 (1978), which called for South African withdrawal 
from Namibia and granting independence to that territory. 11 In 
November 1987, the Security Council issued Resolution 602 (1987) 


214 



calling for the immediate withdrawal of South African forces from 
Angola. 12 In December 1987, the Secretary-General dispatched a 
technical mission to Luanda to investigate South African military 
activities in southern Angola. 13 

In response to the request by the parties to the trilateral 
and bilateral agreements and the recommendations of the 
Secretary-General, the Security Council issued Resolution 626 
(1988) establishing UNAVEM I on December 20, 1988. 14 UNAVEM I's 
larger companion mission in Namibia, the United Nation's 
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), was established a month 
later by Security Council Resolution 629 (1989). 15 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

UNAVEM I began its operations on January 3, 1989, when an 
advance team of 18 military observers deployed in Luanda to 
verify the withdrawal of the first 450 Cuban troops on January 
10. Subsequently, the remaining 52 military observers deployed at 
their permanent verification posts and established two mobile 
inspection teams. 16 
Political and Military Goals 

UNAVEM I's mandate specified limited political and military 
objectives. The group of unarmed observers would "verify the 
redeployment of 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola northwards and 
their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola, 
in accordance with the timetable agreed upon between the two 
governments. 1,17 The main political objective was to verify Cuban 
compliance with the bilateral agreement of December 1988. 


215 



UVAVEM I's military objective was to establish a 
headquarters presence in Luanda, set up regional verification 
posts at designated ports and airports, and conduct ad hoc 
inspections of suspected Cuban troops present in off-limit areas. 
UNAVEM I was to monitor Cuban compliance with a 27-month 
timetable for total withdrawal by tallying the number of Cuban 
military arrivals and departures from Angola, and by identifying 
military equipment accompanying the departed Cuban contingent. 18 
Rules of Engagement 

As an unarmed military observer mission, UNAVEM I had no 
authority or capability to confront hostile troops. UNAVEM I 
personnel were to avoid combat zones, with their security 
respected by all military forces in the area. UNAVEM I was not 
authorized to issue orders or directives, nor could it obstruct 
the activities of any forces encountered. 19 
Composition of Forces 

At maximum strength, UNAVEM I consisted of 70 unarmed 
military observers. 20 Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, 
Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain, and Yugoslavia each 
supplied seven observers; in addition there were 22 international 
and 15 local civilian staff. 21 UNAVEM I was under the command of 
Chief Military Observer (CMO) Brigadier General Pericles Ferreira 
Gomes of Brazil. 22 
Equipment 

UNAVEM I's mobile observer teams employed an unspecified 
number of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and light ground 


216 





transport. Aircraft and logistical support were provided by the 
government of Angola. 23 UN A V EM I's communications eguipment 
included a portable satellite earth station, radio teletype, 
mobile VHF radio, crypto-fax and text cipher machines, and a 
voice encryption device donated by Switzerland. 24 
Training 

Little information is available on the training or previous 
peacekeeping experience of the UNAVEM I observers. 

Tactics 

UNAVEM I's headguarters were established in the capital of 
Luanda. Teams of eight military observers were stationed 
permanently at the ports of Cabinda, Lobito, Luanda, Namibe, and 
the Luanda Airport, where they recorded the movement of any Cuban 
military personnel or equipment. Two or three mobile inspection 
teams of six observers each verified Cuban redeployments. 25 

UNAVEM I was provided by the Cubans with one week's advance 
notice of any departures or rotation of troops and equipment. The 
U.N. mission was also kept apprised of all Cuban redeployments 
northward and of locations from which troops had been withdrawn. 
Mobile inspection teams were accompanied by Cuban and Angolan 
liaison officers, and verification was coordinated by a joint 
commission consisting of the CMO and a senior officer from both 
Cuba and Angola. 26 
Cost 

The total cost for the 31-month operation was initially 
estimated at $20.4 million. 27 The mission expended $1 million 


217 





less than anticipated in its first year. 28 
Operational Assessment 

The Cuban troop withdrawal generally proceeded ahead of 
schedule and without significant impediments or violations. The 
only instance of noncompliance occurred on January 23, 1990 , when 
Cuban forces suspended their withdrawal in response to an UNITA 
attack that killed four Cuban soldiers and wounded five others. 
The Cuban departures resumed on February 25 , and the withdrawal 
was once again on schedule by April 25. 29 

In a report to the Security Council issued on May 10, 1991, 
the Secretary-General expressed his satisfaction with UNAVEM I's 
performance, stating that UNAVEM I was carrying out its tasks 
with "excellent cooperation" from Angola and Cuba. 30 The final 
pullout of Cuban forces was completed on May 25, 1991, more than 
one month ahead of schedule. 

UNAVEM I was a successful U.N. peace observer mission. The 
main reasons for UNAVEM I's success were, first, the limited 
scope of its mandate, which entailed a straightforward 
observation of military movements; and second, the cooperation of 
the parties involved, whose obligations were clearly spelled out 
in an internationally brokered agreement. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

UNAVEM I's original mandate expired in August 1991. The U.N. 
presence in Angola was subsequently expanded under UNAVEM II, 
which was deployed to monitor the cease-fire and demobilization 
of MPLA-PT and UNITA forces. 


218 



CONCLUSION 


UNAVEM I's experience suggests that simple peace observer 
missions with clearly defined objectives stand a good chance of 
success, especially when they receive the full cooperation of the 
parties to the dispute. An important factor contributing to the 
success of the mission was the high level of international 
interest and pressure from the superpowers to have the troop 
withdrawal agreements implemented. 31 

Although UNAVEM I facilitated the negotiation of a cease¬ 
fire and peace accords in May 1991, the Angolan civil war resumed 
in October 1992 after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi refused to 
recognize the results of the U.N.-monitored elections. In mid- 
1993, Angola was once again in a state of full-scale civil war. 


219 


Endnotes 


1. Inge Tvedten, "The Angolan Debacle," Journal of Democracy . 4, 
No. 2, April 1993, 109. 

2. Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World Since 1945 (London: Cassell, 
1991), 350. 

3. The Blue Helmets (New York: United Nations, August 1990), 350. 

4. A1 J. Ventner, "The Angolan War: A Classic Study of Guerrilla 
Warfare," International Defence Review . 23, June 1990, 651. 

5. Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World Since 1945 . 350. 

6. Virginia P. Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission 

I," in William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping: 
Case Studies and Comparative Analyses (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1993), 377. 

7. Ibid ., 345. 

8. "Appendix B: Agreements for Peace in Southwestern Africa," in 
Owen E. Kahn, ed., Disengagement from Southwest Africa (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1990) , 230. 

9. Ibid . 

10. Ibid .. 232. 

11. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New 
York: United Nations, 1990), 345. 

12. Ibid . 335. 

13. The Blue Helmets . 336. 

14. "United Nations Angola Verification Mission Begins Operations" 
[Press release.] (New York: United Nations, Department of Public 
Information, January 3, 1989), 1. 

15. The Blue Helmets . 350. 

16. Ibid .. 338. 

17. "United Nations Angola Verification Mission Begins Operations," 

1. 


18. Ibid. 


19. The Blue Helmets . 339. 


220 




















20. 

Ibid. 


21. 

Ibid. 


22. 

Ibid. 


23 . 

Ibid.. 384. 


24 . 

Ibid. 


25. 

Ibid.. 382. 


26. 

Ibid.. 384. 


27. 

1 . 

"United Nations Angola Verification Mission Begins 

Operations," 

28. Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission I." in William J. Durch. ed. . The Evolution of U.N. 


Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analyses (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1993), 381. 

29. Ibid ., 384. 

30. "Defusing the Crisis," UN Chronicle . 26, No. 3, September 1989, 

10 . 

31. Chester A. Crocker, "Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The 
Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1989," The Diplomatic Record. 1989-90 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 15. 


221 














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1991. 

The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, August 1990. 

Bridgeland, Fred. The War for Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a 
Continent . Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1990. 

Campbell, Horace. The Siege of Cuito Cuanavale . Uppsala, Sweden: 
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1990. 

Collelo, Thomas, ed. Angola: A Country Study . Washington: GPO, 1991. 

Crocker, Chester A. "Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia- 
Angola Settlement of 1988." The Diplomatic Record. 1989-90 . 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 

Doherty, Carroll J. "Wars of Proxy Losing Favor as Cold War Tensions 

End," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . 48, August 25, 1990, 
2721-25. 

Fortna, Virginia P. "United Nations Angola Verification Mission I." In 
William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping . New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

Heitman, H.R. War in Angola: The Final South African Phase . 

Gilbraltar: Ashanti, 1990. 

Hull, Richard W. "United States Policy in Southern Africa," Current 
History . 89, May 1990, 193-96, 228-30. 

Lin, Yung-lo. "The Angola-Namibia Accords: Looking to the Future," 
Issues and Studies . 26, September 1990, 111-30. 

Mallin, Jay. Cuba in Angola . Coral Gables, Florida: Research Institute 
for Cuban Studies, University of Miami, 1987. 

McCormick, Shawn. Angola: The Road to Peace . Washington: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1991. 

Rothchild, Donald. "Conflict Management in Angola," Transafrica Forum . 
8, Spring 1991, 77-101. 

Smith, James. The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-Western 
Africa . London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1990. 

Spikes, Michael. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local 


222 





















Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa . Jefferson, North 
Carolina: McFarland, 1993. 

Tvedten, Inge. "The Angolan Debacle," Journal of Democracy . 4. No. 2, 
April 1993. 

Venter, A1 J. "The Angolan War: A Classic Study of Guerilla Warfare," 
International Defense Review . 23, June 1990, 649-52. 

Von der Ropp, Klaus F. "The Return to Diplomacy in Southern Africa," 
Aussenpolitik , 41, first quarter 1990, 91-102. 

White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security . Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester 
University Press, 1990. 

Wolfers, Michael. Angola in Frontline . London: Zed Press, 1983. 


223 










United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) 


Selected Chronology 

1989 


In January, Cuban and South African troops began to withdraw 
from Angola in accordance with the tripartite and bilateral 
agreements of December 1988. 

In June, the leaders of the two main factions in the Angolan 
civil war, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, met at a 
summit in Gbadolite, Zaire, to sign a cease-fire agreement. The 
cease-fire was almost immediately violated and was subsequently 
repudiated by Savimbi. 

In September, fighting between dos Santos' Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimiento Popular 
de Libertagao de Angola-Partido Trabalho—MPLA-PT) and Savimbi's 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao 
Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola--UNITA) 
intensified as Cuban and South African forces abandoned strategic 
positions. 

1990 


In April, the first of several rounds of peace talks between 
the MPLA-PT and UNITA were held in Lisbon, Portugal, under 
Portuguese mediation. 

1991 


In May, the MPLA-PT and UNITA signed a comprehensive peace 
agreement in Bicesse, Portugal. In support of the Bicesse 
Accords, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council issued 
Resolution 696 (1991), establishing UNAVEM II to verify 
compliance with the agreement. 

1992 


In March, U.N. Security Council Resolution 747 (1992) 
expanded UNAVEM II's mandate to include verification of the 
September 1992 elections. 

In September, U.N.-monitored national elections were held; 
the MPLA-PT defeated UNITA in both the presidential and 
parliamentary voting. UNAVEM II declared the elections free and 
fair, despite irregularities. 

In October, Savimbi publicly rejected the election results, 
withdrawing UNITA personnel from the unified armed forces, 


224 






rearming UNITA troops, and occupying numerous towns and 
municipalities. Savimbi's forces subsequently launched an 
offensive against the capital, Luanda. In retaliation, government 
forces killed several UNITA leaders and launched a military 
counteroffensive. 

1993 

In January, government forces launched a major air and heavy 
artillery offensive against the UNITA stronghold at Huambo; 
approximately 10,000 persons were killed in the fighting. 

In February, UNAVEM evacuated its personnel from 45 of its 
67 verification posts, suspending its operations in most of 
Angola. 

In March, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 811 (1993), strongly condemning persistent violations 
of the Bicesse Accords by UNITA. 

In May, preliminary negotiations between UNITA and the 
Angolan government collapsed after the parties were unable to 
agree on a cease-fire. 

In June, UNAVEM II's civilian chief of mission, Margaret 
Anstee resigned her post, and was replaced by Maitre Alioune 
Blondin Beye. 

In July, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 851 
(1993) , once again condemning UNITA's military actions, calling 
for U.N. member states to refrain from assisting militarily the 
warring parties, and announcing the Council's readiness to 
consider economic sanctions against UNITA. 

In October, UNITA agreed to accept the results of the 
September 1992 elections, prompting the Angolan government to 
propose a new round of negotiations. 


225 



INTRODUCTION 


The Angolan peace process began with the March 1990 
negotiations that ended foreign intervention in the Angolan civil 
war (see UNAVEM I). With the elimination of the Cuban and South 
African military presence, the contending Angolan parties 
embarked on a new peace initiative to be based on democratization 
and integration of the country's two main political movements 
within national institutions. 

The peace accords signed at Bicesse, Portugal, in May 1991, 
instituted a process for the establishment of a competitive, 
multiparty democratic political system, to include members of the 
ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Workers' 
Party (Movimiento Popular de Libertagao de Angola-Partido 
Trabalho—MPLA-PT) and the insurgent National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para la Independencia 
Total de Angola—UNITA). 

The U.N. presence in Angola was enlarged to help implement 
the Bicesse Accords. In May 1991, the U.N. Security Council, in 
Resolution 696 (1991), expanded the mandate of the United Nations 
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to verify the implementation 
of the accords. 1 

This case study examines the original crisis in Angola, the 
factors leading to the deployment of UNAVEM II, the evolution of 
its mandate, the effectiveness of the deployment, and the current 
situation and outlook in Angola in light of the mission's initial 
goals. 


226 


PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The Initial Crisis 

During the phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola 
in 1989-90, the fifteen-year-old Angolan civil war intensified as 
both the MPLA-PT and UNITA, seeking to capitalize on the Cuban 
departures, attempted to control the newly demilitarized areas. 

In light of this situation, an early initiative to end the 
fighting, sponsored by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko in June 
1989, failed to produce a lasting cease-fire. 2 

By early 1990, the military situation in Angola had once 
again stalemated between the government and UNITA forces. A new 
round of peace talks began in April in Lisbon under Portuguese 
mediation. The first three rounds of the talks dealt with 
democratization and national reconciliation issues. The fourth 
round, which included the United States and the Soviet Union as 
observers, produced a commitment by the superpowers to a "zero- 
zero" option whereby all military aid would be suspended once a 
cease-fire was reached. 3 

The peace negotiations were finalized with the signing near 
Lisbon of the Bicesse Peace Accords on May 31, 1991. The 
agreement called for a U.N.-monitored cease-fire, concentrating 
and demobilizing the military forces within a given timetable, 
integrating the forces into a single national army, and holding 
internationally monitored multiparty elections in September 1992. 

The Bicesse Peace Accords established a Joint Political- 
Military Commission (Comissao Conjunto Politico-Militar—CCPM) to 


227 



verify implementation. The CCPM included representatives of the 
Angolan government and UNITA, as well as representatives from 
Portugal, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the U.N. 
Reporting to the commission were a Joint Verification and 
Monitoring Commission (Comissao Monitorio para Verificagao—CMVF) 
and a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces 
(Comissao Conjunto para a Formagao das Forgas Armadas—CCFA). The 
principal monitoring and verification tasks were assigned to the 
CCPM, not the U.N. Ultimate responsibility for the implementation 
of the accords and sanctioning authority rested with the CCPM, 
whereas the U.N. was to observe the CCPM's performance and 
provide support and international recognition of the CCPM's 
activities. 

The U.N. Response 

Following the signing of the peace accords, the Angolan 
government formally requested U.N. assistance in verifying their 
implementation. The initial Angolan request was for U.N. 
verification of the cease-fire and the demobilization of the two 
forces, while the U.N. role in the September 1992 elections was 
not yet clearly spelled out. 

In response to the Angolan request and the recommendations 
of the Secretary-General, the Security Council expanded UNAVEM's 
mandate and authorized strength to meet the new mission 
objectives. Resolution 696 (1991), of May 30, 1991, established 
UNAVEM II as a multicomponent peace observer mission under a 
civilian chief. 


228 



DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 


UNAVEM II's deployment was carried out in several stages. In 
early June 1991, an advance party of 61 military observers and 32 
civilians set up five of the six regional headquarters for the 
operation. At about the same time, reconnaissance missions were 
sent into the various troop assembly points to report on 
military-related conditions. Reconnaissance at some UNITA-held 
areas was delayed until August 1991 because of initial UNITA 
reluctance to clear UNAVEM II's entry. 4 

During the initial phase, UNAVEM II experienced substantial 
delays in its deployment into Angola, taking longer than 
anticipated in becoming operational. The delays were caused by 
logistical problems in Angola, UNITA's initial obstruction of 
reconnaissance in its areas, and the postponement of budget 
approval until August 1991. 

Deployment of UNAVEM II's military monitors in the assembly 
areas was completed on September 30, 1991. UNAVEM II police 
monitors deployed in late August and September, but because their 
CMVF counterparts were not in place until early 1992, patrolling 
of all of Angola's 18 provinces did not commence until mid-June. 
On several occasions, UNITA denied government police forces 
access to its areas. 5 

As a result of delays and a poor logistical situation, the 
original August 1, 1991 deadline for troop assembly was not met. 
The plan called for the establishment of 50 assembly areas—23 
for UNITA and 27 for government forces—in which troops would 


229 


concentrate and be demobilized by the CMVF under U.N. 
observation. 

Political and Military Goals 

UNAVEM II's mandate was "to verify the arrangements agreed 
by the two Angolan parties . . . for monitoring the cease fire . 

. . and for monitoring the Angolan police during the cease-fire 
period." 6 Thismission entailed close collaboration with the CCPM 
and its satellite commissions; however, the U.N. had no direct 
role in the demobilization process or the retraining of the new 
army, and it was to remain operationally separate from the 
Angolan organizations. One of UNAVEM II's primary political 
objectives was to verify that the CCPM conducted its operations 
in a nonpartisan and efficient manner. 

UNAVEM II's military objectives included monitoring the 
concentration and demobilization of MPLA and UNITA forces in 
designated assembly areas, investigating allegations of cease¬ 
fire violations, monitoring police activity, and providing 
technical support for the training of the new Angolan armed 
forces. 

On March 24, 1992, UNAVEM II's mandate was expanded by 
Security Council Resolution 747 (1992) to include monitoring the 
September 1992 national elections. UNAVEM II's new 
responsibilities included verifying electoral rolls, reporting on 
irregularities, and observing voter registration, polling, 
computation, and the announcement of results. 7 
Rules of Engagement 


230 




UNAVEM II's personnel were unarmed and had no authority or 
capability to engage hostile troops. The security of the 
mission's personnel was guaranteed by the Angolan government and 
UNITA. In response to a deteriorating security situation, UNAVEM 
II employed a small number of armed U.N. security guards. It was 
not authorized to issue orders or directives, nor could it 
interfere with the activities of any forces encountered. 
Composition of Forces 

At maximum strength, UNAVEM II numbered 1,112 persons, 
including 350 military observers, 126 police monitors, 87 
international civilian staff, 155 local staff and 400 electoral 
observers; military observers were provided by 24 states. 8 

UNAVEM II's Military Division was commanded by Major General 
Edward Ushie Unimna of Nigeria. In February 1992, Margaret Joan 
Anstee of Britain was appointed Civilian Chief of Mission for 
UNAVEM II. In June 1993, Anstee resigned her post and was 
replaced by Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye, a Malian U.N. official. 
Equipment 

UNAVEM II observer teams were eguipped with an unspecified 
number of light ground transport vehicles as well as a civilian 
air unit with one fixed-wing aircraft and a dozen helicopters. A 
heavy cargo aircraft and a small passenger aircraft were hired as 
necessary. 9 During the election-monitoring phase of the mission, 
UNAVEM II's air wing expanded to 45 transport helicopters and 15 
fixed-wing aircraft. 10 UNAVEM II's communications equipment 
included a portable satellite earth station, radio teletype, 


231 




mobile VHF radio, crypto-fax and text cipher machines, and a 

voice encryption device donated by Switzerland. 11 

Training 

Some of UNAVEM II's military observers had previous 
peacekeeping experience in UNAVEM I. 

Tactics 

Military observers were deployed in teams of five at 50 
troop assembly areas, and in teams of two or more at 12 "critical 
points," primarily airports and ports not covered by the CMVF. 12 
At the troop assembly areas, UNAVEM II military observers 
reported on the number of assembled troops and weapons being 
turned in to the CMVF, and on general conditions and morale. 
Mobile observer teams were also set up to help the CCPM 
investigate and resolve cease-fire violations and other problems. 

UNAVEM II police monitors accompanied the Angolan police on 
patrols in support of CMVF monitors. Teams of four UNAVEM II 
police observers were deployed in each of Angola's eighteen 
provinces. UNAVEM II observers patrolled in pairs, accompanying 
some of the CMVF monitoring teams. 

Cost 

The total cost for UNAVEM II from June 1991 until October 
1992 was estimated at $121.4 million. UNAVEM II's monthly 
expenditures since October 1992 have been estimated at 
approximately $2 million, leading to a total mission cost in 
October 1993 of $145 million. 13 
Operational Assessment 


232 






The troop assembly and demobilization aspects of the peace 
plan were poorly executed by both UNITA and the Angolan 
government. The process was characterized by missed deadlines, 
poor compliance, and ineffective monitoring. As a result, by 
September 1992, the country continued to be divided between two 
heavily armed camps, neither of which had taken significant, 
irreversible steps toward demobilizing their forces. 

Throughout the 15-month period leading to the September 1992 
elections, the demobilization and military integration process 
lagged behind other aspects of the peace plan. In June 1992, 85 
percent of UNITA's troops were assembled, but only 4 percent had 
demobilized; among the government forces, 37 percent had reached 
assembly points, half of those having demobilized. 14 By 
September, only 41 percent of government troops and 24 percent of 
UNITA's forces had demobilized. 15 A large number of troops 
drifted away from the assembly areas prior to demobilization 
because of generally poor morale and discipline, as well as 
shortages of food, clothing, and medicine at the assembly sites. 
Incomplete troop demobilization increasingly threatened the 
success of the peace plan as the scheduled elections approached, 
and eventually became an important factor contributing to the 
resumption of hostilities. 

In contrast to the demobilization and police monitoring 
aspects of UNAVEM II, the election monitoring component of the 
mission proceeded without major impediments. UNAVEM II deployed 
400 electoral observers throughout Angola in two-person mobile 


233 


teams; an additional 400 international observers were brought 
into the country under the auspices of the Angolan National 
Electoral Council (NEC) . 16 The election monitors covered all 18 
provinces and most of the 164 municipalities, visiting about 
4,000 out of a total 6,000 polling stations. 17 In September, 

UNAVEM II's air transport capabilities were expanded to support 
the election monitoring operation, with 45 helicopters and 15 
fixed-wing aircraft being used to deploy monitors in remote 
regions. 18 

The national elections proceeded on schedule on September 
29-30, 1992 without significant disruption. The voting results in 
the presidential race gave the victory to President Jose Eduardo 
dos Santos (MPLA-PT), with 49.57 percent of the vote, against 
40.07 percent for UNITA's Savimbi. 19 The MPLA-PT was also 
victorious in the parliamentary elections, garnering 53.74 
percent of the vote versus 34.10 percent for UNITA. 20 On October 
17, U.N. Special Representative Anstee declared the elections 
"generally free and fair" despite some irregularities. 21 

The political climate in Angola, however, deteriorated 
rapidly following UNITA's electoral defeat. In early October 
1992, UNITA representatives charged that systematic fraud and 
irregularities had characterized the entire process and affected 
the outcome of the voting. The first major violation of the peace 
accord occurred shortly thereafter, when UNITA withdrew from the 
unified Angolan Armed Forces. Tensions escalated throughout 
October, leading to a resumption of fighting between UNITA and 


234 


government troops in the capital. 

By early November, fighting had spread into the provinces, 
where partially demobilized UNITA and government forces regained 
their weapons and resumed military operations. The violence 
escalated throughout the remainder of the year, as UNITA forces, 
reportedly aided by Zairian army units and South African 
mercenaries, captured several important urban areas. In January 
1992, UNITA and government forces engaged in a major battle for 
the central highland city of Huambo. In the course of the 
fighting for Huambo, 10,000 people were reportedly killed and 
540,000 residents were cut off from water and food supplies. 22 
CURRENT SITUATION 

In early January 1993, Angola was once again in a state of 
civil war. The intense fighting brought UNAVEM II's activities to 
a virtual standstill and posed a severe risk to U.N. personnel. 

In February, UNAVEM II conducted emergency evacuations of its 
personnel from 45 of its 67 verification posts, partly in 
response to UNITA's intimidation of U.N. observers. In the midst 
of the pullout, UNITA forces seized an estimated $10 million 
worth of U.N. communications equipment and vehicles. 23 UNAVEM's 
strength was subsequently reduced dramatically from 700 to 70 
observers, pending the negotiation of a new cease-fire. 

A U.N.-mediated effort in January to restore the cease-fire 
yielded few tangible results. On March 12, the U.N. Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 811 (1993), strongly 
condemning persistent violations of the Bicesse Accords by UNITA, 


235 


deploring UNITA's verbal and physical attacks against U.N. 
personnel, and calling on U.N. member states to refrain from 
aiding militarily the fighting forces in Angola. In June, U.N. 
Special Representative Anstee resigned her post following Jonas 
Savimbi's public criticism of her performance and a deterioration 
of relations between UNITA and UNAVEM II. Anstee was replaced by 
Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye, a Malian U.N. official. 

By the summer of 1993, Angola faced little immediate 
prospect of a restoration of peace. The civil war had once again 
settled into a stalemate, with UNITA maintaining control over 70 
percent of the country, including the central highlands and the 
northern border with Zaire, and government forces holding Luanda, 
Cabinda, and most of the major towns. Despite its loss of U.S. 
support, UNITA appeared sufficiently well-equipped and 
financially independent to continue the armed struggle 
indefinitely. With U.N. resources and world attention focused on 
the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, relatively little 
international pressure was being brought to bear on the Angolan 
parties to end the fighting. In February, the World Food Program 
estimated that the renewed warfare had doubled the number of 
displaced persons in the country from 1.5 million to 3 million, 
many of whom faced an imminent threat of disease and 
starvation. 24 

On July 15, 1993, the U.N. Security Council issued 
Resolution 851 (1993), once again condemning UNITA's military 
actions, calling on U.N. member states to refrain from assisting 


236 


militarily the warring parties, and announcing the council's 
readiness to consider economic sanctions against UNITA. 25 In 
response to the threat of sanctions, UNITA agreed in October to 
accept the results of the September 1992 elections, prompting the 
Angolan government to propose a new round of negotiations in 
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. 26 
CONCLUSION 

Despite some notable successes, particularly in the 
observation of national elections and the removal of mines from 
the countryside, UNAVEM II was unsuccessful in its efforts to 
verify the demobilization aspects of the peace plan. This failure 
resulted in large part from external factors beyond the U.N.'s 
control, mainly, the lack of true commitment to a settlement 
among the combatants and the ineffectiveness of the CCPM and its 
satellite commissions. 

Despite their cooperation in certain aspects of the peace 
plan, UNITA and the Angolan government did not achieve a level of 
confidence sufficient to warrant complete demobilization of their 
respective armies, as called for in the Bicesse Accords. Whereas 
both sides may have expressed unreserved support for the plan, 
neither was in fact sufficiently confident in its effectiveness 
to stake its survival on the plan's requirements for voluntary 
disarmament. This is shown by the fact that both sides "hedged" 
by maintaining at least a third of their troops armed, in 
violation of the agreement, to guard against fraud by the other 
party. This lack of confidence among the parties also suggests 


237 


that the UNITA and MPLA-PT leaders had not yet developed a 
sufficiently candid political dialogue within which to discuss 
differences and defuse mutual suspicions. 

It is also possible that one or both parties were obscuring 
their real intentions in signing the peace agreement and were in 
fact seeking to use the peace process as an opportunity to buy 
time or to exploit the opponent's vulnerability. In essence, the 
parties' innate and long-sustained distrust, their leaders' 
hidden agendas, and their physical capacity to continue fighting 
were factors subversive to a settlement and ultimately beyond the 
control of the U.N. and CCPM. 

UNAVEM II's failure cannot, however, be entirely attributed 
to an inauspicious political climate for peace because it is 
evident that the mission missed certain key opportunities to 
prevent an unraveling of the peace process. Particularly during 
the time preceding the elections, when the demobilizations fell 
behind schedule, and immediately afterward, when UNITA began to 
question the results, the U.N. failed to apply pressure on the 
noncompliant parties. To a certain degree, the U.N. was 
restrained from acting more assertively by its status as a 
secondary observer presence in Angola, dependent on the CCPM and 
its satellite commissions to verify compliance with the peace 
plan. As the CMVF demonstrated its incapacity to keep the 
military demobilization on schedule, however, the U.N. did not 
take the initiative to bring the process back on track. Lacking a 
direct mandate to enforce the peace plan or sanction offenders, 


238 


the U.N. was left with few opportunities for constructive 
intervention. 

The main flaw in UNAVEM II's mandate was that it entailed 
granting U.N. certification to a demobilization process that did 
not meet U.N. standards. Because of its limited resources, UNAVEM 
II came to rely too heavily on Angolan institutions and on the 
goodwill of the disputing parties themselves to ensure 
compliance. It did not, as in comparable missions in Central 
America, react decisively in response to early violations of the 
accords or insist on improvements as the demobilization process 
proved increasingly inadequate. 


239 


Endnotes 


1. Virginia P. Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
II," in William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 388. 

2. Ibid . 

3. Ibid ., 389. 

4. Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II," 394. 

5. Ibid ., 399. 

6. Ibid ., 392. 

7. "U.N. Special Representative Declares Angolan Elections 
'Generally Free and Fair'," U.N. Chronicle . 29, No. 4, December 
1992, 10. 

8. Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II," 395. 


9. 

Ibid.. 397. 



10. 

Inoe Tvedten. "The Anaolan Debacle." Journal of Dem 

ocracv. 4. 

No. 

2 April 

1992, 113. 



11. 

Fortna, 

"United Nations Angola 

Verification Mission 

II," 384. 

12. 

Ibid.. 

397. 



13. 

Ibid., 

393. 



14. 

Ibid., 

400. 



15. 

Tvedten 

, "The Angolan Debacle," 

111. 


16. 

Tvedten 

, "The Angolan Debacle," 

114. 


17. 

Ibid. 




18. 

Ibid., 

113. 



19. 

"U.N. 

Special Representative 

Declares Angolan 

Elections 


'Generally Free and Fair'," 9. 

20. Ibid . 

21. Ibid . 

22. Tvedten, "Angolan Debacle," 116. 


240 

















Intel ljqencp d pp:' j ”™* 5 ^ in Angola '" ^ane^ 

M Chronic^ Im Tn edi ^ te 2 Throughout the Country, •- 

I^ed'fateTy^ °°^ss ReTealfe Cease military Action 

Department^of Pu^^n/o^onl J®" 

Taiks with Rebeis '" 


241 







Bibliography 


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York: Human Rights Watch, April 1989. 

Berdal, Mats. "The Resumption of Civil War in Angola," Jane's 
Intelligence Review . 5, No. 6, June 1993, 284-85. 

Clark, Warren Jr. National Reconciliation Efforts for Angola . 

Washington: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
1989. 

Collelo, Thomas, ed. Angola: A Country Study . Washington: GPO 1991. 

Fortna, Virginia P. "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II." 

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York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

Maier, Karl. "Blueprint for Peace?," Africa Report . 36, March-April 
1991, 19-22. 

McCormick, Shawn. Angola: The Road to Peace . Washington: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1991. 

Morrison, Stephen J. The Long Road Home: Angola's Post-War 

Inheritance. Washington: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1991. 

Pazzanita, Anthony G. "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola," 
Journal of Modern African Studies . 29, March 1991, 83-114. 

Pelda, Kurt. "UNITA: Advancing Through Angola," Swiss Review of World 
Affairs . 39, January 1990, 23-6. 

Rothchild, Donald. "Conflict Management in Angola," Transafrica Forum . 
8, Spring 1991, 77-101. 

Schmults, Robert C. "Bloodshed and Blame in Angola," Insight . 16, 
February 14, 1993, 30-31. 

Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local 
Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa . Jefferson, North 
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Stoelting, David. "The Challenge of U.N.-Monitored Elections in 

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Tvedten, Inge. "The Angolan Debacle," Journal of Democracy . 4, No. 2, 
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"United Nations Angola Verification Mission II." Peace-keeping 

Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: United Nations, 


242 























March 1993. 


United Stahas* Congress. 102nd, 2d Session. House of Representatives. 

F °^ e i gn Affalrs - Subcommittee on Africa. Political 
Lh ; El! Pros P e cts for Peace in Mozambiq ue and Review of 

- Process —in Angola (Hearing). Washington: GPO, 1984. 

Ventner , A1 J . "The Angolan War: A Classic Study of Guerilla Warfare," 
I nternational Defense Revip.w r 23, June 1990, 649-52. 

Weitz, Richard. "Resolving Regional Conflicts: International 

^f? C c 1 ^ eS/U — nais of th e Am erican Academy of Political and 
S ocial —Science, 518, November 1991, 11-187. 

Winter, Roger. . Ending Exile: Promoting Su c cessful Reintegration of 

Refugees and Displaced People . Washington: United States 
Committee for Refugees, 1990. 

Wolfers, Michael. Angola in the F rontline . London: Zed Press, 1983. 






243 



























United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 


Selected Chronology 

1920 


League of Nations granted a Class C Mandate for South West 
Africa to the Union of South Africa. 

1960 


The South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) was 
formed. 

1966 


The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly revoked South 
Africa's mandate. SWAPO began its armed struggle 

1967 


The General Assembly created the U.N. Council for South West 
Africa and a Commissioner for South West Africa to administer the 
territory. 

1968 

The General Assembly adopted “Namibia” as the territory’s 

name. 

1969 


Security Council Resolutions 264 and 269 recognized 
revocation of the mandate. 

1971 


The International Court of Justice upheld the General 
Assembly’s revocation of the mandate and declared that South 
Africa was obliged to withdraw from the territory. 

1973 


The General Assembly granted observer status to SWAPO. 


1976 


The Security Council adopted Resolution 385 calling for 
elections under U.N. supervision and control. The General 


244 











Assembly recognized SWAPO as “sole and authentic” representative 
of the Namibian people. The Turnhalle Conference of internal 
parties established interim government. 

1977 


The Western Contact Group (Britain, Canada, France, United 
States, and West Germany) initiated negotiations to find an 
internationally acceptable settlement. 

In November, the U.N. declared South Africa’s annexation of 
Walvis Bay illegal and a violation of the U.N. Charter and 
Declaration on Decolonization. 

1978 


In April, the Contact Group submitted a settlement proposal 
to the Security Council, under which South Africa would 
administer the elections under U.N. supervision and control. 

In July, Security Council Resolution 431 created the office 
of the Special Representative for Namibia, and Resolution 432 
mandated that Walvis Bay be reintegrated into Namibia. The 
Secretary-General immediately appointed Martti Ahtisaari Special 
Representative. 

In September, the Security Council passed Resolution 435 
adopting the Settlement Plan and establishing the U.N. 
Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia, a mission mandated to 
ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair 
elections. 

1980 


Proclamation AG 8 established ethnic administrative 
authorities in Namibia. 

1981 

The United States announced a policy linking implementation 
of Resolution 435 to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. 

1982 


The Secretary-General's Contact Group submitted a proposal 
on principles to govern the electoral system and the 
constitution, and on actions to ensure U.N. and South African 
impartiality. 

1983 


The Council of Ministers in Namibia resigned, and the 


245 








Administrator-General dissolved the National Assembly and resumed 
direct rule. The Multi-Party Conference (MPC) was convened in 
November. 

1985 


The South African President issued Proclamation R101, which 
ceded administrative responsibility to the interim government 
formed by the MPC and also adopted a Bill of Rights. 

1988 


In July, an agreement was reached at Governor’s Island on 
"principles for a peaceful settlement" in south-western Africa 
among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. 

In August, the Protocol of Geneva established a cease-fire 
and called for implementation of the Settlement Plan. 

In December, the Protocol of Brazzaville committed parties 
to treaties providing for the implementation of the Settlement 
Plan, a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and the 
creation of a Joint Commission. The Tripartite Accord was signed 
in New York on December 22. 

1989 


In January, Security Council Resolutions 628 and 629 set 
April 1 as the deadline for the implementation of Resolution 435. 
Debate in the Security Council was held over the size of the 
United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) force. 

In February, Security Council Resolution 632 approved the 
Secretary-General’s compromise over the size of UNTAG force and 
authorized implementation. 

In March, the General Assembly approved the UNTAG budget. 

In April, implementation of the Settlement Plan began with 
the outbreak of hostilities in northern Namibia. The Joint 
Commission issued the Etjo Declaration on April 9, which called 
for restoration of the cease-fire and provided for the withdrawal 
of SWAPO forces to Angola, north of the 16th parallel. 

Amnesty Proclamation, AG 13, and First Law Amendment 
(Abolition of Discriminatory or Restrictive Laws for Purposes of 
Free and Fair Elections) Proclamation, AG 14, were enacted on 
June 12. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
began repatriation of Namibians. Registration of Voters 
(Constituent Assembly) Proclamation, AG-19 enacted on June 28. 

Voter registration began; UNTAG proposed draft election law 


246 





on July 21. 

In August, Security Council Resolution 640 demanded "strict 
compliance" with Resolutions 435 and 632 by all parties, 
"especially South Africa," and directed the Secretary-General to 
ensure that electoral legislation conformed to "internationally 
accepted norms." 

In September, Registration of Political Organizations 
Proclamation, AG 43 was enacted. 

In October, Election Proclamation, AG 49, was enacted. 

In November, the Constituent Assembly unanimously adopted a 
constitution, designated March 21 for independence, and elected 
Sam Nujoma as Namibia's first president. 

1990 


In March, Namibia became independent; UNTAG ceased 
operation. 


247 



INTRODUCTION 


The Republic of Namibia (formerly known as South West 
Africa) achieved independence on March 21, 1990 , after a century 
of colonial rule. Before it gained independence, Namibia had been 
ruled by Germany in the late nineteenth century and after World 
War I by South Africa. The eventual Settlement Proposal, which 
paved the way for independence, was implemented after February 
1989; it was the culmination of a series of international efforts 
at mediation in Namibia that originated in the League of Nations. 
Namibia became the last country in Africa to decolonize. 
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The international community became involved in the issue of 
Namibia's future in opposition to South Africa's role as 
colonizer of the country. In 1914, with the outbreak of the World 
War I, South African troops occupied South West Africa and forced 
Germany to relinquish its possession, which it had held since 
1884. In 1920, the League of Nations entrusted South Africa with 
a mandate to administer South West Africa. In 1925, South Africa 
imposed a constitution on South West Africa that gave complete 
administrative control of local affairs to the country's white 
minority. This system of apartheid was regarded as a violation of 
the League of Nations mandate. After World War II, the U.N. not 
only refused to conclude its trusteeship agreement with South 
Africa, but also disallowed South Africa’s request to annex South 
West Africa. 


248 



In 1950 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a 
ruling stipulating that the area should remain under 
international mandate and that South Africa should submit to U.N. 
control. South Africa refused to comply with this judgment. 
Furthermore, in October 1966, South Africa’s security and 
anti-apartheid laws were extended to South West Africa. 

In 1958 opposition within Namibia to racial segregation, 
land appropriation, the contract labor system, and restrictions 
on blacks' freedom of movement led to the establishment of the 
South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). The following 
year, the South West African National Union (SWANU) was formed. 

As a result of the same principles, both groups agitated for full 
independence from South Africa. In 1966, SWAPO launched an armed 
struggle for the liberation of the territory; and its military 
arm, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), operated 
from bases in Angola and Zambia. An estimated 10,000 people died 
as a result of this guerrilla war. 1 

South Africa was consistently criticized in the U.N. General 
Assembly over its extension of apartheid to the territory. In 
1966, the General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate to 
administer the territory and placed it under the direct 
responsibility of the U.N., creating a U.N. Council for South 
West Africa in May 1967. The name of the territory was changed to 
Namibia in June 1968. Throughout the 1960s, South Africa took a 
defiant stance on South West Africa in international forums. In 
September 1975, for instance, in the Turnhalle initiative, South 


249 


Africa held a Constitutional Conference in Namibia to deliberate 
on ushering in Namibia's independence under an apartheid, non- 
SWAPO government system. 2 Nevertheless, from that time onward, 
the pace of negotiations over the territory's future quickened. 
The U.N. Response 

The U.N. Security Council in January 1976 adopted Resolution 
385, which called for "free elections under the supervision and 
control of the United Nations." 3 Also in 1976, in Resolution 
31/146, the U.N. General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "sole 
and authentic representative of the Namibian people." 4 Five 
Western members of the Security Council—Britain, Canada, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States—formed a 
"Contact Group" in 1977, and began a negotiating process aimed at 
reaching an internationally acceptable solution. 

On April 10, 1978, the Contact Group submitted to the 
Security Council a compromise settlement proposal that formed the 
basis of Resolution 435. The resolution called for 
internationally supervised elections; it was amended in 1982 to 
add provisions for a Bill of Rights, multiparty democracy, and an 
independent judiciary. 5 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

Following a decade of negotiation, in 1988 the Geneva 
Protocol set November 1, 1988, as the date of implementation of 
Resolution 435. 6 Angola and Cuba agreed to Cuban withdrawal from 
Angola. SWAPO and South Africa agreed to a cease-fire, completing 
their troop withdrawal from Namibia. On April 1, 1989, the 


250 




implementation of the resolution finally began. 7 In December 
1988, a tripartite accord, known as the Brazzaville Protocol, was 
signed among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, removing a 
long-standing impasse—the United States linkage of the presence 
of Cuban troops in Angola to the negotiating process. 8 It was 
agreed in principle that all Cuban troops would be withdrawn from 
Angola but that South Africa would, in turn, have to withdraw its 
support for the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA), which was opposed by the Angolan government. The 
accord made possible the elections that marked a milestone in 
Namibia’s transition to independence. On February 16, 1989, the 
Security Council implemented a Settlement Proposal that led to a 
U.N. operation to establish an administration in Namibia that 
would enable the Namibian people to exercise their right of 
self-determination. The accord also designated April 1, 1989, as 
the implementation date for Resolution 435. 9 After more than a 
decade of seemingly endless negotiations, free and fair elections 
were conducted pursuant to the 1978 U.N.-sponsored Settlement 
Plan, U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

UNTAG’s deployment was delayed several weeks because of 
delays caused by debate in the Security Council over the size of 
the military component and who would pay for the operation. Key 
personnel, however, began arriving in Namibia by February 1989. 
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Martti 
Ahtisaari, arrived on March 31, 1989, the day Resolution 435 was 


251 


to be implemented. 

Some 110 nationalities were represented in UNTAG forces. At 
its maximum deployment, during the elections of November 7-11, 
1989, UNTAG’s overall strength was 8,000, consisting of under 
2,000 civilians, 1,500 police (CIVPOL-civilian police), and 
approximately 4,500 military personnel. 10 
Political and Military Goals 

UNTAG’s goals were intended to fulfill political, electoral, 
administrative, police, and military objectives. Its mission was 
primarily political and was intended to assist the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early 
independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the 
supervision and control of the United Nations. Chester A. 

Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
(1981-89), described the mission's role as a "joint governor 
(with South Africa) of a quasi-colonial territory for the 
specific purpose of its decolonization under acceptable 
international auspices." 11 

UNTAG's secondary goal was to monitor the rapid reduction 
and eventual removal of the South African military presence in 
Namibia—a precondition for free and fair elections and for the 
subsequent transition to independence. It also had to ensure that 
the remaining security forces, the South West Africa Police 
(SWAPOL), carried out their duties in a manner that was 
consistent with free and fair elections. Above all, UNTAG was 
tasked with ushering in a major change in the country's political 


252 



environment. 


Rules of Engagement 

UNTAG's military and police functions had a nonaggressive, 
supportive, and subordinate role in furthering Namibia's progress 
toward democracy. UNTAG was not authorized to maintain law and 
order in the country, a responsibility that was ceded to the 
remaining police forces. However, the U.N. peacekeepers 
accompanied the police forces and monitored their discharge of 
duties. U.N. civilian police monitors were at times "constrained" 
by certain limitations, such as urging victims to file 
complaints. 12 
Composition of Forces 

UNTAG consisted of civilian, military, and police 
components. The civilian component had five nonpolice elements: 
the Special Representative’s Office, the Independent Jurist, the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the Electoral Division, and the Division of 
Administration. The Special Representative’s Office and 42 
political offices throughout Namibia carried out liaison, 
administrative, electoral, and humanitarian duties. The civilian 
component included local employees as well as more than 1,000 
international personnel who came to monitor the elections. 

The police component consisted of the Civilian Police 
(CIVPOL). Almost all of the CIVPOL personnel remained in Namibia 
until independence. CIVPOL was commanded by a police commissioner 
who had under him two commanders, one each for the northern and 


253 




southern parts of the territory. Two-thirds of CIVPOL served in 
the south. 

The military component was responsible for all military 
aspects of the Settlement Plan. It was commanded by the Force 
Commander, who was appointed by the Secretary-General after 
consultation with the Security Council. The military component, 
as deployed, consisted of three elements: 300 military monitors 
and observers, three infantry battalions, and a number of 
logistics units. The Security Council approved 4,650 personnel 
for initial deployment but the maximum number actually deployed 
was 4,493, as a result of a reduced requirement of personnel for 
air support. 13 
Equipment 

The military component of UNTAG provided a logistical 
support in the form of transport vehicles and communications 
equipment to the field offices. An Italian helicopter unit 
ferried the mobile election teams around the country. Most 
personnel in the military and police components of UNTAG were 
equipped with U.N.-issued light weapons and transport vehicles. 
Training 

At the request of Special Representative to the Secretary- 
General Ahtisaari, the U.N. Training Service organized week-long 
mission-specific training sessions at U.N. offices in New York, 
Geneva, and Vienna. This training was provided for U.N. 
professional and general service staff; it focused on case 
studies, team-building, and emergency preparedness. Parallel 


254 




training programs were not extended to the civilian police. 

The Training Service was also active in Namibia. The UNTAG 
Election Unit offered instruction in election registration, and 
comprehensive training materials were developed for election 
supervisors. Trainers provided instruction in polling procedures 
and led mock polling exercises. 

Tactics 

Because UNTAG was primarily a political operation, 
information management was essential. Over the course of the 
operation, UNTAG produced more than 200 radio broadcasts, 32 
television programs, and more than 590,000 separate information 
items. 14 Routine activities included monitoring the cease-fire, 
limiting the South African military presence in Namibia, and 
maintaining some surveillance over the territory’s borders. 

Cost 

The Secretary-General in January 1989 projected the final 
costs of UNTAG at $416 million. In December 1989, however, costs 
were estimated at $367 million, $42.8 million below the previous 
estimate. 

Operational Assessment 

Given the suspicions of the major antagonists and the high 
expectations for the mission by the international community, 
UNTAG’s task was extremely challenging. South Africans suspected 
that the U.N. desired a SWAPO victory in the elections, whereas 
SWAPO members accused UNTAG of going to extremes to demonstrate 
its impartiality. Ahtisaari, especially, was criticized by SWAPO 


255 





for authorizing the release of South African troops from 
cantonment to intercept a late 1989 incursion into Namibia by 
SWAPO fighters. 

From a political perspective, the U.N. operation in Namibia 
succeeded in drawing opposing groups into a system of 
participatory democracy. The U.N.’s successful involvement with 
the electoral process in Namibia offered a model for other U.N. 
peacekeeping missions. The special emphasis on preparation of 
civilian personnel, it is widely believed, contributed to the 
overall success of UNTAG. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

UNTAG’s mission to Namibia concluded on March 31, 1990. The 
government apparatus UNTAG set up—a system based on the 
separation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches—has held. The Namibian government has experienced 
difficulty in solving many of its social and economic problems. 
Ethnic, racial, and land redistribution problems remain. 15 Yet, 
observers invariably agree that today the country is in a better 
situation to grapple with these problems than it was in the 
past. 16 
CONCLUSION 

On March 31, 1990, UNTAG ceased operation, having fulfilled 
its mandate of facilitating the process of Namibian independence. 
UNTAG’s significance goes beyond the resolution of the last 
territory mandated by the League of Nations. The future of 
participatory democracy in Namibia had implications for changing 


256 


South Africa's system of minority rule. The international 
community has viewed UNTAG's involvement in preparing the ground 
for Namibia's democratic system of government by providing police 
monitors and administering the Namibian elections as a successful 
model to be emulated by other U.N. peacekeeping operations in 
Africa. 

Events in early 1994 suggest cautious optimism for Namibia's 
future stability and indicate that lessons learned there could be 
extended to benefit neighboring South Africa. Following the 
termination of UNTAG's mandate, Namibia has established a free 
press and a functioning multiparty democracy and has held two 
fair and independent elections, both of which had high turnouts. 
Racial tensions in Namibia are under control, and the white 
population appears to have comfortably adapted to its new status- 
-that of a dynamic minority and economic elite. According to some 
observers, the survival and continued prosperity of Namibia's 
white community might serve to reassure white South Africans 
about their fate in a post-apartheid South Africa. 17 

In a display of appreciation, Namibians have set up in their 
national museum a high-profile exhibit devoted to the U.N. This 
action acknowledges that the presence of UNTAG's peacekeeping 
troops helped to make Namibia's transition to freedom a success. 

UNTAG became a powerful symbol for hope. UNTAG's success set 
a precedent for using U.N.-controlled elections as a means of 
peaceful conflict resolution. 

The Settlement Plan was more than a device for instituting 


257 


independence. It also helped Namibians develop a democratic 
political system. These events have a direct impact on the 
evolving democratization not only in South Africa but in other 
African nations as well. 


258 


Endnotes 


1. Paul Taylor, "No News Is Good News in Namibia," Washington Post . 
August 22, 1993, A31. 

2. Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group," in William J. Durch, ed. , The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: 
Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's, 
1993), 354. 

3. Ibid ., 345. 

4. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New 
York: United Nations, August 1990), 344. 

5. Ibid ., 348. 

6. Ibid .. 349. 

7. Nation Building: UN and Namibia (Washington: National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs, 1990), 165-66. 

8. Ibid .. 349. 

9. Ibid .. 349. 

10. The Blue Helmets . 354. 

11. Cited in Donald L. Sparks, Namibia: The Nation After 
Independence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, December 1992). 


CM 

rH 

Ibid.. 360-61 




13 . 

Ibid.. 341. 




14. 

Ibid.. 360-61. 




15. 

Taylor, "No News 

Is 

Good News in 

Namibia," A30. 

16. 

Nation Building: 

UN 

and Namibia. 

57. 

17. 

Taylor, "No News 

Is 

Good News in 

Namibia," A31. 


259 



















Lbliography 


The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping . New York: 
United Nations, 1985. 

The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. New York: 
United Nations, August 1990. 

Browne, Marjorie Ann. “United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for 

Congress.” (CRS Issue Brief) Washington: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, February 2, 1993. 

Durch, William, J., ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies 
and Comparative Analyses . New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 

Nation Building: The UN and Namibia . Washington: National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs, 1990. 

Sparks, Donald L. Namibia: The Nation After Independence . Boulder: 
Westview Press, December 1992. 

Taylor, Paul. “No News Is Good News in Namibia,” Washington Post . 
August 22, 1993, A30-A31. 

United States. General Accounting Office. U.S. Participation in 

Peacekeeping Operations . (Report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.) Washington: GPO, 
September 1992. 

Wainhouse, David W., et al. International Peace Observation: A History 
and Forecast . Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966. 

White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 

Peace and Security . New York: Manchester University Press, 1992. 


260 















United Nations Mission for the Referendum 
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 


Selected Chronology 

1884 


Spain established a colony in Western Sahara. 


1965 


The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly adopted a 
resolution calling for the decolonization of Western Sahara. 

1966 


The U.N. General Assembly supported the right to self- 
determination in a referendum in Western Sahara. 

1972 


The U.N. passed a resolution reaffirming the rights of the 
Sahrawi peoples of Western Sahara to independence. 

1973 


The Polisario Front, or Polisario (Frente Popular para la 
Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro), was established as 
an insurgent group. 

1974 


The U.N. General Assembly turned to the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) to adjudicate Mauritanian and Moroccan claims to 
Western Saharan territory. 

1975 


On October 16, the ICJ upheld the Sahrawi peoples' right to 
self-determination. 

On October 16, King Hassan II of Morocco began the 
territorial occupation of Western Sahara. In a tripartite 
agreement, Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco agreed to share 
territorial administration of Western Sahara. 

1976 


On February 27, the Polisario declared Western Sahara an 
independent nation, to be known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 


261 










Republic (SADR). 

Spain relinquished its claims to Western Sahara and divided 
territorial rights between Morocco and Mauritania in the Magreb 
Accords. 

1978 

The Polisario was recognized by many nations. 

1979 

The president of Mauritania was overthrown in a coup. The 
Polisario defeated Mauritania, which renounced its claim to 
Western Sahara. 

1980 

The Polisario and Mauritania signed a treaty recognizing the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. 

1981 


The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) called for a 
referendum in Western Sahara. 

1983 


The OAU adopted Resolution 104 urging direct talks between 
the government of Morocco and the Polisario. 

1989 


The U.N. peace efforts in Western Sahara broke down. 


1990 


U.N. Security Council Resolution 658 approved the peace 
accords, providing for a timetable for MINURSO. 

1991 


On April 29, MINURSO was formally established. On September 
9, Morocco and the Polisario agreed to a cease-fire and a 
referendum. 

1992 


A scheduled January 24 referendum was postponed 
indefinitely. 

1993 


262 












In Resolution 809, the U.N. Security Council approved 
holding the Western Saharan referendum by the end of 1993. 


263 


INTRODUCTION 


The 18-year conflict in Western Sahara between Morocco and 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), under the leadership 
of the Polisario, is shaped by the process of decolonization and 
a people's right to national self-determination. In August 1988, 
both parties accepted and signed settlement proposals presented 
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations 
(U.N.). 

In the face of military hostilities, the United Nations 
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 
cooperation with the OAU was established by Security Council 
Resolution 658 (1990) to implement a settlement to the dispute. 
This mission took the form of organizing a referendum in which 
the indigenous people in the territory were asked to choose 
between independence or integration with Morocco. 1 The MINURSO 
mandate has faced a number of obstacles, such as inconsistent 
adherence and continuous modification of the agreed-upon peace 
plan. Other obstacles have included cease-fire violations, a 
political stalemate among the parties, and controversy in 
verifying the eligibility of referendum voters. 

This case study examines the political crisis in Western 
Sahara that caused MINURSO's formation, the involvement of the 
U.N. and OAU in the dispute, and the current U.N. deployment and 
implementation activities in the region. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 


264 



Western Sahara has historically been occupied by European 
and neighboring colonial countries. This process began with the 
Portuguese colonialization in 1487 and continues to the present 
day with Moroccan intervention. In 1884 Spain began its 
occupation of Western Sahara, assuming military and 
administrative control of the territory in 1934. In 1967 and 
again in 1970, the U.N. passed resolutions calling on Spain to 
surrender its territorial claims to Western Sahara. In response, 
Spain recognized the Sahrawi people's rights to self- 
determination in the form of a referendum in consultation with 
Morocco and Mauritania. Mauritania and Morocco also sought 
control over the territory, which has phosphates and iron ore 
deposits, and provides a 660-mile access to the Atlantic coast. 
Both countries denied Sahrawi rights to independence based in 
part on precolonial Moroccan and Mauritanian trade relationships 
with the area. In 1975, the U.N. International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) recognized the Sahrawi people's rights to self- 
determination and also "acknowledged" a historical Moroccan and 
Mauritanian connection that did not compete with or override 
Sahrawi rights to independence. Moroccan support for an ICJ 
ruling on the international legality of a Western Saharan 
referendum undermined any basis for the annexation or integration 
of Sahrawis without a free and fair referendum. 

Western Sahara nationalist movements arose to end Spanish 
rule and embarked on an insurgency that forced Spain to declare a 
state of emergency in the territory in 1972. 2 One of these 


265 


nationalist movements was the Polisario, or Polisario Front 
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de 
Oro) , which was formally established in 1973. The Polisario's 
insurgency succeeded in forcing Spain to recognize Western 
Sahara's independence, resulting in the tripartite Madrid 
Agreement, signed on November 14, 1975, giving Western Sahara to 
Mauritania and Morocco. 3 

Supported by the Algerian government, the Polisario then 
launched a series of attacks on Mauritania, forcing Mauritania in 
1979 to withdraw its troops from Western Sahara and to recognize 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic's (SADR) right to rule in 
the territory. Morocco, however, which still viewed Western 
Sahara as part of a Greater Morocco, continued to fight the 
Polisario with some 100,000 troops. 4 
The U.N. Response 

The mandate for U.N. involvement in the Western Sahara 
conflict originated in the U.N. Charter, which advances the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 5 and 
the U.N. role in the decolonization process in the modern world. 

Both the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
have been involved in attempts to resolve the conflict. In 1981 
the OAU renewed a call for a referendum to decide the territory's 
future. This referendum, however, was stymied by disagreements 
over the right of the Polisario to OAU membership (the SADR was 
granted full OAU membership in 1985). The Polisario had initially 
threatened to reject the OAU/U.N. referendum plan unless Morocco 


266 



withdrew from the territory. 6 On August 30, 1990, Morocco and the 
Polisario agreed to accept an OAU/U.N. proposal to implement a 
peace settlement. MINURSO was established on April 29, 1991 by 
Security Council Resolution 690 (1991) to carry out the 1990 
agreed-upon peace accord; the accord was to culminate in free and 
fair elections for Western Sahara. Supervision of the referendum 
on Western Sahara was MINURSO's main task. 7 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

MINURSO was first deployed in Western Sahara in September 
1991. The mission's military forces were supported by logistics 
and administrative staffs at six sites, which were set up to 
monitor the reduction of Moroccan and Polisario troops and the 
surrender of their arms. Three of these U.N.-supervised sites are 
in Moroccan-controlled territory and three in Polisario- 
controlled territory. 

The field headquarters of the mission was established in 
Laayoune, the territory's capital, with three sector headquarters 
in the central, northern, and southern regions. Ten subsector 
team sites, also known as observation sites, were supervised by 
approximately 18 military observers. 

A liaison office was established in Tindouf (home for 
200,000 Sahrawi refugees) to maintain contact with the Algerian 
authorities and the Polisario. 8 
Political and Military Goals 

MINURSO's main political goal was to register voters and 
conduct a free and fair U.N.-supervised referendum under peaceful 


267 



conditions. Within a limited deployment framework, MINURSO was to 
monitor and verify a September 1991 cease-fire and an end to 
military hostilities and obtain the release of all Western 
Saharan detainees and political prisoners. 9 
Rules of Engagement 

MINURSO conducts surveillance of Western Sahara territory 
and refugee towns in Algeria. Aircraft would be used to monitor 
the cease-fire conditions. Unarmed military observers would 
conduct ground, air, and/or satellite transmission patrols to 
MINURSO observer posts, e.g., at Zoug (relocated to Dugash but 
retains its original name) and Tifariti. 10 
Composition of Forces 

In September 1992, MINURSO comprised 346 personnel, 
including 223 military observers. 11 MINURSO's authorized strength 
is approximately 1,695 military observers and troops, 300 
civilian and 40 military police and about 1,039 other 
personnel. 12 The current strength of the mission is 228 military 
observers, 100 military support personnel, and 103 international 
and local civilian staff members. 13 
Equipment 

MINURSO's equipment supported decentralized field operations 
in Western Sahara and refugee settlements in Tindouf, Algeria. 
Transportation equipment included aircraft (also used for 
surveillance) and four-wheel-drive vehicles. Communications 
equipment included stationary and mobile communications equipment 
such as a trailer-mounted International Telecommunications 


268 






Satellite Organization (Intelsat) earth station, portable 
International Marine Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) terminals, 
radio teletype, and encrypted radio-facsimile machines in field 
offices. Handheld global positioning system (GPS) receivers, 
capable of identifying a user's location within 100 meters, were 
issued to MINURSO personnel. 14 
Training 

MINURSO military personnel had prior training either as 
participants in other U.N. peacekeeping operations or as 
participants in national military training in areas such as 
military observation, military police duties, infantry maneuvers, 
logistics, air support, and signals. The civilian police and 
polling officers had previous experience in these fields. 

Tactics 

In mobile ground patrols, the military observers supervise 
10 observation sites strategically located throughout war areas 
and monitor the cease-fire agreement and adherence to the 1990 
peace settlement plan. 

Helicopter-borne patrols are employed to extend MINURSO's 
verification capacity and expedite the investigation of cease¬ 
fire and/or peace-plan violations. 

Sophisticated communications equipment is used to support 
the speedy notification and deployment of MINURSO troops when 
cease-fire violations or provocations occur. 

Cost 

MINURSO ' s cost is approximately $35 million annually. 15 In 


269 





July 1993, the overall cost of the mission since its inception 
was estimated at $200 million, with approximately $21 million of 
the assessed member-state contributions in arrears. 16 The mission 
is financed by means of a Special Account. 

Operational Assessment 

The MINURSO mandate has encompassed political and military 
objectives. Mission successes were modest and included the 
following: 

First, the international community, through MINURSO's 
establishment, initially demonstrated its commitment to the 
decolonization of Western Sahara. 

Second, the integrity and the diligence of U.N. Special 
Representative Manz in carrying out MINURSO goals proved critical 
to the mission's effectiveness. 

Third, the mission's military observers fulfilled their 
mandate to verify and report cease-fire violations (183 of 191 
were caused by Morocco). 17 

MINURSO, however, has faced a number of obstacles: 

First, adherence to the 1988 peace settlements has wavered, 
causing continued military hostilities and lack of progress 
towards a cease-fire, deployment and withdrawal of troops, and 
sustained peace-making. 

Second, the cease-fire arrangements and deployment of 
Polisario and Moroccan troops were not completed before MINURSO 
began its mandate. 

Third, MINURSO officials have complained that the Moroccan 


270 



government has moved in tens of thousands of Moroccans to pack 
voter rolls, refused to provide information on the number of 
Moroccan troops and their locations in Western Sahara, blocked 
supplies destined for U.N. forces in the field, and interfered 
with U.N. patrols. 

Fourth, Morocco has not been pressed sufficiently either by 
the U.S. or the U.N. Security Council to cause it to support the 
agreed-upon peace plan. 

Fifth, a report released by the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee criticized the U.N. hierarchy for failing to 
provide political and logistical support to help solve Western 
Sahara's problems. 18 

Sixth, although only a few fatalities have been incurred by 
MINURSO, the parties to the conflict remain heavily armed, 
creating further hostilities and denying the safe movement of 
peoples and goods in the Western Sahara and the region. 

Seventh, a series of resignations by the U.N. Special 
Representative and other key U.N. officials and their slow 
replacement damaged the mission's effectiveness in building 
confidence among Morocco, Polisario, and the international 
community. 

Eighth, the U.N. mission's impartiality has on occasion 
been compromised. For example, the U.N. (under Perez de Cuellar) 
revised and expanded voter eligibility and recognized 
intermittent territorial residency (prior to and after the 1974 
census), which favored Moroccan settlers. 


271 


Ninth, a fair settlement of the conflict is difficult to 
attain without international political will to impose face-to- 
face discussions and adherence to the mutually agreed-upon peace 
plan. 19 

CURRENT SITUATION 

Although peace talks but not face-to-face negotiations 
recently resumed between Polisario and Morocco, they concluded 
without resolution of such topics as the deployment of foreign 
troops, voter eligibility, a schedule for the electoral 
referendum, and implementation of the peace plan approved by the 
U.N. in 1988. 20 

At a recent all-party meeting in the British House of 
Commons, organized by the Committee for a Free and Fair 
Referendum in Western Sahara, the consensus was that the U.N. 
must play a more active role in the settlement of the Western 
Sahara dispute. 21 The lack of U.N. and international denouncement 
of a recent Moroccan referendum that included Western Saharan 
territorial occupants has compromised MINURSO'S goal of 
supervising free and fair elections. 

CONCLUSION 

The conflict in Western Sahara continues to be a focus of 
confrontation among the Maghreb states. As the region becomes 
more volatile because of the economic and religio-political 
crises, the issue of the territory's future could serve as a 
flashpoint for wider political and military conflict. 22 

The efforts to overcome the political stalemate over the 


272 


peace plan's implementation center on the registration of Western 
Saharan voters based on agreed-upon eligibility requirements. 
Progress in fulfilling MINURSO's mission depends on the 
willingness of interested parties, particularly in the Security 
Council and neighboring states, to encourage the holding of the 
referendum. 23 There is a consensus that the only peaceful 
solution lies in the continued role of MINURSO in the territory. 


273 


Endnotes 


1. "Report Delay for UN Referendum in Western Sahara", UN 
Chronicle . March 1992. 

2. Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World Since 1945 (London: Cassell, 
1991), 57. 

3. Spain's phosphorus assets in Western Sahara were kept intact by 
Mauritanian and Moroccan territorial control. Barbara Akakpo, 
"Searching for Freedom," Africa Report . No. 3964, 1993, 1668. 

4. In 1980, construction of the vertical sand wall began reportedly 
to obstruct Polisario access to fishing reserves; the first 
construction phase was completed in 1982; by 1984, construction of 
the sand wall extended about 600 kilometers to the Mauritanian 
border; in April 1987 about 2,820 kilometers of the berm were 
completed. Polisario is'said to have penetrated the sand wall by 6 
kilometers inside Western Sahara. 

5. Guy Arnold, The Third World Handbook (Chicago: St. James Press, 
1988), 33. 

6. Ibid . 

7. "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 
Peace-Keeping Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) (New York: 
United Nations, March 1993), 33-36. 

8. Ibid . 

9. Initially scheduled for January 1992, the referendum was 
delayed. 

10. These two sites are located in Polisario-controlled territory. 
There are additional observer posts, some situated across the sand 
berm that defines the Morocco line of control. 

11. Europa World Year Book, 1993 . 1 (London: Europa, 1991), 44. 

12. Almost half of the civilian personnel would be recruited 
locally. William J. Durch, "UN Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara," in William J. Durch, ed. , The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 427. 

13. "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara," 
33-36. 

14. Ibid . 425. 

15. "MINURSO," in United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United 
Nations, August 1993), 26. 


274 














16. "United Nations Peace-keeping Operations in Western Sahara," 
[United Nations Fact Sheet, July 1993], 1; "MINURSO," in United 
Nations Peace-keeping . August 1993, 26. 

17. Christine Harland, "Protest March Against Moroccan 
Parliamentary Elections in Western Sahara: Work To Break Power of 
Invisibility," Washington Report on the Middle East . December 
1992/January 1993, 85. 

18. Tami Hultman, "Peace Effort in W. Sahara Seen at Risk," 
Washington Post . March 14, 1992, A18. 

19. Barbara Akakpo, "Renewed Hopes for Settlement", West Africa . 
No. 3959, 1993, 1397. 

20. Akakpo, 1397. 

21. Ibid . 

22. Ewan W. Anderson, An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints: A 
Sourcebook of Geopolitical Crisis (New York: Facts on File, 1993), 
238. 

23. Jaret Chopra, "The Absence of War and Peace in the Western 
Sahara." (Testimony before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, United States Congress, 
103d, 1st Session; hearing on UN Peacekeeping in Africa: The 
Western Sahara and Somalia.) Washington: GPO, 1992, 31. 


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278 




















United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) 


Selected Chronology 

1960 


In July, Somalia's first civilian government came to power 
when the Italian-administered southern territory merged with the 
former British colony in the north to form the present state of 
Somalia. 

1969 


In October, a military coup overthrew the civilian 
government. A Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was formed 
under the chairmanship of General Mohamed Siad Barre. 

1970 


The SRC declared Somalia a socialist state and formed 
alliances with the communist bloc. 

1974 


A Treaty of Friendship was signed between Somalia and the 
Soviet Union. 

1991 

In January, the government of President Siad Barre was 
overthrown. A new government was formed by a faction of the 
United Somali Congress (USC). 

In September, armed conflict broke out in the USC between 
the followers of General Mohamed Faarah Aideed and interim 
President Ali Mahdi. The conflict soon turned into an all-out 
battle to control the capital, Mogadishu. 

1992 


On January 23, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council 
issued Resolution 733 calling for a cease-fire, an embargo on 
weapons shipments, and an increase in humanitarian aid to 
Somalia. 

On April 24, the Security Council passed Resolution 751 
establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). 

On December 3, the Security Council passed Resolution 794, 
authorizing the use of force to facilitate humanitarian relief 


279 








operations. On December 9, the first elements of the United 
States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) arrived in Mogadishu. 

1993 


On March 15-28, the Conference on National Reconciliation in 
Somalia convened. 

On March 26, the Security Council adopted Resolution 814, 
establishing UNOSOM II, with an expanded mandate, to replace 
UNITAF. 

On April 30, UNOSOM's mandate terminated. 

On May 4, UNITAF's mandate ended. 

On June 6, the Security Council adopted Resolution 837 
condemning attacks against UNOSOM II. 

On August 6, a regional peace conference was held in 
Kismayo. 

An all-Somali conference was held from September 30 to 
October 1 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 

In October, President Bill Clinton announced that United 
States forces would withdraw from Somalia by March 31, 1994. 

On November 18, the Security Council adopted Resolution 886 
extending UNOSOM II's mandate to May 31, 1994. 


280 



INTRODUCTION 


Somalia is the first peacekeeping mission under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter since the end of the Cold 
War and thus is viewed as an important test case for future 
missions. Chapter VII allows the use of military force to achieve 
the objectives of U.N. resolutions. 

Two U.N. peacekeeping operations have been deployed in 
Somalia. The first, the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM, also known as UNOSOM I), was established in April 1992 
to provide humanitarian relief operations. It was accompanied by 
the deployment of a United States-led military contingent, known 
as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to restore order to the 
country. UNOSOM's mandate was terminated on April 30, 1993, while 
UNITAF's mandate ended on May 4. On March 26, 1993, the United 
Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established with 
a large peacekeeping component, to replace UNOSOM I and UNITAF. 
UNOSOM I/UNITAF 
PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

Somalia, which has a population of around 6,709,000, 
occupies a territory slightly larger than the state of Texas. 

The main religion is Sunni Islam. Somalia's first civilian 
government came to power in July 1960, when the Italian- 
administered southern territory merged with the former British 
colony in the north to form the current Somali state. Nepotism, 
corruption, and clan infighting created serious political 


281 



instability in the new government. Deteriorating political, 
economic, and social conditions led in October 1969 to a military 
coup. The coup leaders dissolved the National Assembly, arrested 
leading civilian leaders, and formed a 25-member Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (SRC). Its chairman was General Siad Barre, 
in whose hands power became concentrated. 1 

A year later, the SRC declared Somalia a socialist state and 
introduced extensive political and social changes. United States 
Peace Corps volunteers were expelled, and all professional and 
political organizations were disbanded. Somalia drew close to 
Eastern bloc countries, signing a Treaty of Friendship with the 
Soviet Union in 1974 and beginning a campaign to indoctrinate the 
people with socialist ideas. Harsh human rights conditions, a 
deteriorating economic situation, and the pervasive clan rule 
that dominated the government caused mounting opposition to the 
rule of President Siad Barre. 2 

In January 1991, the government of President Siad Barre was 
overthrown after a month-long, intense battle in the capital, 
Mogadishu. A new government was quickly formed by a faction of 
the United Somali Congress (USC), but because the government had 
no popular mandate, opposition soon arose. Relations among the 
Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement 
(SPM), and the USC—the three major opposition groups that had 
united to carry out the coup—began to deteriorate. In May 1991, 
the SNM, based in the north and the strongest and oldest rebel 
force in Somalia, declared the north to be independent 


282 


Somaliland. Meanwhile, in the south clan-based factions began 
engaging in combat. 3 

By September 1991, a had split developed within the ruling 
USC, erupting into armed conflict between the followers of 
General Mohamed Faarah Aideed and those of the interim President 
Ali Mahdi. By late 1991, this conflict had turned into an all-out 
battle to control Mogadishu. The battle, which continued for 
weeks with no clear victor, led to massive destruction of 
property and loss of civilian lives, and armed gang violence 
gripped the capital. Thousands of people fled the capital to look 
for food in rural areas. Humanitarian relief work became 
impossible because of the intensity of the violence and growing 
insecurity in Mogadishu. According to relief agencies and 
newspaper reports, between 20,000 and 30,000 people had been 
killed or wounded by January 1992. More than half the population 
needed emergency assistance by this time. 4 
The U.N. Response 

With the crisis in Somalia escalating and the civilian death 
toll rising rapidly, the U.N. came under strong criticism for its 
failure to act. The worsening situation led to an announcement on 
December 27, 1991 by then Secretary-General Javier Perez de 
Cuellar to the President of the Security Council of a peace 
initiative to restore order to Somalia. Following a visit by 
senior U.N. officials to Somalia, the Security Council then 
issued Resolution 733 on January 23, 1992. 5 The resolution called 
for a cease-fire, an arms embargo, and for increased humanitarian 


283 



aid. 6 The next month, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had succeeded de 
Cuellar as U.N. Secretary-General, convened the so-called New 
York Conference at the U.N. to try to resolve the crisis. He 
stressed that Somalia presented a special challenge because the 
extraordinarily complex, tragic situation made conventional 
solutions ineffective. He urged that innovative methods 
commensurate with the humanitarian and political situation be 
explored. The conference was attended by representatives of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States 
(Arab League), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and 
leading Somali political factions. After intense negotiations, on 
March 3, 1992, a cease-fire was agreed upon among Somali warring 
factions. 7 On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
746, which called for dispatching a technical team to plan for 
the cease-fire. The resolution was carried out on March 23, when 
40 military observers arrived in Mogadishu to monitor the cease¬ 
fire. 8 They were accompanied by a contingent of U.N. civilian 
police tasked to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
in the Mogadishu area. 9 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was 
established on April 24, 1992, when the Security Council passed 
Resolution 751, requesting the immediate deployment of 50 unarmed 
observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. 10 On April 28 
the Secretary General appointed Mohammed Sahnoun, an Algerian 
diplomat, as U.N. special representative for Somalia. 11 This was 


284 



followed on August 12 by the Secretary-General's announcement 
that a UNOSOM contingent of 500 U.N. security personnel would be 
deployed in Mogadishu. 12 

The U.N. operation faced a tremendous challenge. General 
Aideed had ousted interim President Ali Mahdi from Mogadishu, but 
Mahdi's clan dominated the area around the capital. Moreover, 
factional clan fighting on the north-south issue threatened to 
escalate into a full-scale civil war. Critics of U.N. Resolution 
751 claimed that the force was too small to be effective in 
monitoring the cease-fire agreement and that lasting solutions to 
the Somali crisis could be found only by the Somalis themselves. 
The United States, for its part, was concerned about the 
financing of the peacekeeping force; the cost was estimated to be 
$23 million for six months. The United States agreed to pay about 
a third of this amount. 13 

On July 5, 1992, the UNOSOM mission arrived in Somalia. Its 
efforts were stalled, however, by the uncooperative stance of the 
various warlords who controlled parts of Somalia. On July 27, 
with an estimated 30 percent of the Somali population starving, 
the U.N. Security Council approved an emergency airlift of relief 
supplies. Relief workers and supplies were targeted by bandits, 
however, so the U.N. decided on additional peacekeeping troops. 

On August 28, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 775, 
which authorized the deployment of up to 3,000 security troops to 
UNOSOM to protect relief supplies. 14 

As anarchy rose and the death rate increased in Somalia, the 


285 


U.N. Security Council unanimously approved on December 3, 19?. 
the use of all necessary force to secure the environment for 
humanitarian relief operations. Resolution 794 (1992) marked - 
first U.N. sanction for the use of force to ensure the deliver 
of humanitarian relief. It stemmed from the assessment by the 
Secretary-General that the existing course of UNOSOM would nc: 
"be an adequate response to the tragedy." During the debate c." 
the historic resolution, council members said that an "appros- 
different from the usual form of peace-keeping operation" was 
warranted by the "exceptional" circumstances of human suffer: - 
in Somalia. 15 

The first phase of the unified military response sanction 
by Resolution 794 was launched by the United States. On Decs— 
4, 1992, in a nationwide address, President George Bush said — 
the United States was sending military units into Somalia to 
"create a secure environment" and that it would later withdra 
these troops and hand over responsibility for secured areas ar. 
delivery of supplies to a U.N. peacekeeping force. 16 

The U.N. Secretary-General said on December 8, 1992 that 
there was no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the I 
Charter, which allows the use of military force to achieve poa- 
Any forceful action should preferably be under U.N. command nr 
control, but if that were not possible, a Security Council- 
authorized operation undertaken by member states should be 
considered. Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council that the 
United States was prepared to take the lead in organizing tlv 


286 


operation. 17 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The UNOSOM mission arrived in Somalia on July 5, 1992. On 
September 14, 1992, the first contingent of an additional 500 
UNOSOM security troops arrived in Mogadishu. By the end of 
September, UNOSOM's total strength in Somalia reached 4,219 
personnel. 18 This was followed by the deployment of the U.S.-led 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF, also known as Operation Restore Hope) 
on December 9, 1992. 19 
Political and Military Goals 

U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in a message to the 
people of Somalia on December 8, 1992, said that the military 
troops arriving in their country came "to feed the starving, 
protect the defenseless and prepare the way for political, 
economic and social reconstruction." 20 
Rules of Engagement 

UNOSOM's rules of engagement authorized the use of force by 
U.N. troops. UNOSOM was to use all necessary means, including 
"shoot to kill," in order to establish a secure environment for 
the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid. 

Composition of Forces 

By late December 1992, an estimated 44 countries had 
expressed interest in contributing troops, money, and logistical 
assistance to the operation. The U.S.-led UNITAF deployment 
peaked in mid-January at 25,800 troops, which was less than the 
anticipated 28,000 because other countries made substantial 


287 





contributions. The number of non-U.S. troops reached 11,000 by 
mid-January 1993. 21 The peacekeeping troops encountered little 
resistance and made rapid progress in deploying around Somalia 
and protecting relief supplies. This success enabled the United 
States to begin incremental troop withdrawals on January 19, 

1993 . 

Equipment 

A relatively low level of armaments was deployed in Somalia. 
The U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed a helicopter squadron 
and amphibious assault vehicles. Equipment was pre-positioned on 
a squadron of maritime ships, which sailed in from the island of 
Diego Garcia. Four ships of Pacific Fleet Task Force 176 were 
deployed off the coast of Somalia. U.S. Transportation Command 
Headquarters (Transcom) sent 30 C-141 and 25 C-5 Galaxy 
aircraft. 22 
Training 

The U.S. Quick Reaction Forces (QRF), the Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Army's 10th Mountain Division, 
which formed the bulk of U.S. forces, were highly mobile forces 
trained for rapid deployment. Many of these forces had served in 
Operation Desert Storm. 23 
Tactics 

The first phase of UNITAF's mission, known as "Operation 
Restore Hope," began on December 9 with the successful seizure of 
the airfield and port in Mogadishu by a U.S. Marine special- 
purpose air-ground task force supported by U.S. Navy elements. 


288 





The second phase of the U.S.-led operation involved securing the 
relief centers of Baidoa, as well as Oddur, Beledweyne and 
Jalalaqsi. The third phase involved expanding the operations to 
the south to secure the port and airfield at Chisimayu, 
Baardheere, and the land route from Baardheere to Baidoa. The 
fourth and last phase was the transfer of responsibility for 
maintaining a secure environment for UNOSOM peacekeeping forces. 
On December 31, President Bush visited with U.S. troops in 
Somalia. 24 

The main tactics of the UNOSOM force included working with 
UNITAF to maintain security at Mogadishu Airport, providing 
movement control for U.N. flights, and escorting all relief 
agency personnel and food convoys within the city of Mogadishu. 
Cost 

During the period from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993, the 
General Assembly appropriated $109.7 million to UNOSOM I. 25 The 
mission was financed by assessments of member states drawn from a 
Special Account. 

Operational Assessment 

UNITAF's mission ended on May 4, 1993. There was wide 
agreement that the U.S.-led operation had succeeded in bringing 
an end to starvation and allowing near-normal conditions to 
resume in Somalia. Schools, shops, and markets had reopened, and 
police had returned to the streets. Agreement had also been 
reached among the various political factions on a transitional 
administration for the country. According to U.S. Special Envoy 


289 




to Somalia Robert Oakley, the effort u to restore hope and stop 
the killing from war, famine and disease . . . has largely been 

accomplished. " 26 

Nonetheless, the mission had some failures. Weapons were 
still abundant in Somalia, and various tribal and factional 
leaders remained poised to see what would happen next as the U.N. 
attempted to orchestrate reconciliation and recovery in the face 
of a challenge by General Aideed. He had threatened that Somalis 
would fight any attempt to turn the country into a "U.N. 
trusteeship." Many were concerned that anti-U.N. and anti-U.S. 
sentiments demonstrated by pro-Aideed guerrillas and civilians 
indicated increasingly widespread resentment over the role of 
foreigners in Somalia. 27 
UNOSOM II 

The Initial Crisis 

In the first months of 1993, Boutros-Ghali sought U.N. 
Security Council approval of a successor force to UNOSOM I and 
UNITAF, and on March 26, 1993, he won approval of UNOSOM II with 
the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 814. The 
resolution was enacted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
which authorizes the use of force. Citing its concern over the 
crippling famine and drought in Somalia, which had been 
aggravated by civil strife, the Security Council transferred the 
task of securing humanitarian aid deliveries from a U.S.-led 
international peacekeeping force to a U.N. peacekeeping 
operation. UNOSOM II was also designed to help Somalia take its 


290 



first steps toward rebuilding its economy and government. 28 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

By unanimously adopting Resolution 814, the Council endorsed 
the Secretary-General's recommendation that UNOSOM II formally 
take over from the Unified Task Force on the target date of May 
1, 1993 and authorized its mandate for an initial period through 
October 31, 1993. Stating that there was a "need for a prompt, 
smooth and phased transition" from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the 
resolution referred to the "continuing reports of widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law and the general 
absence of the rule of law in Somalia." 29 The resolution also 
emphasized the "crucial importance of disarmament" and demanded 
that all Somali parties comply fully with commitments they had 
undertaken at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali 
Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 
1993. All Somali parties were to "take all measures to ensure the 
safety of the personnel" of the U.N. and its agencies, as well as 
the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations engaged in 
humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia. 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
Political and Military Goals 

The overall military goal of UNOSOM II was to transfer the 
task of securing humanitarian aid deliveries from a United 
States-led international force to a U.N. peacekeeping operation. 
Specifically, this included maintaining control of the organized 


291 




factions' heavy weapons and seizing small arms of unauthorized 
armed elements; continuing the mine-clearing program; assisting 
in the repatriation of refugees; and securing all ports, 
airports, and lines of communication. This expanded U.N. 
operation was designed to help Somalia take its first steps 
towards rebuilding its economy and government. The main political 
goal was to restore Somalia as a functioning member of the 
community of nations by rehabilitating its political institutions 
and economy and promoting political settlement and national 
reconciliation. 

Rules of Engagement 

Like UNITAF forces, UNOSOM II operated under the provisions 
of Chapter VII, which authorizes the use of force. UNOSOM II's 
rules of engagement were to prevent any resumption of violence 
and, if necessary, to take action against factions violating the 
cease-fire; maintain control of the organized factions' heavy 
weapons and seize small arms of unauthorized armed elements; 
continue the mine-clearing program; assist in the repatriation of 
refugees; secure all ports, airports and lines of communications 
for the delivery of humanitarian aid; and protect personnel and 
installations of the U.N. and other organizations. As with UNOSOM 
I, the use of force was authorized against those attacking or 
threatening the troops. 30 
Composition of Forces 

The strength of the forces had to be substantial in the 
early stage in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in 


292 




security conditions. UNITAF, which had an initial strength of 
37,000, was already deployed in 40 percent of the territory. It 
was estimated that the somewhat smaller UNOSOM II force would 
number approximately 28,000 and be deployed in the entire area of 
Somalia. 31 With the transition from Operation Restore Hope to 
UNOSOM II, troops from other countries assumed major security 
roles. Forces from Italy, Morocco, and Pakistan, along with those 
from the United States, have played major combat roles. The 
largest contingents in Somalia as of July 14, 1993, were from the 
United States (4,039), Pakistan (4,700), and Italy (2,442). U.S. 
forces included a 1,200-1,300-member infantry element serving as 
a Quick-Reaction Force that remained under U.S. command. The bulk 
of the remaining U.S. troops served in logistical roles and were 
"blue helmeted" forces under U.N. command. 

Equipment 

In contrast to UNOSOM I, member states contributed heavier 
weapons, including armored personnel carriers, tanks, and attack 
helicopters to confront and deter armed attacks against U.N. 
forces. The United States deployed powerful AC-130 gunships, 
which were flown in by U.S. Air Force special operations forces. 
Training 

The units deployed for UNOSOM II had participated in UNOSOM 
I and Operation Restore Hope, where they had gained training and 
experience for the second phase of U.N. involvement in Somalia. 
Tactics 

UNOSOM II's military operations were conducted in four 


293 





phases: transition from UNITAF, consolidation and expansion of 
security, transfer to civilian institutions, and redeployment. 

In Phase I, military support of relief activity and disarming of 
factions continued. In Phase II, operations were extended into 
northern Somalia, based in the port cities of Berbera and Bender 
Cassim, then moved to Hargeysa and Garoowe. The operation was to 
conclude when UNOSOM II was operating effectively throughout 
Somalia and the border regions. In Phase III, the military 
presence was to be scaled down in the more stable areas to give 
way to Somali civilian authorities. When major U.N. military 
operations were no longer required, the Secretary-General would 
make recommendations to the Council under Phase IV to redeploy or 
reduce forces. 32 
Cost 

The total cost was initially estimated at $327.2 million for 
the first two months of UNOSOM II. The estimated annual cost to 
the U.N. is $1,550 million, with the mission's budget drawn from 
assessments of member states to a Special Account. 33 By April 30, 
1993, approximately $352 million in contributions to UNOSOM I and 
UNOSOM II were in arrears. 34 
Operational Assessment 

The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations in Somalia 
has been undermined by several factors. First, there have been 
disagreements among the peacekeepers. Some of the participants, 
Italy in particular, have been unhappy about their lack of a role 
in the overall command structure and at times have been reluctant 


294 




to obey U.N. orders. In the Italian view, U.N. peacekeeping 
operations were too heavily influenced by U.S. civilians and 
military officers in the U.N. command. U.N. officials have 
responded to Italian complaints by redeploying Italian troops 
outside Mogadishu and sending the senior Italian commander home 
in mid-July. The question of how and when to use military force 
has led to disputes among Italy, the United States, and the U.N. 
central command in Somalia. Italy has questioned the decision by 
Turkish General Civvak Bir, the U.N. commander in Somalia, and 
U.S. forces stationed there to retaliate against General Aideed 
for attacks against U.N. troops. 35 

The underlying problem is a lack of consensus among the 
peacekeepers on how to handle this nontraditional peacekeeping 
mission. In the opinion of countries such as Italy, military 
goals have overshadowed political and humanitarian operations to 
the detriment of the peacekeeping mission. Ireland and Kenya have 
joined the critical voices by calling on the U.N. to reconsider 
its combat role. The immediate cause of their criticism was the 
July 12, 1993, attack on the suspected headquarters of General 
Aideed by the U.S. Quick-Reaction Force. The attack led to 
rioting in southern Mogadishu and the murder of four journalists 
by mobs. The press in Italy and Kenya featured articles 
portraying the July 12 action as a reprisal, a massacre, and an 
example of "gunboat diplomacy" by a U.N. force that had fallen 
under the control of the U.S. 36 

The U.N.'s political strategy in Somalia is seen by some 


295 


critics, including members of the U.S. Congress, as too crude. 
They argue that the United States is involving the U.N. in Somali 
clan politics, touching off even greater problems in the region, 
and point out that there has been no significant progress in clan 
reconciliation at the regional levels and hardly any progress on 
disarmament outside Mogadishu. These same critics are concerned 
that anti-U.N. and anti-U.S. sentiments demonstrated by pro- 
Aideed forces and civilians point to widespread discontent 
stemming from local resentment over the role of foreigners in 
Somalia. 37 The mounting violence against U.N. forces in 
Mogadishu, which has caused the deaths of growing numbers of U.S. 
servicemen, reinforces this concern. Finally, there is the 
general problem that the U.N. violates its principle of 
impartiality when it goes after men like General Aideed. In the 
case of Somalia, the peacekeepers are not remaining impartial 
referees, as they did in past U.N. missions. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Somalia are facing increasing 
obstacles. Since the launching of UNOSOM II, violence has 
escalated in Mogadishu, as General Aideed and his followers have 
challenged the UNOSOM II presence there. In June 1993, before the 
July raid on Aideed's suspected headquarters, Aideed forces 
ambushed U.N. peacekeepers and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. In 
early August, four U.S. soldiers died when a command-detonated 
mine exploded beneath their vehicle. 

Weapons continue to abound throughout the country, and the 


296 


various tribal and factional leaders are waiting to see how the 
U.N. will react to the challenge posed by Aideed. 

Following a series of attacks on American troops in Somalia, 
the U.S. Government announced in late August that it planned to 
send 400 of its most highly trained combat soldiers—U.S. Army 
Rangers—to buttress U.S. forces in Mogadishu. The decision to 
send these forces appeared to foretell a new round of military 
confrontation with General Aideed. The U.S. government has made 
no secret of its aim of getting rid of Aideed, either by killing 
or capturing him. 38 Immediately after their arrival, on August 
30, U.S. Army Rangers launched a raid on a building in Mogadishu 
believed to house top aides to Aideed. By mistake, the rangers 
rounded up a handful of U.N. aid officials and their Somali 
assistants, detaining them for several hours. The episode served 
as a reminder of the many pitfalls confronting U.N. soldiers 
trying to find Aideed. 

Meanwhile the U.S. Government has reiterated its commitment 
to U.N. peacekeeping in Somalia, and in early October 1993 
announced plans to send additional U.S. troops to Mogadishu. The 
administration has also expressed a desire to resume stalled 
political peace talks among Somali political factions, but has 
not determined the procedure for inviting participants. Fear 
that Aideed might intimidate participants in the negotiations has 
discouraged the United States from reconvening talks. 39 
CONCLUSION 

What happens next will depend upon the actions of the 


297 


Somalis and their ability to reach a political reconciliation. 
Another factor will be whether or not other nations are willing 
to contribute forces to this U.N. operation over the long term. 

In the immediate future, the U.N. command must respond to the 
criticism of its operations, particularly to the growing claims 
that it has drifted from its humanitarian mission. 

The question of how long UNOSOM II will last remains 
uncertain. The U.S. Government has argued against a time limit on 
the participation of U.S. troops in UNOSOM II because it would 
hamper the U.S. ability to support the U.N. and respond to 
unexpected developments in Somalia. Many of those who favor a 
continuing, substantial U.S. role in UNOSOM II realize that the 
fighting in the summer and autumn of 1993 could cause further 
pressure on the United States to withdraw. Essential to the 
success of the continuing mission is the U.N. ability to deal 
with the Aideed problem, heal relations with Italy, and restore 
an image of UNOSOM II as a humanitarian and peacekeeping mission, 
rather than a military one. 

Whether the United States and other countries will support a 
substantial, long-term international role in Somalia has become 
unclear in view of the hostility shown by Aideed backers toward 
the U.N. According to those who argue for such a role, it is the 
only way to prevent war and famine, but skeptics claim that the 
international community is wasting its resources in trying to 
promote peace and stability in a country where reaching these 
goals is impossible. 


298 


Endnotes 


1. John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2. 

2. Ibid . 

3. Theodore Dagne, Somalia: A Country at War—Prospects for 
Peace and Reconciliation (CRS Issue Brief) (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, June 15, 
1992), 10. 

4. Ibid . 

5. United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations Information Notes (1993: 
Update No. 2), (New York: United Nations, November 1993), 80. 

6. "Security Council Establishes New UN Operation in Somalia," UN 

Chronicle, 22, No. 4, September 1992, 14. 

7. United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations Information Notes . 

(1993: Update No. 2), 80. 

8. "Arms Embargo for Somalia Imposed, UN Team Tries for Cease- 
Fire," UN Chronicle . 29, No. 2, June 1992, 22. 

9. Ibid . 

10. United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations Information Notes . 

(1993: Update No. 2), 80-1. 

11. "The Situation in Somalia," Report of the United Nations 
Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, April 21, 1992) 
(S/23829). 

12. Ibid ., 81. 

13. "Uncle Pygmy Pleads Poverty," New York Times . April 28, 1992, 
A22 . 

14. "Somalia: 100-Day Relief Plan for Somalia Launched," UN 
Chronicle, 22, No. 4, December 1992, 5. 

15. UN Chronicle . 30, No. 1, March 1993, 13. 

16. Mark M. Lowenthal, Somalia Intervention: Broader Implications 
for U.S. Policy (CRS Issue Brief) (Washington: Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, December 8, 1992). 

17. Ibid. 


299 























18. United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations Information Notes 

[1993: Update No. 2.], 81. 

19. Ibid .. 84. 

20. UN Chronicle . 30, No. 1, March 1993, 13-14. 

21. Ibid . 

22. Government Executive . No. 2, February 1993, 6-8. 

23. Ibid . 

24. Theodore Dagne, Somalia: War and Famine (CRS Issue Brief) 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
March 1, 1993). 

25. "UNOSOM I," United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United 
Nations, August 1993), 53. 

26. Raymond W. Copson, Somalia: Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM 
II (CRS Issue Brief) (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, July 16, 1993), 3. 

27. Ibid . 

28. UN Chronicle . March 1993, 13-14. 

29. Ibid . 

30. UN Chronicle . June 1993, 13-17. 

31. United Nations Peace-keeping Operations (New York: United 
Nations, May 31, 1993). 

32. Copson, Somalia . 3. 

33. Ibid . 

34. "UNOSOM II," United Nations Peace-keeping (August 1993), 35. 

35. Defense News . 23, July 26-August 1, 1993, 3. 

36. Copson, Somalia . 1-2. 

37. Copson, Somalia . 1-2; Africa Confidential [London], 34, No. 15, 

July 30, 1993, 1. 

38. Copson, Somalia . 1-3; Washington Post . August 24, 1993, Al; 
Defense News . July 26-August 1, 1993, 3. 

39. Washington Post . August 31, 1993, A16. 


300 



























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Dagne, Theodore S. Somalia: A Country at War—Prospects for Peace and 
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301 


















United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 


Selected Chronology 

1975 


Mozambique won its independence from Portugal. The Front for 
the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) government was installed. 
Its radical political and socio-economic programs provoked a 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) guerrilla 
insurgency. 

1977 


Civil war broke out in Mozambique. 


1980 


South Africa extended its support of Renamo's insurgency. 


1982 


Renamo insurgents occupied 9 of the 11 provinces in 
Mozambique, denying the Frelimo government full administrative 
control over the country. 

1984 


The Nkomati Accord, a nonaggression pact between South 
Africa and Mozambique, was signed (although not adhered to). 

1988 


The government of Mozambique launched successful offensives 
against Renamo rebels in the Zambezia, Tete, and Nampula 
provinces, with the aim of taking control of agricultural 
heartlands and the Beira Corridor. The flow of traffic, overland 
communication, and emergency, aid were reestablished. 

Presidents P. W. Botha and Joachim Chissano of South Africa 
and Mozambique, respectively, met to reestablish conditions for 
adherence to the Nkomati Accord. 

1989 


A Renamo conference was held in Maputo to alter the 
organization's guerrilla character. 

The Fifth Congress of Frelimo abandoned its 11-year 
commitment to Marxism-Leninism, supported talks with Renamo, and 
called for multiparty elections. 


302 









In June, Soviet military advisers announced a reduction in 
their military assistance to the government. 

1990 


On July 8-10, the first round of face-to-face negotiations 
between the government and Renamo were held in Rome. In a joint 
communique, both sides expressed a commitment to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. 

On December 1, the government and Renamo met at the 
headquarters of a vatican-linked charity, the Community of the 
St. Egideo Organization in Rome, and signed the Point 1 Accord. 

1991 


By mid-year, the Joint Commission of Verification received 
complaints about cease-fire violations by Renamo and Frelimo. 

1992 


In July, a declaration was signed by the government and 
Renamo on guiding principles for humanitarian assistance. In 
August, a joint declaration was signed in Rome. 

On October 4, Mozambique President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, 
and Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of Renamo, signed 
a General Peace Agreement (the Rome Accord). 

On October 15, the United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping 
contingent arrived in Mozambique to observe the cease-fire 
between Renamo and the government. 

On December 16, the U.N. Operation in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) was formally established. 

1993 


After several months of stalemate, President Chissano and 
Colonel Dhlakama of Renamo held talks in Mozambique, in which 
they agreed on a transition government to facilitate elections in 
October 1994. 


303 






INTRODUCTION 


The civil war in Mozambique began in 1980 when Renamo (the 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement) embarked on a violent 
insurgency against the Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique)-led government. The United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established in December 1992 upon the 
termination of the civil war, following the General Peace 
Agreement, signed in Rome, Italy, on October 4, 1992, by the 
Mozambique President and the President of Renamo. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

Upon independence on June 12, 1975, the government of 
Mozambique inherited a situation of economic chaos and political 
instability because of its Portuguese colonial legacy and 
regional geopolitics. South Africa, and earlier Rhodesia, 
supported Renamo's insurgency because they felt threatened by the 
new Mozambican government's Marxist policies, as well as its 
support for national liberation movements in the southern African 
region. 

Renamo also opposed the government's Marxist policies. With 
support from the South African Defence Forces (SADF), Renamo's 
strategy was to take over the country's 11 major provinces and 
disrupt the transportation and communication systems, in order to 
destabilize Mozambique's development potential. The government 
then launched a counterinsurgency offensive against Renamo. 

On October 4, 1992, following a debilitating 12-year civil 


304 



war, the government and Renamo signed a peace accord in Rome. 
Witnessed by the St. Egideo Community and international 
representatives, the Rome Accord signalled both parties' 
commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflict. 

The U. N. Response 

The Rome Accord outlined the terms of a cease-fire agreement 
between the Frelimo and Renamo forces, their gradual 
demobilization, 1 and prepared the ground for the detachment of a 
United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping mission to monitor the 
situation. Several commissions were to be formed to implement the 
accord, which addressed such matters as election law, formation 
and recognition of political parties, funding, refugee problems 
and other internal population resettlement issues. 

The accord also outlined the U.N.'s participation in 
monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire, withdrawal of 
foreign troops, and the provision of technical and other 
monitoring assistance for the upcoming elections. Five days 
later, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security 
Council on the proposed U.N. role in Mozambique. He recommended 
appointing an Interim Special Representative to oversee U.N. 
activities in the country. On October 13, Aldo Ajello of Italy 
was appointed Interim Special Representative for Mozambique, in 
line with Security Council Resolution 783 (1992). The dispatch of 
a team of up to 25 military observers was also approved. 2 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 797 on 


305 




December 16, 1992 authorizing the establishment of ONUMOZ. The 
Resolution called on the government of Mozambique and Renamo to 
implement the terms of the October 4, 1992 peace agreement, 
particularly agreements concerning the cease-fire and deployment 
of their respective military forces. Prior to ONUMOZ's 
establishment, on October 13, 1992, Security Council Resolution 
782 established the initial U.N. peacekeeping presence in 
Mozambique to monitor and guarantee the peace agreement's 
implementation. 3 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

On October 15, 1992, 21 ONOMOZ military observers arrived in 
Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. Five days later,, two teams of 
military observers were deployed in the Nampula 4 and Beira 
corridors. Two additional outposts were established to verify the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Zimbabwe and Malawi, in 
particular. 5 

Political and Military Goals 

The General Peace Agreement between the Mozambique 
government and Renamo focused on political, military, electoral, 
and humanitarian goals. 6 The political goals included guiding the 
peace process, carrying out the negotiated agreements specified 
in the Rome Accord, and administering the functions of the 
Supervisory and Monitoring Commission. 

The military goals included demilitarizing all armed forces 
and deploying troops in 49 pre-identified areas. These goals 
included maintaining the cease-fire between the government and 


306 



rebel forces, verifying the disbandment of "informal" groups, 7 
completing the withdrawal of foreign troops, and collecting, 
storing, and destroying weapons. 

Upon completion of the military goals, the ONUMOZ was 
scheduled to facilitate the electoral and humanitarian mandates, 
under the supervision of the National Elections Commission and 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The U.N. mission was charged 
with administering, verifying, and supporting the execution of 
each mandate as outlined in the ONUMOZ charter. The U.N. Special 
Representative was charged with the management and coordination 
of all four elements of ONUMOZ's operations, through the 
Supervisory and Monitoring Commission. 

Rules of Engagement 

The rules of engagement consisted of impartially 
facilitating the implementation of the October 1992 peace 
agreement, monitoring and verifying the cease-fire arrangements, 
monitoring the activities of the country's new police force, 
providing liaison services to the parties, providing security for 
U.N. and other international non-governmental organizations 
(NGO's) involved in implementing the peace process, and providing 
assistance to humanitarian relief efforts in the country. 8 ONUMOZ 
military observers are lightly armed and were authorized to use 
weapons only in situations requiring self-defense. 

Composition of Forces 

U.N. Resolution 797 approved the assignment of 7,000 to 
8,000 military and civilian personnel. 9 The military component 


307 




included 354 military observers; five infantry battalions, each 
composed of up to 850 personnel; one engineer battalion; three 
logistics companies; a headquarters company; a movement control 
company; a communications unit; a medical unit; and an air 
unit. 10 

In addition to the Office of the Interim Special 
Representative, the personnel requirement for the elections and 
humanitarian operations would increase the overall size of 
ONUMOZ. Approximately 1,200 people would be required to monitor 
the election process. 11 

The resettlement of Mozambican refugees and displaced 
persons entailed the services of ONUMOZ personnel in addition to 
other local and international organizations. 

Equipment 

The ONUMOZ mandate required various equipment, such as 
jeeps, mobile telecommunications systems, and helicopters. 
Weapons were standard equipment inasmuch as all of the infantry 
battalions consisted of armed soldiers. 

Training 

Drawn from existing U. N. peacekeeping operations, the 
military observers had previous training in conducting such 
activities. In the absence of language training and peacekeeping 
experience, rank-and-file troops received logistics training on 
site and their prior military experience was considered basic 
training for the operation. 12 
Tactics 


308 





ONUMOZ, as a peacekeeper, has focused mainly on cease-fire 
verification and negotiating an interim power-sharing accord 
between the contending sides. ONUMOZ's mission called for 
securing the country's transportation corridors, demobilizing all 
armed forces, and facilitating the creation of a restructured 
police force and a 30,000-member Mozambican army. 

Cost 

The annual cost of the ONUMOZ mission was $310 million in 
1993. 13 A Special Account was established to provide for the 
mission's financing. Approximately $114 million in contributions 
to the mission's budget was in arrears as of April 30, 1993. 14 
Operational Assessment 

ONUMOZ has striven in many ways to support the efforts of 
Renamo and the Mozambique government to implement the terms of 
the October 1992 peace accord. The uninterrupted tenure of the 
U.N. Special Envoy to Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, has been 
particularly helpful in this regard. 

First, the peacekeeping process, fledgling during the first 
12 months, has been holding since the cease-fire accords were 
implemented under the direction of the U.N.-monitored Cease-Fire 
Commission. 

Second, ONUMOZ has survived its initial period of 
deployment. The 7,500-strong U.N. peacekeeping mission is now 
fully deployed, and troops from Bangladesh, Botswana, Italy, 
Uruguay, and Zambia are guarding the country's major transport 
corridors. 15 This action fulfills the Secretary-General's mandate 


309 




f 


to prevent any disorder that could be exploited by armed 
irregulars pending the formation of the new unified armed forces. 

Third, about 35 of the 49 confinement areas have been 
investigated and approved. These areas will be used to receive 
and disarm the government, Renamo, and other armed groups. 

Fourth, a British training center in Nyanga (Zimbabwe) has 
been established and has begun receiving government and Renamo 
officers for training. The government has provided its 270-person 
requirement; Renamo's full obligation, however, has not been 
met. 16 

Fifth, three countries (Canada, Britain, and the United 
States) have submitted proposals for removing mines for review 
and approval. 

Sixth, ONUMOZ's operation has been accompanied by few 
fatalities, indicating a desire for peace on the part of both 
government and Renamo forces. 

Seventh, the ONUMOZ operation has smoothed the way for the 
resettlement of refugees. 

Finally, the peace dividends promote economic redevelopment. 
The Beira, Tete, and Nampula corridors generate receipts from the 
transportation of food and material goods throughout the region. 
This post-civil war climate encourages foreign investment and 
facilitates national privatization efforts. 

Future problems, however, are likely in a number of areas: 

First, the ONUMOZ operation has met with numerous delays. 

U.N. budget delays and disputes between the government and Renamo 


310 


commission representatives have complicated the peace plan 
timetable. 17 Six months after its initial deployment, only one- 
fifth of the operation was on site in Mozambique. This staffing 
was considered inadequate to verify complaints of cease-fire 
violations. Inadequate security forces to guard transportation 
corridors encouraged slow foreign troop withdrawal. 

A British-financed training center in Nyanga, Zimbabwe 
threatened to close after five months to reduce its losses 
because the government and Renamo had not sent their full 270- 
officer requirement for training. 

Second, the timetables for troop demobilization and national 
elections have been rescheduled. The new timetables have 
constrained ONUMOZ's mandate to complete its work before the 
October 1994 U.N. Security Council deadline. 

Third, the mine removal operation has proved to be very 
extensive, with an estimated 2 million unexploded mines left in 
the country. 18 This operation requires additional training and 
funding. 19 

Fourth, because troop demobilization relates to the 
resolution of other issues still under dispute, ONUMOZ must 
proceed carefully because problems may arise that could undermine 
the entire peacekeeping process. In was not until the spring of 
1993 that the government and ONUMOZ signed an accord outlining 
rules of engagement to be in effect during the peacekeeping and 
transition period until the upcoming elections. 

Fifth, the resettlement process remains incomplete. It is 


311 


one of the largest refugee resettlement operations supported by 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. More funding and 
resources are required to complete the process of national 
reintegration. Refugees are maintaining their pre-cease-fire 
residences until they are convinced that Mozambican peace can be 
sustained. 

Finally, there is unease that ONUMOZ has been relegated by 
the U.N. Security Council to a secondary status in relation to 
other U.N. peacekeeping operations. 20 

CURRENT SITUATION 

On August 22, 1993, Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, and 
President Chissano held face-to-face talks in Mozambique. To 
expedite the October 1994 elections, they agreed to form a 
transition government. Several political conditions have also 
been addressed, such as the verification of the Trust Fund 
funding to subsidize newly formed political parties, the setting 
up by Renamo of headquarters in the capital of Maputo, the naming 
of Renamo-appointed assistants to each provisional governor, and 
agreement by the government to request a U.N. police 
contingent. 21 

Signed in April 1993, an agreement between the government 
and ONUMOZ has provided a framework for further U.N. peacekeeping 
assistance. 

Other political issues include how the state-controlled 
media will support Renamo and other political opposition parties 
during the transition period and pressure from external elements 


312 


to hasten the approval of the new electoral law for the October 
1994 elections. 

ONUMOZ has registered and demobilized government soldiers in 
the Maputo and Gaza provinces, but it is still uncertain when the 
formal and complete demobilization of government and Renamo 
forces will take place. 

CONCLUSION 

ONUMOZ has thus far proven to be a successful peacemaking 
operation. Peacekeeping progress, however, is stymied by the 
delay in demobilizing government and Renamo forces and other 
preconditions required to fulfill the October 1992 peace 
agreement. Nevertheless, the cease-fire has held so far, and 
Renamo and Frelimo, and other registered parties have continued 
to meet as part of the efforts to resolve the conflict. 


313 


Endnotes 


1. In addition to the Frelimo and Renamo troops, other armed groups 
in Mozambique, numbering approximately 2,000, were to be 
demobilized. 

2. "New UN Operations to Oversee Troop Withdrawal, Elections," 

UN Chronicle . 30, No. 3, 24. 

3. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)," 
in United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, August 
1993), 32. 

4. Nampala, one of eleven provinces situated along the northeastern 
corridor, connects Nacala and Nampula railway service between the 
Indian Ocean and Malawi, Tanzania (in the east), Zambezia Province 
to central Mozambique, and Beira railway corridor. 

5. According to the July 30, 1993 issue of Africa Confidential . 34, 
No. 15, 3-5, Zimbabwe units left the Beira Corridor in mid-April; 
on June 9 Malawian troops left the Nacala Corridor. 

6. Chissano and Dhklama signed a joint communique on July 10, 1990 

and an agreement dated December 1, 1990. The communique and the 

agreement are important components of the General Peace Agreement. 

7. Armed bandits who operate independently and the Naparamas 
(traditional militia) are armed groups not organized under Renamo 
or under government supervision. 

8. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)," 
November 9, 1993, 3. 

9. "United Nations Operation in Mozambique," Peace-Keeping 

Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) (New York: United Nations, 
March 1993) , 63-67. 

10. Ibid . 

11. More than 125 international and local support staff would 
supplement the election monitors. 

12. Dan Isaacs, "Watching and Waiting," Africa Report . 38, No. 4, 
1993, 41. 

13. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)," 
November 9, 1993, 1. 

14. "ONUMOZ," in United Nations Peace-keeping . August 1993, 32. 


314 










15. "Mozambican Peace Thrown Off Balance by Political Posturing, 
Christian Science Monitor . 85, No. 174, 1, 4. 


16. "Mozambique: Renamo Plays for Time," Africa Confidential . 34, 
No. 15, July 30, 1993, 3-5. 

17. Dan Isaacs, "Watching and Waiting," Africa Report . 38, 

No. 4, 1993, 40-44. 

18. Dan Isaacs, "Life After Landmines," Africa Report . 38, No. 3, 
22-24. 

19. United States Institute of Peace, "Achieving Post-Settlement 

Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the International Community," 

Special Report on Mozambique . May 18, 1993, 5. 

20. Edmund Piasecki, "Southern Africa: More Hard Lessons for 
U.N. Peacekeeping," The Interdependent . 19, No. 2, 1993, 1. 

21. "Agreement Reached," West Africa . No. 3964, 1993, 1639. 


315 









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1639. 

Akakpo, Barbara. "Working for Peace," West Africa . July 12-18, No. 
3955, 1993, 1205-6. 

Alden, Chris, and Mark Simpson. "Mozambique: A Delicate Peace," The 

Journal of Modern African Studies . 13, No. 1, March 1993, 109-30. 

Ansah Ayisi, Ruth. "And Now the Peace," Africa Report . 37, No. 6, 

1992, 31-33. 

Arnold, Guy. Wars in the Third World . New York: Cassell, 1991. 

Association of Concerned African Scholars. U.S. Military Involvement 
in Southern Africa . Boston: South End, 1978. 

Battersby, John. "Mozambican Peace Thrown Off Balance by Political 

Posturing," Christian Science Monitor . August 4, 1993, p. 1, 4. 

-. "Talks in Mozambique Solidify Peace Accord," Christian Science 

Monitor, August 31, 1993, 7. 

"Elections Delayed, Timetables 'Unrealistic'," UN Chronicle . 30, No. 

2 , 21 . 

Finnegan, William. A Complicated War . Berkeley: University of 
California, 1992. 

Gehrke, William. "The Mozambique Crisis: A Case for United Nations 
Military Intervention," Cornell International Law Journal . No. 

24, 1991, 135-64. 

General Peace Accord of Mozambique . Rome: 1992. 

Harsch, Ernest, with Roy Laishley. "Mozambique: Out of the Ruins of 
War," Africa Recovery . No. 8, 1993, 1-20. 

Hill, Heather. "Going Home," Africa Report . 38, No. 4, 1993, 44-48. 

Isaacs, Dan. "Life After Landmines," Africa Report . 38, No. 3, 1993, 
22-24. 

-. "Watching and Waiting," Africa Report . 38, No. 4, 1993, 40-43. 

Mackinlay, John. "Avoiding Another Angola," Africa Report . 38, No. 5, 

1993, 46-49. 

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Operations," Washington Quarterly . 15, No. 3, 1992, 


113-31. 


Meldrum, Andrew. "Peace at Last," Africa Report . 38, No. 2, 1993, 47- 
50. 


"Money Needed for Repatriation," Indian Ocean Newsletter [Paris], No. 
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"Mozambique: Renamo Plays for Time," Africa Confidential [London], 34, 
No. 15, July 30, 1993, 3-5. 

"New UN Operations to Oversee Troop Withdrawal, Elections," UN 
Chronicle . 30, No. 1, 1993, 24. 

"Observers Sent to Monitor Mozambique Cease-fire," UN Chronicle . 

29, No. 4, 1992, 12-13. 

Piasecki, Edmund. "Southern Africa: More Hard Lessons for U.N. 
Peacekeeping," The Interdependent . 19, No. 2, 1993, 1, 6. 

"Repatriation of Refugees," West Africa . May 24-30, 1993, No. 3962, 
1549. 

Serapiao, Luis B., and Mohamed A. El-Khawas. Mozambique in the 

Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence . Washington: 
University Press of America, 1979. 

-. "Mozambique's National Interest in the Regional Conflict of 

Southern Africa," Conflict . 9, No. 4, 341-56. 

-. "The Role of Religious Groups in Peace and Conflict-Resolution 

in Africa: The Case of Mozambique," Dialogue and Alliance . 7, No. 
1, 1993, 68-75. 

"United Nations Operation in Mozambique," Peace-Keeping Information 

Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) New York: United Nations, March 1993, 
63-67. 

United States Institute of Peace. Special Report on Mozambique. 

"Achieving Post-Settlement Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the 
International Community," Executive Summary . May 18, 1993, 1-8. 

"UN Troops Arrive," West Africa . May 24-30, 1993, 878. 

U.S. Committee for Refugees. "Refugee Repatriation Underway in 
Mozambique," Monday Developments . No. 11, 1993, 1-3. 

Vines, Alex. Terrorism in Mozambique . Bloomington: Indiana University 
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Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in 
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317 


























United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) 


Selected Chronology 

1989 


Declaration on Apartheid and Its Destructive Consequences in 
Southern Africa passed by the United Nations (U.N.) General 
Assembly. 

1991 


On September 14, the National Peace Accord (NPA) was 
concluded in South Africa between the governing National Party 
and the African National Congress (ANC). 

1992 


In June, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued 
a report on South Africa. 

On August 17 , U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 112 , 
authorizing the U.N. Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). 

In September, an initial contingent of UNOMSA members was 
detached to South Africa and was deployed in all of the country's 
eleven regions by the end of November. 

1993 


On December 7, the Transitional Executive Council, a 
multiparty, multiracial body, was installed to oversee 
preparations for the country's April 27, 1994 parliamentary 
elections, based on universal suffrage. 


318 






INTRODUCTION 


In September 1993 the first contingent of the United Nations 
Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) was deployed to assist 
in implementing the terms of the 1991 National Peace Accord (NPA) 
to transform the country's system of apartheid into a nonracial 
democratic society. The mission was authorized to remain in South 
Africa during the period of transition leading to the April 27- 
28 , 1994 national and provincial elections, which were expected 
to usher in a five-year transitional government of national 
unity. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES. 

The Initial Crisis 

On December 13, 1991, the United Nations (U.N.) General 
Assembly discussed the progress made by South Africa in 
negotiating a new constitution as part of the transition to a 
multiracial democratic political system. The assembly praised the 
September 14, 1991 National Peace Accord, which was concluded by 
the South African government, the African National Congress 
(ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and other parties to 
usher in the post-apartheid era. 

In response to the General Assembly statement, South African 
Foreign Minister R.F. Botha said that it was encouraging that the 
U.N. was "at last recognizing important political developments in 

South Africa." 1 Earlier, in November 1991, Botha had informed the 

j: 

Secretary-General that his government did not accept the premise 
that punitive sanctions against South Africa, in particular the 


319 



trade embargo, were required in the light of "real, profound and 
irreversible changes" there. 2 

ANC President Nelson Mandela, addressing the General 
Assembly on December 3, 1991, said that continued international 
pressure was necessary to encourage speedy movement toward ending 
apartheid. Sanctions should be lifted in phases that corresponded 
to actual progress being made within South Africa, he said. Two 
major phases would be the establishment of an interim government 
and the election of a new government based on a democratic 
constitution. 3 

These positive developments toward democracy and an end to 
apartheid in South Africa were disrupted on June 17, 1992, when 
armed whites randomly attacked residents of Boipatong and Slovo 
in the Johannesburg area and 39 people were killed. Mandela 
called off talks begun under the auspices of the National Peace 
Accord. On June 19, the U.N. Special Committee Against Apartheid 
said that it was "appalled" by the June 17 massacre and that the 
escalating violence in South Africa continued to demonstrate 
Pretoria's inability or unwillingness to end it. 4 

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali urged South African 
leaders to resume negotiations, but to no avail. Following talks 
in late June with South African leaders in Lagos, Nigeria and 
Dakar, Senegal, Boutros-Ghali noted a growing consensus for a 
U.N. role in talks on transitional arrangements leading to 
democratic rule in South Africa. The precise nature of that role, 
he said, would have to be defined in agreement with the parties 


320 


to those talks, known as the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA), and the support of the Security Council would be 
required for the U.N. to play such a role. 

In July, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali underlined his 
concern about the deteriorating situation in South Africa 
resulting from the June massacre. He stressed the need for strong 
international cooperation in ending the violence and helping to 
reach a political accord among South African political groups. 
According to the Special Committee Against Apartheid, the 
massacre "lent additional credence to the allegations that the 
violence was being orchestrated and aimed at distrupting ongoing 
efforts to foster a peaceful political process." 5 
Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

On August 17, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 
772, authorizing Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to deploy U.N. 
observers in South Africa to help end the spiraling cycle of 
violence, the continuation of which, the council said, "would 
seriously jeopardize peace and security in the region." 6 The 
resolution invited the Secretary-General to assist in 
strengthening the structures set up under the September 1991 NPA. 
Deployment of U.N. observers, the council stated, should be 
implemented by the Secretary-General "in such a manner and in 
such numbers as he determines necessary to address effectively 
the areas of concern noted in his report." 7 

In addition to UNOMSA, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), the British Commonwealth, and the European Community (EC), 


321 



were also requested by the major negotiating parties in South 
Africa to send observers. 8 
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

On September 9, 1992 , the Secretary-General announced that 
50 U.N. observers would be deployed in South Africa, in 
accordance with Resolution 772. An advance party of 13 observers 
arrived in South Africa on September 11, and set up the mission's 
headquarters in Johannesburg. A regional office for the 
Natal/KwaZulu province, led by the Deputy Chief of Mission, was 
established in Durban. Upon UNOMSA's full deployment, the 
mission's observers were posted in the country's 11 regions: 
Natal/Kwazulu, Border/Ciskei, Wits/Vaal, Western Cape, Orange 
Free State, Northern Cape, Far Northern Transvaal, Northern 
Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, Eastern Cape, and Western 
Transvaal. 9 By the end of November, the U.N. observer mission was 
in full force and deployed in all eleven regions. The South 
African government, political parties, and other organizations 
were called upon to extend their full cooperation to the U.N. 
observers to enable them to carry out their tasks effectively. 10 

In early March 1994, it was announced that over 5,000 
international observers would be used to monitor an estimated 
10,000 polling stations, including 2,840 from the U.N., the 
Organization of African States (OAU), and the Commonwealth. 11 To 
prepare the ground for the deployment of the observers, a Joint 
Operations Unit was established, chaired by the U.N.'s Chief of 
Mission, Angela King. 


322 


Political and Military Goals 


UNOMSA's political goal was to monitor the holding of the 
April 27-28, 1994 national and provincial elections, and to 
observe whether participants in the electoral campaign were 
allowed to follow the established principles and guidelines for 
marches and political gatherings. Free and fair elections 
constituted part of the ultimate goal of assisting the country's 
progress toward full democracy. The mission was also authorized 
to cooperate with the NPA's own conflict resolution bodies. 12 
Following the election, the mission was tasked with preparing a 
joint statement of the U.N., Commonwealth, OAU, and European 
Community (EC) regarding the fairness of the vote. 

The mission's military goal was to monitor the activities 
and conduct of the South African police and military services 
during the transition to democratic rule. 

Rules of Engagement 

As an observer mission, UNOMSA's rules of engagement called 
for impartially monitoring the activities of the South African 
police and military forces, particularly during demonstrations 
and mass rallies, in addition to monitoring the holding of free 
and fair nonracial national elections. The mission's observers 
were authorized to maintain informal contacts with the country's 
political groupings at all levels. The observers were not 
authorized to carry arms. 

Composition of Forces 

Over 36 countries, including the United States and Britain, 


323 





sent representatives to observe the April 1994 elections. 

UNOMSA's size grew exponentially as South Africa prepared to hold 
the vote. Thus, in September 1993, UNOMSA consisted of more than 
100 observers, 13 while by March 1994, the number of observers 
from the U.N., the OAU, and the Commonwealth increased to 
2,840. 14 Other international organizations and countries sent an 
additional 2,160 international observers to monitor the polling 
stations. 15 
Equipment 

As an observer mission, UNOMSA personnel were unarmed. The 
observers were provided with ground vehicles, such as jeeps, as 
well as binoculars and medical supplies. 

Training 

The mission's observers consisted of professionals with 
expertise in criminal law, political science, economics, election 
monitoring, human rights, security, policing, socioeconomic 
development, public diplomacy, human resource management, 
education, and administration. 16 
Tactics 

The election observers monitored demonstrations, marches, 
public meetings, and other forms of political activity, covering 
more than 8,500 political events and gatherings throughout South 
Africa during the period from August 1992 to September 1993. 17 
Informal contacts were maintained with most of the country's 
political groupings and civic associations. 18 The observers also 
monitored the activities and conduct of the country's police and 


324 





military services during the transition to a nonracial democratic 
political system. 

Cost 

The cost of the mission, which was handled under the regular 
U.N. budget, was estimated at $13,121,300 from mid-September 1992 
through December 1993. This amount included communications, 
travel, and operational costs. 19 
Operational Assessment 

Tom Vraalsen of Norway was dispatched to South Africa on 
November 23, 1992, as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to 
assess the U.N. mission. After a 17-day trip, he reported on 
December 9, 1992 that the increased momentum toward resuming 
multiparty talks was a "hopeful sign." On December 22, Secretary- 
General Boutros-Ghali expressed "guarded optimism" about the 
success of the U.N. observer mission and the prospects for a 
negotiated settlement in South Africa. He noted that all parties 
appeared to agree in principle that multiparty negotiations were 
the only solution to resolving South Africa's political problems. 
However, he pointed out, violence continued to be a feature of 
daily life in South Africa. 20 
CURRENT SITUATION 

South African President F.W. de Klerk announced in December 
1992 a timetable on the transitional process in South Africa that 
envisaged a full representative government of national unity in 
place no later than the first half of 1994. An agreement on 
multiparty negotiations was reached in September 1993, with the 


325 




Transitional Executive Council was inaugurated in December 1993. 
Nonracial, democratic national elections were scheduled to be 
held on April 27, 1994. 

CONCLUSION 

Given the complex political situation in South Africa, it 
would be unreasonable to expect that a small U.N. observer 
mission could have a significant impact on events there. 
Nonetheless, this mission sends a signal to political actors in 
South Africa of U.N. interest in their country's future. It could 
pave the way for deeper and more extensive U.N. involvement in 
the future. In other words, limited as the objectives of UNOMSA 
are at present, they are significant and useful as a first step. 
Having observers on the spot in South Africa enables the U.N. to 
keep up with events there and to gain enough information to make 
measured decisions about future U.N. policy toward South Africa. 


326 


Endnotes 


1. "Progress Towards Democratic Order in South Africa Acknowledged, 
Call for Resumed Academic, Scientific, Cultural, Sports Link," UN 
Chronicle . 29, No. 1, March 1992, 56-57. 

2. Ibid . 

3. "Deployment of UN Observers Authorized for South Africa," UN 
Chronicle . 29, No. 4, December 1992, 15. 

4. "Growing Consensus for UN Role in Talks on Future of South 
Africa," UN Chronicle . 29, No. 3, September 1992, 24-25. 

5. Ibid . 

6. "Deployment of UN Observers Authorized for South Africa," 14. 

7. Ibid . 

8. "South Africa: The National Peace Accord and the International 
Community," 1. 

9. United Nations Secretary-General,"Secretary-General Deplores 
Loss of Life in Ciskei, Announces Details of UN Observer Missions 
to South Africa," Press Release . September 9, 1992. 

10. Ibid . 

11. "10,000 Polling Stations for Election," Business Day [South 
Africa], March 2, 1994. 

12. "South Africa: The National Peace Accord and the International 
Community," United States Institute of Peace Special Report . 
September 24, 1993, 1. 

13. "South Africa: Prospects for Non-Racial Democracy 'Encouraging" 
Despite Difficulties," UN Chronicle . 30, No. 3, September 1993, 30; 
"Special Report: Violence: The Biggest Obstacle," UN Chronicle . 30, 
No. 3, September 1993, 31. 

14. "10,000 Polling Stations for Election." 

15. Ibid . 

16. United Nations Focus: South Africa ; United Nations Observer 
Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) (New York: United Nations, 
Department of Public Information, August 1993), 6. 

17. "Special Report: Violence the Biggest Obstacle," 31. 

18. Ibid. 


327 



















19. U.N. Document . December 15, 1992, 5 (A/C.5/47/79). 

20. "Assembly Welcomes Deployment of UN Observers," UN Chronicle . 
30, No. 2, March 1993, 71. 


328 




Bibliography 


"Assembly Welcomes Deployment of UN Observers," UN Chronicle . 30, No. 
2, March 1993, 71. 

"Deployment of UN Observers Authorized for South Africa." UN 
Chronicle . 29, NO. 4, December 1992, 15. 

"Growing Consensus for UN Role in Talks on Future of South Africa." UN 
Chronicle . 29, No. 3, September 1992, 24-25. 

Ottoway, Marina. South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order . 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993. 

"Progress Towards Democratic Order in South Africa Acknowledged, Call 
for Resumed Academic, Scientific, Cultural, Sports Link." UN 
Chronicle . 29, No. 1, March 1992, 56-57. 

U.N. Document December 15, 1992, 5 (A/C.5/47/79). 

United Nations, Secretary-General. "Secretary-General Deplores Loss of 
Life in Ciskei, Announces Details of UN Observer Missions to 
South Africa," Press Release . September 9, 1992. 


329 









United Nations Military Observer Group 
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 


Selected Chronology 

1947 


On August 14, India and Pakistan became independent 
dominions in accordance with the terms of Indian Independence Act 
of 1947. 

1948 


In January, India complained to the Security Council that 
Pathan tribesmen, supported by Pakistan, were invading Kashmir. 

On January 20, the Security Council adopted Resolution 39, 
creating a three-member United Nations Commission for India and 
Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the dispute over Kashmir. 

On April 21, the Security Council adopted Resolution 47, 
thereby enlarging membership of the commission from three 
(Argentina, Czechoslovakia, and the United States) to five 
representatives (with Belgium and Canada now added). United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 
received an indirect mandate from the resolution. 

1949 


On January 1, the cease-fire between India and Pakistan 
became effective. 

On January 24, the first group of United Nations (U.N.) 
military observers arrived in Kashmir. 

On July 18, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement, 
establishing a cease-fire line to be supervised by 
observers. 

1950 


On March 14, the Security Council adopted Resolution 80 
(1950), thereby terminating the UNCIP. 

1951 


On March 30, the Security Council, adopted Resolution 91 
(1951), which formally “authorizes” UNMOGIP to continue to 
supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir, replacing UNCIP, which was 
terminated the year before. 


330 







1965 


In August, hostilities broke out along the cease-fire line 
in Kashmir, eventually spreading to the international border 
between India and Pakistan. The war lasted until September. 

1971 


On April 17, Bangladesh formally declared independence. On 
December 3, Pakistan launched preemptive air strikes against 
India, which supported Bangladesh. The following day India 
invaded East Pakistan. On December 16, Pakistani military 
surrendered to the Indian armed forces, and East Pakistan became 
independent Bangladesh. 

On December 21, the Security Council adopted Resolution 307 
—thereby demanding a durable cease-fire remain in effect until 
all armed forces had withdrawn to their respective territories 
and to positions that fully respected the cease-fire line in 
Kashmir supervised by UNMOGIP. 

On July 2, Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the Simla Agreement. 


331 




s 


INTRODUCTION 

The Kashmir territorial dispute between India and Pakistan 
ranks among one of the most vexing peacekeeping operations 
undertaken by the United Nations (U.N.). The challenge for the 
successful resolution of the conflict over Kashmir is daunting 
not only because of the longevity of the problem but also because 
of the almost visceral reaction to the issue by both sides. 

In August 1947, India and Pakistan gained independence from 
Britain, in accordance with a partition provided by the Indian 
Independence Act of 1947. Under that scheme, the princely state 
of Jammu and Kashmir (referred to as Kashmir) was free to accede 
either to India or to Pakistan. The accession immediately became 
a matter of dispute between the two countries, and fighting broke 
out later that year. 

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan (UNMOGIP) began operations in January 1949 as part of 
the cease-fire arrangement between India and Pakistan ending the 
first war over Kashmir. UNMOGIP’s predecessor organization, the 
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), a group 
of observers established in January 1948 to observe and mediate 
the dispute while hostilities were ongoing, was disbanded in 1951 
but provided the core of UNMOGIP. An administrative adjunct, the 
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), was 
later created when war broke out again over Kashmir in 1965 and 
disbanded when the war ended. 

Pakistan and India fought major wars in 1947-48 and in 1965, 


332 


and have engaged in many other border skirmishes over Kashmir. 

The countries approach the Kashmir problem from different 
perspectives. India is a predominantly Hindu country while 
Pakistan is predominantly Muslim. Hinduism has often been 
described as being more of a philosophy and encompassing way of 
life than a formal religion. Indian adherents of a secular state 
argue that Hinduism is more inclined toward a separation of 
church and state. Pakistanis maintain that according to Islamic 
law there is no such separation of church and state. Thus 
differences over how Pakistanis and Indians regard the social and 
political polity run deep and their arguments develop a religious 
coloration. These differences have been especially manifest in 
the principles they apply to defend their positions on Kashmir. 

The argument used by India to justify its claim to Kashmir 
is that it is part of a multiethnic India. In this perspective, 
Kashmir was, and always will be, an integral part of India’s 
cultural diversity. Furthermore, the fact that the Hindu Maharaja 
of Kashmir--a mostly Muslim state--was persuaded to join India 
immediately after partition makes Kashmir a territory not subject 
to dispute. 

The Pakistani claim to Kashmir is premised on the successful 
creation of an Islamic state based on what was to be called the 
"two nations" theory of Hindu and Muslim separatism. For the 
Pakistanis, the creation of a separate state based on shared 
religious identity is part of the "natural order" of events as 
would be the accession of the Muslim majority state of Kashmir to 


333 


Pakistan. 


\ 


Fundamentalist thinking—Islamist in Pakistan and Hindu in 
India—is growing and has become strong enough to affect 
government decision making in both countries. Pakistani 
nationalists believe that India’s retention of a Muslim-majority 
area such as Kashmir represents an assault on Muslim rights, 
while Hindu nationalists in India demand that India become a 
nonsecular Hindu state. In this view, Muslims who decided to stay 
in India after partition constitute a potential fifth column and 
a force supporting the secession of Kashmir. The struggle over 
Kashmir is thus seen as a prelude to the balkanization of the 
other states in India and the eventual breakup of the union. This 
perspective, which has gained much currency in the past few years 
in India, reduces the possible solution to the Kashmir problem to 
one of the state reasserting internal control over civil 
unrest—a direction that allows little recourse to international 
mediation. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

The Kashmir problem had its genesis in the Lahore Resolution 
of 1940 when the Muslim League—the political party that 
represented most Muslims in India in the years preceding 
independence—espoused Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s “two nations” 
theory, which argued for a permanent separation between Muslims 
and Hindus. This partition of India into two states was bitterly 
opposed by the predominantly Hindu Congress Party led by 


334 



Jawaharlal Nehru and Motilal Gandhi. The Congress Party and the 
Muslim League, which was led by Jinnah, were unable to agree on 
the terms for a draft constitution for a united independent 
India. As a result, in 1946 the British government declared its 
intention to grant dominion status to what became two separate 
nations—India and Pakistan. 

To achieve partition, British India, Bengal, and the Punjab 
would have to be partitioned according to the principle of 
communal majority; the remaining princely states would be offered 
the chance to accede either to India or to Pakistan. Independence 
within the Commonwealth was granted to both countries in August 
1947. 

All but three of the more than 500 former princely states 
quickly acceded either to Pakistan or India. Under guidelines 
established with the aid of Lord Louis Mountbatten, the British 
Viceroy of India, the states decided to join Pakistan or India 
after considering the geographic location of their respective 
states and the religious majority of the people of the state. 
Hyderabad, the most populous of the princely states and one with 
a muslim plurality was surrounded by territory that would go to 
India. It and Junagarh (a small state with a Muslim prince but a 
Hindu majority) presented a problem. Both the governments 
hesitated, but their states were quickly absorbed into India. The 
status of the third state, Kashmir, was not resolved peacefully. 
Its indeterminate status has poisoned relations between South 
Asia’s two most powerful states for almost a half century. 


335 


Despite the overwhelming Muslim majority, following a period 
of indecision, Kashmir was ultimately pressured to join India. 
Pakistan immediately invaded Kashmir, with Indian forces 
occupying the eastern portions of the territory, including the 
capital, Srinagar. 

The war, relatively modest in scale, was contained in 
Kashmir and ended on January 1, 1949, upon implementation of a 
truce agreement mediated by the Security Council-appointed UNCIP. 
The truce was soon followed by a bilateral accord between India 
and Pakistan (the Karachi Agreement) authorizing the 
establishment of a Cease-Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir and the 
presence of observers to monitor it. By November 1, 1949, this 
line was delimited and became one of the United Nation's (U.N.) 
earliest peacekeeping operations. The UNMOGIP was then charged 
with monitoring the cease-fire. 

The U.N. Response 

The issue of Kashmir was first broached by India in the 
Security Council in January 1948. India had complained that 
tribesmen, with active Pakistani encouragement, were invading 
Kashmir, resulting in extensive fighting. Pakistan denied India’s 
charges and declared that Kashmir’s accession to India was 
illegal. That India first solicited U.N. intervention on the 
issue of Kashmir and thereby internationalized the issue is of 
considerable importance. By taking this action, in the view of 
many observers, India weakened its argument that the issue of 
accession must ultimately be settled bilaterally with Pakistan 


336 



without the benefit of the U.N.-sponsored plebiscite conditions 
to which it had originally agreed. 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

On January 20, 1948, after extensive consultations between 
the Security Council and the governments of India and Pakistan, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 39, which established the 
three-member UNCIP. The resolution was passed 9-0, with the 
Soviet Union and Ukraine abstaining. Although India and Pakistan 
were consulted on the above resolution, serious disagreement 
arose between the two governments regarding its implementation 
—specifically, disagreement as to which country would constitute 
the third member of the proposed commission. India nominated 
Czechoslovakia, whereas Pakistan chose Argentina. The choice of a 
third country, however, could not be agreed upon. 

On April 21, 1948, the Security Council met to decide on 
enlarging the membership of the commission from three to five 
members (Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, and the 
United States) and authorized the commission to establish “such 
observers as it may require.” 1 Thus UNMOGIP received its mandate 
indirectly. A military adviser to the commission was appointed to 
organize and oversee the U.N. observers. 2 

On March 30, 1951, the Security Council decided by its 
Resolution 91 to terminate UNCIP and replaced it with a U.N. 
Representative. 3 The Security Council also decided to separate 
the responsibilities of UNMOGIP from those of the U.N. 
Representative, whose responsibilities were primarily political. 


337 



The military adviser was then made Chief Military Observer 
(CMO). 4 Henceforth, UNMOGIP operated as an autonomous operation 
led by the Military Observer who, in turn, served under the 
authority of the Secretary-General. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The UNCIP arrived in the subcontinent on July 7, 1948 and 
immediately consulted with Indian and Pakistani authorities. On 
July 20, the Secretary-General was asked to appoint a 
high-ranking officer to act as military adviser to the 
commission. 

The cease-fire between India and Pakistan came into effect 
on January 1, 1949, and a first group of U.N. military observers 
arrived in the area on January 24, 1949. On July 18, 1949, India 
and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease¬ 
fire line to be supervised by the observers of UNCIP. These 
observers, who initially included a Plebiscite Administrator, 
formed the nucleus of the UNMOGIP. When UNCIP did not achieve its 
goals of mediating in the Kashmir dispute and overseeing a 
plebiscite, it was disbanded in March 1950. Following the 
termination of UNCIP, the Security Council, by Resolution 91 of 
March 1951, allowed UNMOGIP to continue to supervise the cease¬ 
fire in Kashmir, which it has done to the present day. 5 
Political and Military Goals 

UNMOGIP has functioned as an autonomous operation, directed 
by the Chief Military Observer. UNMOGIP is charged with reporting 
and investigating complaints of cease-fire violations and is 


338 



supposed to submit its findings to both India and Pakistan as 
well as the Secretary-General. Throughout its existence, however, 
UNMOGIP has had to modify its agenda to accommodate new 
limitations imposed on it by changed circumstances in Kashmir. 

In early August 1965, hostilities again broke out on a large 
scale along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and eventually spread 
to the international border between India and West Pakistan. The 
Security Council called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all 
forces to the positions held before the hostilities began. In 
Kashmir, the supervision called for by the Security Council was 
exercised by UNMOGIP. In addition, because the hostilities 
extended beyond the Kashmir cease-fire line, the 
Secretary-General established UNIPOM, an administrative adjunct 
of UNMOGIP, as a temporary measure for the sole purpose of 
supervising the cease-fire along the India-Pakistan border 
outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Following the withdrawal 
of troops in 1966, UNMOGIP reverted to its original task, and 
UNIPOM was terminated. 

At the end of 1971, full-scale hostilities again broke out 
between India and Pakistan. By the time fighting had ended and a 
cease-fire had gone into effect, a number of military positions 
on both sides of the 1949 cease-fire line had changed hands. In 
July 1972, India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line 
of Control in Kashmir, which, with minor deviations, followed the 
same course as the cease-fire line established by the Karachi 
Agreement of 1949. At this juncture, India took the position that 


339 


f 


the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed because it had related 
specifically to the cease-fire line under the Karachi Agreement 
and did not extend to the actual Line of Control that had come 
into existence in December 1971. Pakistan, however, did not 
accept this position. UNMOGIP continued, however, to pursue its 
peacekeeping activities but solely on the Pakistani side of the 
border. 

Rules of Engagement 

Political scientist Robert Wirsing succinctly described the 
limitations the UNMOGIP has been forced to operate under during 
the past two decades as “operating essentially—and 
dishearteningly—on one leg in Kashmir.” The Karachi Agreement of 
1949 had barred the strengthening of fortifications in the cease¬ 
fire zone, which was a 500-yard wide strip on either side of the 
line. Until their movement was significantly curtailed after 
implementation of the Simla Agreement in 1972, U.N. observers 
customarily visited both Indian and Pakistani forward pickets to 
confirm that no defenses had been strengthened or altered in this 
zone. 

The bilateral Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan was 
signed in July 1972, following Pakistan’s defeat in the 
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 that gave birth to Bangladesh. This 
agreement placed new restrictions on any attempts at 
international monitoring of the situation in Kashmir. 6 UNMOGIP’s 
Simla-imposed limitations on monitoring activities were multiple. 
Because a new Line of Control replaced the former cease-fire line 


340 



zone, the former 1,000-yard-wide zone effectively disappeared, 
changing the basis for the Karachi Agreement. Furthermore, 
military observers were denied access to the Line of Control 
except at three crossing points on the Indian side. The 
Pakistanis insisted that UNMOGIP continue to implement the 
monitoring activities sanctioned by the Karachi Agreement, but 
doing so was possible only on the Pakistani side. On the Indian 
side, the U.N. maintained a limited presence. U.N. officials 
stated that they know a great deal about Pakistani troop 
deployments but little about Indian deployment because of the 
forementioned limitations to their mobility. From the onset of 
the U.N. involvement in the India-Pakistan dispute, observers 
were under instructions not to engage directly in combat. 
Composition of Forces 

As of 1993, UNMOGIP has 38 observers from eight 
countries--Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden, and Uruguay--deployed on both sides of the Line of 
Control that had been agreed upon by India and Pakistan in 1972. 
The observers are divided into two groups, one attached to each 
army, and are rotated periodically to prevent partisanship. 
UNMOGIP observers are headquartered from November to April in 
Rawalpindi, Pakistan, and from May to October in Srinagar, India. 
Equipment 

Both India and Pakistan provide the U.N. observers with 
necessary transportation as well as food and lodging, making the 
units highly mobile, but quite dependent on the largess and 


341 




goodwill of their hosts. 

Tactics 

Observers operate in teams of two and are attached to the 
various peacekeeping units as circumstances require. The number 
and location of the Field Observation Teams are determined 
according to need and sometimes at the request of either the 
Indian or the Pakistani army. 

Cost 

UNMOGIP is financed from the regular budget of the United 
Nations under the heading "Special Missions and Inquiries." The 
annual cost of the operation is about $7 million. 7 
Operational Assessment 

The Kashmir dispute has changed in nature since 1948. U.N. 
peacekeepers have been challenged by three wars between India and 
Pakistan (1947-49, 1965, 1971), India’s subsequent claim to the 
Siachin Glacier in northern Kashmir in 1984, and a Kashmiri 
separatist uprising that began in 1989. According to most 
assessments of the situation, the U.N. presence is today even 
less well equipped than it was more than four decades ago to find 
a successful resolution to the persistent problem of Kashmir. 

UNMOGIP faces a conflict that has changed fundamentally. 
First, the problem of boundary delimitation is now much more 
complex. The original UNCIP-supervised Pakistani and Indian 
military teams, which had undertaken the delimitation exercises 
in 1949, stopped approximately 40 miles short of the Chinese 
border. This inaccessible area is now recognized for its 


342 





strategic importance and has become a sharply contested 
territory. 

Second, a movement for Kashmiri self-determination that 
excludes both the Indian and Pakistani agenda is growing. Since 
1989 UNMOGIP also has had to confront the increased tempo of 
events and heightened tensions in the Indian-occupied areas of 
Kashmir. The Indian army, which maintains three heavy divisions 
supported by large numbers of ill-trained and often unruly 
paramilitary forces, including the Central Reserve Police Force 
and the Border Security Force, has been unable to quash a 
rebellion that has had more success politically than militarily 
against India. By its heavy-handed actions in Kashmir, India has 
attracted the scrutiny of human rights groups worldwide; these 
investigations have increasingly given credence to Kashmiri 
complaints of Indian abuse. Although this uprising has been 
supported by Pakistan, the fact remains that many Kashmiris want 
their own state, separate from either India or Pakistan—a very 
unlikely eventuality. 

Third, cross-border infiltration by militants has turned 
Kashmir into a battleground. The Kashmiri uprising has brought 
Indian charges of covert Pakistani support for insurgents. 
Although the Indian press has routinely exaggerated the number of 
infiltrators, termed Anti-National Elements from Pakistan, most 
third party observers agreed that Pakistan has maintained 
training camps in Azad Kashmir (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, 
according to India) and has offered material support to 


343 


\ 


insurgents fighting the Indian government. 

The U.N. response to the changed circumstances of the 
Kashmir situation has been less than vigorous. On the Indian 
side, UNMOGIP is severely hampered in fulfilling its intended 
peacekeeping role, and on the Pakistani side its role is also 
somewhat circumscribed. With an observer group numbering less 
than 40 officers—by far the smallest U.N. peacekeeping mission 
in existence today—its resources are incommensurate with the 
scale of violations occurring. Political scientist Robert Wirsing 
has stated that the past two decades of peacekeeping in Kashmir 
have witnessed the “severe functional decline of UNMOGIP.” 

CURRENT SITUATION 

UNMOGIP is now operating under significant Simla 
Agreement-induced limitations. The bilateral 1972 Simla Agreement 
between India and Pakistan made no explicit reference to UNMOGIP. 
Yet, the Simla Agreement did not formally disestablish UNMOGIP. 
The role UNMOGIP plays today—serving neither as an effective 
agent of change nor as a defender of the status quo—is far 
vaguer now that the element of bilateralism—introduced by the 
Simla Agreement and espoused by India—has been brought into the 
equation. 

UNMOGIP has continued its duty to observe cease-fire 
violations. Complaints continue to be lodged, but mainly on the 
Pakistani side. India, for its part, has not lodged a complaint 
since 1972. Still, India, which hardly acknowledges UNMOGIP, 
continues to provide accommodation, transport, and other 


344 


facilities to UNMOGIP. The Secretary-General’s position on 
UNMOGIP is that although it plays only a circumscribed role 
today, it will continue to be maintained with the same 
administrative arrangements as before unless it is terminated by 
a decision of the Security Council. 8 
CONCLUSION 

UNMOGIP is simply too small and has too many restrictions on 
its movement to be an effective force. UNMOGIP accomplished its 
original objective of overseeing a cease-fire between India and 
Pakistan. Since the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, however, the 
Kashmiri situation has changed substantially while the mandate 
under which the U.N. peacekeepers operate has not. For more than 
two decades, Pakistan has continued to report incidents to 
UNMOGIP, but India virtually ignores its presence, thereby 
undermining its significance. However, the argument can be made 
that a continued U.N. presence in this troubled area provides a 
useful signal of continuing international interest and concern, 
and acts as a restraint, albeit minor, to two now de facto 
nuclear countries at loggerheads over a very volatile and 
explosive issue. 

Another important change in the Kashmir situation is that 
the conflict has increasingly become less of a contest between 
opposing armies and, on the Indian side, more of an internal 
conflict pitting the Indian army and police against a suppressed 
civilian population. This populace is supported by Pakistan in 
what has been called a “Kashmiri intifada” against India. The 


345 



extent to which Pakistan has militarily supported Muslim 
militants in Kashmir has varied over the years, and the Indian 
threat to retaliate for this support has increased in the last 
few years. 

Despite helping “keep a lid” on a potentially dangerous 
situation, the U.N. mediation efforts have not progressed very 
far, and the dispute remains far from resolution. India remains 
adamant in its claim that Kashmir is an Indian territory; India 
appears no longer willing, as it did in its early resolutions, to 
entertain the idea of a plebiscite to determine the fate of 
Kashmir. 

The issue of Kashmir is deep-rooted for India and Pakistan. 
The nearly half century of continuing violence indicates that 
this conflict is more than a boundary dispute. The Kashmir 
dilemma is acute for India because the dispute internationalizes 
India’s internal ethnic and religious differences and poses the 
question of the survival of the Indian nation. For Pakistan, 
Kashmir is symbolically central to its nationalist, military, 
and Islamic identification. At present both countries have weak 
governments that can be manipulated by ethnic or religious 
pressure groups. In each country, any attempt at resolving the 
Kashmir dispute that even hints at accommodating the opposing 
view would mean political suicide. A tough nationalist stance on 
the Kashmir issue is the safest political course to take in both 
Pakistan and India. Only a strong government willing to take 
major risks could make concessions significant enough to defuse 


346 


the Kashmir conflict. 

Indian Prime Minister Rao in 1993 hinted at holding 
elections in Kashmir to determine its future, but at the same 
time sanctioned the presence of some 400,000 security troops that 
occupy the state. It is therefore not surprising that militant 
groups in Kashmir insist that only a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite 
will suffice. Even in this demand the Kashmiri militants are 
divided. Pro-Pakistani groups support carrying out the original 
U.N. resolutions, whose context was a choice between India or 
Pakistan, whereas groups such as the militant Jammu Kashmir 
Liberation Front seek an open plebiscite formula with a third 
option of independence. 9 

Much of Pakistan’s position revolves around India’s prior 
acceptance of the U.N.’s original resolution promising a 
plebiscite, yet Pakistan has not recognized the major changes 
that have taken place over the years, particularly in the 
military balance. India, on the other hand, believes it has to 
keep a sullen and predominantly Muslim Kashmir under its control 
in order to preserve its secularist ideology and demonstrate that 
its sizable Muslim minority population should remain within its 
domain. Furthermore, there is a reluctance to acknowledge a 
rising tide of Kashmiri self-determination that eschews accession 
to either India or Pakistan. 

U.N. involvement in the Kashmir issue is important, but to 
be effective, it must be redefined. It is important because no 
proposal that has relied on bilateral instruments of conflict 


347 


\ 

management between India and Pakistan has ever worked. Most 
Pakistanis view the bilateral Simla Agreement—signed in the wake 
of its defeat over Bangladesh—as a document that codifies its 
defeat and submission to Indian regional hegemony. An 
international effort at mediation is probably the only course of 
action that can realistically resolve this long-standing issue. 10 


348 


Endnotes 


1. Iftikhar H. Malik, "Ethnicity and Contemporary South Asian 
Politics: The Kashmir Conflict As A Case Study," Malik, Round 
Table . 322, 207-8. 

2. "United Nations Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan," The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1993), 277. 

3. Ibid .. 277-83. 

4. Ibid .. 278. 

5. United Nations Document, March 1993 (DPI/1306/Rev.). 

6. Robert Wirsing. "Kashmir Conflict," 139, in Charles Kennedy 
ed., Pakistan. 1992 . Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 

7. Peace-Keeping Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) (New 
York: United Nations, March 1993. 

8. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 

(New York: United Nations, August 1990), 171-9. 

9. Richard Cronin and Barbara LePoer, "South Asia: US Interests 
and Policy Issues" (CRS Issue Brief, No. 93-243F.) (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February, 
1993) . 

10. Ragu C.C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of 
Conflict in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 3-4. 


349 












Bibliography 


Baxter, Craig, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and Robert C. 
Oberst. “South Asia Under the British.” In Government and 
Politics in South Asia . Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 


—. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping. New 
York: United Nations, 1985. 


-. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. 

New York: United Nations, August 1990. 

Browne, Marjorie Ann. “United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for 
Congress.” (CRS Issue Brief, No. IB90103.) Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress February 2, 
1993 . 


Cronin, Richard, and Barbara Le Poer, "South Asia: US Interests and 
Policy Issues." CRS Issues Brief, No. 93-243F.) Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 
1993. 

Durch, William, J. ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping . New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993. 

Higgins, Rosalyn. United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and 
Commentary, 2: Asia . London: Oxford University Press, 1970. 

Malik, Iftikhar H. “Ethnicity and Contemporary South Asian Politics,” 
The Round Table . No. 322, 203-14. 

Nyrop, Richard F., ed. India: A Country Study . Washington: GPO 1985. 

Nyrop, Richard F., ed., Pakistan: A Country Study . Washington: GPO, 
1983. 

Pandya, Amit. “Kashmir: The Way Forward,” Journal of Asian and African 
Affairs . 2, No. 1, 1990, 1-6. 

Thomas, Raju G.C., ed., Perspectives on Kashmir. The Roots of Conflict 
in South Asia . Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 

United Nations Document, March 1993 (DPI/1306/Rev.). 

"United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," The 

Evolution of UN Peacekeeping . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 

United States. General Accounting Office. U.S. Participation in 

Peacekeeping Operation (Report to the Chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.) Washington: GPO 
September 1992. 


350 






















Wainhouse, David W., et al. International Peace Observation: A History 
and Forecast. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 

White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 

Peace and Security . New York: Manchester University Press, 1992. 

Wirsing, Robert. “Kashmir Conflict.” In Charles Kennedy, ed., Pakistan 
1991 . Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 


351 









\ 


United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea 
(West Irian) (UNSF) 


Selected Chronology 

1828-36 


First Dutch settlement in West New Guinea (known to 
Indonesia as West Irian or Irian Barat). 

1896 


Permanent Dutch settlement reestablished in West New Guinea 

1945 

On August 17, Indonesia declared its independence from the 
Netherlands. 

1949 


In November, the Netherlands government agreed to the 
establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the 
independence of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. 

On December 27, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty of the 
Indonesian archipelago, but not the territory of West New Guinea, 
to Indonesia. 

1950 


On August 17, federal states dissolved into the unitary 
Republic of Indonesia. 

1956 


In May, Indonesia unilaterally abrograted the Netherlands- 
Indonesian Union and in August repudiated its international debt 
to the Netherlands. 

1957 


Labor and trade unions seized Dutch property and businesses, 
turning them over to military control. A number of Dutch 
nationals were expelled from Indonesia; approximately 40,000 
Dutch nationals departed Indonesia. 

1960 


On August 17, Indonesia broke diplomatic relations with the 
Netherlands in the continuing dispute over claims to Dutch rule 
over West New Guinea. 


352 










1961 


On January 15, at a news conference in Washington, President 
Kennedy declared that he favored United Nations (U.N.) Secretary- 
General U Thant's efforts to prevent a Dutch-Indonesian conflict 
over West New Guinea. 

On June 10, documents, reportedly providing for a 
continuation of Soviet arms aid to Indonesia, were signed in the 
Kremlin by defense ministers Abdul Haris Nasution of Indonesia 
and Rodion Y. Malinovsky of the Soviet Union. 

On August 17, Indonesian President Sukarno threatened to use 
military force to annex West New Guinea, but also offered to 
negotiate with the Netherlands for the territory's transfer to 
Indonesian rule. 

On September 26, Foreign Minister Joseph M.A.H. Luns of the 
Netherlands declared that the Dutch government was prepared to 
offer a settlement in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West New 
Guinea on the basis of a new concept in "decolonization”; it was 
ready to give control of West New Guinea to the U.N. 

In December, President Sukarno stated that he was ready to 
"mobilize" his country for a military struggle against the 
Netherlands and began to infiltrate guerrilla fighters into the 
disputed territory. 

1962 


On January 2, Netherlands Prime Minister Jan Eduard de Quay 
told the Dutch parliament that his government had dropped its 
demand that Indonesia accept the principle of self-determination 
for the Melanesians as a precondition for talks over the disputed 
lands. 

Netherlands Prime Minister de Quay told the Dutch parliament 
that Dutch forces had killed 22 Indonesian paratroopers in West 
New Guinea and had captured 119 others. On May 28, Dutch forces 
reported their troops had "isolated" all Indonesian paratroopers 
in West New Guinea. 

Following a June 16 meeting between U.N. Secretary-General U 
Thant and U.N. Representative C.W.A. Schurmann of the 
Netherlands, Sukarno was notified on June 17 that the Netherlands 
had accepted in principle U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's plan 
for settling the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. 

On June 24, Dutch military headquarters in Hollandia (later 
known as Jayapura) announced that an estimated 150-200 Indonesian 
paratroopers had been dropped near Merauke in West New Guinea. 


353 




\ 


At a July 31 meeting, Dutch and Indonesian negotiators 
agreed on a plan giving Indonesia full administrative control 
over West New Guinea by May 1, 1963; the territory would be 
administered by the U.N. until then. 

On August 15, U Thant appointed Brigadier General Indar Jit 
Rikhye of India to head an observation team to supervise the 
cessation of hostilities in West New Guinea. A military truce 
between Dutch and Indonesian forces went into effect on August 
17. 


On September 4, the United Nations Security Force's (UNSF) 
commander, Major General Saad Uddin Khan, of Pakistan, arrived in 
West New Guinea to assume control over the UNSF. By the end of 
November, six military units had been deployed. 

U Thant appointed Chief of Cabinet Jose Rolz-Bennett of 
Guatemala as the temporary Administrator of the United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and UNSF. 

On October 5, the UNSF, composed of 1,500 men, mostly from 
Pakistan, took up their positions in the disputed territory. 

On October 19, Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed to 
select Dr. Djalal Abdoh of Iran as the permanent U.N. 
administrator for West New Guinea. 

1963 


In March, diplomatic relations were restored between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands. Full administrative control over 
West New Guinea, renamed Irian Barat or West Irian, was 
transferred to Indonesia by the U.N. administration on May 1, 
1963. The U.N. contingent was completely withdrawn. Indonesia 
agreed to hold a plebiscite, the "Act of Free Choice." 

On October 21, U Thant reported that he had established a 
U.N. fund for the economic and social development of West Irian. 


1968 


As required by the 1962 agreement, U Thant appointed Fernando 
Ortiz-Sanz to participate in monitoring the "Act of Free Choice" 
administered by Indonesia. 

1969 


By August 2, the representative councils of West Irian had 
voted unanimously to remain with Indonesia. West Irian became 
Indonesia's twenty-sixth province. 

On November 19, the U.N. General Assembly proclaimed that 


354 





the tasks assigned to U Thant under the August 15, 1962 agreement 
had been fully implemented. 

1972 


Name of Irian Barat changed to Irian Jaya (Victorious Irian) 
to avoid charges of territorial aggrandizement over "Irian Timur" 
(East Irian), the U.N. trusteeship territory of Papua, New 
Guinea, then moving toward independence. 


355 



N 


INTRODUCTION 

When the Indonesian nationalist leadership, under the 

V 

direction of Sukarno, proclaimed the independence of the unitary 
Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, it intended to assert 
its authority over all the territories historically incorporated 
within the boundaries of the Netherlands Indies. This area 
included West New Guinea (West Irian), which since 1828 had been 
considered part of the Netherlands Indies. The dispute over the 
future of West New Guinea arose largely as a result of a larger 
conflict that quickly developed between Dutch and Indonesian 
nationalists. The Dutch were well aware that extensive changes 
were needed because the former status quo in the Netherlands 
Indies could not be restored after World War II. The Dutch 
government thought of creating a larger commonwealth of nations, 
similar to the British model, in which the Netherlands would 
continue to play the dominant role. With the emergence of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the incompatibility of Indonesian 
demands and Dutch objectives, the idea of separating various 
segments of the former Netherlands Indies, including West New 
Guinea, and incorporating them into the Indonesian Republic began 
to materialize. 

In the midst of warfare between Indonesia and Dutch forces, 

V 

a series of conferences were held to discuss the future of the 
archipelago, but no definitive agreements were reached. The 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) was established in 
1947 to mediate the dispute, and on December 27, 1949, the 


356 


Netherlands transferred sovereignty of the Indonesian archipelago 
to the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia, but 
West New Guinea was not included in the transfer and the issue 
remained unresolved. The deadlocked dispute was finally broken 
when the Dutch and Indonesian governments mutually agreed to the 
UNCI proposal to continue Dutch rule for one year, during which 
its future status would be resolved by further negotiations 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Unfortunately, the issue 
became bogged down, and the deadlock continued for several 
additional years. In heated public debates before the United 
Nations (U.N.) General Assembly between 1954 and 1957, Indonesian 
representatives accused the Netherlands of reneging on the 1949 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union, which recognized the independence 
of Indonesia and agreed to hand over West New Guinea to Indonesia 
after one year. The Netherlands, on the other hand, insisted that 
Indonesia was calling for total capitulation and was not engaged 
in constructive negotiations. Finally, when the 1961 U.N. General 
Assembly failed to settle the dispute, the Indonesian government, 
impatient with the lack of progress in the negotiations, decided 
to take direct military action by infiltrating guerrilla fighters 
into West New Guinea. This case study examines the origins of the 
dispute in West New Guinea (West Irian, or, in Indonesian, Irian 
Barat), the internal dynamics leading to the detachment of the 
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and the 
United Nations Security Force (UNSF), and the effectiveness of 
the UNSF deployment. 


357 


PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 


The Initial Crisis v 

At the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, 
the debate revolved around a proposal advanced by the Dutch 
Permanent Representative, C.W.A. Schurmann, to place the 
territory of West New Guinea under a U.N. trusteeship, subject to 
the condition that the rights of the Melanesian (or Papuan) 
population to ultimate self-determination be suitably guaranteed. 
The Netherlands maintained that the Melanesians of West New 
Guinea were an ethnically and culturally unique racial group, 
distinct from the Indonesian majority of the East Indies 
archipelago, and thus had a moral and political right to self- 
determination. Thirteen African states, led by Ambassador Omar 
Adeel of Sudan, presented a draft resolution calling for the 
free-expression of self-determination by the people of West New 
Guinea. Although the African group was unable to garner the 
necessary two-thirds majority to pass the resolution in the 
General Assembly, it managed to obtain the support of Western 
Europe, the United States, Canada, most of Latin America, and the 
non-Arab African states. 1 

A counter-proposal, submitted by Indonesia and vehemently 
supported by India, which at this time had its own plans of 
annexing the Portuguese colony of Goa, rejected the principle of 
self-determination and accused the 13 African states supporting 
the plebiscite of being accomplices to "the colonial powers' 
well-known policy of 'divide and rule.'" 2 With the General 


358 



Assembly once again unable to resolve the dispute and military 
clashes escalating, Prime Minister Jan Eduard de Quay of the 
Netherlands announced that the Dutch government was abandoning 
its insistence on self-determination as a precondition for new 
negotiations with Indonesia. Sukarno demanded that the 
administration of the territory be turned over to Indonesia, but 
conceded that Indonesia might give "eventual" self-determination 
to the Melanesians if it could administer the territory in the 
meantime. 3 

The Dutch government, realizing that by this time it had 
lost much of its U.S. support, decided to "cave in." The United 
States, deeply engaged in the affairs of Asia and caught up in a 
worldwide confrontation with communist countries, was concerned 
about the future development of Indonesia along lines not 
antithetical to the larger American position and national 
interests in the area. The U.S. government feared that escalation 
of the military situation in West New Guinea into a major 
international crisis would strengthen the position of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and drive the country to join 
the communist bloc in search of support and material assistance, 
especially from the Soviet Union. In fact, in 1961, Indonesia 
signed a $400 million arms contract for the delivery of Soviet 
jets, bombers, and submarines. 4 The massive scope of Soviet 
assistance was encouraging a growing dependence on communist 
sources, especially for arms. It was clear that Soviet diplomacy 
was skillfully fostering a major reorientation of Indonesia's 


359 


international position through support of Jakarta's foreign 
policy objectives, as in West New Guinea, and by the apparent 
generosity of its aid programs. With the failure of the 16th U.N. 
General Assembly to assume temporary control over West New Guinea 
and the military situation escalating to near-dangerous levels, 
the prospect of an all-out war persuaded U.S. President John F. 
Kennedy to take a more active and visible role in resolving the 
dispute. 

The U.N. Response 

With fighting escalating to new levels in late 1961 and 
early 1962, both Acting Secretary-General U Thant and President 
Kennedy became alarmed at the deteriorating situation in West New 
Guinea. At about the same time that the United States was 
undertaking a more decisive role in searching for a peaceful 
solution, U Thant intervened actively in the dispute, lending the 
prestige and power of his office. With United States assistance, 
he arranged a meeting between Indonesian and Dutch permanent 
representatives to the U.N. to accept former U.S. Ambassador 
Ellsworth Bunker as a neutral mediator to work out a solution 
acceptable to both parties. On June 17, 1962, U Thant informed 
Sukarno that the Netherlands had accepted in principle Bunker's 
plan for settling the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West New 
Guinea. A formal agreement turning the administration of 
Netherlands New Guinea over to Indonesia on May 1, 1963-- 
following temporary U.N. control of the territory starting 
October 1, 1962—was signed by Dutch and Indonesian 


360 



representatives at the U.N. headquarters in New York on August 
15, 1962. 

Under the terms of the agreement, by the end of 1969 
Indonesia was to arrange a U.N.-supervised plebiscite known as 
the "Act of Free Choice," in which the territory's 700,000 
indigenous inhabitants, mainly Melanesians, acting through their 
tribal leaders, would decide whether to remain with Indonesia or 
sever their ties. The agreement provided for a truce between 
Dutch and Indonesian forces to take effect on August 17, 1962. 

The Dutch-Indonesian agreement was accompanied by an 
exchange of letters in which the Netherlands and Indonesian 
governments resumed diplomatic relations, which had been broken 
on August 17, 1960. The agreement was signed by Indonesian 
foreign minister Subandrio and two Dutch officials—Jan Herman 
Van Roijen, ambassador to the United States, and the U.N. 
Permanent Representative C.W.A. Schurmann. U Thant and Ambassador 
Bunker attended the ceremonies. Bunker's proposals formed the 
basis for the settlement, and he acted as mediator in the 
discussions on U Thant's behalf. 

The compromise called for administration of the territory to 
be transferred from the Netherlands to the UNTEA under the 
jurisdiction of the Secretary-General. The agreement also 
stipulated that the Secretary-General provide a UNSF to assist 
UNTEA in its peacekeeping operations. 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

After considering Secretary-General U Thant's reports, the 


361 



U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 89 to 0, with 14 abstentions 
and 5 absentees, adopted Resolution 1752 (XVII) on September 21, 
1962 establishing the UNSF. Most of those who abstained were 
delegates to the Brazzaville group, comprised of former French 
colonies in Africa. Upon adopting the resolution, U Thant 
appointed Chief of Cabinet Jose Rolz-Bennett of Guatemala as 
temporary administrator of the UNSF for a period of approximately 
six weeks. 5 On October 22, 1962, under Article IV of the 
agreement, U Thant replaced Administrator Rolz-Bennett with 
Djalal Abdoh of Iran as permanent U.N. administrator. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

To arrange an immediate ceasefire and facilitate the arrival 
of UNTEA and UNSF personnel in West New Guinea, U Thant 
designated his military adviser, Brigadier General Indar Jit 
Rikhye, to lead an advance observation party to supervise the 
cessation of hostilities. The observation team, stationed at four 
main centers and headquartered in Hollandia (later renamed 
Jayapura), arrived on August 20, 1962, and consisted of 21 
military representatives recruited from six member states-- 
Brazil, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Ireland, Nigeria, and Sweden. 
Upon completion of their mission on September 21, 1962, they were 
replaced by the permanent UNSF, headed by UNSF Commander Major 
General Saad Uddin Khan of Pakistan. 6 
Political and Military Goals 

The U.N. operation in West New Guinea was charged with a 
number of functions, including peace-observation and 


362 



peacekeeping. It observed the implementation of the cease-fire 
agreement among the respective countries, prevented military 
clashes that might endanger the security of the Dutch-Indonesian 
forces, and restored law and order by forming a police force. 
UNTEA's political functions were providing for full 
administration of the disputed territory, informing the 
population of the eventual transfer of powers, preparing the 
inhabitants for self-determination, and advancing the status of 
education among the population. The U.N. mission also performed 
other roles in West New Guinea's internal and external affairs. 
Rules of Engagement 

The UNSF's rules of engagement entailed the posting of 
military observers in the main towns and districts to oversee and 
deter any attempts to violate the cease-fire and to prepare the 
outlying communities for the smooth transfer of power. The six 
military units comprising the UNSF were under the command of 
Major General Saad Uddin Khan of Pakistan. They were not to be 
dispersed throughout the countryside, but instead were to be 
deployed in the major port towns and instructed to remain in 
their garrisons on call for any emergencies. 

Composition of Forces 

At maximum strength, the UNSF consisted of 1,608 personnel 
from five nations, including a U.S. Air Force transport unit 
composed of 99 officers and enlisted men, and a Royal Canadian 
Air Force flying and maintenance crew of 12 members. The bulk of 
the UNSF was composed of approximately 1,500 army and navy 


363 




personnel from Pakistan, who also provided engineers, supply 
personnel, signal corps, and other support units. In addition, 
the UNSF was supplemented by a military contingent of 
approximately 1,500 men from the Papuan (West Irian) Volunteer 
Corps, the civil police, Netherlands forces awaiting 
repatriation, and troops of the Indonesian armed forces. One 
month before the Republic of Indonesia took over the 
administration of West New Guinea, the U.S. presence decreased to 
49 personnel and the Canadian contingent, whose primary task was 
largely logistical—transporting men and equipment from Biak, an 
island off the northern coast of New Guinea, to Fakfak on the 
main island—decreased to 11 members. 7 
Equipment 

Because the primary function of the UNSF was to supplement 
the existing police force in maintaining law and order in West 
New Guinea, the officers and enlisted men were lightly armed. 
Ground transportation equipment was limited but included some 
light vehicles and trucks left by the departing Dutch forces. The 
UNSF air detachment unit stationed at Biak consisted of four 
United States Dakota DC-3s and six light helicopters from the 
Thirteenth US Task Force for the Far East, and two amphibious 
Twin Otters from the Royal Canadian Air Force. 8 The aircraft were 
used primarily for reconnaissance flights, troop transport, daily 
patrols, and air support missions. Although some initial 
mechanical problems were encountered with the aircraft, the 
planes proved well-suited for the operations and few incidents 


364 



occurred. 


Training 

The 21-member group comprising Brigadier General Rikhye's 
observation team had been assembled largely from existing U.N. 
operations, with the majority having obtained training and other 
peacekeeping experience in the Congo and the Middle East. With 
the exception of the Indonesian infiltrators, who had been 
incorporated into the UNSF by agreement, the U.S., Canadian, and 
Pakistani units, together with the Dutch-trained Melanesian 
soldiers and the nonrepatriated Dutch forces, were all well- 
trained and experienced personnel. 9 
Tactics 

Because the strategic aim of the U.N. operation was to 
provide law and order in the disputed territory, the tactics 
consisted of immediately notifying the rebel Indonesian troops— 
dispersed deep throughout the jungles—of the cessation of 
hostilities. With aerial support provided by U.S. and Canadian 
crews, the U.N. observers helped resupply the ailing and starving 
Indonesian rebel forces with food and medicine and regrouped them 
in select areas for better access. U.N. aircraft provided 
supplies and equipment in four staging areas: Sarong, Fakfak, 
Kaimana, and Merauke. 10 By the end of 1962, six military 
battalions of the UNSF had been deployed, one in each of the 
major administrative areas. The personnel remained in their 
compounds, on call for emergencies, and were not dispersed 
throughout the countryside. By 1963, direct radio links between 


365 




field headquarters at Hollandia and Jakarta had been established. 
Cost 

Under the terms of the August 15, 1962 agreement, the 
governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands each agreed to 
reimburse the U.N. for all costs "incurred by that organization 
and to make funds available in advance for the discharge of 
Secretary-General's responsibilities." 11 The parties agreed also 
to share on an equal basis the costs of such reimbursements and 
advances. By early September 1962, each country had contributed 
$1 million; each country advanced another $5 million apiece by 
early November 1962. The total cost of the 1962-63 UNSF operation 
was $26.4 million, of which Indonesia and the Netherlands each 
contributed about $13 million. 12 
Operational Assessment 

Within the terms of its mandate, the UNTEA and the UNSF were 
considered successful operations. The mission's successes 
included: 

First, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant's ability to formulate 
and direct the peacekeeping operation on a short schedule. His 
leadership reflected the competence of the U.N. organization and 
its personnel. 

Second, the UNSF's stabilization of a potentially dangerous 
military situation within a relatively short period of time. 
Functioning as a internal law and security force, the UNSF 
supervised the staggered withdrawal of Dutch naval and land 
forces from the territory without any major incidents. 


366 




Third, a U.N. mission's assumption of complete temporary 
administrative control over a disputed territory under the 
jurisdiction of the Secretary-General for the first time in its 
history. The departure of the Dutch civilian administration and 
the lack of Papuan replacements had left a dangerous social 
vacuum. Administrator Rolz-Bennett quickly recruited 
international, as well as Indonesian and Dutch personnel, to 
immediately replace the administrative gaps. The territory's 
judicial bodies were quickly replaced with qualified judicial 
officers from the Republic of Indonesia. 13 

Fourth, the UNSF's successful use of a single security force 
for peacekeeping operations; the UNSF consisted largely of a 
Pakistani contingent. 

Fifth, addressing the massive economic and social issues 
confronting the territory. With the departure of Dutch personnel 
and a lack of qualified Papuan workers and technicians, 
unemployment was high. UNTEA reactivated work on existing 
community projects and public works, and formulated plans for 
similar projects to develop the economy in the territory. In the 
field of public health, the UNTEA administration not only pursued 
the construction of community health clinics, centers, and 
hospitals, but also embarked on a successful drive to address 
regional epidemiological problems by providing valuable health 
teams and necessary medical supplies. 

Sixth, instituting a campaign to prepare the indigenous 
population for the eventual transfer of powers to Indonesia and 


367 


educating it about the provisions of the agreement by 
distributing posters, pamphlets, texts, and creating discussion 
groups. 

Seventh, using aerial support provided by U.S. and Canadian 
air crews to successfully conduct an ambitious campaign to locate 
and resupply Indonesian troops dispersed throughout the jungle 
with food and medicine. In addition, 500 Indonesian political 
detainees were repatriated to Indonesia. 

The UNTEA mission also had some failures: 

First, the U.N.'s primary objective—the right of the people 
of the territory of West New Guinea to exercise their freedom of 
choice in self-determination—was a dismal failure. Indonesia, 
and not the U.N., arranged for the Melanesian population to 
participate in the act of self-determination. 

Second, instead of a truly "free" plebiscite, the choice was 
put to specially designated delegates who voted unanimously in 
favor of Indonesian rule. 

CONCLUSION 

On initial examination, the resolution of the West New 
Guinea conflict by the U.N., if evaluated strictly in terms of 
the successful maintenance of peacekeeping operations, must be 
declared an unqualified success. The rapid cessation of 
hostilities and the relatively smooth transfer of full 
administrative control from Dutch to Indonesian authorities, 
completed without any major incidents and a minimum of violence, 
is a tribute to U.N. leadership. Moreover, the close financial 


368 


cooperation among the warring parties in equally sharing the 
peacekeeping expenses, Secretary-General U Thant's determination 
to handle personally the U.N.'s peacekeeping functions, and the 
timely formation of a U.N. military force demonstrated the unique 
competence of the U.N. peacekeeping organization, its personnel, 
and their procedures. 

However, because of the broad and extra-dimensional tasks 
assumed by UNTEA forces, the resolution of the West New Guinea 
dispute cannot be judged solely on the basis of the results of 
the UN operation. From a long-range view, the resolution must be 
viewed as a failure because it did not achieve the objective of 
upholding the principles of international law. 14 By allowing 
Indonesia the responsibility of implementing the self-plebiscite 
rule, and by extending the issue until 1969, the U.N. de facto 
relinquished its authority and made it possible for Indonesia to 
achieve the "right decision" in the final plebiscite. 15 

Fear of a power vacuum led the U.S. administration to 
pressure the Dutch authorities to appease Indonesian aspirations 
for fear of a rise in communist influence. For reasons of 
political expediency and fears of being entangled in a long and 
bloody war, the U.S. government did not provide any political or 
military support to the Netherlands to prevent the infiltration 
of Indonesian guerrilla forces into West New Guinea. 16 In 
addition, by casting Ambassador Bunker in the role of "U.N. 
observer" rather than "U.S. mediator," the U.S. was exercising 
its own policy of realpolitik and promoting its own national 


369 


interests at the expense of the U.N. organization . 17 At the time, 
Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut and Representative John J. 
Rhodes of Arizona agreed with Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania 
that the episode was a "sellout of West New Guinea" and of 
genuine "self-determination" inasmuch as the U.N. was rewarding 
agression by giving its consent to a solution imposed outside the 
U.N., in disregard of the U.N. Charter . 18 


370 


Endnotes 


1. Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the 
U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 78. 

2. Ibid .. 77-78. 

3. Ibid ., 78. 

4. Guy J. Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," Foreign 

Affairs . 40, No. 4, July 1962, 126. 

5. William J. Durch, "U.N. Temporary Executive Authority," in 
William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case 
Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993) , 292 . 

6. Ibid .. 291. 

7. Ibid .. 291. 

8. Fred Gaffen, In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987), 210. 

9. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 43. 

10. David W. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation: A History 
and Forecast (New York: Manchester University Press, 1990, 416. 


11. 

Durch, 

"UN Temporary Executive 

Authority," 289. 

12. 

Ibid.. 

289. 


13. 

Wainhouse. International Peace 

Observation. 417 

14 . 

Ibid., 

419. 


15. 

Franck, 

Nation Against Nation. 

79. 

16. 

Ibid.. 

78. 


17. 

Ibid.. 

80. 


18. 

Ibid., 

80. 



371 
























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Coyle, D.C. The United Nations and How It Works. New York: Mentor 
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Cribb, Robert. Historical Dictionary of Indonesia. Metuchen: 

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Gaffen, Fred. In the Eve of the Storm: A History of Canadian 
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1, No. 5, July 1961, 28-56. 

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Palmier, Leslie H. Indonesia and the Dutch. London: Oxford University 
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Siekman, Robert C.R. Basic Documents on United Nations and Related 
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Van der Veur, Paul W. "West Irian: A New Era," Asian Survey . 2, No. 8, 
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Wainhouse, David W., et al. International Peace Observation: A History 
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White, N.D. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International 

Peace and Security. New York: Manchester University Press, 1990. 

















United Nations Transition Authority in 
Cambodia 


Selected Chronology 

1941 


In April, Norodom Sihanouk, then aged 18, succeeded his 
grandfather as monarch. 

1945 


In March, the Japanese sweep defeated the Vichy French 
administration in Cambodia and induced Prince Sihanouk to 
proclaim independence. The Japanese remained in control until 
their defeat by France, which reimposed its authority. 

1953 


On November 9, Cambodia attained independence. 


1955 


In March, King Sihanouk abdicated in favor of his father in 
order to enter the political arena. Now known as Prince Sihanouk, 
he formed a political movement, the Popular Socialist Community 
(Sangkum Riastre Niyum). 

I960 


In April, the Parliament elected Prince Sihanouk as Head of 
State. 

1970 


In March, Prince Sihanouk was deposed in a coup led by 
Lieutenant General Lon Nol. 

1975 


In April, the Khmer Rouge, or Party of Democratic Kampuchea, 
began its rule, which ended in January 1979. 

1991 


On October 23, the Agreement on the Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was signed in Paris. 

By December, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia 
(UNMIC)—composed of 300 men—was in place in Cambodia. 


374 










1992 


On February 28, the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) was established by Security Council Resolution 
745. 


On October 13, the Security Council demanded that the Khmer 
Rouge allow UNTAC troops to deploy in areas under its control. 

On November 30, the Security Council determined that 
preparations for May 1993 elections would proceed in all areas to 
which UNTAC had full and free access as of January 1993. 

In March, UNTAC began operations. 


1993 


From May 23 to 28, elections were held in all 21 provinces, 
and the royalist party, known as Funcinpec, emerged with a 
plurality, joining the Phnom Penh government in forming the joint 
interim government, with representatives of the former Khmer 
People’s Front as junior partners. 1 

On June 15, the Security Council, in Resolution 840, 
endorsed the results of the elections to secure a peaceful 
transition to democracy. 


375 




INTRODUCTION 


Cambodia has a particularly painful and troubled history. A 
former protectorate of France (dating from 1864), it has been in 
a state of protracted armed struggle since it was invaded in 
World War II by the Japanese. When the country was granted 
independence from France in 1953, Cambodia’s leader, Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk—who abdicated the throne to become head of 
state—sought to keep his country neutral in an effort to avoid 
being caught up in the war that engulfed neighboring Vietnam and 
Laos in the 1960s. This proved impossible, however. By 1970 
Cambodia could no longer escape the effects of the war in Vietnam 
and began enduring repeated border incursions by North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong troops. 

Cambodia soon found itself in the throes of a civil war. In 
the spring of 1975, only a few weeks after the communist victory 
in neighboring Vietnam, the communist Khmer Rouge took over the 
country. The victors, under Prime Minister Pol Pot, proceeded to 
impose what is considered one of the most genocidal regimes in 
history. It eventually claimed more than 1 million Cambodian 
lives. This period came to an end in 1979, following a full-scale 
invasion and occupation by Vietnam. A new government in Phnom 
Penh under Hun Sen was installed by the Vietnamese army. For the 
next twelve years, a coalition that included the ousted Khmer 
Rouge and two non-communist resistance groups continued to wage a 
guerrilla war against the Vietnamese-backed government. The 
combination of Khmer Rouge brutality, the Vietnamese invasion, 


376 


and the ensuing years of fighting produced a refugee population 
of more than 500,000. Resistance guerrilla groups continued their 
struggle against the Vietnamese-backed government until October 
1991, when all the parties agreed to the terms of a United 
Nations (U.N.)-sponsored peace agreement. 

This chapter examines efforts by the U.N. to establish basic 
democratic institutions and principles in a country best known 
for its “killing fields.” Emphasis is placed on the factors 
leading up to the detachment of the United Nations Transitional 
Authority (UNTAC), the effectiveness of its deployment, and the 
current situation in the country in light of the operation’s 
goals. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The Initial Crisis 

The Vietnamese-supported government in Phnom Penh was 
resisted by the Khmer Rouge and other noncommunist groups and 
thus gained little legitimacy. In 1983, former Cambodian leader 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk formed the Cambodian National Resistance, 
which joined two noncommunist guerrilla armies—Sihanouk’s 
National Army of Independent Kampuchea and the Khmer People’s 
National Liberation Front—in an uneasy alliance with the Khmer 
Rouge. It had, however, become clear by the late 1980s that 
neither the government nor the resistance coalition had 
sufficient military strength to prevail. In February 1989, the 
resistance called for a U.N. peacekeeping force to supervise the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from the country, to oversee 


377 



national elections, and to supervise the creation of a new 
integrated national military force. When Vietnam pulled out its 
remaining 50,000 troops in 1989, a power vacuum ensued with the 
potential for civil war. U.N. action was critical in defusing a 
potential armed struggle in the country. 

The U.N. Response 

The U.N. Security Council concluded that the time had come 
to intercede in the Cambodian quagmire because of a number of 
factors. These included the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the 
collapse of many communist regimes, the Soviet Union’s 
unwillingness or inability to support its client states, and 
certain other domestic and military developments in Cambodia. 

The window of opportunity for U.N. action in Cambodia was 
narrow, however. In 1991, there was little likelihood that Prime 
Minister Hun Sen’s Phnom Penh government and the three resistance 
factions opposing it could find common cause toward a lasting 
peace. Yet by late 1990, Vietnam, which had created and continued 
to support the Phnom Penh government, and China, patron of the 
Khmer Rouge and their two resistance coalition partners, had 
begun to normalize their relationship. By June 1991, the Khmer 
Rouge, the most rigid of the factions, had concluded that it was 
stalemated on the battlefield, could not count on continued 
Chinese support, and that it was time to compromise and join its 
two coalition partners in seeking rapprochement with Phnom Penh. 

A meeting of the Phnom Penh government with the three 
resistance factions in the Thai resort of Pattaya, later in June, 


378 



provided the opening toward a peace agreement. China’s 
acquiescence in giving Sihanouk a free hand to force the 
factions, including the Khmer Rouge, to compromise provided the 
impetus needed for the peace process. The four factions met under 
the auspices of the Supreme National Council (SNC). The SNC 
consisted of six Phnom Penh delegates and two delegates each from 
the three resistance factions. The SNC was designed as a 
Cambodian sovereignty forum to give each faction a say in the 
country’s political developments in the period preceding the 
U.N.-supervised election. Sihanouk was its leader and spokesman. 

The U.N. policy planners hoped that the SNC would be the 
sole repository of Cambodian sovereignty during this period. The 
SNC format was first suggested by Australia and introduced by the 
Security Council as part of its plan in late 1990. 

The SNC agreed to continue the cease-fire and prevent all 
foreign military supplies from entering the country. This meant 
ending the shipment of arms from the Soviet Union and Vietnam to 
the Phnom Penh government, and from China to the resistance. A 
second SNC meeting in August, also at Pattaya, and a third 
meeting shortly thereafter in New York completed the compromise 
process. Finally, the last obstacle to signing the U.N.-brokered 
agreement—the voting method in the upcoming elections—was 
resolved. 

Adoption of U.N. Resolution 

The four factions of the SNC and representatives from 19 
nations, grouped under the Paris International Conference on 


379 



Cambodia, met in Paris on October 23, 1991 to sign the 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (also 
known as the Paris Agreement). The agreement represented the 
efforts of more than a decade of negotiations in which the U.N. 
had been closely involved from the outset. Under the guidelines 
set up by the Paris Agreement, the Security Council was invited 
to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC). 

On February 19, 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the 
Security Council a report containing his proposed implementation 
plan. The Council approved that report and, by Resolution 745 of 
February 28, established UNTAC under its authority for a period 
not to exceed 18 months. UNTAC began operations on March 15, 

1992 . 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The Paris Agreement was signed on October 23, 1991. It 
called for a transformation of Cambodia's political system. 
Because of the magnitude of the peacekeeping operation and its ad 
hoc nature, the U.N. faced a number of initial problems. A 
staffing shortage delayed the implementation of the operational 
plan. Second, information for determining the location of troop 
deployments and manpower requirements was scarce. Data became 
available only in December. There also were logistical and 
provisioning obstacles. Meanwhile, UNTAC was expected to be in 
place by August 1992. As an interim measure, the United Nations 
Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), comprising 300 persons, was 


380 


in place by the end of 1991. UNAMIC included 40 communications 
officers charged with linking the headquarters of all four 
factions, 50 military liaison officers to resolve cease-fire 
violations, and a 20-person mine awareness team to train 
civilians to avoid and report land mines. 

In early 1992, the U.N. mission remained in the planning 
stage. UNAMIC was only a preliminary force. The full 
peacekeeping contingent was still needed. Continued delay in the 
deployment of the main body of peacekeepers, it was feared, would 
threaten UNTAC’s authority. As the period of official transition 
approached, the situation in the country deteriorated. Armed 
deserters from various factions turned to banditry, government 
corruption increased, and the police became unruly and predatory. 

By the end of February 1992, UNTAC's mission was ready to be 
deployed. The first U.N. troops arrived in Phnom Penh in 
mid-March 1992. These forces included 10,200 troops in infantry 
battalions and 12,000 other military and civilian personnel. 2 
Political and Military Goals 

The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia was not meant to 
be a permanent mission. It had a specific objective and a limited 
time frame. Above all, UNTAC was entrusted with organizing 
general elections—the focal point of the comprehensive 
settlement in Cambodia. Voter registration, which began on 
October 5, 1992 and ended on January 31, 1993, accommodated more 
than 4.6 million Cambodians. UNTAC’s mandate also dealt with 
human rights, military arrangements, civil aviation, law and 


381 



order, the repatriation of Cambodian refugees, and the 
rehabilitation of essential infrastructure during the 
transitional period. 

UNTAC’s mission was all encompassing. The 1991 Paris 
Agreement empowered UNTAC to police a cease-fire, repatriate 
refugees, organize elections, create an interim government, 
oversee key government ministries, remove Cambodian officials 
from office, manage the economy, rid the country of tens of 
thousands of land mines, and install its own communication 
system. In short, UNTAC was mandated to take over the 
government—thereby constituting a nation-building mission as 
well as a peacekeeping one. 

Rules of Engagement 

UNTAC's rules of engagement resulted from the effort to 
establish a politically neutral environment conducive to holding 
free and fair elections. As part of its human rights 
responsibility, mission personnel were empowered to investigate, 
arrest, detain, and prosecute suspects accused of human rights 
abuses. Its electoral responsibility called for managing the 
electoral process in all its phases, including registering 
voters. Its military charge entailed verifying and investigating 
the withdrawal from the country of foreign forces; supervising 
the cease-fire, the separation of forces and their 
demobilization; and assisting with mine-clearing operations. To 
carry out its military responsibility, mission peacekeepers were 
armed and authorized to use force. 


382 



Composition of Forces 


UNTAC's authorized strength was 22,000 military and civilian 
personnel. 3 In 1993, some 47 nations contributed to UNTAC 15,900 
troops, 3,600 civilian police, and 2,400 civilian administrators. 
UNTAC's staff also consisted of U.N. staff personnel, including 
those of its specialized agencies, and local personnel. In 1993, 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of 
the Mission was Yasushi Akashi of Japan. The Commander of UNTAC 
forces was Major General John Sanderson of Australia. 

Equipment 

In the military component of UNTAC, most peacekeepers were 
equipped with small arms. Logistical equipment was used by 
reconnaissance units, and most UNTAC ground transportation 
consisted of light vehicles. 

Training 

Few UNTAC personnel had previous experience in Cambodia. 

Yet, depending on which component they served, most UNTAC 
peacekeepers had a fair amount of technical expertise. The 
military component of UNTAC set up mine-clearance training 
centers and trained some 1,600 personnel in mine-clearing. The 
civilian component of UNTAC emphasized the day-to-day involvement 
of its advisers in setting up the new democratic governmental 
machinery. U.N. civilian advisers worked alongside their 
Cambodian counterparts in the transition period. By July 15, 

1992, UNTAC had established administrative offices in all 21 
provinces of Cambodia. Like other UNTAC components, however, the 


383 





civilian administrators were denied access to Khmer-controlled 
areas. The UNTAC Civilian Police Component gave special 
instruction to police officers and judges to allow the new penal 
code to be enforced locally. UNTAC also awarded graduation 
certificates to Cambodian police officers. 4 
Tactics 

UNTAC’s tactics were intended to stabilize the security 
situation and build local confidence to end the conflict. 

Specific tactics included the verification of the withdrawal from 
Cambodia of foreign forces, their arms, and equipment; 
supervision of the cease-fire; the cantonment and disarmament of 
opposing factions; weapons control; assisting in mine clearing; 
and peacekeeping training. 

After the May 1993 elections, which were boycotted by the 
Khmer Rouge, the U.N. recognized that the Khmer Rouge was intent 
on taking power and viewed UNTAC as an obstacle to that end. As 
UNTAC winds up its mission, its primary tactic is to buttress the 
anti-Khmer coalition forces in the hope that they will prevail 
over the Khmer Rouge. 

Cost 

The total cost of UNTAC has been $1.7 billion. 5 Initially, 
the General Assembly appropriated an amount of some $840 million 
for the expenses of UNAMIC and UNTAC through October 31, 1992. As 
of November 1992, contributions to the UNAMIC and UNTAC Special 
Accounts amounted to $4,215 million. 6 

On December 22, 1992, the General Assembly appropriated $484 


384 




million for UNTAC's operation for the period November 1, 1992 to 
April 30, 1993. 7 It also authorized the Secretary-General to 
enter into commitments of $242 million. 8 

In addition, voluntary contributions from nongovernmental 
organizations fund the repatriation and resettlement of refugees 
and displaced persons. The June 1992 Ministerial Conference on 
the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, for example, 
received pledges of some $880 million. 

Operational Assessment 

The U.N. effort in Cambodia was scheduled to end in November 
1993. Many of the U.N. peacekeeping operation's objectives have 
been met, especially when the difficulties inherent in the 
political situation in Cambodia are considered. UNTAC's agenda 
was extremely ambitious—to set in motion the machinery of 
electoral, public information, and security institutions. In 
essence, UNTAC attempted to put in place much of what was needed 
to create a democratic political system nurtured by a viable 
economy. 

UNTAC is credited with the following successes: 

First, the peacekeepers organized free and fair elections, 
with a large voter turnout. This democratic election represented 
one of the greatest accomplishments in Cambodia's history. 

Second, the U.N. peacekeepers made it possible for some 
350,000 Cambodian refugees to return to their homeland. 

Cambodians thus regained control of their country for the first 
time since Vietnam invaded in January 1979. 


385 



However, UNTAC's mission has encountered several problems. 
First, some of UNTAC's national contingents have objected to the 
cautious and nonconfrontational style of UNTAC commander General 
John Sanderson. They have complained that he stymied efforts to 
force the Khmer Rouge to disarm or allow U.N. peacekeepers to 
enter areas under Khmer control. French general Michael Loridon, 
who was Sanderson’s deputy, was particularly vocal in his 
criticism of UNTAC’s lack of toughness and was subsequently 
replaced. 

Second, criticism was also expressed of the political 
cautiousness of Yasushi Akashi, head of the UNTAC mission. Akashi 
believed that the key to a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cambodian conflict was the inclusion of all opposing factions, 
causing him to overlook much Khmer Rouge resistance to his 
democratic initiative. Although it had agreed previously to the 
terms of the U.N.-sponsored 1991 Paris Agreement, the Khmer 
Rouge, which never disarmed, refused to permit the U.N.- 
monitored voter registration to take place in areas under its 
control, and it boycotted the May 23-28, 1993 elections held 
under U.N. supervision. The Khmer Rouge has thus played the role 
of spoiler in the peacekeeping operation, while demanding a major 
role in the government it had no part in choosing. 

Third, U.N. peacekeepers have failed to contain the military 
threat posed by the Khmer Rouge, the largest rebel force, which 
still threatens to wreak havoc in the fragile country. 

CURRENT SITUATION 


386 


On June 15, 1993, the Security Council, in Resolution 840, 
endorsed the outcome of the Cambodian elections and called on all 
the parties to abide by the results and cooperate in securing a 
peaceful transition. 

The Security Council expressed full support of the new 
120-member Constituent Assembly, which was to draw up a 
constitution and then transform itself into a legislative 
assembly in order to set up a new government. The Security 
Council emphasized that the assembly must complete its work as 
soon as possible—within the three-month time frame stipulated in 
the Agreement. Furthermore, the Security Council stressed that 
UNTAC and the SNC must cooperate through the transition period. 
The Secretary-General was requested to make recommendations to 
the Security Council by mid-July 1993 on the U.N.'s role 
following the completion of UNTAC's mandate. The Security Council 
urged the international community to contribute to the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia. 

The “co-premiers,” Sihanouk’s son, Prince Norodom Ranaridd, 
leader of the royalist opposition that won the election, and Hun 
Sen, who was prime minister in the Vietnamese-installed 
government that was voted out of office in May, have agreed on an 
“interim power-sharing arrangement” under the leadership of 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head of state and former monarch. 

The interim government is the best hope to achieve national 
reconciliation. 

However, as of August 1993, the Khmer Rouge was still 


387 


threatening to renew the civil war unless it got its way. 9 The 
Cambodian Armed Forces, the interim government’s military, had by 
late August 1993 taken the initiative against the Khmer Rouge and 
launched its largest offensive since the U.N. peacekeeping 
mission was established in Cambodia. This offensive responded to 
weeks of mounting Khmer Rouge subversion and violence. The U.N. 
has given more than tacit support to the anti-Khmer Rouge 
operations. The U.N. has begun financing the new army in the hope 
that this army will be able to ensure stability in the country 
until a new government is formed. 10 
CONCLUSION 

The Khmer Rouge is once again threatening to resume its 
rebellion unless it is given an advisory role in the new 
government, despite having boycotted the election of that 
government and having threatened to sabotage it. Thus, the Paris 
Agreement’s basic premise is questionable: that the Khmer Rouge 
can become a part of the solution to the Cambodian problem rather 
than remain a source of discord and armed threat. The Khmer Rouge 
realizes that its capacity for disruption is not likely to be 
eliminated by the emergence of a democratically elected 
government. Thus, on the one hand, it is pursuing a strategy of 
appearing to accede to UNTAC's demands and to play by the Paris 
Agreement’s rules, while on the other hand, it awaits UNTAC's 
departure from the country before making a move to seize power. 

Thus, a key element of the Khmer Rouge strategy is to draw 
out the peace process, as part of its expectation that the 


388 


international community eventually would withdraw support for 
such an expensive peacekeeping operation. Mounting Khmer Rouge 
denunciations of UNTAC and the U.N.-sponsored election process 
appear to confirm that the Khmer Rouge is following such a 
strategy. These denunciations are, in effect, a declaration of 
war against any future democratically elected government. 

In late August 1993, the Cambodian armed forces, the interim 
government’s newly unified army, launched a major offensive 
against the Khmer Rouge to counter a recent upsurge in the Khmer 
Rouge's campaign of blowing up trains, attacking bridges, killing 
Vietnamese settlers, and detaining U.N. peacekeepers. Observers 
believe this latest offensive is an attempt to increase Khmer 
Rouge leverage on the new government. With its 10,000- to 15,000- 
man force, the Khmer Rouge now controls some 20 percent of 
Cambodia and continues to present a grave threat to the gains 
made by the U.N. peacekeeping operation. 


389 


Endnotes 


1. William Branigan, "U.N. Ends Cambodian Operation," Washington 
Post . September 27, 1993, A12. 

2. William J. Durch, "Epilogue: Peacekeeping in Uncharted 
Territory," in William J. Durch, ed. , The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analyses (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1993), 465. 

3. United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations Information Notes [1993: 
Update No. 2.] (New York: United Nations, November 1993), 55. 

4. United Nations. United Nations Focus (New York: March 1993), 3- 

13 (DPI/1352-93184) . 

5. William Branigan, "U.N. Ends Cambodian Operation," A12. 

6. Ibid . 

7. Ibid . 

8. Ibid . 

9. William Branigan, "UN Preparing to End Its Operations in 
Cambodia," Washington Post . August 12, 1993, A6. 

10. Ibid. 


390 













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United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) 


Selected Chronology 

1979 


In July, after two years of civil war, a coalition of 
political opposition groups and the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional—FSLN) 
deposed the authoritarian government of President Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle and established a provisional Government of 
National Reconstruction. 


1980 


The governing coalition collapsed as power became 
concentrated in the nine-member FSLN Directorate. 

1981 


The Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras) was established by 
various dissident groups in Nicaragua and expatriates operating 
from bases Honduras and Costa Rica. 

1983 


In January, representatives of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, 
and Panama convened on Contadora Island, Panama to discuss ways 
to restore peace and stability to Central America. 

1986 


In June, the Contadora talks collapsed after differences 
arose among Nicaragua and the other Central American states over 
questions of democratization and national reconciliation. 

1987 


In August, the five Central American presidents signed the 
Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas II), committing 
their governments to undertake various measures to restore 
regional peace and democracy. 

In October, the U.N. General Assembly issued Resolution 42/1 
expressing its "firmest support" for the Esquipulas II Agreement. 

1989 


In February, at a regional summit in Costa del Sol, El 
Salvador, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega promised to hold 


393 









free and fair elections by February 1990. 

In July, at a Central American summit in Honduras, the five 
presidents issued the Tela Accord, containing a joint plan for 
demobilization and repatriation of the Contras. 

In August, the U.N. General Assembly established the United 
Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in 
Nicaragua (ONUVEN). 

In November, Security Council Resolution 644 (1989) 
established the United Nations Observer Group in Central America 
(ONUCA) to monitor compliance with the Esquipulas II Agreement. 

1990 


In January, ONUCA began its deployment in all five Central 
American states. 

In February, Nicaragua held internationally monitored 
presidential elections. 

In March, Security Council Resolution 650 (1990) expanded 
ONUCA's mandate to include direct supervision of the voluntary 
demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance. 

In April, Security Council Resolution 653 (1990) once again 
expanded ONUCA's mandate, authorizing it to establish "security 
zones" within Nicaragua in which to demobilize the Resistance. 

In May the Nicaraguan demobilization process stalled amid 
charges of violations by the former combatants. Demobilization 
resumed after the contending parties negotiated the Managua 
Protocol. 

In June, the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance was 
completed. 

1992 


In January, ONUCA completed its operations. Some ONUCA 
personnel and equipment were transferred to the United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). 


394 




INTRODUCTION 


The Central American crisis of the 1980s was caused by the 
escalation of internal civil wars into a regional crisis of wider 
strategic significance. Beginning in the late 1970s, Central 
America experienced a series of political convulsions that shook 
the foundations of military authoritarian regimes in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua. All three countries subsequently 
experienced civil wars between leftist insurgencies and 
militarily backed right-wing regimes. 

In Nicaragua, the insurgent movement against the 
dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle escalated into a full- 
scale civil war in 1978. Debayle was ousted by a broad-based 
coalition of civic and insurgent groups in July 1979. A second 
civil conflict erupted in 1981, when several opposition groups 
rebelled against the increasingly authoritarian policies of the 
new revolutionary government dominated by the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional— 

FSLN). 

By the mid-1980s, the Nicaraguan civil conflict was becoming 
increasingly internationalized as the Sandinista government 
received assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union and was 
accused by the United States of arming the leftist insurgency in 
El Salvador. The Nicaraguan Resistance (also known as the 
Contras), on the other hand, relied on U.S. military assistance 
and on safe havens in southern Honduras and northern Costa Rica. 


395 


Alarmed by the threat of a regional war, several Latin 
American nations began in 1983 to devise a regional peace plan. 
After the collapse of the first peace process in 1986, a second 
peace plan was negotiated in 1987 by the Central American 
governments that called for democratization, the declaration of 
permanent cease-fires and an end to cross-border weapons 
transfers and insurgent activities. On November 7, 1989, the 
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council established the United 
Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to verify 
compliance with the Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas 
II) and facilitate the demobilization of the Contras. 

This case study examines the original crisis in Central 
America, the factors leading to the establishment of ONUCA, the 
evolution of its mandate, the effectiveness of its deployment, 
and the current situation in Nicaragua and the rest of Central 
America in light of the mission's initial goals. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

After two years of civil war, a revolutionary government 
assumed power in Nicaragua in July 1979. The provisional junta 
consisted of a coalition of the Directorate of the FSLN and other 
opposition leaders. 

In the months following the junta's assumption of power, the 
governing coalition collapsed as the FSLN bypassed the moderate 
leadership and implemented increasingly radical political and 
economic policies aimed at establishing a socialist regime. 


396 



Executive power became concentrated in the nine-member FSLN 
Directorate led by Daniel Ortega Saavedra. 

By 1981 increasingly authoritarian FSLN rule and the absence 
of meaningful opportunities for effective civilian opposition in 
the emerging single-party hegemonic system drove a variety of 
groups into armed insurrection. The Contras consisted of a 
variety of guerrilla groups operating mainly from bases in the 
border regions of Honduras and Costa Rica. Covert training and 
military assistance for the Contras was initially provided by the 
governments of Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and 
the United States. The main benefactor of the Contras, however, 
was the United States. 

By the mid-1980s, Nicaragua was again in a state of full 
scale civil war. Compounding the destabilizing effects of the 
internal conflict were the external linkages of the warring 
parties. Nicaragua depended on aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union 
while providing assistance to the Salvadoran insurgency, the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Marti 
de Liberacion Nacional—FMLN). The Contras depended on United 
States aid and safe haven in southern Honduras and northern Costa 
Rica. These external linkages threatened to convert the 
Nicaraguan civil war into a regional conflict between Central 
American states. 

The Central American Peace Process 

In early 1983, several Latin American states initiated a 
multilateral peace negotiation effort to defuse the most serious 


397 



civil conflicts in Central America. The Central American peace 
process formally began in January 1983 when the foreign ministers 
of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela convened on the 
Panamanian island of Contadora to discuss threats to regional 
peace and security stemming from the crisis in the region. 

Between 1983 and 1986 the Contadora Group, which in 1985 became a 
broad regional forum that included a "support group" of 
Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, issued several proposals 
for resolving the Central American crisis. The Contadora process 
ultimately failed in 1986 when its recommendations for arms 
reductions were rejected by the Central American governments. 
Contadora was also weakened by a lack of support from the United 
States and the Nicaraguan government's unwillingness to implement 
its recommendations on democratization and national 
reconciliation prior to the cessation of United States aid to the 
Contras. 

Although it failed, the Contadora process laid the 
groundwork for a future regional peace initiative. The main 
differences between this second effort and Contadora were that 
the new proposals were developed among the Central American 
nations themselves with a greater emphasis on internal 
democratization. 1 The new peace initiative was led by Costa 
Rican president Oscar Arias Sanchez who, on August 7, 1987, 
convened a summit of the five Central American republics in 
Esquipulas, Guatemala, to develop a plan based largely on the 
previous draft Contadora documents. The Arias plan, also known as 


398 


the Central American Peace Agreement or Esquipulas II, committed 
the Central American republics to restore regional peace and 
democracy by negotiating cease-fires, discontinuing outside aid 
to insurgent groups, and denying safe haven for cross-border 
insurgent activities. 

After losing momentum in 1988 because of a lack of progress 
in ending the Nicaraguan civil war, the Esquipulas II initiative 
was revitalized in early 1989 by a variety of factors, including 
a major shift in U.S. policy toward Contra aid, informal U.S.- 
Soviet agreements on nonintervention in Central America, and the 
announcement by Nicaraguan President Ortega in February 1989 that 
presidential elections would be held no later than 25 February 
25, 1990. Further progress toward implementation of Esquipulas II 
was made at the Central American summit in Tela, Honduras, on 
August 5-7, 1989. The Tela Accord, which cleared the way for 
direct U.N. participation in the peace process, included a joint 
plan for demobilization and repatriation of the Contras and a 
proposal for constructive dialogue between the Salvadoran 
government and the FMLN. 

The U.N. Response 

From 1987 to 1989, the U.N. played a supportive but minor 
role in the Central American peace process. In October 1987, the 
U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 42/1 expressing its 
"firmest support" for the Esquipulas II Agreement. 2 It requested 
that the Secretary-General afford the fullest assistance to the 
Central American governments in their efforts to implement the 


399 



agreement. In accordance with this resolution, the U.N. and the 
Organization of American States (O.A.S.) dispatched a small 
advance team to Central America in late 1987 to establish 
criteria for monitoring compliance with the Esquipulas II peace 
plan. The U.N.-O.A.S. advance team defined four minimum 
requirements for effective verification: (1) a clear definition 
of the peace observers' roles; (2) a cease-fire that would be 
respected by all parties in the conflict, including irregular 
forces; (3) agreement on the details of disarmament; and (4) 
guarantees of freedom of movement and physical security for the 
observers. 3 

No further progress was made toward establishing a U.N. 
peace observer mission until February 1989, when the five Central 
American foreign ministers met in New York with U.N. Secretary- 
General Javier Perez de Cuellar to discuss a U.N. role in Central 
American peacekeeping. During the talks, the Secretary- 
General emphasized that the four conditions outlined by the 1987 
advance team would have to be met in Nicaragua prior to 
deployment of any U.N. observer mission. Disputes between Central 
American countries over the size of the mission and the scope of 
its mandate would also need to be resolved. 

The Costa del Sol Declaration in February 1989 and the Tela 
Agreement in July set the stage for further U.N. involvement. 

With a resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict apparently underway, 
the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 637 (1989) on 
July 27, expressing the Council's firmest support for the 


400 


Esquipulas II Agreement and endorsing the Secretary-General's 
provision of good offices. 

In March 1989, the U.N. General Assembly, responding to a 
request by the government of Nicaragua, established the United 
Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in 
Nicaragua (ONUVEN) to monitor the Nicaraguan electoral process. 
ONUVEN officially opened its offices in Managua on August 25, 
1989. The mission consisted of 207 civilian observers authorized 
to evaluate the organization and mobilization of political 
parties, the electoral campaign, and the elections held on 
February 25, 1985. After six months of monitoring throughout 
Nicaragua, ONUVEN declared electoral process "impartial and 
fair." 4 

The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) 
was established by Security Council Resolution 644 (1989) on 
November 7, 1989. ONUCA's original mandate was to conduct on-site 
verification in all five Central American nations of the security 
undertakings contained in the Central American Peace Agreement, 
namely, the cessation of aid to irregular forces and the non-use 
of the territory of one state for attacks on other states. 5 
At the request of the Secretary-General, ONUCA's mandate was 
expanded on March 27, 1990 by Security Council Resolution 650 
(1990), which authorized, on a contingency basis, the addition of 
armed personnel to the mission to allow direct U.N. supervision 
of the voluntary demobilization of the Contras. 6 

A further expansion of ONUCA's mandate took place on April 


401 


20, 1990, when the Security Council passed Resolution 653 (1990). 
It authorized ONUCA to monitor the Nicaraguan cease-fire, the 
separation of forces, and the demobilization of the Contras in 
designated "security zones" within Nicaragua. 7 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

An advance team of ONUCA personnel arrived in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, in December 1989, establishing a provisional 
headquarters in the offices of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) in Honduras. The first ONUCA military personnel 
arrived a few days later under the Command of General Augustin 
Quesada Gomez of Spain. Regional offices were subsequently 
established in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El 
Salvador. 8 

The majority of ONUCA resources and personnel were 
concentrated in Honduras and Nicaragua, where the Contra 
demobilization was taking place. In March 1990, ONUCA's 260 
military observers were reinforced by an additional 116 unarmed 
monitors and an armed infantry battalion of approximately 800 
troops from Venezuela. 9 The Venezuelan battalion was deployed 
among the eight Contra demobilization zones between April and 
June 1990. Upon completion of the demobilization in June, the 
armed battalion was withdrawn. Thereafter, ONUCA was rapidly 
scaled down, with its strength reduced to approximately 200 
personnel until its mandate expired in January 1992. 10 
Political and Military Goals 

ONUCA's original mandate, composition, and operational 


402 



concept established it as an unarmed verification and peace- 
observing mission, not a full-scale peacekeeping mission. As 
such, its political objective was to help maintain the momentum 
of the Esquipulas II process by monitoring whatever cease-fires 
might develop as a result of government-insurgent negotiations in 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. ONUCA's initial military 
objective was to conduct mobile surveillance of key border and 
strategic areas that might be used for staging cross-border 
military operations or conducting illicit transport of weapons 
across international boundaries. These limited political and 
military objectives were in effect from November until March 
1990. 

In March 1990, ONUCA's military objectives were 
significantly expanded to include monitoring of the voluntary 
demobilization and repatriation of the Contras. The expansion of 
the mandate was made in response to a request from the Central 
American governments issued at a regional summit in San Isidro de 
Coronado, Costa Rica, in December 1989. The new mandate 
reiterated ONUCA's initial verification and surveillance duties 
but added an armed peacekeeping contingent to the peace-observer 
force. The peacekeeping contingent was deployed to assist in the 
demobilization of the Contras, the only regional insurgency that 
had signed a permanent cease-fire and had agreed to demobilize. 

ONUCA's mandate was expanded once again on April 20, 1990, 
when the Security Council, with the consent of the Nicaraguan 
government, authorized the establishment of "security zones" from 


403 


which the EPS would withdraw to allow the Contras in Nicaragua to 
concentrate and be demobilized. ONUCA's military objectives in 
Nicaragua were first, to monitor the cease-fire throughout the 
country; second, to verify the separation of forces within the 
security zones; and third, to receive and destroy on the ground 
the weapons and uniforms of the Contra's troops as they entered 
the security zones. 11 
Rules of Engagement 

ONUCA's original rules of engagement entailed unarmed ground 
and air patrolling along the Nicaraguan-Honduran and Salvadoran- 
Honduran borders, as well as maritime patrolling in selected 
rivers and the Gulf of Fonseca. Mobile military observer teams 
were charged to monitor and verify the cessation of aid to 
irregular forces and the non-use of the territory of one state 
for attacks on other states. Under its original mandate, ONUCA 
was not authorized to issue orders or directives and could not 
initiate or engage in combat with any forces encountered. 

Following the second and third expansions of ONUCA's 
mandate, the rules of engagement were changed. ONUCA was 
subsequently authorized to enforce order within the Nicaraguan 
security zones and to engage in defensive combat against any 
hostile forces. Nevertheless, continued emphasis was placed on 
the voluntary nature of demobilization of the Contras. 

Composition of Forces 

At maximum strength, ONUCA consisted of 1,195 personnel from 
13 nations. This included an 800-strong infantry battalion and a 


404 




logistics unit from Venezuela; 29 naval personnel from Argentina; 
a 124-man helicopter unit from Canada with; 13 civilian medical 
personnel from the Federal Republic of Germany; 169 military 
observers from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, 
Spain, Sweden, and Venezuela; 85 U.N. international staff 
personnel; and 89 locally hired civilians. 12 

During its first year, ONUCA was commanded by Major General 
Augustin Quesada Gomez of Spain. Following the reduction in its 
size and mission in November 1990, ONUCA's command was 
transferred to Brigadier General Lewis McKenzie of Canada, who 
was succeeded by Brigadier General Victor Suanzes Pardo of Spain. 
Equipment 

Under its first mandate, ONUCA's military observers were 
unarmed. With the addition of a 800-strong mobile infantry 
battalion, ONUCA could count on a significant small arms 
capability for self-defense and security enforcement. Ground 
transport consisted of light vehicles, including several dozen 
four-wheel-drive vehicles. Maritime transport consisted of four 
coastal fast patrol craft. Air transport consisted of four CH-139 
Jet Ranger light observation helicopters, twelve UH-1 "Huey" 
transport helicopters, and one Dornier 228-200 fixed-wing VIP 
aircraft. 13 Communications equipment included INMARSAT portable 
terminals for secure voice and fax transmissions between El 
Salvador and U.N. Headquarters in New York. 14 
Training 

Some units participating in ONUCA had experience in previous 


405 




U.N. peacekeeping missions. The Canadian and Spanish officers 
were experienced U.N. peacekeepers. The Venezuelan battalion had 
previously served with the United Nations Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. 15 
Tactics 

Under ONUCA's original mandate, tactics consisted of 
establishing mobile teams of military observers patrolling from 
verification centers, each of which was manned by up to ten 
observers, and from smaller operational posts in forward areas. 

In rugged mountain areas, patrolling was conducted primarily by 
helicopters. Less rugged areas were patrolled by four-wheel-drive 
vehicles. Offshore fast patrolling was conducted in the Gulf of 
Fonseca. 

Following the second and third expansions of ONUCA's 
mandate, armed peacekeepers were stationed along the perimeters 
of the Nicaraguan security zones. 16 
Cost 

The total cost of ONUCA from November 7, 1989 until its 
termination on January 16, 1992 was approximately $87 million. 17 
The operation was rapidly scaled down after the demobilization of 
the Contras was completed on July 5, 1990. 

Operational Assessment 

During the initial implementation phase of the mission, 

ONUCA was partially successful in fulfilling its initial mandate 
under Security Council Resolution 644 (1989). Although the 
effectiveness of ONUCA's verification patrols was marginal, ONUCA 


406 





effectively investigated reported violations of Esquipulas II and 
helped build confidence among the disputing parties. 

Because of the ruggedness and the large extent of the 
territory being patrolled, the small size of the original 
observer contingent, and the limited number of vehicles at its 
disposal, ONUCA lacked the remote surveillance capability needed 
to verify full compliance with the arms-trafficking restrictions 
of Esquipulas II. As a result, ONUCA concentrated its efforts on 
mobile surveillance of strategic areas along the Honduran- 
Nicaraguan and Honduran-Salvadoran borders, and in the Gulf of 
Fonseca. Additionally, ONUCA established verification centers in 
the national capitals to process and investigate charges of 
Esquipulas II violations. ONUCA responded to government requests 
for investigations on eight occasions. None of those 
investigations yielded evidence of significant violations. 

During the second phase of the mission, ONUCA encountered 
temporary political delays and obstacles to the fulfillment of 
its expanded mandate, but eventually succeeded in fulfilling its 
mandate under a revised deadline. 

Following the Nicaraguan elections of February 25, 1990, and 
the passage of Security Council Resolutions 650 (1989) and 653 
(1989), ONUCA's efforts focused on the voluntary demobilization 
of the Contras. The demobilization effort, which thereafter 
consumed the bulk of ONUCA's resources, was designated "Operation 
Home Run." 18 

Between March 27 and May 30 1990, ONUCA made little progress 


407 


toward demobilizing the Contras because of the reluctance of 
several of the groups to recognize the Esquipulas II agreement 
and their concerns over personal safety during the demobilization 
and repatriation process. In addition, a key faction of the 
Contras refused to demobilize until specific guarantees for 
resettlement assistance were provided by the Nicaraguan 
government. 

On May 30, the Nicaraguan government and Contra Commander 
Israel Galeano (Commander Franklin) signed the Managua Protocol, 
which committed the Nicaraguan government to resettle demobilized 
Contras in designated "development areas," to provide them with 
economic aid, and allow them to join a police force to be set up 
in those areas. In exchange, the Contras would demobilize 
completely within a given deadline. Between May 30 and June 29, 
1990, the remaining Contras, totalling 19,614 personnel--16,361 
of them armed—were demobilized in the eight security zones 
established by ONUCA. 19 

Despite estimates that less than half of the weapons 
originally in the possession of the Contras were turned in to 
ONUCA and the subsequent "remobilization" of about 3,000 
"Recontras," ONUCA was generally successful in fulfilling its 
expanded mandate under Resolution 650 (1989) and Resolution 653 
(1989). The main achievements of Operation Home Run were first, 
to support the Nicaraguan cease-fire by assisting in the break up 
of the Contras as a significant military force; second, to make 
possible the reintegration into Nicaraguan society of those 


408 


members of the resistance who wished to return to civilian life 
in the new democratic political context; and third, to help bind 
the Nicaraguan government into honoring its commitment to 
implement drastic reductions in the Sandinista Popular Army 
(Ejercito Popular Sandinista—EPS). 

CURRENT SITUATION 

Following the completion of Operation Home Run on July 29, 
1990, ONUCA was rapidly scaled down and reverted to its original 
mandate. Many of ONUCA's personnel and much of its equipment were 
transferred to El Salvador for service in the United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). ONUCA was reduced in 
size to about 200 personnel until its mission was completed on 
January 16, 1992. 

CONCLUSIONS 

As a result of ongoing political conflicts in Nicaragua and 
the incapacity of the Chamorro government to fulfill the 
commitments made in the Managua Protocol, elements of the Contras 
began to "remobilize" in early 1991. The so-called "Recontras" 
reportedly numbered between 300 and 1,100 combatants by June 
1991. 20 At about the same time, discharged members of the EPS, 
claiming comparable land rights and other government benefits, 
resorted to banditry and antigovernment guerrilla activities. 
Elements of these two groups had reportedly joined forces and 
were engaged in operations against the Chamorro government in 
1992. 

In Managua, the political arena became increasingly 


409 


polarized as the FSLN attempted to block economic structural 
adjustment through violent strikes and other forms of civil 
disobedience. The political environment became further polarized 
as the National Opposition Union (Union Nacional Opositora—UNO) 
coalition, which had brought the Chamorro government to power, 
protested the increasingly close collaboration between the 
government and the FSLN. A main point of contention was the 
continued political affiliation of the armed forces with the FSLN 
under Defense Minister Humberto Ortega. 

In early 1992, UNO withdrew its support for the government 
and entered into opposition. As political polarization 
intensified, general lawlessness and political violence became 
increasingly widespread. The political outlook for Nicaragua was 
one of continued sporadic violence, but without the scale or 
intensity of the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s. 

Despite the continuing problems of political polarization 
and rural insurgency in Nicaragua and illegal arms trafficking in 
Central America, ONUCA can be considered a qualified success. 
ONUCA's success is attributed to the specificity and limited 
scope of its mandates, particularly the monitoring of compliance 
with the Esquipulas II agreement and the verification of the 
Contra demobilization. By adhering strictly to the letter of its 
mandate and avoiding broader political commitments, ONUCA was 
able to uphold the U.N. principle of neutrality, and thereby 
contributed significantly to confidence-building between the 
disputing parties. Such confidence building made possible further 


410 


steps in the deescalation of the Central American civil wars, 
including the drastic reduction of the Nicaraguan EPS and the 
eventual acceptance by the Salvadoran government and FMLN 
insurgents of U.N. mediation and verification of the Salvadoran 
peace process. 


411 


Endnotes 


1. Jack Child, The Central American Peace Process 1983-1991 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 45. 

2. Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch, "UN Observer Group in 
Central America," in William J. Durch (ed.), The Evolution of U.N. 
Peacekeeping . (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 441. 

3. Child, The Central American Peace Process . 50. 

4. "Central American Peace Process Progresses," UN Chronicle . 27, 
No. 2, June 1990, 15. 

5. Child, The Central American Peace Process . 182. 

6. United Nations, The United Nations Role in the Central American 
Peace Process (New York: United Nations, Department of Public 
Information, 1990), 4. 

7. Ibid . 

8. Child, The Central American Peace Process . 83. 

9. Ibid ., 91. 

10. Ibid .. 127. 

11. United Nations, United Nations Role in the Demobilization of 
the Nicaraguan Resistance (New York: United Nations, Department of 
Public Information, 1990), 1. 

12. Smith and Durch "U.N. Observer Group in Central America," 449. 

13. Ibid .. 450. 

14. Ibid .. 451. 

15. Child, The Central American Peace Process . 92. 

16. The Blue Helmets (New York: United Nations, August 1990), 395. 

17. Smith and Durch "The U.N. Observer Group in Central America," 
447. 

18. Child, The Central American Peace Process . 84. 

19. "ONUCA Mission Deemed a Success," UN Chronicle . 27, No 3, 
September 1990, 5. 

20. Child. The Central American Peace Process . 123. 


412 























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414 










United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 


Selected Chronology 

1979 


In October, a reformist military-civilian junta deposed the 
authoritarian government of General Carlos Humberto Romero Mena. 
The junta decreed extensive land reform but failed to curb human 
rights abuses by the armed forces against leftist groups. 

1980 


In January, several leftist groups united under the banner 
of the Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses (Coodinadora 
Revolucionaria de las Masas—CRM) , calling for armed 
insurrection. 

In March, Archbishop of San Salvador Oscar Arnulfo Romero 
was assassinated by a right-wing death squad. Mass violence 
erupted between demonstrators and security forces at Romero's 
funeral. 

1981 


In January, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional—FMLN) launched a 
"final offensive" campaign against the government. 


1982 


Elections were held for a provisional government and 
Constituent Assembly. 

1983 


The Contadora initiative began. 


1984 


In national elections, Christian Democratic Party candidate 
Jose Napoleon Duarte Fuentes was elected president. 

1986 


The Contadora process collapsed. 


1987 


In August, the Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas 
II) was signed by the five Central American presidents. 


415 










1989 


In March, Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista—Arena) candidate Alfredo Cristiani 
Burkard was elected president. 

In September, negotiations were initiated between the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN. 

In November, the FMLN launched a major offensive against San 
Salvador, leaving 2,000 dead. Six Jesuit professors at the 
Central American University were assassinated by an army squad. 

1990 


In July, the government and the FMLN signed the Agreement on 
Human Rights, calling for a United Nations (U.N.) Verification 
Mission to monitor the agreement. 

1991 


In May, U.N. Security Council Resolution 693 established 
ONUSAL. 

In December, the government and FMLN negotiated a peace 
agreement, calling for a cease-fire effective February 1, 1992. 

1992 


In January, U.N. Security Council Resolution 792 expanded 
ONUSAL's mandate to include verification and monitoring of the 
peace agreement. Military and police divisions were added to 
ONUSAL. 

In October, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
reported on delays in implementing the peace accords and proposed 
adjustments to the agreement's timetable. 

In December, the civil war was officially ended. 


1993 


In January, the Ad Hoc Commission on Purification of the 
Armed Forces in El Salvador issued a report implicating 103 
Salvadoran officers in human rights violations and recommending 
their retirement or dismissal. The U.N. endorsed the commission's 
findings. 

In February, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN 
requested U.N. verification of the forthcoming March 1994 general 
elections. 


416 







In March, 
human rights v 


the Truth Commission issued a report documenting 
olations during the civil war. 


417 


INTRODUCTION 


The Salvadoran civil war was one of three major civil 
conflicts that erupted in Central America during the 1980s. The 
civil war began in 1980, when fighting between revolutionary 
leftist groups and the predominantly right-wing Salvadoran 
government, backed by their allied paramilitary "death squads," 
escalated into nationwide civil unrest. 

After a failed urban offensive against San Salvador in 
January 1981, the leftist insurgent groups belonging to the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Marti 
de Liberacion Nacional—FMLN) launched a protracted rural-based 
guerrilla insurgency against the Salvadoran government. The 
ensuing civil war left 70,000 dead and resulted in the flight of 
more than half a million refugees from the country, with 500,000 
becoming internally displaced. By the early 1990s, damage to El 
Salvador's economic infrastructure exceeded $300 million, with an 
estimated $1 billion required to rebuild the economy. 1 

Efforts to restore peace began in 1984 when Christian 
Democratic president Jose Napoleon Duarte Fuentes initiated an 
unsuccessful dialogue with the FMLN. Following the collapse of 
the Duarte peace initiative, further peace efforts were promoted 
by the multilateral Contadora Peace Process. The failure, in 
turn, of Contadora led to a third peace initiative under the 
Central American Peace Agreement (Esquipulas II) of 1987. 

Intermittent peace talks resumed in 1987 in accordance with 
the Esquipulas II agreement. Further progress was made following 


418 


the election of President Alfredo Cristiani Burkard, of the 
conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista—Arena) party. The peace negotiations were 
interrupted in November 1989 when the FMLN launched a second 
major offensive against San Salvador. The FMLN offensive was 
effectively repulsed by government forces, but left a death toll 
of 2,000. 

Realizing that the civil war had developed into a stalemate, 
the warring parties returned to the negotiating table in 1990 
with the assistance of United Nations (U.N.) mediation. In July 
1990, the government and the FMLN signed the Agreement on Human 
Rights, which provided for the establishment of a U.N. 
verification mission to monitor nationwide observance of human 
rights by the warring parties. On May 20, 1991, the U.N. Security 
Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in El 
Salvador (ONUSAL) to monitor all agreements concluded between the 
government and the FMLN. 2 

This case study examines the original crisis in El Salvador, 
the factors leading to the deployment of ONUSAL, the evolution of 
its mandate, the effectiveness of the deployment, ONUSAL's 
current status, and the current situation and outlook in El 
Salvador in light of the mission's initial goals. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

In October 1979, reformist junior officers of the Salvadoran 
army ousted the authoritarian military government of General 


419 



Carlos Alberto Romero Mena and established executive authority in 
the first of four military-civilian juntas. Concerned over the 
possibility of a mass uprising similar to the Nicaraguan 
Revolution of July 1979, the junta governments sought to 
implement extensive land reform measures but were unable to curb 
widespread human rights abuses against civilians by the armed 
forces and paramilitary death sguads. 

Sporadic political violence intensified throughout 1980, 
particularly after the assassination by a right-wing death sguad 
of the Archbishop of San Salvador, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero 
y Galdamez, an outspoken critic of human rights violations by the 
armed forces and its associated death squads. 3 Political 
violence intensified after right-wing army officers reasserted 
their control over the armed forces in May 1980, effectively 
halting land reform and implementing further draconian measures 
against the leftist opposition. 

Spurred by the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 
several Salvadoran guerrilla groups met in Havana in early 1980 
to establish a unified command under the Unified Revolutionary 
Directorate (Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada—DRU), an 
insurgent front that eventually evolved into the FMLN. Soon 
thereafter, other left-wing and center-left-wing opposition 
movements became affiliated with or integrated into the FMLN. 

The civil war intensified on January 10, 1981, when the FMLN 
launched a major offensive against the capital, San Salvador. The 
Salvadoran armed forces repelled the guerrilla offensive with the 


420 


help of U.S. military aid. Following the defeat of its urban 
offensive, the FMLN regrouped and embarked on a protracted 
guerrilla war in the countryside. The army responded by launching 
a series of rural counterinsurgency campaigns in which torture, 
extrajudicial executions, and massacres of noncombatants were 
widespread. 

Efforts to resolve the Salvadoran civil war began in 
October 1984 when newly elected President Jose Napoleon Duarte 
Fuentes initiated a dialogue with the FMLN. The Duarte initiative 
stalled, however, and eventually failed after his daughter was 
kidnapped by an FMLN faction. 

Further efforts toward a negotiated solution were made in 
the mid-1980s in response to the Contadora Process, a 
multilateral effort by several Latin American states to defuse 
the Central American civil wars by promoting regional 
democratization and disarmament. The Contadora Process also lost 
momentum and ultimately failed in 1986. 

Preliminary progress toward resolving the Salvadoran 
conflict was finally achieved under the provisions of the Central 
American Peace Agreement, signed on August 7, 1987. This regional 
peace agreement called for ending outside aid and safe haven to 
insurgent forces, decreeing amnesties to political prisoners, 
initiating dialogue between governments and opposition groups, 
negotiating cease-fires between governments and insurgent groups, 
and promoting the development of a "pluralisitc and participatory 
democratic process" in all signatory states. 


421 


During 1987 and 1988, El Salvador took tentative steps 
toward complying with the Esquipulas II Agreement. It decreed an 
amnesty for political prisoners and initiated peace talks under 
temporary cease-fires. Progress toward complying with the 
Esquipulas II Agreement halted abruptly in November 1989, 
however, when the FMLN launched a major offensive against San 
Salvador. The ensuing street battles killed 2,000 persons and 
were accompanied by further human rights abuses by the armed 
forces, most notably the assassination of six Jesuit priests on 
the campus of the Central American University. 

The U.N. Response 

The U.N. has played a central role in the mediation and 
verification of the Salvadoran peace process. U.N. involvement 
was initially conducted within the framework of the Esquipulas II 
Agreement and was subsequently expanded to mediate and monitor 
the Salvadoran Human Rights and Peace Agreements. 

In October 1987, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 
42/1 expressing its "firmest support" for the Esquipulas II 
Agreement and requesting that the Secretary-General assist 
Central American governments in their efforts to implement the 
agreement. U.N. support for Esquipulas II was reiterated by 
Security Council Resolution 637 in July 1989, which welcomed 
Esquipulas II and the subsequent agreements of the Central 
American presidents, and supported the Secretary-General in his 
mission of good offices to the region. On November 7, 1989, 
Security Council Resolution 644 (1989) established the United 


422 



Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to verify the 
Esquipulas II security commitments in all five central American 
states. The ONUCA mission in El Salvador was initially limited to 
monitoring selected border zones for Esquipulas II violations. 

U.N. participation in the Salvadoran peace process began in 
January 1990, when Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar 
intensified his good offices with the Salvadoran government and 
the FMLN in accordance with Security Council Resolution 637 
(1989). On April 4, 1990, the government and the FMLN signed the 
Geneva Accord, which set the framework for the U.N.-mediated 
peace talks. In May 1990, Security Council Resolution 654 
confirmed the council's support for U.N. mediation of the 
Salvadoran conflict. 

As a result of U.N.-mediated talks, the first substantive 
agreement in the Salvadoran peace process was reached in July 
1990 with the signing of the San Jose Accord on Human Rights. The 
agreement provided for the establishment of a U.N. verification 
mission to monitor nationwide observance of human rights by the 
security forces and the FMLN. The U.N. was also requested to 
establish a human rights verification mission prior to the cease¬ 
fire agreements. 

In response to the Salvadoran request, the Security Council 
dispatched an advance team to El Salvador in January 1991 to 
study the possibility of deploying a human rights verification 
mission prior to the signing of a cease-fire. 

After a new round of U.N.-mediated talks in Mexico City, the 


423 


Salvadoran government and the FMLN reached an agreement in late 
April 1991 on governmental, military, and constitutional reforms. 
They also agreed to create a U.N. Truth Commission to investigate 
violations of human rights. 

In response to the Mexico accord, the Security Council 
issued Resolution 693 (1991) on May 20, 1991, establishing ONUSAL 
as an "integrated peacekeeping operation" with an initial mandate 
to verify compliance with the San Jose Accord on Human Rights. 4 

Further rounds of negotiations in New York resulted in a 
permanent cease-fire on December 31, 1991, and a comprehensive 
peace agreement in Chapultepec, Mexico, on January 16, 1992. 

On January 14, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 
729 (1992) expanding ONUSAL's mandate to include verification and 
monitoring of the Chapultepec Agreement. In addition to verifying 
compliance with the San Jose Accord on Human Rights, ONUSAL was 
to verify all aspects of the cease-fire and the separation of 
forces, including the demobilization of the FMLN, and to monitor 
the maintenance of public order during the transitional period 
while a National Civil Police was being established. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

Approximately 40 ONUSAL human rights observers began 
arriving in El Salvador on July 26, 1991. 5 From July to 
September, ONUSAL's primary task was to set up its headquarters 
and regional offices and deploy its communications and 
transportation equipment. In October ONUSAL personnel began to 
investigate cases and situations involving allegations of human 


424 


rights abuses. In February 1992, 380 military observers arrived 
in El Salvador and deployed as mobile teams in government and 
FMLN concentration zones. 6 
Political and Military Goals 

ONUSAL's initial mandate established it as an unarmed, 
predominantly civilian observer mission. Its political objectives 
were to monitor and investigate the human rights situation in El 
Salvador and recommend improvements for implementing human 
rights. 

On January 14, 1992, ONUSAL's political and military 
objectives were expanded to include verification and monitoring 
of the Chapultepec Agreement. This entailed the addition of a 
Military Division to monitor the separation of military forces, 
the demobilization of the FMLN, and the creation of a U.N. Police 
Division to supervise the maintenance of public order by the 
existing National Police (Policia Nacional—PN), pending the 
establishment of a new National Civil Police (Policia Nacional 
Civil—PNC) . 

Under its expanded mandate, ONUSAL's military objectives 
included supervising the concentration of the approximately 
63,000 members of the armed forces (Fuerzas Armadas de El 
Salvador—FAES) into 62 designated areas, with FMLN forces 
concentrated in 15 areas. 7 Subsequently, ONUSAL military 
observers were to inventory and destroy in place the weapons of 
FMLN personnel who were being demobilized. 

Rules of Engagement 


425 




ONUSAL's rules of engagement entailed unarmed monitoring of 
troop movements as well as police activities. ONUSAL personnel 
were authorized to visit any site without prior notice; to 
receive communications from any Salvadoran individual, group or 
entity; to interview freely any individual or group; to conduct 
direct investigations; and to use the media to fulfill its 
mandate. 8 ONUSAL was not authorized to issue orders or 
directives, and could not engage in combat or otherwise obstruct 
the activities of any forces encountered. 

Composition of Forces 

At maximum strength, ONUSAL consisted of 1,098 personnel 
from 18 nations. ONUSAL's 356 military observers included 47 from 
Brazil, 55 from Canada, 8 from Colombia, 45 from Ecuador, 11 from 
India, 12 from Ireland, 1 from Norway, 138 from Spain, 9 from 
Sweden and 40 from Venezuela. In addition, there were 29 naval 
crew members from Argentina, 294 police observers from Austria, 
Chile, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and Sweden, 
and several helicopter aircrews from Canada as well as 95 
civilian staff. 9 

ONUSAL was established as an "integrated" U.N. peacekeeping 
operation under a civilian chief of mission. The first ONUSAL 
chief of mission was Iqbal Riza of Pakistan; he was succeeded by 
Augusto Ramirez Ocampo of Colombia on April 1, 1993. 

Equipment 

ONUSAL's civilian, military, and police observers were 
unarmed. Ground transport consisted of light vehicles, including 


426 




several dozen four-wheel-drive vehicles. Air transport consisted 
of an unspecified number of UH-1 "Huey" transport helicopters 
from Canada. Maritime transport consisted of four coastal fast 
patrol craft from Argentina. 

Training 

Most ONUSAL military observers had previous peacekeeping 
experience in the United Nations Observer Group in Central 
America (ONUCA). Canadian and Spanish military observers had 
other prior experience as U.N. peacekeepers. 

Tactics 

ONUSAL's initial operational objectives were to establish a 
presence at its headquarters in San Salvador and its regional 
offices and sub-offices in selected cities in El Salvador. 
Subsequently, teams of civilian observers from ONUSAL's Human 
Rights Division would travel throughout the country, making 
contacts with political, military and juridical authorities, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the FMLN to gather evidence as 
required for investigation of human rights violations. 

The tactics of ONUSAL's Military Division consisted of 
establishing mobile teams of unarmed military observers to verify 
the concentration of FAES and FMLN forces. Verification teams 
were deployed at all 15 FMLN concentration zones, while mobile 
teams periodically visited and inspected the 62 FAES 
concentration areas. Additionally, the ONUSAL Military Division 
was to assure safe passage and provide transport for FMLN 
commanders engaged in concentration and demobilization, as well 


427 




as logistical support and consultancy as resources permitted. 
Military observers were to receive, inventory, and destroy 
weapons turned over by the FMLN during demobilization in its 
concentration zones. 

Cost 

The total projected cost of ONUSAL from May 1991 until 
December 1993 was approximately $96 million. 10 An additional $7 
million was projected to be spent in monitoring the March 1994 
national elections. ONUSAL was financed from a special assessed 
account established by the General Assembly on June 21, 1991. 

Operational Assessment 

During the initial human rights monitoring phase of the 
mission, ONUSAL was only marginally effective in fulfilling its 
mandate under Resolution 693 (1991). Despite a well executed 
deployment and aggressive monitoring by ONUSAL personnel, no 
discernible improvement in the human rights situation occurred in 
the first six months after ONUSAL's arrival. 11 The initial lack 
of progress on human rights resulted largely from continued 
hostilities during the ONUSAL deployment. However, ONUSAL's human 
rights monitoring contributed indirectly to an improvement in the 
human rights situation by creating an atmosphere conducive to the 
eventual cease-fire, which produced a dramatic decline in rights 
violations. 12 

From January to October 1992, ONUSAL was partially 
successful in fulfilling its mandate under Resolution 792 (1992), 
which entailed supervising the demobilization of the FMLN and 


428 




institutional reforms by the security forces. By midyear, 
implementation of several commitments contained in the peace 
agreement had fallen behind schedule, particularly the provision 
of agricultural land in the former zones of conflict and the 
government's purge of army officers accused of human rights 
abuses as recommended by the Ad Hoc Commission on the 
Purification of the Armed Forces. Moreover, both parties appeared 
to be evading full compliance with the agreement by postponing 
their major force reductions. 

The demobilization process nearly broke down in October 1992 
when both the government and the FMLN suspended their 
demobilizations, alleging noncompliance by the other party. 
Following successful U.N. mediation of the dispute, a revised 
timetable was issued for completion of the demobilizations with a 
new target date of December 15, 1992. 

Between October 31 and December 15, 1992, further progress 
was made by both sides in implementing the Chapultepec Agreement. 
The FMLN demobilized the final 40 percent of its forces (a total 
of approximately 6,000 personnel and 4,000 weapons), while the 
military reduced its forces by more than 50 percent from (63,000 
to 31,000). 13 The Salvadoran government also began to purge 
officers identified by the Ad Hoc Commission as perpetrators of 
human rights violations. 

Based on his assessment of compliance by both parties, on 
December 23, 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Security 
Council that the armed conflict between the government and the 


429 


FMLN had formally ended on December 15 in accordance with the 
agreed adjustments in the timetable for implementing the peace 
agreements. 

Despite repeated delays and political crises, ONUSAL has 
been generally successful in implementing its expanded mandate 
under Security Council Resolution 792 (1992). Two of its mission 
objectives, verifying and assisting the demobilization of the 
FMLN and the purging and reduction of the FAES, have to a large 
extent been attained. A third objective, monitoring public order 
while the new National Civil Police was being established, was 
hampered by insufficient U.N. personnel and resources. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

Following the completion of the demobilizations in December 
1992, ONUSAL's military observers were withdrawn, reducing the 
mission personnel to approximately 400 human rights monitors and 
police observers. 14 On May 27, 1993, Security Council Resolution 
832 (1993) expanded the mission's mandate once again to include 
monitoring and verification of the March 1994 general elections. 
Approximately 900 civilian election observers will be added to 
ONUSAL to monitor the polling. 15 ONUSAL's mandate is expected to 
terminate shortly thereafter. 

CONCLUSION 

In May 1993, FMLN compliance with the peace agreement was 
brought into question when a clandestine FMLN weapons cache was 
discovered in Managua, Nicaragua. Responding to this discovery, 
the U.N. found the FMLN to be in violation of the peace agreement 


430 


and issued a 45-day deadline for the surrender of all weapons 
that were not included in the original FMLN inventory. 16 On 
August 18, 1993, the U.N. announced that all remaining FMLN 
weapons had been presented to the U.N. for destruction and found 
the FMLN to be in compliance with the peace agreement. 17 

Despite these violations of the peace agreement, the 
political climate in El Salvador has improved. The FMLN has 
joined the political process and begun to field candidates for 
the March 1994 elections. On March 12, 1993, General Rene Emilio 
Ponce, the senior military officer implicated in human rights 
violations by the Ad Hoc Commission, resigned his post as 
Minister of Defense. Three days later, the Truth Commission 
issued a report on human rights violations that implicated the 
FMLN, the army, and the security services. 

Given its effectiveness in restoring peace and democratizing 
the Salvadoran political process, ONUSAL can be judged a 
successful peace observer mission and a model for future U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. Part of ONUSAL's success is attributed 
to its ability to transcend traditional peacekeeping roles and to 
involve itself in "peacebuilding" functions such as monitoring 
the creation of a new democratic political system. 18 Moreover, 
the integration of the different aspects of the U.N. presence 
under a single civilian chief of mission has provided for 
concerted action on a wide range of interrelated problems within 
the host country. 


431 


Endnotes 


1. Pamela Constable, "At War's End in El Salvador," Current 
History . 92, No. 572, March 1993, 106. 

2. United Nations, ONUSAL in El Salvador (New York: United Nations, 
Department of Public Information, May 1992), 1. 

3. "El Salvador: Report of the United Nations Truth Commission for 

El Salvador," March 1993, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
Daily Report Supplement: Latin America (FBIS-LAT-93-082-S), 30 

April 1993, 62-65. 

4. "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," Peace-keeping 
Information Notes (1993: Update No. 1.) (New York: United Nations, 
August 1993), 27. 

5. Ibid .. 28. 

6. Ibid . 

7. Stephen Baranyi and Liisa North, Stretching the Limits of the 
Possible: United Nations Peacekeeping in Central America (Ottawa: 
Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1992), 30. 

8. United Nations, ONUSAL in El Salvador . 1. 

9. William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1993), 475. 

10. "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," 31; and 
Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations. 1993 (Mclean, Virginia: Central 
Intelligence Agency, May 1993), 1. 

11. Baranyi and North, Stretching the Limits of the Possible . 31. 

12. Ibid . 

13. Knut Walter and Philip J. Williams, "The Military and 
Democratization in El Salvador," Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs . 35, No. 1, 1993, 83. 

14. "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," 31. 

15. "Security Council Extends Mandate of Observer Mission in El 
Salvador to 30 November" (Press Release.) (New York: United 
Nations, Department of Public Information), May 27, 1993, 1. 

16. "Onusal Says 90 Percent of FMLN Weapons Inventory Destroyed," 
[San Salvador] Radio Farabundo Marti . 9 August 1993, Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America . 11 
August 1993 (FBIS-LAT-93-153), 14. 


432 





















17. Noticias Univision (television broadcast), August 18, 1993 

18. Baranyi and North, Stretching the Limits of the Possible . 


33 . 


433 




Bibliography 


Arnold, Guy. Wars in the Third World Since 1945 . London: Cassell, 

1991. 

Baranyi, Stephen, and Liisa North. Stretching the Limits of the 

Possible: United Nations Peacekeeping in Central America . Ottawa: 
Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1992. 

Browning, David. "El Salvador: History." In Europa: South America, 

Central America, and the Caribbean, 1993 . London: Europa, 1992. 

Child, Jack. The Central American Peace Process. 1983-1991 . Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992. 

Close, David. "Central American Elections 1989-90: Costa Rica, El 

Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama," Electoral Studies . 10, 
March 1991, 60-76. 

Constable, Pamela. "At War's End in El Salvador," Current History . 92, 
No. 572, March 1993, 106-11. 

"El Salvador: Report of the United Nations Truth Commission for El 
Salvador," March 1993. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
Daily Report Supplement: Latin America (FBIS-LAT-93-082-S), April 
30, 1993. 

"FMLN Reportedly Concludes UN Weapons Surrender," AFP [Paris], August 
4, 1993. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: 
Latin America (FBIS-LAT-93-150), August 6, 1993. 

Garcia, Jose Z. "Military Questions in El Salvador," Hemisphere . 4, 
Summer 1992, 32-4, 36-41. 

Haggerty, Richard A., ed. El Salvador: A Country Study . Washington: 

GPO, 1990. 

Lemco, Jonathan. Canada and the Crisis in Central America . New York: 
Praeger, 1991. 

Montes, Julio A. "El Salvador: The Last Battlefield in Central 

America," International Defense Review [Geneva], 24, September 
19, 1991, 915-18. 

"ONUSAL Says 90 Percent of FMLN Weapons Inventory Destroyed," Radio 

Farabundo Marti [San Salvador], August 9, 1993, Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America (FBIS-LAT-93- 
153), August 11, 1993. 

Rosenberg, Robin L. Spain and Central America: Democracy and Foreign 
Policy . New York: Greenwood, 1992. 


434 






















Singer, Max. "Militarism and Democracy in El Salvador," Society . 27, 
September-October 1990, 49-56. 

United Nations. El Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace . New York: 
United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1992. 

-. Peace-keeping Information Notes . (1993: Update No. 1.) New 

York: United Nations, August 1993. 

United States. Congress. 102d, 1st Session. House of Representatives. 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs. Toward Peace in El Salvador: The Final Steps (Hearing). 
Washington: GPO, 1993. 

-. 102d, 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on 

Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. 

Peace and Reconstruction in El Salvador (Hearing). Washington: 
GPO, 1992. 

-. General Accounting Office. El Salvador: Role of 

Nongovernmental Organizations in Postwar Reconstruction (Briefing 
report to Congressional requesters.) Washington: General 
Accounting Office, November 16, 1992. 

-. General Accounting Office. El Salvador: Status of 

Reconstruction Activities One Year After the Peace Agreement . 

(Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.) 
Washington: March 23, 1993. 

Walter, Knut, and Philip J. Williams. "The Military and 

Democratization in El Salvador," Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs . 35, No. 1, 1993. 


435 


















United Nations Observer Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 


Selected Chronology 

1986 


In February, President Jean-Claude Duvalier fled into exile 
in France following an outbreak of public protests against his 
rule. An interim military-civilian National Council of Government 
headed by General Henri Namphy assumed executive authority. 

1987 


In March, a new constitution was approved in a national 
referendum by 99.8 percent of voters. 

In November, Leslie Manigat was elected president in voting 
marred by violence and fraud. 

1988 


In June, General Namphy ousted Manigat and abrogated the 
Constitution. 

1990 

In December, Father John Bertrand Aristide was elected 
president with 67 percent of the vote in United Nations (U.N.)- 
monitored elections. Concurrent legislative elections gave 
Aristide's National Front for Change and Democracy (Front 
National Pour le Changement et la Democratie—FNCD) five of the 
27 seats in the Senate and 18 of 83 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 

1991 


In July, President Aristide removed several senior officers 
in the armed forces, appointing General Raoul Cedras as Commander 
in Chief of the Army. 

In September, following an emotionally charged speech by 
President Aristide calling for the "necklacing" of political 
opponents, a military junta led by General Cedras overthrew the 
government in a violent coup. Aristide was forced to leave the 
country; the Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the 
coup and automatically imposed an economic embargo. Hundreds of 
demonstrators and Aristide supporters were killed by security 
forces, and several thousand people attempted to flee to the 
United States by sea. 

In October, the military forcibly convened a quorum of 


436 







legislators to approve Joseph Nerette as interim president. 
Nerette's appointment was rejected by the international 
community, which recognized the government-in-exile of President 
Aristide. 

1992 


I n February, OAS-mediated talks between Aristide and members 
of a Haitian legislative delegation resulted in the signing of an 
interim agreement for Aristide's eventual return. Under pressure 
from the military, the agreement was declared null and void by 
the Haitian Supreme Court. 

In June, as a result of a tripartite agreement reached a 
month earlier by the Haitian military government and parliament, 
Nerette vacated the presidency and Marc Bazin was appointed prime 
minister of a "consensus government." 

In September, the Bazin government authorized the dispatch 
of 18 OAS human rights monitors to Haiti. 

1993 


In January, United States President Bill Clinton reaffirmed 
the U.S. commitment to Aristide's return to Haiti and announced 
intensified U.S. efforts to find a democratic solution to the 
crisis. 

In February, the Bazin government authorized the dispatch to 
Haiti of 200 U.N. and OAS human rights monitors. 

In June, the U.N. imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti. 

In July, U.N.-mediated negotiations led to the signing of 
the Governor's Island Agreement and the New York Pact, which 
called for President Aristide's return to Haiti in October, the 
appointment of a new prime minister, an amnesty from criminal 
prosecution for the military, the resignation of General Cedras, 
and the dispatch of a U.N. technical mission to train a new 
police force and professionalize the military. 

In September, President Aristide appointed Robert Malval as 
the new prime minister. Attacks against Aristide supporters 
continued with the complicity of the security forces. After 
dispatching an advance team of 30 military and police 
specialists, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 867 
(1993) establishing the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). 


437 




INTRODUCTION 


On September 30, 1991, the democratically elected government 
of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in a violent 
military coup led by rebellious junior officers and enlisted 
personnel of the Haitian army. Following the restoration of the 
chain of command, a military junta led by Army Commander in Chief 
Raoul Cedras assumed control of the government and compelled 
Aristide and his closest advisers to go into exile. In the 
aftermath of the coup, an estimated 3,500 Aristide supporters 
were killed by paramilitary police and the armed forces. 1 

Facing deteriorating economic conditions and intensified 
political repression, thousands of Haitians attempted to enter 
illegally into the United States by sea in poorly constructed and 
overcrowded boats. Thousands of refugees drowned when their boats 
capsized or sank; approximately 40,000 were rescued by the U.S. 
Coast Guard and eventually returned to Haiti after being denied 
political asylum in the United States. 

In October, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
imposed a regional oil and arms embargo against Haiti and 
reaffirmed the international legitimacy of the Aristide 
government, rejecting an effort by the Haitian military to 
install a new civilian government. In support of the OAS action, 
the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council imposed a global oil 
and arms embargo on Haiti in June 1993. 

On July 3, 1993, President Aristide and General Cedras 
signed the Governor's Island Agreement in New York, which 


438 


provided for President Aristide's return to office in Haiti by 
October 30, 1993, the suspension of international sanctions, the 
appointment of a new prime minister, an amnesty from prosecution 
for military personnel involved in the coup, the resignation of 
General Cedras, and the dispatch of a U.N. technical mission to 
train a new police force and professionalize the armed forces. 2 

In response to progress made toward resolving the Haitian 
crisis, the U.N. Security Council suspended the oil and arms 
embargo against Haiti on August 27, 1993. On September 23, the 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 867 (1993), 
establishing the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a 
period of six months, to assist the implementation of the 
Governor's Island Agreement. 3 

This case study examines the original crisis in Haiti, the 
factors leading to the dispatch of UNMIH, the problems that UNMIH 
is likely to face, and the potential for success in light of 
current and foreseeable conditions in Haiti. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The Initial Crisis 

On February 7, 1986, nearly 30 years of uninterrupted 
authoritarian rule in Haiti ended when President Jean-Claude 
Duvalier fled to France during an outbreak of civil unrest and 
mass demonstrations against his government. Three decades of 
corrupt and despotic rule under Duvalier and his father, Frangois 
"Papa Doc," had resulted in the stagnation of the Haitian economy 
and had reinforced economic disparities between the mulatto 


439 



entrepreneurial elite and the darker skinned majority. Upon his 
departure in 1986, Duvalier left behind the poorest country in 
the Western Hemisphere and the lowest ranked on virtually every 
indicator of general health and welfare. 

In the absence of democratic civilian institutions, the 
power vacuum left by Duvalier's departure was immediately filled 
by the Haitian army, which established an interim military- 
civilian administration, ostensibly to serve as a caretaker until 
a new constitution could be written and democratic elections 
held. Despite its declared democratic intent, the interim 
government, headed by General Henri Namphy, was widely criticized 
for retaining many former members of the Duvalier cabinet. Under 
General Namphy's supervision, a new constitution was written in 
March 1987 and approved by 99 percent of voters in a referendum. 4 
A civilian government with strong ties to the military was voted 
into office in January 1988 in elections marred by extensive 
fraud. 

The Haitian army demonstrated its continuing influence over 
political affairs in June 1988, when it ousted President Leslie 
Manigat after he had attempted to discharge General Namphy as 
Commander in Chief of the army. General Namphy subsequently 
imposed martial law and abrogated the Constitution of 1987. Two 
months later, General Namphy was ousted by an army faction led by 
General Prosper Avril. General Avril took tentative steps toward 
restoring democratic rule before being forced to resign in March 
1990 in the midst of popular opposition and diplomatic pressure 


440 


for his removal on the part of the United States. 

Following General Namphy's resignation from the presidency, 
a civilian interim government headed by Supreme Court Justice 
Ertha-Pascal Trouillot assumed executive authority until 
presidential and legislative elections were held on December 16, 
1990. 

The elections, which were monitored by U.N. and OAS 
observers, gave a landslide victory in the presidential race to 
Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide, a popular left-wing 
activist and priest, secured 67 percent of the vote in the first 
round of presidential voting. Aristide's allies in the National 
Front for Change and Democracy (Front Nacional pour le Changement 
et la Democratie--FNCD) achieved minority representation in the 
legislative chambers, capturing 5 of 27 seats in the Senate and 
18 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 5 

President Aristide's nine-month tenure was punctuated by 
bitter political clashes between his left-wing administration and 
right-wing opponents in the legislature and the business 
community. Although the populist president took tentative steps 
toward restoring civilian control over the military, he failed to 
foster a climate of consensual democratic politics, relying 
instead on an autocratic style of government and on intimidation 
of political opponents to effect his policies. Tensions mounted 
in August 1991, when a large crowd of supporters of President 
Aristide and Prime Minister Rene Preval marched on the parliament 
building and threatened with violence legislators who had 


441 


convened to consider a vote of no confidence against the 
government. The following day, pro-Aristide mobs set fire to FNCD 
headquarters after its leader, Evans Paul, publicly broke with 
Aristide over his political tactics and endorsed the no 
confidence vote. 6 

President Aristide's most dramatic departure from democratic 
discourse occurred on September 28, 1990, when, in a speech 
before a large crowd in Port-au-Prince, he alluded favorably to 
the practice of "necklacing" (the placement of a flaming tire 
around a person's neck), as a means of redressing social 
grievances. By this time, Aristide had also alienated the 
military by establishing a paramilitary presidential guard 
independent of the Armed Forces High Command. 

Alarmed by the President Aristide's oratory and wary of 
losing their traditional privileges under a left-wing government, 
members of the commercial sector and the traditional elite joined 
with right-wing sectors of the army in support of a coup. On 
September 30, 1990, junior officers and enlisted personnel of the 
Haitian army deposed President Aristide in a violent uprising. 
After several hours of disorder, General Raoul Cedras declared 
himself still in command of the Army, assumed de facto control of 
the government, and forced Aristide to leave the country. 

In the months following the coup, approximately 3,500 
persons, mostly Aristide supporters victimized by the police and 
armed forces, were killed in factional violence. International 
human rights monitors reported widespread violations of human 


442 


rights by the armed forces throughout the country. There was also 
a dramatic increase in the number of persons attempting to escape 
Haiti by crossing the Dominican Republic border or by navigating 
the Windward Passage toward Florida in poorly constructed and 
overcrowded boats. Reports of capsized vessels off the coasts of 
Cuba and Florida indicated that thousands of refugees had drowned 
attempting to cross the Windward Passage. Approximately 40,000 
refugees were intercepted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard and 
detained for processing at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, 
Cuba, while an estimated 300,000 persons fled to the Dominican 
Republic. 7 

As the flow of refugees threatened to become a mass exodus 
in late 1992, the U.S. government announced a policy to deter 
illegal immigration from Haiti, including immediate repatriation 
of persons intercepted at sea. This policy was renewed in January 
by President-elect Bill Clinton, who expanded the Coast Guard 
presence in the Windward Passage while promising intensified U.S. 
efforts to find an early democratic solution to the crisis. 

The OAS Response 

The response of the international community to the crisis in 
Haiti was spearheaded by the OAS. On October 1, 1991, the OAS 
convened in emergency session at its headquarters in Washington 
to discuss the situation in Haiti. In accordance with the 
Santiago Protocols for the protection of hemispheric democracy 
signed in May 1991, the OAS condemned the coup and reiterated its 
recognition of Aristide as the democratically elected head of 


443 



state, calling for his immediate restoration, imposing a regional 
arms and oil embargo against Haiti, and considering further 
measures to restore democratic rule. 

In February 1992, OAS-mediated talks between President 
Aristide and members of a Haitian legislative delegation resulted 
in the signing of an interim agreement for Aristide's eventual 
return. This agreement was repudiated, however, after the Haitian 
Supreme Court, under pressure from the military, declared it null 
and void. 

In an effort to obtain international legitimacy for the de 
facto government, the Haitian military engineered a tripartite 
agreement in May 1992 among itself, the legislature, and the 
interim president that called for the interim presidency to be 
vacated and center-right politician Marc Bazin to be appointed 
prime minister. This agreement, which conceded Aristide's status 
as head of state but imposed highly restrictive conditions for 
his return to Haiti, was also rejected by the international 
community. 

In September, the OAS dispatched to Haiti an 18-member 
Civilian Commission to monitor human rights conditions in the 
country. In February 1993, President Aristide requested, and the 
Bazin government authorized, the expansion of the Civilian 
Commission to 200 O.A.S. and U.N. human rights observers. 8 
The U.N. Response 

Direct U.N. involvement in the Haitian crisis began in 
November 1992, when U.N. General Assembly Resolution 47/20 


444 



requested that the Secretary-General cooperate with the OAS to 
resolve the crisis. 9 In accordance with the Assembly request, 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on December 11, 
appointed Dante Caputo as his Special Envoy to Haiti. Special 
Envoy Caputo met with President Aristide and General Cedras later 
that month to explore avenues for resolving the crisis. As a 
result of these meetings, the Bazin government in February 
approved the dispatch of a joint U.N.-OAS Civilian Observer 
Mission to Haiti, comprising 200 civilian observers, to monitor 
the human rights situation. 10 

On June 16, 1993, the Security Council issued Resolution 841 
(1993) , imposing a global oil and arms embargo on Haiti in order 
to pressure the de facto government into making further 
concessions toward restoring President Aristide. 11 Facing 
toughened sanctions, the Bazin government agreed to resume U.N.- 
mediated negotiations with President Aristide on terms for his 
resumption of office in Haiti. 

A U.N.-mediated agreement on the return of President 
Aristide and the restoration of constitutional rule was signed on 
July 3, 1993, on Governor's Island, New York. The main terms of 
the Governor's Island Agreement were: (1) the establishment of a 
timetable for Aristide's return; (2) the naming of a new prime 
minister by Aristide; (3) the granting of a general amnesty for 
the military and members of the de facto government; (4) the 
retirement of General Cedras and twelve legislators elected since 
the coup; and (5) the creation of a new Haitian police force and 


445 


freedom of movement throughout Haitian territory. They will also 
be entitled to hold discussions freely and confidentially with 
any person or group and to collect any information deemed 
relevant. 21 

Composition of Forces 

UNMIH will consist of approximately 1,600 personnel, 
including 567 police monitors from Canada, France, Algeria, and 
countries in the Caribbean, and a 600-member contingent of 
military engineers and medical and civil affairs specialists from 
the United States. In addition, UNMIH will employ 99 
international civilian staff and 271 local civilian staff. 22 The 
mission will work in close collaboration with the 200-person 
U.N.-OAS Civilian Commission already in Haiti. 

Equipment 

Police monitors have been authorized to wear sidearms, 
while the United States contingent has been assigned a 
"nonconfrontational role" and will deploy unarmed. The mission 
will require naval, air, and land transport, including trucks, 
light vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and heavy 
construction equipment as well as portable secure communications 
equipment. 

Training 

Information on the training or prior peacekeeping experience 
of U.N. personnel is unavailable. 

Tactics 

UNMIH will establish its headquarters in Port-au-Prince and 


448 






subheadquarters in different parts of the country. As in prior 
police monitoring missions, U.N. police monitors will be divided 
into mobile teams that will accompany the Haitian police and 
armed forces on patrols throughout the country, monitoring all 
activities, but will not assume any law enforcement functions 
themselves. A contingent of the police unit will also help 
establish a new police academy in Port-au-Prince. 

Cost 

The total projected cost of UNMIH during its first six 
months is estimated at $49,856,000. 23 
Operational Assessment 

Under its current mandate, UNMIH's success depends upon its 
ability to persuade the Haitian army to relinquish its internal 
security functions and reorient itself toward external defense 
and technical roles. Although General Cedras and the Army High 
Command have publicly endorsed these goals, their ability to 
direct junior officers and the rank and file to work 
cooperatively with foreign military personnel remains in doubt in 
light of the factionalism and corruption that has characterized 
the Haitian army during the past six years. Moreover, it became 
apparent in the immediate aftermath of the September 1991 coup 
that General Cedras had only a tenuous command of his troops. 

Should mid-level officers opposed to Aristide's return 
choose to disregard orders to cooperate with UNMIH, the U.N. 
mission might face an insurmountable obstacle to the fulfillment 
of its mandate. Whether Haitian officers can be commanded to 


449 




forego their lucrative and powerful positions under the current 
regime and enter into less prestigious labor under a democratic 
government remains doubtful. 

A second potential problem arises from the presence of a 
large contingent of U.S. military personnel within UNMIH. Some 
Haitian political leaders, appealing to nationalist sentiment, 
have drawn unfavorable comparisons between UNMIH and the U.S. 
military occupation of Haiti from 1916 to 1934. If this 
perception were to become widespread, the mission could be 
jeopardized and popular support for President Aristide could 
dissipate in light of his apparent dependence on United States 
military support. 

An additional risk to UNMIH arises from the fragility of the 
Haitian democratic process and its almost exclusive 
identification with the central personality of President 
Aristide. Recent events indicate that President Aristide's safety 
upon his return to Haiti has not yet been assured. If he were to 
be assassinated or forced again to leave the country, the ensuing 
unrest could pose a hazard to UNMIH personnel, who might be 
blamed for failing to protect the president. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

The current situation in Haiti poses a severe challenge to 
U.N. efforts to restore democratic rule in that country. The 
climate of terror prevailing throughout Haiti and slow progress 
in implementing the Governor's Island Agreement represent serious 
obstacles to UNMIH's operations. 


450 


Between July and September, U.N. and OAS monitors reported 
over 100 politically motivated killings in the capital alone. 24 
On several occasions, armed civilians linked to the security 
forces, commonly known as "attaches," seized and publicly 
executed Aristide supporters. The most notable incident occurred 
on September 11, 1993, when a prominent Aristide backer was 
dragged from a Port-au-Prince church during a service and shot 
dead in the street while police officers nearby made no attempt 
to arrest the killer. 25 Three days later, the prosecutor 
investigating the case resigned after receiving death threats. 

Despite their obligation under the Governor's Island 
Agreement to ensure public safety and respect for human rights, 
the Haitian military and police have failed to curb violence 
against Aristide supporters and have themselves perpetrated 
attacks. Compliance with the Governor's Island Agreement has also 
been hampered by delays in the legislative confirmation of Robert 
Malval as prime minister and by widespread acts of intimidation 
against newly appointed Malval government officials. 

CONCLUSION 

In light of the continuing climate of violence prevailing in 
Haiti, the lack of a sustained effort by the security forces to 
ensure public safety and curb human rights violations, and 
continuing logistical and political obstacles to President 
Aristide's return, it is unlikely that implementation of the 
Governor's Island Agreement will remain on schedule. Despite 
General Cedras' public support for UNMIH, the lower levels of the 


451 


Haitian military have yet to demonstrate a willingness to observe 
human rights and redefine their mission. Until such cooperation 
is obtained, it is unlikely that UNMIH will be able to 
effectively carry out its mandate. 


452 


Endnotes 


1. "U.S. Congresswoman Criticizes Military in Haiti Over 
Killings," New York Times . September 27, 1993, A6. 

2. "Agreement Summarized," [Madrid] EFE, July 3, 1993. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America (FBIS- 
LAT-93-127), July 6, 1993, 13. 

3. "Security Council Authorizes Dispatch of Mission in Haiti for 
Six Months" (Press Release.) (New York: United Nations, 

Department of Public Information), September 23, 1993. 

4. "Haiti, Introductory Survey," Europa World Year Book. 1993 
(London: Europa, 1993), 1336. 

5. Ibid .. 1337. 

6. George Packer, "Choke Hold on Haiti," Dissent, 40, Summer 
1993, 297-308. 

7. Greg Chamberlain, "Haiti: History" Europa: South America. 
Central America and the Caribbean. 1993 (London: Europa, 1993), 
361. 

8. Report of the Secretary-General Concerning Haiti (New York: 
United Nations, Department of Public Information), August 25, 
1993, 2, (Document S/26352). 

9. "Caputo Goes to Haiti," UN Chronicle . 30, No. 1, March 1993, 

68 . 


10. Report of the Secretary-General . 2. 

11. "UN Security Council Resolution 841 on Crisis in Haiti," US 
Department of State Dispatch . 4, No. 26, June 28, 1993, 469. 

12. "Agreement Summarized," 13. 

13. "Security Council Suspends Oil and Arms Embargo Against 

Haiti" (New York: United Nations Security Council), August 27, 
1993), 1 (Document SC/5692). 

14. "Security Council Approves Dispatch of 30-Member Advance Team 
to Haiti to Prepare for Deployment of Proposed Mission" (New 
York: United Nations Security Council, August 31, 1993), 1 
(Document SC/5693). 

15. "Security Council Authorizes Dispatch of Mission in Haiti for 

Six Months" (New York: United Nations Security Council, September 
23, 1993), 1 (Document SC/5705). 


453 














16. "UN Police to Arrive 8 September; Malval to Submit Bill," 
(Port-au-Prince FM Radio in French) [Port-au-Prince], September 
8, 1993. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: 
Latin America (FBIS-LAT-93-173), September 9, 1993, 10. 

17. Report of the Secretary-General . 2. 


CO 

iH 

Ibid. 


19. 

Ibid., 

4 . 

20. 

Ibid.. 

3 . 

21. 

Ibid.. 

3 . 

22. 

Ibid.. 

4 . 


23. "Security Council Authorizes Dispatch of Mission in Haiti for 
Six Months" (New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information), 23 September 1993, 4 (Press Release SC/5705). 

24. Howard W. French, "Haiti in Turmoil as it Awaits Aristide," 
New York Times . September 22, 1993, A3. 

25. Ibid. 


454 












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1993 . 


Casimir, Jean. "Haiti After the Coup," World Policy Journal . 9, Spring 
1992, 349-64. 

Chamberlain, Greg. "Haiti: History." Pages 360-61 in South 

America, Central America and the Caribbean, 1993 . London: 

Europa, 1993. 

Cleaver, Carole. "Bazin, Aristide, and the Generals: Haiti in 
Limbo," New Leader . 76, January 25, 1993, 7-9. 

Constable, Pamela. "Haiti's Shattered Hopes," Journal ofDemocracy . 3, 
January 1992, 41-51. 

Griffin, Clifford E. "Haiti's Democratic Challenge," Third World 
Quarterly . 13, No. 4, 1992, 663-73. 

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Cuba, Dominican Republic. 
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Einaurdi, Luigi R. "Support for Haiti," U.S. Department of State 
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Haggerty, Richard A., ed. Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country 
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Lundahl, Mats. Politics or Markets? Essays on Haitian 
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Maingot, Anthony P. "Haiti and Aristide: The Legacy of History," 
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McGown, Kelly. Silencing the People: The Destruction of Civil Society 
in Haiti . New York: Human Rights Watch and National Coalition for 
Haitian Refugees, 1993. 

Mouat, Lucia. "Haiti's Return to Democracy: Obstacles Confront Malval 
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30, 1993, 4. 

Nanda, Ved P. "Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and 

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Rodman, Selden. "Waiting for Aristide," National Review . 45, July 5, 
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"UN Security Council Resolution 841 on Crisis in Haiti," U.S. 

Department of State Dispatch . 4, No. 26, June 28, 1993, 469. 

United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General Concerning Haiti 

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Department of Public Information, August 27, 1993 (Document 
SC/5692). 

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Dispatch of 30-Member Advance Team to Haiti to Prepare for 
Deployment of Proposed Mission," New York: United Nations 
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United States. Congress. 102d, 2d Session. House of Representatives. 
Select Committee on Hunger. Humanitarian Conditions in Haiti 
(Hearing, June 11, 1992). Washington: GPO, 1992. 

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Immigration and Refugee Affairs. Haitian Democracy and Refugees: 
Problems and Prospects . Washington: GPO, 1992. 

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456 
















Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG) 


Selected Chronology 

1980 


In April, Army Master Sergeant Samuel Doe assassinated 
President William Tolbert in a military coup and seized power. 

1985 


In October, Doe was elected president in elections marked by 
irregularities. 

1989 


In December, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
under Charles Taylor launched a rebellion from neighboring Cote 
d'Ivoire with Libyan support. 

1990 


In January, a regional security crisis developed when tens 
of thousands of Liberians belonging to the Gio ethnic group fled 
to Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea to escape retaliation from government 
forces belonging to the Krahn group. 

In May, the NPFL captured the port of Buchanan. 

In July, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(INPFL) under Prince Yormie Johnson captured the Monrovia port. 

In August, an amphibious peacekeeping force of the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia 
(ECOMOG) disembarked in Monrovia. Johnson and Doe welcomed the 
peacekeeping force while Taylor, denouncing it as a vehicle for 
Nigerian intervention, declared war against it. 

In September, during an unannounced visit to ECOMOG 
headquarters, Doe was captured and killed by the INPFL. 

In November, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) established the Interim Government of National Unity 
(IGNU) under Interim President Amos Sawyer. 

1991 


In May, the NPFL broke off negotiations with IGNU and 
resumed military operations against the government. NPFL troops 
conducted raids against Sierra Leone. 


457 







In October, an ECOMOG-brokered meeting in Yamoussoukro, Cote 
d'Ivoire, produced a cease-fire agreement in which the rebel 
factions agreed to demobilize within 60 days and IGNU agreed to 
hold elections within six months. 

1992 


In January, ECOMOG deployed at air and sea ports formerly 
held by the NPFL and established a buffer zone along the border 
with Sierra Leone. 

In May, NPFL forces captured and executed six Senegalese 
ECOMOG peacekeepers. 

In August, an anti-Taylor militia clashed with NPFL forces, 
capturing substantial NPFL territory. 

In October, the NPFL and INPFL dissidents launched an 
offensive against Monrovia, targeting ECOMOG and Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL) forces. ECOMOG responded with air and artillery 
assaults on NPFL positions. 

1993 


In July, at a summit in Cotonou, Benin, a peace agreement 
was signed, calling for a cease-fire, NPFL demobilization under 
United Nations (U.N.) supervision, and the formation of a 
transitional government until elections were held in seven 
months. 

In September, serious clashes were reported on the Liberian 
border with Cote d'Ivoire. 


458 




INTRODUCTION 


The Liberian civil war, in its various stages, entailed 
factional and ethnic warfare between the Liberian government and 
various rebel movements, the most important of which was the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor 
Ethnic identity played a significant role in the conflict, with 
the former government of President Samuel Doe drawing support 
from the Krahn ethnic group and the rebels receiving most of 
their support and membership from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups 
As the fighting intensified in 1990, the Liberian civil war 
became a regional security crisis when hundreds of thousands of 
refugees fled to neighboring Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, severely 
straining those countries' limited resources. The outbreak of 
ethnic warfare was perceived by Liberia's neighbors as a 
dangerous phenomenon in a region dominated by multiethnic states 
In response to the growing threat to regional security, the 
countries of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) established a regional peacekeeping force to end the 
fighting and restore order and central government authority in 
Liberia. In August 1990, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a 
regional peacekeeping operation, began its deployment in the 
Liberian capital of Monrovia. 

Following the capture and execution of President Doe in 
September 1990 by a second rebel faction under Prince Yormie 
Johnson, ECOWAS established an interim government headed by Dr. 
Amos Sawyer. After several failed attempts to implement a cease- 


459 


fire, a peace agreement was signed on July 25, 1993 in Cotonou, 
Benin, calling for an immediate cease-fire, demobilization of the 
NPFL under U.N. supervision, and elections within seven months. 

By this time, the Liberian civil war had claimed more than 
150,000 lives and had displaced half of Liberia's 2.8 million 
people. 1 

This study examines the initial crisis in Liberia, the 
factors leading to the detachment of ECOMOG, the effectiveness of 
its deployment, and the current situation in the country in light 
of the mission's initial goals. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 
The Initial Crisis 

Liberia's historical pattern of stable government was 
interrupted in April 1980 when the government of President 
William Tolbert was toppled in a military coup led by Master 
Sergeant Samuel Doe. Following the execution of the ousted 
president and thirteen high government officials, Doe installed 
himself as military dictator, and in October 1985 declared 
himself president after claiming victory in a fraudulent 
election. 

Originally welcomed by Liberians as an improvement over the 
thoroughly corrupt Tolbert government, Doe's regime soon 
disappointed popular expectations by engaging in comparable 
corruption and repression of political dissidents and 
adversaries. The extent of opposition to Doe's rule became 
evident in 1985, when the first of several failed coup attempts 


460 



was carried out by disaffected members of the Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL). 

A sustained rebellion against Doe's government was begun by 
Charles Taylor's NPFL on Christmas Eve 1989. Relying on aid and 
training from Libya and Burkina Faso, the NPFL commanded support 
among the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. A second rebel front, the 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), 
consisted of exiled Liberians from Cote d'Ivoire under the 
leadership of Prince Yormie Johnson. 

The fighting quickly intensified as Doe's security forces, 
mainly from the Krahn ethnic group, conducted retaliatory 
killings of Gio and Mano civilians. Doe's repression drove 
thousands of displaced Gio and Mano into the ranks of the NPFL 
and INPFL guerrillas. Many more thousands became internally and 
externally displaced, creating a regional refugee crisis. 

By April 1990, the rebels had overcome government resistance 
in Nimba county. The NPFL and INPFL began taking strategic 
positions in the capital in late July, eventually laying siege to 
the presidential palace. By late 1990, the war had claimed more 
than 20,000 lives, the majority civilian, with at least half the 
deaths resulting from starvation and disease. 2 Hundreds of 
thousands more had taken refuge in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. 

The ECOWAS Response 

The involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis began in 
May 1990, when, at an organization meeting held in Banjul, 

Gambia, Liberian hostilities were discussed. The ECOWAS 


461 



discussions concluded with the issuance of a formal statement 
calling for an end to the hostilities and the creation by five 
member states of a Standing Mediation Committee to help resolve 
the Liberian conflict. 

Considerable differences emerged among the sixteen ECOWAS 
member states over how to respond to the Liberian crisis. Nigeria 
and Gambia were at the forefront of efforts to expand ECOWAS's 
role in regional affairs and saw the Liberian crisis as an 
opportunity to advance this goal, whereas Burkina Faso, Cote 
d'Ivoire, and Mali opposed such a role expansion. 3 The decision 
to dispatch ECOMOG to Liberia was therefore not unanimous, but 
was instead undertaken by a Standing Mediation Committee 
comprising Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra-Leone. 

After repeated efforts by the Standing Mediation Committee 
to negotiate a cease-fire proved unsuccessful, ECOWAS dispatched 
an amphibious force of approximately 4,000 ECOMOG troops to 
Liberia on August 25, 1990. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

On August 24, 1990, a 4,000-strong ECOMOG amphibious landing 
force designated "Operation Liberty" disembarked in the port of 
Monrovia. The Liberian government and the INPFL welcomed the 
ECOMOG presence, whereas the NPFL rejected the peacekeeping 
mission, considering it a pretense for Nigerian military support 
of the Doe regime. Taylor subsequently declared war on ECOMOG and 
began assaults against ECOMOG forces in Monrovia. 

ECOMOG experienced a major setback early in its deployment 


462 


when, during an unannounced visit by Samuel Doe to ECOMOG 
headquarters in September 1990, the Liberian president was 
captured and tortured to death by the INPFR. Following Doe's 
killing, ECOWAS attempted to fill the power vacuum left by his 
death by intensifying its efforts to establish an Interim 
Government of National Unity (IGNU) under Interim President Amos 
Sawyer. Sawyer, a political moderate, would preside over what 
remained of the Liberian central government apparatus until a 
cease-fire and elections could be held. The new Sawyer government 
was inaugurated in November 1990. 

A second immediate impact of the Doe assassination was to 
spur more active Nigerian participation in ECOMOG. In the wake of 
the Doe killing, the peacekeeping force's command and control 
structure was reorganized; henceforth, all the overall commanders 
would be Nigerian. 

Preliminary progress toward resolving the Liberian conflict 
occurred in late 1990 and early 1991. In December 1990, ECOWAS 
mediated a cease-fire agreement among the NPFL, INPFL, and the 
AFL that proposed the convening of a national conference within 
60 days to establish a new interim administration and the 
creation of an ECOWAS-sponsored technical committee to monitor 
the cease-fire. In January 1991, all rebel forces, in fulfillment 
of their obligations under the cease-fire agreement, withdrew 
from Monrovia and relinquished their positions to ECOMOG troops. 

Further steps toward a political settlement were taken in 
April 1991, when an INFPL official was appointed vice president 


463 


of the interim government and the INPFL gained representation in 
the Interim National Assembly. Taylor's NPFL, however, continued 
to avoid a firm commitment to enter the political process 
peacefully and, in May 1991, broke off negotiations with IGNU, 
resuming its military offensive. 

In June, a third resistance movement, the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Ulimo), was established by 
Krahn supporters of the late President Doe who had taken refuge 
in Sierra Leone. Ulimo's main objectives were to defeat Taylor in 
his bid for power in Liberia and advance the interests of former 
Doe supporters. 

A comprehensive initiative for resolving the Liberian 
conflict began in October 1991, when a summit meeting in 
Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, produced a peace agreement between 
the NPFL and IGNU. Under the agreement, which was subsequently 
signed by the INPFL and Ulimo, the rebels agreed to disarm and to 
relinquish all territory under their control to ECOMOG. It was 
also agreed that all Liberian forces would be withdrawn from 
Sierra Leone and that ECOMOG would establish a demilitarized zone 
along Liberia's border with Sierra Leone. The agreement would be 
implemented within 60 days and elections would be held within six 
months. 

As with previous agreements, compliance was only partial 
and was limited to observance of the cease-fire. Although some 
rebel units began to disarm voluntarily in May 1992, the 
demobilization was far behind schedule and did not significantly 


464 


reduce rebel military capabilities. Moreover, ECOMOG was not 
allowed to extend its territorial control beyond the capital, the 
port of Buchanan, and the Sierra Leone buffer zone. 

The Yamoussoukro agreement collapsed in mid-1992 as the 
factional fighting between Ulimo and the NPFL resumed and 
relations between ECOMOG and the NPFL deteriorated. In May, NPFL 
troops captured and executed six Senegalese members of the ECOMOG 
forces near the Sierra Leone border. In August, Ulimo launched an 
offensive against the NPFL, forcing Taylor's militia out of two 
southwestern counties. In September, nearly 600 ECOMOG soldiers 
were taken prisoner and physically mistreated by NPFL troops. The 
ECOMOG personnel were later released, but relations were further 
strained when an ECOMOG soldier fired upon Charles Taylor's land 
convoy, prompting Taylor to charge that ECOMOG was trying to 
assassinate him. 

Full scale fighting between ECOMOG and the NPFL resumed on 
October 15, 1992, when the NPFL and dissident elements of the 
INPFL launched a coordinated offensive against Monrovia, 
targeting ECOMOG and AFL personnel. ECOMOG sustained an 
undisclosed number of casualties in the fighting; among the 
casualties were two soldiers who, along with two United States 
nationals, were abducted and murdered by the NPFL on October 20, 
1992. 4 

ECOMOG responded to the rebel offensive with a 
counteroffensive that involved tank, artillery, and air strikes 
against rebel positions, including Taylor's headquarters in the 


465 


town of Gbarnga. 5 ECOMOG also launched air strikes against NPFL 
supply lines and weapons caches, causing some damage among the 
civilian population. By early 1993, ECOMOG had repelled the NPFL 
offensive and had taken control of several strategic areas and 
economic zones, including Roberts International Airport, the 
Firestone plantations, and the port city of Buchanan. The 
peacekeeping force's efforts to neutralize the NPFL's military 
capabilities were hampered, however, by the continuing support 
provided to Taylor's army by the government of Burkina Faso. 6 
Political and Military Goals 

ECOMOG's political goals combined the security and 
humanitarian concerns of the Mediation Committee member states. 
These were, first, to restore stable central government in 
Liberia; second, to halt the spread of ethnic warfare and bring 
an immediate end to the mass killings of civilians; third, to 
repatriate war refugees; and, fourth, to create a secure 
environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. 

ECOMOG's military objectives were initially ill-defined and 
have undergone substantial evolution during the course of the 
operation, reflecting changing military conditions in Liberia and 
the lack of a clear operational blueprint for the separation of 
forces. ECOMOG's operational doctrine also tended to change in 
response to changes in mission leadership, with different 
commanders alternating between peacekeeping and more aggressive 
peace enforcement approaches. 7 

In general terms, ECOMOG's military objectives were first, 


466 



to facilitate the disengagement of forces and police a cease¬ 
fire; second, to supervise the concentration and demobilization 
of irregular armies; and third, to restore civil peace and 
establish central government authority. 

Rules of Engagement 

During the first few months of its deployment, ECOMOG's 
rules of engagement allowed ECOMOG troops to fire only in self- 
defense. As the mission's military capabilities increased and the 
frequency and intensity of NPFL attacks escalated, ECOMOG 
developed a shoot-to-kill policy for both defensive and limited 
offensive actions. The policy included the selective use of 
tanks, artillery, and armed aircraft against military targets. 
ECOMOG was also authorized to take and hold territory by force. 
Composition of Forces 

At maximum strength, ECOMOG consisted of between 9,000 and 
11,000 ground, naval, and air forces. 8 From 1990 until mid- 1993, 
military personnel were provided by Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The largest contingent 
consisted of approximately 4,000 troops from Nigeria. 9 In mid- 
1993, planning was underway for the addition of contingents from 
Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, to help offset the 
Nigerian presence. 

ECOMOG was originally commanded by General Arnold Quiano of 
Ghana. He was succeeded by Nigerian generals Joshua Dongoyaro, 
Rufus Kupolati, Ishaya Bakut, and Adetunji Olurin. Major General 
Olurin is the current mission commander. 


467 




Equipment 


ECOMOG has relied primarily on the Nigerian armed forces for 
its equipment needs. Equipment in use includes light weapons, 
tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, helicopters, fixed- 
wing ground attack and transport aircraft, and naval transport 
and patrol craft. 

Among the ground equipment available in the Nigerian arsenal 
were T-55 and Vickers MK 3 main battle tanks; Scorpion light 
tanks; Saracen, 4K-7FA, and Piranha armored personnel carriers; 
155mm, 122mm and 105mm towed artillery pieces; and 81mm mortars. 
Available naval equipment included frigates, corvettes, Ambe(Ge) 
LSTs, and converted commercial vessels for troop transport. 
Available air equipment included L-39MS and MB-339AN 
counterinsurgency aircraft; Alpha Jet, MiG-2 IMF, MiG-21U, MiG- 
21B/FR and Jaguar ground attack aircraft; and Bo-105D attack 
helicopters. 10 

Nonlethal supplies and logistical support were also provided 
by the United States to the Senegalese contingent. 11 
Training 

ECOMOG Commander Olurin had prior peacekeeping experience as 
a Lieutenant Colonel in the Nigerian contingent of the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Most ECOMOG personnel 
had no prior peacekeeping experience or specialized training. 
Tactics 

ECOMOG's initial tactics included the occupation of 
strategic air and sea port facilities formerly held by the NPFL 


468 





and the establishment of a defensive perimeter around Monrovia. 
Approximately 800 ECOMOG troops were also deployed in a buffer 
zone between Liberia and Sierra Leone to repel NPFL incursions 
into that country. Under the command of Major General Olurin, in 
late 1992 ECOMOG began to target directly NPFL command and 
control, particularly NPFL leader Charles Taylor, through 
artillery and air assaults. ECOMOG was also involved in escorting 
U.N. relief convoys along the road from the port of Buchanan to 
Monrovia through NPFL-held territory. 

Cost 

The estimated 1993 cost of ECOMOG was $80 million, with 
ECOWAS countries—primarily Nigeria—bearing the major expense of 
fielding the peacekeeping force in Liberia. 12 The United States 
has provided $8.6 million directly to ECOMOG and $18.75 million 
in foreign military sales and Defense Department drawdown 
authority to ECOWAS member states to support the peacekeeping 
operation. 13 

Operational Assessment 

As an ongoing peacekeeping mission, ECOMOG's performance in 
Liberia cannot be conclusively evaluated. Nevertheless, it is 
generally acknowledged that the performance of the peacekeeping 
operation has been mixed. 

With regard to its primary political objective—containing 
the conflict in Liberia and halting the spread of ethnic warfare 
to other states in West Africa—ECOMOG has been partially 
successful. No ethnically based rebel movements comparable to 


469 




Taylor's NPFL have emerged in the subregion, but the Liberian 
fighting has at times spread into Sierra Leone and currently 
threatens Cote d'Ivoire. Additionally, Burkina Faso has been 
involved in clandestinely supplying the NPFL, while Ulimo has 
used the territory of Sierra Leone as a staging area for armed 
incursions into Liberian territory, prompting NPFL incursions 
into Sierra Leone. 

A second political objective, to establish a Liberian 
central government authority and restore civil order in Liberia, 
has only tentatively been achieved and remains to be fully 
realized. Prior to the Cotonou Agreement, several cease-fire 
agreements negotiated under ECOWAS auspices failed to produce a 
lasting peace, mainly because they lacked a clear procedure for 
verifying and enforcing the demobilization of irregular forces. 
Moreover, the breakthroughs achieved at the Cotonou summit were 
made possible by the intercession of the U.N. after ECOWAS's 
neutrality was guestioned. Whether the current formula for 
demobilization, transitional government, and internationally 
monitored elections can be effectively implemented remains to be 
determined. 

A third objective, relating to the humanitarian concerns of 
the ECOWAS states, namely, to stop the mass killings of civilians 
and prevent famine, has also been achieved only partially. 
Although ECOWAS was not able to bring an immediate halt to the 
killing of civilians, it has been minimally successful in 
establishing pockets of security where displaced persons can 


470 


receive humanitarian assistance. It has also provided for safe 
delivery of food convoys. Although the majority of deaths in the 
Liberian civil war have occurred since the arrival of ECOMOG, 
without the presence of the peacekeeping force the death toll 
would have been considerably higher than the current estimate of 
150,000. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

The resumption of fighting in Liberia in late 1992 prompted 
the U.N. to increase its involvement in the Liberian crisis. On 
November 19, 1992, U.N. Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) 
imposed an arms and oil embargo on all military forces in Liberia 
excluding ECOMOG. It also instructed the Secretary-General to 
intensify his good offices to help resolve the Liberian crisis. 14 

A new round of U.N.-brokered negotiations to end the 
fighting culminated in the signing of an interim peace agreement 
in Geneva on July 17, 1993, and a comprehensive agreement on July 
25 in Cotonou, Benin. The Cotonou Agreement, signed by IGNU, the 
NPFL, and Ulimo, establishes a transitional government with 
executive authority vested in a five-person Council of State with 
a rotating chairmanship. The agreement stipulates that the 
transitional government will not take office until the U.N. has 
verified that the disarmament process is irreversible. As part of 
the agreement, the U.N. will deploy a 300-strong military 
observer force throughout Liberia to verify demobilization. The 
Cotonou Agreement further requires that ECOMOG be expanded to 
include contingents from Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 


471 


to help offset the Nigerian presence. 

On August 10, 1993, U.N. Security Council Resolution 856 
(1993) approved the dispatch to Liberia of an advance team of 30 
military observers to monitor, investigate, and report cease-fire 
violations, as called for in the Cotonou Agreement. The 
Secretary-General also dispatched a technical team to evaluate 
the proposed establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission 
in Liberia (UNOMIL). 15 

On September 5, 1993, the U.N. reported a serious cease-fire 
violation at the Liberian border with Cote d'Ivoire. 16 In 
October, the renewed fighting threatened to reignite the civil 
war. 

CONCLUSION 

The ability of ECOMOG to fulfill its mandate over the next 
several months will depend on its success in disarming the rebel 
factions and in establishing the rule of law throughout Liberia. 
In order to fully realize its mission objectives, ECOMOG will 
need to make more progress than it has to date in disarming the 
rebel factions and extending its presence into the Liberian 
interior. It will also need to work cooperatively with the U.N. 
to ensure that the rebel factions are being irreversibly 
demobilized. 


472 


Endnotes 


1- Europa World Year Book. 1993 . 1 (London: Europa, 1992), 1727. 

2. Joshua Sinai, "Settlement and Reconstruction Still Evade 
Liberia," Defense and Foreign Affairs . 18, No. 11, November 1990, 
32. 

3. Abiodun Alao, "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: The 
Liberian Civil War," Brassev's Defence Yearbook. 1993 (London: 
Brassey's, 1992), 342. 

4. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report: 1993 (New 
York: 1993), 192. 

5. Mark Huband, "Targeting Taylor," Africa Report . 38, No. 4, 
July-August 1993, 29. 

6. United States, Congress, 102d, 2d Session, House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Africa, The Ongoing Civil War and Crisis in Liberia (Washington: 
GPO, November 19, 1992), 7. 

7. Abiodun Alao, "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa," 346. 

8. United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of 
Intelligence, Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations. 1993 . 
(Washington: GPO, May 1993), 1. 

9. The Military Balance. 1992-1993 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 206. 

10. Ibid . 

11. United States. Congress. 102d, 2d Session. House of 
Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Ongoing Civil 
War and Crisis in Liberia (Washington: GPO, November 19, 1992), 

8 . 


12. United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of 
Intelligence, Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1993 . 1. 

13. The Ongoing Civil War and Crisis in Liberia . 4. 

14. "Arms Embargo Imposed on Liberia," UN Chronicle . 30, No. 1, 
March 1993, 23. 

15. "Security Council Approves Dispatch of Advance Military 
Observers to Liberia to Monitor Cease-Fire as Called for in July 
Cotonou Agreement" (New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information, August 10, 1993), 1 (Press release SC/5683). 


473 
















16. "Fresh Fighting Reported in Liberia," Washington Post, 
September 5, 1993, A43. 


474 



Bibliography 

Alao, Abiodun. "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Liberian Civil 
War." In Brassev's Defence Yearbook. 1993 . London: Brassey's, 
1992. 

Amnesty International Report: 1993 . New York: Amnesty International, 
1993 . 


"Arms Embargo Imposed on Liberia," UN Chronicle . 30, No. 1, March 
1993. 

Da Costa, Peter. "A New Role for ECOWAS," Africa Report . 36, 
September-October 1991, 37-40. 

| Guluma, Esther L. The Trouble with Liberia . (Universities Field Staff 
International, UFSI Reports, Africa/Middle East, No. 4.) 
Indianapolis: 1990/91. 

1 "Fresh Fighting Reported in Liberia," Washington Post . September 5, 
1993, A43. 

[ Huband, Mark. "Liberia: The Scars of War," Africa Report . 36, March- 
April 1991, 47-50. 

-. "Targeting Taylor," Africa Report . 38, No. 4, July-August 

1993, 29-32. 

1 Jefferson, Carolyn. "The Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes." (Research paper.) Washington: Howard University, 1991. 

Joseph, Richard. "Mending Torn Liberia," Christian Science Monitor . 
August 9, 1993, 19. 

Kieh, George D. "Combatants, Patrons, Peacemakers, and the Liberian 
Civil Conflict," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism . 15, April- 
June 1992, 125-43. 

"Liberia: Introductory Survey." In Europa World Year Book, 1993 . 
London: Europa, 1992. 

"Liberia: Tribal Civil War 1990." In Guy Arnold, ed., Wars in the 
Third World Since 1945 . London: Cassell, 1991. 

Metz, Helen C., ed. Nigeria: A Country Study . Washington: GPO, 1992. 

The Military Balance. 1992-1993 . London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1992. 

Nelson. Harold D., ed. Liberia: A Country Study . Washington: GPO, 


475 






















1985. 


O'Neill, William. "Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy," Current History , 

92, No. 574, May 1993, 213-17. 

Ruiz, Hiram A. Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War . 
Washington: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1992. 

"Security Council Approves Dispatch of Advanced Military Observers to 
Liberia to Monitor Cease-Fire as Called for in July Cotonou 
Agreement." New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information, August 10, 1993. (Press release SC/5683.) 

Sinai, Joshua. "Settlement and Reconstruction Still Evade Liberia," 
Defense and Foreign Affairs , 23, No. 11, November 1990. 

Sirleaf, Ellen J. "The Causes and Consequences of the Liberian Civil 
War," International Review . 13. Spring 1991, 32-5. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of 
Intelligence. Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations. 1993 . 

Washington: GPO, 1993. 

-. Congress. 102d, 2d Session. House of Representatives. 

Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Ongoing Civil War and Crisis in 
Liberia . Washington: GPO, November 19, 1992. 

-. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 

for 1992 . (Report submitted to United States Congress, 103d, 1st 
Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washington: GPO, 
February 1993. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Economist [London], 1990-93; 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Sub-Saharan 
Africa , 1990-93; and West Africa [London], 1990-93.) 


476 

















British Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland 


Selected Chronology 

1922 


Following partition of Ireland's 32 provinces, the 
independent Republic of Ireland was created in the south's 26 
provinces; the six counties in the northeast remain part of the 
United Kingdom as the province of Northern Ireland. 

1969 


In August, the British Army was deployed in Northern Ireland 
and given overall responsibility for internal security. 

1972 


The British government imposed direct rule over Northern 
Ireland and assumed responsibility for law and order. 

1974 


Britain legislated the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 


1985 


The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by the British and 
Irish governments. 

1991 


Peace negotiations began under British auspices, with inter 
party talks between representatives of the leading political 
parties in Northern Ireland, except Sinn Fein. 

1992 


In May, M.I.-5, the British domestic counterintelligence 
agency, was given overall responsibility for counterinsurgency 
against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in mainland 
Britain. The British army continued to play the predominant role 
in counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland. 

In November, the peace negotiations collapsed as the 
negotiating sides failed to resolve several key differences. 


477 









INTRODUCTION 


The insurgency in Northern Ireland (also referred to as the 
Ulster Province) by the Roman Catholic-based Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) has forced Britain to confront for more 
than two decades one of the most difficult problems of terrorism 
in Western Europe. Protestant paramilitaries have also engaged in 
a parallel, although more limited, insurgency that has been 
primarily directed at Roman Catholic targets in the province. 

From 1969, when the PIRA first began its rebellion, until mid- 
1993, more than 3,032 people have been killed in the province 
(including more than 120 deaths in mainland Britain) and 35,000 
injured. 1 To resolve these insurgencies, in 1972 Britain assumed 
direct responsibility for law and order in the province; direct 
rule from London, under the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, was introduced in 1972. In 1993 there was limited hope 
for resolution of the Northern Ireland insurgency based on 
developments springing from the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and 
the rounds of peace talks that have followed. In the meantime, in 
the absence of a negotiated agreement, direct rule by Britain and 
the deployment of the British army in the province appear to 
provide the only means to prevent extremist elements in the Roman 
Catholic and Protestant communities from destroying each other. 

The British counterinsurgency campaign has employed 
political, legal, military, intelligence, and police measures 
against the PIRA, the primary insurgent group. Unlike the 


478 


traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations examined in 
this study, the British counterterrorism campaign has been 
governed by different political and military goals, rules of 
engagement, tactics, mix of forces, equipment, and cost. 

PREDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

The sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland is the product of 
a number of historical legacies, of which the most important was 
the partition of Ireland in 1922 into the 26 counties of the 
overwhelmingly Roman Catholic Republic of Ireland and the six 
counties of the predominantly Protestant Northern Ireland. 
Although Protestants have ruled Northern Ireland and formed the 
majority of the 1.6 million inhabitants, Roman Catholics have 
always constituted a large minority, reaching 38.4 percent of the 
population in 1991. 2 

The conflict revolves around the clashing aspirations of the 
two communities. Most Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland are 
Irish nationalists and Republicans, and seek to reunite the 32 
counties of historical Ireland into a single, independent Irish 
state. Most Protestants are Loyalists and Unionists, i.e., they 
are loyal to Britain and view their future as remaining an 
integral part of the United Kingdom. Therefore they reject the 
notion of any "reunification" with the Irish Republic, where they 
would be reduced to a religious minority. 

The Initial Crisis 

The British involvement in Northern Ireland was caused by an 
escalation in violence in the late 1960s when a militant faction 


479 



within the primarily nonviolent Roman Catholic-based civil rights 
movement broke away to form the PIRA, and embarked on a campaign 
of terrorist violence. 

The British Response 

In April 1969, the Northern Ireland government, faced with 
mounting disorder and violence, asked Britain to send army units 
to protect key government installations in the province. In 
August of that year, all security forces in the province were 
placed under British command. In March 1972, the escalation in 
violence and the Northern Ireland government's inability to 
manage the disorder resulted in the assumption by the British 
government of direct responsibility for law and order in the 
province. This step led to the resignation of the Northern 
Ireland government, the abolition of the province's parliament, 
and the introduction of direct rule from London, with a Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland appointed to manage the province's 
affairs. 

DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 

Although the British government had initially attempted to 
contain the insurgency within the province's civilian structure, 
the intensity of PIRA violence resulted in the transformation of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the main police force, into 
a paramilitary organization, and the deployment in the province 
of the British army and other special operations forces, 
including the British domestic intelligence service, M.I.-5. In 
mainland Britain, M.I.-5 and the Special Branch of the 


480 



Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) are primarily used to 
counteract the PIRA. 

Political and Military Goals 

The British government's political aims in the province are 
to maintain the rule of law, ensure that the inhabitants' civil 
and political rights are protected, maintain democratic 
institutions, and promote the conditions for a negotiated 
settlement of the conflict. 

Although the British government has ruled the province by 
decree, the ultimate aim is to establish a devolved form of 
government in the province that would be acceptable to both the 
Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. Britain has aimed to 
bring about constitutional change in the province by drawing 
together in peace negotiations leaders of the major parties of 
the two communities who are willing to arrive at a new political 
arrangement. In Britain's view, political power and resources 
would be handed to locally elected bodies in the new political 
system. The only party to be excluded from these talks is Sinn 
Fein, the PIRA's political front, which steadfastly adheres to a 
political solution calling for a united Ireland and continued 
armed struggle against Britain. 

The British Army's mission in the province is to maintain 
security, particularly the eradication of terrorism, and to 
prevent an outbreak of large-scale civil war. The ultimate 
objective is for the British army gradually to hand 
responsibility for security back to the RUC and the UDR. 


481 



Rules of Engagement 


The British Army's primary mission is peacekeeping and 
security enforcement. First, British Army personnel are given a 
"yellow card," which spells out the instructions regulating the 
use of firearms when a threat exists to the life of the soldier 
or another person. Second, under certain extraordinary 
circumstances, security forces, such as the Special Air Services 
(SAS), are authorized to kill PIRA personnel, particularly when 
the victims are engaged in an act of terrorism. 3 Third, British 
army troops are forbidden to pursue or fire upon suspected PIRA 
fighters across the Irish border. Fourth, the movements of 
British army and security personnel, particularly off-duty, are 
restricted in the province, especially in what are termed "no-go" 
areas in the Roman Catholic communities. In these areas, where 
the chance of encountering a sniper's bullet is ever present, 
there is no fraternization between British personnel and the 
openly hostile local community. 

Composition of Forces 

Britain has deployed police, military, and intelligence 
services in the counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland 
and mainland Britain. The RUC is the leading police force 
operating in Northern Ireland. In mainland Britain, the Special 
Branch of the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) was the primary 
police service engaged in counterterrorism against the PIRA until 
1992 when its coordinating role was taken over by M.I.-5. 

The British army's deployment in Northern Ireland began in 


482 




1969 with 8,000 troops. By July 1972, this deployment had 
increased to 21,288 personnel. On November 15, 1991, Britain 
called up 1,400 reserve troops from the Ulster Defence Regiment 
(UDR) for full-time active duty; this force was augmented on 
November 18 of that year by the deployment of 300 additional 
regular troops in the province. 

In 1993 Britain deployed 20,000 troops in Northern Ireland. 
These units were composed of three brigade headquarters, one 
engineer field squadron, one engineer squadron, six long-tour 
infantry battalions, six short-tour infantry battalions, and one 
regiment army air corps and seven battalions of the newly- 
established Royal Irish Regiment. 4 

The SAS Regiment of the British army is the principal 
military unit deployed in counterinsurgency operations in 
Northern Ireland. In 1992, its strength was estimated at one 
regiment. 5 

In addition to the British army, the largely Protestant UDR 
was deployed in the province until July 1, 1991, when it was 
merged with the Royal Irish Rangers to form a new Northern Irish 
Regiment (NIR). The NIR was established to provide a more capable 
security force to operate in support of the RUC. In the mid- 
1980s, the UDR had 2,500 full-time troops. 6 
Equipment 

The equipment used by British counterterrorism units 
includes armored personnel carriers (APCs); Scout, Westland 
Wessex, and Lynx helicopters (for Army patrols in border areas); 


483 



Gazelle helicopters equipped with TV camera mountings (including 
thermal imagers); tanks fitted with bulldozer blades; Ferret 
scout cars; offensive riot-control weapons, such as plastic 
bullets and dye-filled water cannons; defensive riot-control 
equipment such as helmets, visors, long shields, and flak vests; 
remote-controlled tracked Wheelbarrow bomb disposal equipment; a 
variety of nonstandard weapons, special firearms, and Armalite 
assault rifles; specially designed vehicles to protect patrols 
from radio command bombs, vehicle trailers containing 
transmitters to jam detonation signals; the CRUCIBLE computer 
database system; high-technology bugging and listening equipment 
(including devices used inside weapons); overt observation posts, 
with posts equipped with computers linked to vehicle 
registrations; and high quality surveillance cameras. 7 
Training 

The British security forces initially deployed in Northern 
Ireland in 1970 had gained formidable experience in 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Borneo and Dhofar (part of Oman). 
All SAS personnel stationed in the province undergo rigorous and 
continuous training in special forces techniques, including the 
use of a variety of firearms, physical fitness, demolition, 
signaling, and first aid. 8 SAS-type training is also provided to 
soldiers from army units. Soldiers are trained in riot control 
techniques, as well as civil affairs, in order to improve their 
relations with the local population. 

Prior to their deployment in the province, British Army 


484 



soldiers undergo "work-up" training in a simulated environment 

that replicates Ulster streets and countryside. 9 

Tactics 

For British military forces, tactics consist of manning 
observation posts; ground and aerial border patrolling and 
surveillance; intelligence surveillance, including covertly 
photographing terrorist movements and activities; the use of 
informers and defectors to gain intelligence information, as well 
as interrogation of detainees and prisoners; undercover 
activities, such as armed, plain-clothed patrols by Military 
Reconnaissance Forces (MRF); riot control; and the use of 
computer data bases to store information about terrorist 
personnel and activities. 

Cost 

The total cost of the British counterinsurgency campaign in 
Northern Ireland and mainland Britain has reached billions of 
dollars since 1969. The total cost includes funding the 
deployment in the province of the British military, police, and 
intelligence services (in addition to the deployment of M.I.-5 
and the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police in combating 
Northern Ireland-inspired terrorism in mainland Britain), as well 
as providing annual socioeconomic subsidies to the province 
(reaching $3 billion in 1992 10 ) . Additional funds are expended on 
diplomatic and public relations campaigns. 

Operational Assessment 

The British counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland 


485 





has succeeded in restraining the terrorist-inspired violence from 
breaking out into full-scale civil war. A number of problems 
remain, however. 

First, the continued deployment of the British army is still 
required in the province because it is the only force capable of 
preventing the outbreak of full-scale civil war (by 
paramilitaries of both sides.) 

Second, in mid-1993 the PIRA's relatively small force was 
still capable of mounting lethal terrorist operations against 
British targets, both in Northern Ireland and in mainland 
Britain. Furthermore, this terrorism campaign has begun to 
concentrate on economic and industrial targets in Britain in 
order to bring about economic chaos, particularly in London's 
financial district. Several billion dollars worth of damage has 
resulted from these attacks in recent years; Britain has 
therefore been unable to contain PIRA violence to a "tolerable" 
level. 

Third, the links between Roman Catholic and Protestant 
terrorist organizations and their respective local populations 
have remained strong over the years, despite British attempts to 
proscribe these paramilitaries and subject their members to 
imprisonment. 

Fourth, the paramilitaries have continued to provide a self¬ 
policing function in the province, despite the presence of the 
RUC and the British Army. The RUC continues to be considered 
generally weak and must rely on the British army for help in 


486 


carrying out its police duties. 

Fifth, the RUC and the British army have failed to resolve 
the problem of the continued existence of what are termed "no-go" 
areas in the Roman Catholic communities. In these areas, there is 
no fraternization between the RUC and British troops and the 
openly hostile Roman Catholic community. The continued existence 
of these areas is one of the most serious consequences of the 
security problem facing the British military authorities in 
Northern Ireland. 11 

Sixth, restrictions continue to be placed on the movement of 
British army and security personnel in certain parts of the 
province because of past heavy-handed behavior during violent 
clashes with elements in the Roman Catholic community. 12 

The main British success in Northern Ireland lies in the 
recognition by both mainstream Protestants and Catholics that its 
continuing deployment in the province is the primary instrument 
and guarantor for ensuring peace and stability for the province. 

Second, although peace negotiations, under British auspices, 
collapsed in November 1992, they still hold the best promise for 
an eventual political solution to the conflict. These talks also 
represent the first time in 23 years that leaders of the 
contending Roman Catholic and Protestant parties have agreed to 
talk to one another—although the PIRA's political front, Sinn 
Fein, is not represented. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

On November 10, 1992, the Northern Ireland constitutional 


487 


talks wound down after the parties decided that there was little 
possibility of a settlement. 13 The breakdown in these 
negotiations resulted from the disagreement over the type of 
government to be installed in the province, the nature of the 
cross-border body to be set up, and whether or not the Republic 
of Ireland was prepared to renounce its claim to Northern 
Ireland. By October 1993, this situation remained static, with 
the politically weak Conservative-led British government unable 
to offer new initiatives to resolve the stalemate between 
Northern Ireland's Protestant and Roman Catholic parties. 
CONCLUSION 

Terrorist-inspired violence has continued to haunt Northern 
Ireland, with a spillover into mainland Britain. Both the Roman 
Catholic and Protestant communities have continued to maintain 
their own extremist paramilitary organizations, in the process 
accumulating large caches of arms. 

To date, Northern Ireland continues to drain Britain's 
resources, both in terms of lives lost and financially. It has 
led the British authorities to impose a heightened state of 
security alert not only on British military personnel in Northern 
Ireland and in Western Europe, but also in Britain itself, where 
government officials, government buildings, major cities, and 
centers of business and transportation are frequently targeted by 
PIRA terrorism. 

In the absence of a military solution, the Northern Ireland 
conflict can be resolved only through political measures such as 


488 


peace negotiations. Until this process of compromise occurs and 
the paramilitary organizations begin to disarm and agree to enter 
the democratic political process, the conflict will continue to 
brutalize all sides. 


489 


Endnotes 


1. James F. Clarity, "Northern Ireland Talks Are Expected in 
Dublin," New York Times . January 18, 1993, A10; William E. 
Schmidt, "Bombed Again by I.R.A., London Goes to Work Undaunted," 
New York Times . April 27, 1993, A3. 

2. "Narrowing of Ulster's Religious Divide Seen," Financial 
Times . October 24-25, 1992, 4. 

3. "Not Always So Polite," Economist . May 30, 1992, 57-58. 

4. Michael Prescott and Christopher Jenkins, "Rifkind Faces 
Pressure from MP's to Rethink Army Cuts," Sunday Times . January 
31, 1993, 12; "Britain Spares Troops at Weapons' Expense," 

Defense News . February 8-13, 1993, 6. 

5. "Not Always So Polite," 58. 

6. Mark Urban, Big Bovs' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the 
IRA (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), 16. 

7. See Urban, Big Bovs' Rules . 106-22; Keith Jeffery, Northern 
Ireland: The Divided Province (New York: Crescent, 1985) (various 
sections). 

8. Jeffery, Northern Ireland: The Divided Province . 104. 

9. Ibid ., 106. 

10. Glenn Frankel, "'Fatal Embrace' of Two Peoples Locks N. 
Ireland in Conflict," Washington Post . January 19, 1992, A24. 

11. Tom Wilson, Ulster: Conflict and Consent (New York: 

Blackwell, 1989), 165. 

12. Alexander MacLeod, "British Take Paratroopers Off Ulster 
Security Detail," Christian Science Monitor . May 28, 1992. 

13. "Northern Ireland Talks Collapse," Washington Post . November 
11, 1992, A31. 


490 



















Bibliography 


"Britain Spares Troops at Weapons' Expense," Defense News . February 8- 
13, 1993, 6. 

Clarity, James F. "Northern Ireland Talks Are Expected in Dublin," New 
York Times . January 18, 1993, A10. 

Frankel, Glenn. "'Fatal Embrace' of Two Peoples Locks N. Ireland in 
Conflict," Washington Post . January 19, 1992, A24. 

Jeffery, Keith. Northern Ireland: The Divided Province . New York: 
Crescent, 1985. 

MacLeod, Alexander. "British Take Paratroopers Off Ulster Security 
Detail," Christian Science Monitor . May 28, 1992. 

"Narrowing of Ulster's Religious Divide Seen," Financial Times . 

October 24-25, 1992, 4. 

"Not Always So Polite," Economist . May 30, 1992, 57-58. 

"Northern Ireland: Introductory Survey." In Europa World Year Book. 
1993 . 2. London: Europa, 1993. 

"Northrn Ireland Talks Collapse," Washington Post . November 11, 1992, 
A31. 

I Prescott, Michael, and Christopher Jenkins. "Rifkind Faces Pressure 

from MP's to Rethink Army Cuts," Sunday Times . January 31, 1993, 

12 . 

Schmidt, William E. "Bombed Again by I.R.A., London Goes to Work 
Undaunted," New York Times . April 27, 1993, A3. 

Urban, Mark. Big Bovs' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA . 
London: Faber and Faber, 1992. 

Wilson, Tom. Ulster: Conflict and Consent . New York: Blackwell, 1989. 


491 



















CONCLUSION 


United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations have 
traditionally been provisional measures, intended to be 
temporary. As past experience shows, they can never by themselves 
resolve a conflict. Their goal is to stop or contain hostilities 
and thus create conditions in which peaceful solutions can be 
reached among contending parties. Viewed in terms of these 
limited goals, U.N. peacekeeping operations have a mixed record 
of past and current successes and failures. Missions like UNMOGIP 
in India and Pakistan or UNFICYP in Cyprus, for example, have 
successfully monitored cease-fires and kept intercommunal or 
religious violence to a minimum, although they did not solve the 
underlying problems that caused the conflicts. The U.N. 
supervised the implementation of an effective political 
settlement in Namibia. It monitored the free and fair elections 
in Nicaragua and oversaw the demobilization of the Nicaraguan 
Contras. U.N. military observers are also overseeing a successful 
political transition in El Salvador. Similarly, the non-U.N. 
peacekeeping forces examined in this study—ECOWAS in Liberia and 
the British army in Northern Ireland—have been partially 
successful in achieving their military and political goals of 
halting the spread of ethnic and religious warfare and preventing 
violence from overwhelming these societies. 

The U.N. operation in the Congo, on the other hand, proved 
unequal to the task of maintaining peace. In the words of one 


492 


expert: "As the Congo descended into chaos, there was no peace to 
keep, no line to be patrolled." 1 The mission was deeply flawed 
and doomed to fail from the beginning because the U.N. was 
interfering with a regional conflict that could have been dealt 
with quickly by using the Belgian troops already deployed in the 
country. 

A similar situation has occurred in Somalia, with bloodshed 
and violence threatening the viability of the U.N. mission there. 
Once the peacekeeping operation was extended beyond the provision 
of nonmilitary humanitarian aid, the question of strategic 
interests arose. The recent deaths of U.S. military personnel 
serving with the U.N. force have caused intense controversy in 
the United States and have led numerous experts and Congressmen 
to call for the U.N. to withdraw its mission. The Somalia 
problem, then, illustrates the difficulty of a reaching a 
consensus, both domestically and multinationally, when U.N. 
missions extend beyond traditional peacekeeping objectives. 

The lessons from past U.N. experience in peacekeeping shows 
that U.N. missions have been effective at monitoring conventional 
military forces and force separation agreements, verifying the 
withdrawal of forces from combat, supervising elections, and 
mediating political transitions in situations where all sides 
favored the transition. But the U.N. has not been effective in 
cases where it has tried to restore government authority that is 
undermined by civil unrest or where it has monitored borders to 
detect the illicit infiltration of peoples or weapons. 


493 


Although its political impartiality and international 
legitimacy allow the U.N. to do what no single state can do, 
there are still considerable constraints on its operations that 
date back to the period of the Cold War. U.N. members have shown 
considerable hesitation, for example, before committing forces to 
the field when there are clear military risks involved, such as 
in the former Yugoslavia. Here the U.N. waited for a firm cease¬ 
fire to be reached between the contending parties before 
committing its peacekeeping forces and as a result thousands of 
civilian lives were lost. 

Both the U.N. mission in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) 
and UNOSOM point to another complex issue, that of national 
sovereignty. The situation in Bosnia has presented a great 
challenge: does the U.N. abandon the notion of national 
sovereignty or try to preserve it by means of humanitarian 
intervention? As for Somalia, the issue arises of how to enable 
the country to regain its sovereignty after humanitarian goals 
have been met. The inherent tension between humanitarian 
intervention and national sovereignty is likely to continue to be 
debated when the U.N. is weighing action in what are essentially 
domestic national conflicts. 

Clearly, past U.N. peacekeeping operations offer useful 
lessons that should provide the basis for future action. In the 
optimum situation, the U.N. operation should be preceded by a 
cessation of hostilities and the agreement of the disputing 
parties to the presence of a U.N. peacekeeping force. In cases 


494 


where these conditions are lacking, prior to making a decision to 
become involved in a peacekeeping operation the U.N. should 
consider such factors as the severity of the internal political 
problems, the duration and size of the proposed operation, the 
rules of engagement, including the requirement for enforcement 
action by the military forces, and the tactics that will be 
required. The time between the initial commitment by the Security 
Council and the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces should be 
kept to a minimum and the lines of communication between U.N. 
headquarters and the operations in the field should be tightened 
so as to avoid misunderstandings over the mission's goals. 2 

Despite the dangers of extending U.N. peacekeeping into the 
realm of enforcement, the U.N. cannot fulfill its international 
objectives if it renounces the use of force. If the U.N. backs 
down and withdraws in the face of armed opposition, as it has 
contemplated in Somalia and Haiti, it will send a message to the 
mission's opponents in other trouble spots that any small force 
can thwart a U.N. peacekeeping operation. 

The case studies of U.N. peacekeeping operations show that 
if the U.N. is to ensure collective security effectively, it must 
have an enforcement capability. This means that its troops must 
be well trained and well-equipped, criteria that have not always 
been met in the past. In some cases, the mixture of equipment 
used by the various national contingents making up the U.N. force 
and the language barriers among contingents have caused 
logistical problems. If troops from different countries have no 


495 


experience interacting with each other, they will have trouble 
functioning in their initial deployment together. These were 
problems demonstrated in the early stages of UNEF I and later 
UNEF II. 

In acting forcefully, the U.N. Security Council should 
observe certain rules. First, it must be careful to define 
clearly the reasons for intervention and avoid using double 
standards. Why does it decide to act in Bosnia and Hercegovena, 
Kurdish Iraq or Somalia, for example, but to stay out of southern 
Sudan, Liberia, or Northern Ireland? Second, the Security Council 
must ensure that its use of force will succeed by instituting a 
very careful military analysis of the task to be performed and 
deploying sufficient forces to accomplish it. Third, the Security 
Council must define a means by which U.N. forces can be withdrawn 
without leaving chaos and tyranny behind. 3 

Despite these apparent difficulties, numerous proposals for 
strengthening U.N. peacekeeping are currently being considered at 
the U.N. and in the U.S. government. These proposals are 
motivated by the change in the international environment as a 
result of the end of the Cold War. New demands for peacekeeping 
operations have arisen as national, ethnic, and religious 
separatism have led to unprecedented violence around the world. 
The future threats to international peace are less likely to be 
conflicts between conventional armies of different countries than 
they are ethnic conflicts within nation states or humanitarian 
disasters resulting from massive refugee flows across national 


496 


borders. 


The new international security environment generated by the 
post-Cold War era is likely to expand vastly the deployment of 
U.N. peacekeeping operations. Proposed new U.N. peacekeeping 
missions include monitoring a possible cease-fire between 
northern and southern warring parties in the Sudan; providing an 
observer or buffer force in Zaire; replacing the ECOWAS force in 
Liberia; serving as a buffer force in Sri Lanka; and providing 
buffer or cease-fire monitoring forces in the former Soviet 
republics of South Ossetia, Modova, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, 
and Tajikistan. There is a possibility that U.N. peacekeeping 
operations currently being deployed in the Arab-Israeli sector 
might be replaced by U.S.-led, non-U.N. multinational 
peacekeeping missions when peace treaties between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, are signed within the 
next few years. 

It is also possible that the role of U.N. peacekeeping 
operations will be expanded into other functional areas. There 
have been suggestions that the U.N. disregard its principle of 
noninterference in the internal affairs of U.N. members, so that 
it could resolve internal conflicts before they extend beyond a 
country's borders. This would mean that the U.N. would expand its 
mission to that of peacekeeping in a civic action or nation¬ 
building capacity. Another possible role for future U.N. 
peacekeeping would be in combating terrorism by the creation of 
highly skilled, elite counterterrorist units. 


497 


Financing the growing scale of peacekeeping operations will 
be an immense problem. The operational costs are rising at a 
rapid rate, having reached close to 2 billion dollars in 1992. 
From 1988 to 1993, for example, U.N. peacekeeping expenses 
increased by a factor of ten. 4 Because the U.N. often finds 
itself responding to emergencies, calls to U.N. member states for 
contributions come unexpectedly, making it difficult for 
governments to respond quickly. Furthermore, some major 
contributing countries, including the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, have fallen behind in meeting their 
financial obligations to the U.N. As these countries reassess 
their priorities in the post Cold War world, however, they are 
realizing that whenever possible it is better economically and 
politically to act under U.N. auspices than unilaterally. This 
change in strategy should eventually result in a stronger and 
more regular financial commitment to U.N. peacekeeping operations 
on the part of member countries. 


498 


Endnotes 


1. Ernest W. Lefever, "Reining in the U.N.: Mistaking the 
Instrument for the Actor," Foreign Affairs , Summer 1993, 19. 

2. Sir Peter Inge, "UN Operations in a Changing Security 
Environment," International Defense Review , No. 5, May 1993, 
372-73. 


3. Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations 
Peacekeeping," International Affairs . 69, No. 3, 1993, 451-64. 

4. Robert T. Grey, Jr., "Strengthening the United Nations to 
Implement the 'Agenda for Peace'," Strategic Review . Summer 1993, 
21 . 










Bibliography 


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International Affairs . 69, No. 3, 1993, 451-64. 

Grey, Robert T. Jr., "Strengthening the United Nations to Implement 
the 'Agenda for Peace'" Strategic Review . Summer 1993. 

Inge, Sir Peter. "UN Operations in a Changing Security Environment," 
International Defense Review . No. 5, May 1993, 372-73. 

Lefever, Ernest W. "Reining in the U.N.: Mistaking the Instrument for 
the Actor," Foreign Affairs . Summer 1993. 


500 







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